How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Centurian52]

On 4/30/2023 at 5:12 AM, The_Capt said:

I disagree with the idea that Russia can sustain a 5 year war.

The sense I've been getting is that the Russian economy and equipment reserves can sustain about another 2 years of war at most, assuming that neither spending nor attrition rates increase (which they're sure to do).

[Bulletpoint]

3 hours ago, Offshoot said:

That was just the beginning "trailer", which shows some very short clips from the longer video. The actual sequence of events is shown clearly later with an explanation.

Alright, thanks. I must admit I stopped watching after I thought it was manipulatively edited.

[Centurian52]

On 4/30/2023 at 5:30 AM, The_MonkeyKing said:

Even if Ukraine captures all of its territories back next month, Russia can keep the war up as a cross-border war between two states likely for years.

I assume that's how it's going to go. Once Ukraine recaptures all of its territory it will return to being a frozen conflict, albeit one more favorable to Ukraine than it was from 2014 to 2022 (stronger Ukraine, weaker Russia, more defensible borders). Decades from now people will point out as an interesting factoid that Russia and Ukraine are technically still at war, in the same sense that North Korea and South Korea are technically still at war. That is assuming that Russia still exists of course.

I hope that isn't how it goes, since being in a frozen conflict would probably prevent Ukraine from being able to join NATO. An unambiguous peace, and NATO membership, would be best.

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I think the problem with this sort of point of view is that it still assumes that annihilation through manoeuvre was possible. And even if it was, would it have been worth the costs at that point in the war? 

Russia got itself out of Kherson; however, 1) we do not know the full scope of attritional losses over time - how much critical equipment did they leave behind? and 2) how do those stack up with Ukrainian gains compared to their loses?  This point of view mirrors more than a few western pundits as “lost opportunity = loss”, but skips over the cost-benefit equation on retaking a regional capital essentially unopposed.  I strongly suspect that the UA looking to a longer game was not interested in bagging whatever was left of the RA at Kherson because the cost was too high for the gains.  Worst scenario for Kherson was a large urban battle that would still be raging.  If Ukraine had boxed the RA up into that city that is what likely would have happened.  Instead Ukraine left the back door open so the RA would simply leave - it was less about killing Russians there and more about liberating Ukrainians.

We keep making the error of looking for a western style victory in this thing.  I have seen more bold offensive arrows, both red and blue, being drawn all over the place.  What we have seen though is bold arrows of red collapse, with a blue follow up.  This is a war of Russian collapses and contractions, some better controlled than others.  This is what victory looks like, yet we keep demanding a Gulf War metric as an indicator of success, which does not track in this environment.  The losses are over time, erosion, not fast forced crushing.  It is the environment that drives this - death of surprise, mass dilemmas, long range and precision.   We are talking about a war where both sides have had to relegate their armor to indirect fire roles - something is happening in a fundamental way.

So what?  Well this does not mean that the 30k prisoner haul is impossible in this war, or the bold strokes we all want to see.  However, I strongly suspect that they are going to be a finishing stroke/final note at the end as a result of corrosive warfare, not the cause of the end itself.  The core warfare principle we in the west adhere to will become a punctuation mark, not the primary means of delivery of victory.  We should not hold Ukraine to a standard of success that I am not sure even exists anymore in this sort of operating environment.  This war is still about killing Russians, but it is all over the place, all the time, not in a single concentrated area.  Why, because concentration kills in this environment unless you have already eroded an opponent into collapse - be it slow or fast.

In the end Kherson along with Kharkiv were major corrosive warfare victories.  At Kherson the UA with nearly 1:1 force ratio pushed the RA across a major river because they made their position untenable.  They retook a provincial capital of 300k taking very few losses which was a major strategic blow to Russia - no one could call this war for Russia after Kharkiv and Kherson (or at least no one credible).  We should not apply our own western experience to this war because we have not fought one like this since Korea, and the rules of the game have shifted dramatically since then.

I for one am surprised that Kherson did not turn into a protracted bloodbath, there was a lost RA opportunity that speaks to an idea that perhaps Russian Will is not made of steel.  Now if Russia is finally so badly beat up that the old rules of warfare apply - a la Iraqi Army - then yippee!  But that 1) does not validate our western doctrines as “right all along” because that final stroke took a year of broad scope high speed attrition pruning ops and 2) will be a signpost, not a decisive point.  The result of months of shaping and eroding that has already occurred over the winter. 

All good thoughts.  I think the best way to address them is to sketch out what I believe happened, which of course is full of speculation because neither side has provided a good overview of the operation.

1. Ukraine's primary objective was to kick the Russians over to the other side of the Dnepr, which achieved four meaningful goals:
   1. Liberate the only regional capital and one of two large urban centers from Russian control.  This was as much a PR victory as it was a practical benefit to Ukraine's governance of the region
   2. Eliminate any form of ground threat west of the Dnepr
   3. Shorten the frontline and reestablish new line on extremely defensible terrain (Dnepr)
   4. Standalone PR victory because there could be no doubts that Ukraine took something from Russia that Russia didn't want to lose
2. Russia invested most of its best units into the Kherson bridgehead, which gave Ukraine an opportunity to degrade and/or destroy units that might otherwise cause problems for Kharkiv and beyond.  The more Kherson terrain Ukraine took from Russia, the easier finding and killing Russians due to compression of the battlespace.  Russia had no such opportunities in reverse, so this was decidedly a one sided situation in Ukraine's favor
3. Leverage Russia's propensity to hold onto terrain too long for political reasons and obligate Russia to continually invest its available resources into Kherson instead of anywhere else, in particular Kharkiv.
4. Create a realistic threat of a river crossing to threaten Russia's southern holdings.  To the degree Russia fears an actual amphibious assault diverts Russian resources and planning.  If the threat is real rather than posture, and Russia doesn't take that possibility seriously, then a possible strategic opening exists

Ukraine fully achieved #1, #3, and #4, so the question is to what degree did it achieve #2.  Here's my thoughts on that...

From what we can tell Russia lost a significant amount of men and material during the course of the battle.  More importantly, none of them could be moved to confront the Kharkiv counter offensive.  If Russia had tried to extract them the front would have likely collapsed in chaos and the forces withdrawn unlikely to have gotten to Kharkiv in time to make much of a difference. 

Unfortunately, it seems that Ukraine suffered some extremely heavy losses of its own.  There is evidence that Ukraine employed the same sort of unsophisticated "tank rush" tactics that we've seen both sides engage in throughout this war.  This is where the armored/mech forces rush straight into the enemy's positions and seek to take them by storm.  I suspect Ukraine used more combined arms tactics than Russia has shown, however still not very sophisticated and prone to catastrophic failure.

It is possible that Ukraine lost as many, if not more, of its forces taking Kherson than Russia lost.  10% losses for each side would be in the 3000-4000 range each.  Significant losses for both sides for sure and losses that, ironically, Russia could afford less than Ukraine.

My theory about Russia's ability to withdraw is they stayed long enough that Ukraine's forces were tired and cautious.  They were in no mood or condition for a rapid drive, but Russia's forces were highly motivated to get themselves out of there.  We heard from many Ukrainian sources that they were hesitant to race forward due to mines and booby traps.  By they time they successfully penetrated the front line the Russians were gone.

I do not completely rule out a secret arrangement between the two sides where Russia said "if we stay we will ensure Kherson is left in ruins, but if you let us go we won't have time to do that".  If I were the Ukrainian decision maker I would likely have taken that deal, especially if my forces were as bloodied and tired as I think they were.

In conclusion:

Ukraine achieved all of its objectives, though possibly its own expectations for Russian force destruction came up short.

Steve

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Discussing 

(A) The lack of resolution could be affected not just by operational considerations but mil-factional. We've touched on these internal tensions within the Russian war machine before,  and ISW did a superb job laying it out yesterday. 

(B) I'm curious how much of this is a new form of an old warfare,  versus a form dictated by necessity (UKR lack of Air parity/dominance),  i.e. You fight however you can with what you have.

There's obviously a new approach going on here that utilizes new tech and mentalities,  but I'm curious if that would still dominate as the chosen approach if UKR had better control of the skies.

I assume using the best of both approaches (Western-type punctuative high altitude, long range airborne rampage +UKR low altitude, incessant & personal corrosive ****ery) is what Ukraine is working towards. 

At the moment,  the Russians in theory have the systems for the former (but has stagnated)  while Ukraine has the latter and is rapidly developing. Whichever of the two sides can tie the two extremes together will have a war winning advantage. 

The end balance between the two will be fascinating to watch.  

The airpower conundrum.  So here is the thing with AirPower - it is only about a century old as concept and we do not know if it has been a transitory phase in the evolution of warfare.  Everyone assumes that it must be a thing because we can "do air" now, and this part is correct.  However, "how we do air" is really in its infancy when compared to maritime and land military domains (and they have been bouncing around too), and is by no means decided.

So the question as to Ukraine is a bit chicken and egg.  Is this what they have to live with, or is this just how things are now?  The issue is military economics.  Airpower is really expensive right now and built around projecting airpower mass.  Big planes with big payloads in big waves.  One side has it and takes it away from an opponent - Bob'd your uncle and the war is over in a bibby, accept for all that nasty uncon stuff which really does not count - unless we are talking places like Algeria, Palestine, Lebanon Vietnam, Afghanistan (both times) and maybe Iraq - but we are not talking about them.  In a real war airpower is definitive and deterministic to an outcome.

Ok, sure...right up the point it no longer works.  Now why is it not working?  We the problem looks to be similar to the problems of other military mass - a concentration dilemma.  Technology has created small little nasty systems that can be carried around that have suddenly gained ridiculous range and lethality.  They are also really hard to suppress and toxic to massed concentrations.  "Oh but we have all the SEAD".  Well true but even our SEAD cannot solve for things like MANPADs and IADS, especially when they are hooked into a C4ISR architecture that can see everything.  The cost gets too high very quickly.

"Well we won't go there"...whoops, that is never the right answer.  If we can't go "there" someone else will. So when we go there we will have to accept less than total air dominance, in fact we might have to live with air denial above certain altitudes.

And then there is the below 2000 feet problem.  It is the freakin Wild West for air power right now and no one is controlling it in any meaningful way.  We get some denial but those UAS are so cheap that they can just keep lobbing them at the problem indefinitely.  So we are looking at denial risks above 2000 feet and not being able to control below 2000 feet...none of this is good news that magic western might is going to wave away.  Someone is very shortly going to figure out how to mount a Starstreak on a modest UAS and then we have a whole new set of problems.  And then there is ersatz airpower in the form of long range strike.  No one has the technology for whatever version of Chinese HIMARs looks like ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PHL-03 that took seconds).

Bottom line is that I, personally, do not think that the air denial and control problems we are seeing in Ukraine are specific to this conflict.  The technology is moving too fast.  We are likely going to have to accept that the airpower picture is going to be compromised and that we are vulnerable to whatever it is becoming and its cousins in long range strike.  We do not have a magic suite of capability that can erase what we are basically arming the Ukrainian's to do against the Russians.  I do no think the western assumption of air superiority, or space superiority, or EW/Cyber superiority or good old fashion land power mass and manoeuvre superiority are currently safe regardless of what conflicts we see them in. 

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

All good thoughts.  I think the best way to address them is to sketch out what I believe happened, which of course is full of speculation because neither side has provided a good overview of the operation.

1. Ukraine's primary objective was to kick the Russians over to the other side of the Dnepr, which achieved four meaningful goals:
   1. Liberate the only regional capital and one of two large urban centers from Russian control.  This was as much a PR victory as it was a practical benefit to Ukraine's governance of the region
   2. Eliminate any form of ground threat west of the Dnepr
   3. Shorten the frontline and reestablish new line on extremely defensible terrain (Dnepr)
   4. Standalone PR victory because there could be no doubts that Ukraine took something from Russia that Russia didn't want to lose
2. Russia invested most of its best units into the Kherson bridgehead, which gave Ukraine an opportunity to degrade and/or destroy units that might otherwise cause problems for Kharkiv and beyond.  The more Kherson terrain Ukraine took from Russia, the easier finding and killing Russians due to compression of the battlespace.  Russia had no such opportunities in reverse, so this was decidedly a one sided situation in Ukraine's favor
3. Leverage Russia's propensity to hold onto terrain too long for political reasons and obligate Russia to continually invest its available resources into Kherson instead of anywhere else, in particular Kharkiv.
4. Create a realistic threat of a river crossing to threaten Russia's southern holdings.  To the degree Russia fears an actual amphibious assault diverts Russian resources and planning.  If the threat is real rather than posture, and Russia doesn't take that possibility seriously, then a possible strategic opening exists

Ukraine fully achieved #1, #3, and #4, so the question is to what degree did it achieve #2.  Here's my thoughts on that...

From what we can tell Russia lost a significant amount of men and material during the course of the battle.  More importantly, none of them could be moved to confront the Kharkiv counter offensive.  If Russia had tried to extract them the front would have likely collapsed in chaos and the forces withdrawn unlikely to have gotten to Kharkiv in time to make much of a difference. 

Unfortunately, it seems that Ukraine suffered some extremely heavy losses of its own.  There is evidence that Ukraine employed the same sort of unsophisticated "tank rush" tactics that we've seen both sides engage in throughout this war.  This is where the armored/mech forces rush straight into the enemy's positions and seek to take them by storm.  I suspect Ukraine used more combined arms tactics than Russia has shown, however still not very sophisticated and prone to catastrophic failure.

It is possible that Ukraine lost as many, if not more, of its forces taking Kherson than Russia lost.  10% losses for each side would be in the 3000-4000 range each.  Significant losses for both sides for sure and losses that, ironically, Russia could afford less than Ukraine.

My theory about Russia's ability to withdraw is they stayed long enough that Ukraine's forces were tired and cautious.  They were in no mood or condition for a rapid drive, but Russia's forces were highly motivated to get themselves out of there.  We heard from many Ukrainian sources that they were hesitant to race forward due to mines and booby traps.  By they time they successfully penetrated the front line the Russians were gone.

I do not completely rule out a secret arrangement between the two sides where Russia said "if we stay we will ensure Kherson is left in ruins, but if you let us go we won't have time to do that".  If I were the Ukrainian decision maker I would likely have taken that deal, especially if my forces were as bloodied and tired as I think they were.

In conclusion:

Ukraine achieved all of its objectives, though possibly its own expectations for Russian force destruction came up short.

Steve

Fair across the board.  I guess my only push back would be that whoever did the figuring on the Ukrainian staff side of the calculation turned out to be right.  The RA did get out with forces intact but not enough to really make a difference down back in the Donbas.  If the RA had seen a lot of success over the winter on its offensive than maybe a case could be made that this was a UA operational error at Kherson, but it really did not go that way.  The RA did not have enough of anything, let alone "best units" to actually take Bakhmut - or pull off a breakout battle they needed to really get this thing going back in their direction.  The RA could not even conduct decent corrosive warfare in depth as far as we can tell.

So maybe the UA simply went "good enough" for #2, and did not want to take the risks given it was a harder go and they were still playing catch up on force generation.  I am a strong believer that Kherson should not be viewed as a failure or lost opportunity that colours whatever happens next until we get a lot more data.  I also am allergic to western biases (not saying you were going there...more the pundits) because we simply have zero proof that our way of war is somehow superior in all this.  Until we have that confirmation we need to be very cautious in projecting failure on Ukraine because they do not fight like us - I am not sure fighting like us even works anymore.  

[The_Capt]

6 hours ago, Grossman said:

UK Ministry of Defence.

Since last summer Russia has built “some of the most extensive systems of military defensive works seen anywhere in the world for many decades” in the areas it controls in Ukraine as well as in its own border regions, the UK’s Ministry of Defence has written in its latest intelligence update on the conflict.

Imagery shows that Russia has made a particular effort to fortify the northern border of occupied Crimea, it said, adding that Russia had also dug “hundreds of miles of trenches well inside internationally recognised Russian territory including in the Belgorod and Kursk regions”.

The defences “highlight Russian leaders’ deep concern that Ukraine could achieve a major breakthrough,” the MoD said, although it added that “some works have likely been ordered by local commanders and civil leaders in attempts to promote the official narrative that Russia is ‘threatened’ by Ukraine and NATO”.

What is weird about this one is that the UA did not need to construct the "most extensive systems of military defensive works seen anywhere in the world in many decades" and they held off multiple assaults that went on for months all along the line.  

[billbindc]

26 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

The airpower conundrum.  So here is the thing with AirPower - it is only about a century old as concept and we do not know if it has been a transitory phase in the evolution of warfare.  Everyone assumes that it must be a thing because we can "do air" now, and this part is correct.  However, "how we do air" is really in its infancy when compared to maritime and land military domains (and they have been bouncing around too), and is by no means decided.

So the question as to Ukraine is a bit chicken and egg.  Is this what they have to live with, or is this just how things are now?  The issue is military economics.  Airpower is really expensive right now and built around projecting airpower mass.  Big planes with big payloads in big waves.  One side has it and takes it away from an opponent - Bob'd your uncle and the war is over in a bibby, accept for all that nasty uncon stuff which really does not count - unless we are talking places like Algeria, Palestine, Lebanon Vietnam, Afghanistan (both times) and maybe Iraq - but we are not talking about them.  In a real war airpower is definitive and deterministic to an outcome.

Ok, sure...right up the point it no longer works.  Now why is it not working?  We the problem looks to be similar to the problems of other military mass - a concentration dilemma.  Technology has created small little nasty systems that can be carried around that have suddenly gained ridiculous range and lethality.  They are also really hard to suppress and toxic to massed concentrations.  "Oh but we have all the SEAD".  Well true but even our SEAD cannot solve for things like MANPADs and IADS, especially when they are hooked into a C4ISR architecture that can see everything.  The cost gets too high very quickly.

"Well we won't go there"...whoops, that is never the right answer.  If we can't go "there" someone else will. So when we go there we will have to accept less than total air dominance, in fact we might have to live with air denial above certain altitudes.

And then there is the below 2000 feet problem.  It is the freakin Wild West for air power right now and no one is controlling it in any meaningful way.  We get some denial but those UAS are so cheap that they can just keep lobbing them at the problem indefinitely.  So we are looking at denial risks above 2000 feet and not being able to control below 2000 feet...none of this is good news that magic western might is going to wave away.  Someone is very shortly going to figure out how to mount a Starstreak on a modest UAS and then we have a whole new set of problems.  And then there is ersatz airpower in the form of long range strike.  No one has the technology for whatever version of Chinese HIMARs looks like ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PHL-03 that took seconds).

Bottom line is that I, personally, do not think that the air denial and control problems we are seeing in Ukraine are specific to this conflict.  The technology is moving too fast.  We are likely going to have to accept that the airpower picture is going to be compromised and that we are vulnerable to whatever it is becoming and its cousins in long range strike.  We do not have a magic suite of capability that can erase what we are basically arming the Ukrainian's to do against the Russians.  I do no think the western assumption of air superiority, or space superiority, or EW/Cyber superiority or good old fashion land power mass and manoeuvre superiority are currently safe regardless of what conflicts we see them in. 

What is your best assessment of what happens when/if Ukrainian *air* defenses get degraded as reported in the next few months? Is the Russia AF able to do FA? Will it gain some advantages at high altitude lobbing, etc but not much else? 

Edited May 1, 2023 by billbindc

[Battlefront.com]

My thoughts on maneuver warfare cutting off and destroying large enemy forces:

Both sides have repeatedly failed to achieve anything resembling force destruction through surrounding and reduction.  Like others, I wonder why this is.  I think I have a glimmer of an idea as to the underlying cause.  And The_Capt is going to be pleased to know that I think it is corrosive warfare

What does a force require in order to conduct an encircling operation?  The ability to move faster than the enemy can withdraw.  What is the most important element for achieving that speed?  Vehicles.  What is the second most important element?  The defender having little warning or knowledge of where the enemy's "pincers" are.  Historically speaking nothing was more destructive than a force trying to withdraw and finding the enemy already blocking its route of retreat.

Corrosive warfare makes it quite difficult for the attacking force to achieve rapid movement because loitering munitions, long range ATGMs, mines, and the ability to direct accurate artillery fire (PGM or dumb) at the right place at the right time.  Both sides have these capabilities, therefore both sides know they have to advance far more cautiously than in previous wars because bold moves are more likely to result in disaster than in the past.

There is a solution to this, but neither side has it.  Yes, I'm talking about TacAir.  Much of the corrosive warfare concepts I mentioned above require the defender retain some degree of flexibility in redeploying assets, in particular artillery, to thwart the advancing forces.  If the attacker has the ability to find and destroy those assets while they are on the move, then the defender's ability to effectively confront bold advances is decreased.  The destruction and disruption of such efforts also creates significant command and morale challenges on top of the stress that comes with withdrawing under pressure.

Since neither side has effective TacAir, the defender has the opportunity to conduct retrograde ops with a fair number of variables in its favor.  A bold attacker may get lucky, but is perhaps more likely to suffer significant degradation instead.

Steve

[danfrodo]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I think the problem with this sort of point of view is that it still assumes that annihilation through manoeuvre was possible. And even if it was, would it have been worth the costs at that point in the war? 

Russia got itself out of Kherson; however, 1) we do not know the full scope of attritional losses over time - how much critical equipment did they leave behind? and 2) how do those stack up with Ukrainian gains compared to their loses?  This point of view mirrors more than a few western pundits as “lost opportunity = loss”, but skips over the cost-benefit equation on retaking a regional capital essentially unopposed.  I strongly suspect that the UA looking to a longer game was not interested in bagging whatever was left of the RA at Kherson because the cost was too high for the gains.  Worst scenario for Kherson was a large urban battle that would still be raging.  If Ukraine had boxed the RA up into that city that is what likely would have happened.  Instead Ukraine left the back door open so the RA would simply leave - it was less about killing Russians there and more about liberating Ukrainians.

We keep making the error of looking for a western style victory in this thing.  I have seen more bold offensive arrows, both red and blue, being drawn all over the place.  What we have seen though is bold arrows of red collapse, with a blue follow up.  This is a war of Russian collapses and contractions, some better controlled than others.  This is what victory looks like, yet we keep demanding a Gulf War metric as an indicator of success, which does not track in this environment.  The losses are over time, erosion, not fast forced crushing.  It is the environment that drives this - death of surprise, mass dilemmas, long range and precision.   We are talking about a war where both sides have had to relegate their armor to indirect fire roles - something is happening in a fundamental way.

So what?  Well this does not mean that the 30k prisoner haul is impossible in this war, or the bold strokes we all want to see.  However, I strongly suspect that they are going to be a finishing stroke/final note at the end as a result of corrosive warfare, not the cause of the end itself.  The core warfare principle we in the west adhere to will become a punctuation mark, not the primary means of delivery of victory.  We should not hold Ukraine to a standard of success that I am not sure even exists anymore in this sort of operating environment.  This war is still about killing Russians, but it is all over the place, all the time, not in a single concentrated area.  Why, because concentration kills in this environment unless you have already eroded an opponent into collapse - be it slow or fast.

In the end Kherson along with Kharkiv were major corrosive warfare victories.  At Kherson the UA with nearly 1:1 force ratio pushed the RA across a major river because they made their position untenable.  They retook a provincial capital of 300k taking very few losses which was a major strategic blow to Russia - no one could call this war for Russia after Kharkiv and Kherson (or at least no one credible).  We should not apply our own western experience to this war because we have not fought one like this since Korea, and the rules of the game have shifted dramatically since then.

I for one am surprised that Kherson did not turn into a protracted bloodbath, there was a lost RA opportunity that speaks to an idea that perhaps Russian Will is not made of steel.  Now if Russia is finally so badly beat up that the old rules of warfare apply - a la Iraqi Army - then yippee!  But that 1) does not validate our western doctrines as “right all along” because that final stroke took a year of broad scope high speed attrition pruning ops and 2) will be a signpost, not a decisive point.  The result of months of shaping and eroding that has already occurred over the winter. 

This is definitely how I've been thinking the campaign season will go.  And instead of some big Wacht Am Rhein counteroffensive I believe we will see UKR operating a campaign season.  Offensive operations perations cutting RU in multiple places for the next 5 months, shaping opportunities then striking. They will work to unhinge RU forces wherever they can via cutting logistics.  Hopefully some big breakthroughs and RU sector collapse along the way w most of the Feb22 borders restored.

I am also wondering if UKR might first do some attacks on Bakhmut's flanks, just because it's such a target of opportunity and might draw in RU reserves, at which point UKR stops there and hits elsewhere in another limited fashion.  Control the narrative by forcing RU to react at various places in turn, with RU never know whether each new one is the big one.  Attrit RU as they move reserves to each new place.

Edited May 1, 2023 by danfrodo

[womble]

30 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Since neither side has effective TacAir, the defender has the opportunity to conduct retrograde ops with a fair number of variables in its favor.  A bold attacker may get lucky, but is perhaps more likely to suffer significant degradation instead.

 

At the ranges involved in encircling something like Bakhmut, or Kherson, given UKR levels of C4ISR, GMLRS equivalents in sufficient numbers ought to be able to substitute for TacAir on eiher offense or defense, when deciding whether kettles might form.

Russia doesn't have the precision info they need, and UKR don't have enough rocket artillery. But even if they did (or had TacAir able to freely sprinkle their goodies over the battlefield, this:

34 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Corrosive warfare makes it quite difficult for the attacking force to achieve rapid movement because loitering munitions, long range ATGMs, mines, and the ability to direct accurate artillery fire (PGM or dumb) at the right place at the right time.  Both sides have these capabilities, therefore both sides know they have to advance far more cautiously than in previous wars because bold moves are more likely to result in disaster than in the past.

wouldn't go away in a hurry.

[Lethaface]

28 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

My thoughts on maneuver warfare cutting off and destroying large enemy forces:

Both sides have repeatedly failed to achieve anything resembling force destruction through surrounding and reduction.  Like others, I wonder why this is.  I think I have a glimmer of an idea as to the underlying cause.  And The_Capt is going to be pleased to know that I think it is corrosive warfare

What does a force require in order to conduct an encircling operation?  The ability to move faster than the enemy can withdraw.  What is the most important element for achieving that speed?  Vehicles.  What is the second most important element?  The defender having little warning or knowledge of where the enemy's "pincers" are.  Historically speaking nothing was more destructive than a force trying to withdraw and finding the enemy already blocking its route of retreat.

Corrosive warfare makes it quite difficult for the attacking force to achieve rapid movement because loitering munitions, long range ATGMs, mines, and the ability to direct accurate artillery fire (PGM or dumb) at the right place at the right time.  Both sides have these capabilities, therefore both sides know they have to advance far more cautiously than in previous wars because bold moves are more likely to result in disaster than in the past.

There is a solution to this, but neither side has it.  Yes, I'm talking about TacAir.  Much of the corrosive warfare concepts I mentioned above require the defender retain some degree of flexibility in redeploying assets, in particular artillery, to thwart the advancing forces.  If the attacker has the ability to find and destroy those assets while they are on the move, then the defender's ability to effectively confront bold advances is decreased.  The destruction and disruption of such efforts also creates significant command and morale challenges on top of the stress that comes with withdrawing under pressure.

Since neither side has effective TacAir, the defender has the opportunity to conduct retrograde ops with a fair number of variables in its favor.  A bold attacker may get lucky, but is perhaps more likely to suffer significant degradation instead.

Steve

Interesting discussion. Unfortunately only have time for drive by posts, I just noticed some rumors about Ukraine having begun a counter offensive in Bakhmut. Could just be local stuff / rumors.

But in my brain it kind of make sense to do so. Some of the better informed talking heads overhere predicted it a while back.

Imho not necessarily from a classical 'maneuver to attrit' perspective, but from a perspective of attack where the enemy is the weakest, plus, perhaps more important, where success has the most effect (on 'National Ethos' or however one wants to call it).
If UKR manages to undo the progress made by Russia over 3/4 year, at heavy costs, in a short time and at a fraction of the cost; how can RU nationalists still maintain they can win this war? Of course the easy answer would be 'the same ignorant way they have been doing for quite some time now', but not the only answer.

Put in another way, what other result, achievable with equal or less resources, will have a larger impact on Russia's strategy of continuing this war until UKR / Western support gives in?
(taking into account opportunity costs and maximizing effect per life put on the line).

Even in a successful Bakhmut offensive Ukraine might not be able to destroy / encircle large parts of Russian/Wagner forces. But it will destroy the myth of Bakmuth/Wagner/Russia.

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, womble said:

At the ranges involved in encircling something like Bakhmut, or Kherson, given UKR levels of C4ISR, GMLRS equivalents in sufficient numbers ought to be able to substitute for TacAir on eiher offense or defense, when deciding whether kettles might form.

Perhaps.  However, practically speaking I don't think the quantity of PGMs are likely to be available to oppose an encirclement of any significant scale.  There's never going to be enough long range PGMs that the attacker can afford to whack a couple of trucks moving light infantry.  The further out the target is, the less likely there's going to be something available to find/track the target and strike it.  The advancing force can, of course, pause to redeploy ISR and shorter range attack systems, but since speed is the problem trying to be solved for this is a self defeating concept.

TacAir has the advantage of providing its own ISR or leveraging calls from the ground that don't have lasers or GPS coordinates of the place to strike.  Since we just mentioned A-10s, something like that can be directed to a general area and tasked with killing ANYTHING it sees on the move.  Nobody on the ground has to hold the hand of TacAir to get results.

Additionally, TacAir has some ability to verify if its strikes have been effective or not.  This can be achieved by drone type ISR, of course, but again it requires that a number of things are in place for that to be possible and those things become far more difficult when trying to move quickly.

2 minutes ago, womble said:

Russia doesn't have the precision info they need, and UKR don't have enough rocket artillery. But even if they did (or had TacAir able to freely sprinkle their goodies over the battlefield, this:

wouldn't go away in a hurry.

I agree that having TacAir would not automatically overcome the corrosive elements designed to slow an attack.  However, the defender needs the freedom to redeploy assets to counter the attacker's advances, so to the extent the defender's freedom of action is reduced is the extent that corrosive measures aren't effectively employed. 

Picture a truck trying to rush a supply of AT mines to a section of road that the attacker appears to have selected as an axis of advance.  TacAir sees the truck and destroys it.  Artillery systems are being set up to smash an attacker's attack route, TacAir spots and destroys them.  An ATGM nest scores a hit on a lead attacking vehicle and TacAir is brought in to saturate the suspected location with directed fire.  Etc.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

14 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

Even in a successful Bakhmut offensive Ukraine might not be able to destroy / encircle large parts of Russian/Wagner forces. But it will destroy the myth of Bakmuth/Wagner/Russia.

It also is a place where Russia has invested some of its remaining offensive combat power, including VDV, EW, and artillery.  Smashing all of that would be a very good thing to do even if only a few KMs of terrain are liberated.  I see this sort of operation as being a meaningful side show because even a great success here would not tick the boxes of what Ukraine needs to do this year.

A possible strategy for Ukraine is to have most of its forces concentrated on a large push in the south and a brigade or two tasked with smashing up Russian forces in Bakhmut, then redeploying to Kreminna and smashing them there.  This is entirely feasible.  Two months in each spot is likely more than adequate.  Add in a few weeks for redeployment and there's enough time between now and the Fall mud season to get this done.

Steve

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

The airpower conundrum.  So here is the thing with AirPower - it is only about a century old as concept and we do not know if it has been a transitory phase in the evolution of warfare.  Everyone assumes that it must be a thing because we can "do air" now, and this part is correct.  However, "how we do air" is really in its infancy when compared to maritime and land military domains (and they have been bouncing around too), and is by no means decided.

So the question as to Ukraine is a bit chicken and egg.  Is this what they have to live with, or is this just how things are now?  The issue is military economics.  Airpower is really expensive right now and built around projecting airpower mass.  Big planes with big payloads in big waves.  One side has it and takes it away from an opponent - Bob'd your uncle and the war is over in a bibby, accept for all that nasty uncon stuff which really does not count - unless we are talking places like Algeria, Palestine, Lebanon Vietnam, Afghanistan (both times) and maybe Iraq - but we are not talking about them.  In a real war airpower is definitive and deterministic to an outcome.

Ok, sure...right up the point it no longer works.  Now why is it not working?  We the problem looks to be similar to the problems of other military mass - a concentration dilemma.  Technology has created small little nasty systems that can be carried around that have suddenly gained ridiculous range and lethality.  They are also really hard to suppress and toxic to massed concentrations.  "Oh but we have all the SEAD".  Well true but even our SEAD cannot solve for things like MANPADs and IADS, especially when they are hooked into a C4ISR architecture that can see everything.  The cost gets too high very quickly.

"Well we won't go there"...whoops, that is never the right answer.  If we can't go "there" someone else will. So when we go there we will have to accept less than total air dominance, in fact we might have to live with air denial above certain altitudes.

And then there is the below 2000 feet problem.  It is the freakin Wild West for air power right now and no one is controlling it in any meaningful way.  We get some denial but those UAS are so cheap that they can just keep lobbing them at the problem indefinitely.  So we are looking at denial risks above 2000 feet and not being able to control below 2000 feet...none of this is good news that magic western might is going to wave away.  Someone is very shortly going to figure out how to mount a Starstreak on a modest UAS and then we have a whole new set of problems.  And then there is ersatz airpower in the form of long range strike.  No one has the technology for whatever version of Chinese HIMARs looks like ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PHL-03 that took seconds).

Bottom line is that I, personally, do not think that the air denial and control problems we are seeing in Ukraine are specific to this conflict.  The technology is moving too fast.  We are likely going to have to accept that the airpower picture is going to be compromised and that we are vulnerable to whatever it is becoming and its cousins in long range strike.  We do not have a magic suite of capability that can erase what we are basically arming the Ukrainian's to do against the Russians.  I do no think the western assumption of air superiority, or space superiority, or EW/Cyber superiority or good old fashion land power mass and manoeuvre superiority are currently safe regardless of what conflicts we see them in. 

Just one little thing to add: You don't really want to be flying jet engines through an environment that's got a lot of drones buzzing around right where the action is and where the CAS jet is going to come through.  Ingesting a drone in a jet engine is going to be like sucking in a big chicken (or swan, for the bigger ones) with a lot of random hard metal parts and magnet wire.

[sross112]

55 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

My thoughts on maneuver warfare cutting off and destroying large enemy forces:

Both sides have repeatedly failed to achieve anything resembling force destruction through surrounding and reduction.  Like others, I wonder why this is.  I think I have a glimmer of an idea as to the underlying cause.  And The_Capt is going to be pleased to know that I think it is corrosive warfare

What does a force require in order to conduct an encircling operation?  The ability to move faster than the enemy can withdraw.  What is the most important element for achieving that speed?  Vehicles.  What is the second most important element?  The defender having little warning or knowledge of where the enemy's "pincers" are.  Historically speaking nothing was more destructive than a force trying to withdraw and finding the enemy already blocking its route of retreat.

Corrosive warfare makes it quite difficult for the attacking force to achieve rapid movement because loitering munitions, long range ATGMs, mines, and the ability to direct accurate artillery fire (PGM or dumb) at the right place at the right time.  Both sides have these capabilities, therefore both sides know they have to advance far more cautiously than in previous wars because bold moves are more likely to result in disaster than in the past.

There is a solution to this, but neither side has it.  Yes, I'm talking about TacAir.  Much of the corrosive warfare concepts I mentioned above require the defender retain some degree of flexibility in redeploying assets, in particular artillery, to thwart the advancing forces.  If the attacker has the ability to find and destroy those assets while they are on the move, then the defender's ability to effectively confront bold advances is decreased.  The destruction and disruption of such efforts also creates significant command and morale challenges on top of the stress that comes with withdrawing under pressure.

Since neither side has effective TacAir, the defender has the opportunity to conduct retrograde ops with a fair number of variables in its favor.  A bold attacker may get lucky, but is perhaps more likely to suffer significant degradation instead.

Steve

I'm going to wear my optimist hat again today.

I think we have identified C4ISR as one of the most important things in this war. We've seen that the UA has what could really be viewed as C4ISR supremacy. Corrosive warfare will most likely be what is used in the initial phase to create an exploitable weakness or even to clear the breach. We've discussed a lot about the fact that the lines are held by too few troops. If the RA does have available reserves the UA most likely knows what they are and where they are at. With the low headcount defending the very long front it isn't like there are many areas that have a defense in depth. So once the crust is broken there shouldn't be much to stand in the way. If the RA is operating with a severe deficit of C4ISR like we think then the advantage should be to the UA. If the RA doesn't know where the UA is it makes it a lot harder for them to contain or even move against a breakthrough.

A good case to show this is the Great Raid of 2014. A UA force was able to travel 470km behind the lines, complete their mission and get back out over a course of 22 days. So in 22 days the RA was unable to find, fix, and destroy a raiding force of a couple battalions. Not some 4 man Force Recon team, a couple battalions. This sort of situation gives me lots of hope, especially in the south.

If the UA does have 9 or so newly staffed, equipped, and trained brigades on a leash and can get them through a breach, will the RA be able to deal with that? The corrosive type slow warfare all along the lines gives the RA a situation they can somewhat handle as it is really slow. How will they handle fast? I'm betting it will look a lot more like Kharkiv than Kherson.

So there you have my sunshine and rainbows for the day.  

[dan/california]

11 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

The successor to Germany's Goliath...

 

 

The_Capt has been expecting these for a while...

3 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Discussing 

(A) The lack of resolution could be affected not just by operational considerations but mil-factional. We've touched on these internal tensions within the Russian war machine before,  and ISW did a superb job laying it out yesterday. 

(B) I'm curious how much of this is a new form of an old warfare,  versus a form dictated by necessity (UKR lack of Air parity/dominance),  i.e. You fight however you can with what you have.

There's obviously a new approach going on here that utilizes new tech and mentalities,  but I'm curious if that would still dominate as the chosen approach if UKR had better control of the skies.

I assume using the best of both approaches (Western-type punctuative high altitude, long range airborne rampage +UKR low altitude, incessant & personal corrosive ****ery) is what Ukraine is working towards. 

At the moment,  the Russians in theory have the systems for the former (but has stagnated)  while Ukraine has the latter and is rapidly developing. Whichever of the two sides can tie the two extremes together will have a war winning advantage. 

The end balance between the two will be fascinating to watch.  

 

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

The airpower conundrum.  So here is the thing with AirPower - it is only about a century old as concept and we do not know if it has been a transitory phase in the evolution of warfare.  Everyone assumes that it must be a thing because we can "do air" now, and this part is correct.  However, "how we do air" is really in its infancy when compared to maritime and land military domains (and they have been bouncing around too), and is by no means decided.

So the question as to Ukraine is a bit chicken and egg.  Is this what they have to live with, or is this just how things are now?  The issue is military economics.  Airpower is really expensive right now and built around projecting airpower mass.  Big planes with big payloads in big waves.  One side has it and takes it away from an opponent - Bob'd your uncle and the war is over in a bibby, accept for all that nasty uncon stuff which really does not count - unless we are talking places like Algeria, Palestine, Lebanon Vietnam, Afghanistan (both times) and maybe Iraq - but we are not talking about them.  In a real war airpower is definitive and deterministic to an outcome.

Ok, sure...right up the point it no longer works.  Now why is it not working?  We the problem looks to be similar to the problems of other military mass - a concentration dilemma.  Technology has created small little nasty systems that can be carried around that have suddenly gained ridiculous range and lethality.  They are also really hard to suppress and toxic to massed concentrations.  "Oh but we have all the SEAD".  Well true but even our SEAD cannot solve for things like MANPADs and IADS, especially when they are hooked into a C4ISR architecture that can see everything.  The cost gets too high very quickly.

"Well we won't go there"...whoops, that is never the right answer.  If we can't go "there" someone else will. So when we go there we will have to accept less than total air dominance, in fact we might have to live with air denial above certain altitudes.

And then there is the below 2000 feet problem.  It is the freakin Wild West for air power right now and no one is controlling it in any meaningful way.  We get some denial but those UAS are so cheap that they can just keep lobbing them at the problem indefinitely.  So we are looking at denial risks above 2000 feet and not being able to control below 2000 feet...none of this is good news that magic western might is going to wave away.  Someone is very shortly going to figure out how to mount a Starstreak on a modest UAS and then we have a whole new set of problems.  And then there is ersatz airpower in the form of long range strike.  No one has the technology for whatever version of Chinese HIMARs looks like ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PHL-03 that took seconds).

Bottom line is that I, personally, do not think that the air denial and control problems we are seeing in Ukraine are specific to this conflict.  The technology is moving too fast.  We are likely going to have to accept that the airpower picture is going to be compromised and that we are vulnerable to whatever it is becoming and its cousins in long range strike.  We do not have a magic suite of capability that can erase what we are basically arming the Ukrainian's to do against the Russians.  I do no think the western assumption of air superiority, or space superiority, or EW/Cyber superiority or good old fashion land power mass and manoeuvre superiority are currently safe regardless of what conflicts we see them in. 

I think we need to keep VERY open minds about the place and potential of airpower, and even missile and drone, based power projection going forward. The air war in Ukraine has settled in a particular spot on a very large field of possibilities, because of what they brought to the fight at the beginning, and their apparently different learning curves since. Both lasers and autonomous systems have been notable by their absence from the Ukrainian battlefield. One or both of them might dominate the next war, whenever and wherever that is. The next time things get serious autonomous kamikaze drones could sweep the field of absolutely everything, including each other. The side that starts with more of them wins by attrition. Lasers could could sweep the sky of anything bigger than a sparrow, but the sparrows swarm like piranhas, and you can't get within three kilometers of the FEBA with anything bigger. The U.S. seems to think it has a 50 kilowatt laser with real battlefield utility. Leaving aside the fact that the Pentagon blows it occasionally, if you can mount it on Stryker, you can mount it on 737 or similar. What can an AWACS with an effective laser weapon do? Is this 50 kilowatt system the end of that technological thread, or just the beginning, and we are going to see power/efficiency doubling every couple of years for a decade. We just don't know, and the planners need to keep that in mind.

Edited May 1, 2023 by dan/california

[Yet]

2 hours ago, Centurian52 said:

I hope that isn't how it goes, since being in a frozen conflict would probably prevent Ukraine from being able to join NATO. An unambiguous peace, and NATO membership, would be best.

War was never declared, so a frozen conflict over old borders is on paper nothing different from pre 2014 situation. Also it is not a NATO rule that it is not acceptable. I dont think this would be a NATO breakpoint considering the situation.

[Haiduk]

In this sad new some interesting statistic of typical "Starstreak" tasks:

Andriy Liniychuk (callsign "Celt") has died at the war - most effective AA-shooter of AFU. On his count 16 Orlans, 1 Zala and Kа-52 helicopter. Andriy was first, who has performed combat usage of "Starstreak". For three years of service he was wounded twice and twice has returning back to own unit. He served in 95th air-assault brigade. He was killed in artillry shelling of out positions. 

 

[Battlefront.com]

40 minutes ago, Yet said:

War was never declared, so a frozen conflict over old borders is on paper nothing different from pre 2014 situation. Also it is not a NATO rule that it is not acceptable. I dont think this would be a NATO breakpoint considering the situation.

This is something that is overlooked within NATO.  As I understand it the reason NATO doesn't want to accept a member that is currently actively engaged in a war is that it would, defacto, mean all the other members of NATO would be drawn into that war.  However, the members can modify the rules however they like if they can all agree. 

One thing NATO could do is grant Ukraine some sort of status that is less than a full member.  This would open up certain doors between NATO and Ukraine in a very direct way.  It could also lead to NATO deploying forces on Ukrainian soil and have Article 4 and 5 protection go along with them.  This wouldn't put an end to the fighting, but it sure would make things far more complicated for Russia.  Especially because whatever NATO forces moved into Ukraine they would have air defenses coming with them.  Any threats headed towards a NATO base would therefore be a threat to NATO.

So on and so forth.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

More trench warfare first person viewpoint from Azov Bn.  Looks like there's a couple of friendly casualties in the mix. This is a pretty basic, shallow trench.  Not clear if they are defending or taking the trench, though there does appear to be dead Russians within it.

Interview with three captured Wagner soldiers from the infamous T intersection fight.  According to them they were supposed to do mostly non-combat stuff, but wound up being there when the Ukrainians attacked.  One guy said they are the only survivors of a group of 83.

Steve

[Centurian52]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

The airpower conundrum.  So here is the thing with AirPower - it is only about a century old as concept and we do not know if it has been a transitory phase in the evolution of warfare.  Everyone assumes that it must be a thing because we can "do air" now, and this part is correct.  However, "how we do air" is really in its infancy when compared to maritime and land military domains (and they have been bouncing around too), and is by no means decided.

So the question as to Ukraine is a bit chicken and egg.  Is this what they have to live with, or is this just how things are now?  The issue is military economics.  Airpower is really expensive right now and built around projecting airpower mass.  Big planes with big payloads in big waves.  One side has it and takes it away from an opponent - Bob'd your uncle and the war is over in a bibby, accept for all that nasty uncon stuff which really does not count - unless we are talking places like Algeria, Palestine, Lebanon Vietnam, Afghanistan (both times) and maybe Iraq - but we are not talking about them.  In a real war airpower is definitive and deterministic to an outcome.

Ok, sure...right up the point it no longer works.  Now why is it not working?  We the problem looks to be similar to the problems of other military mass - a concentration dilemma.  Technology has created small little nasty systems that can be carried around that have suddenly gained ridiculous range and lethality.  They are also really hard to suppress and toxic to massed concentrations.  "Oh but we have all the SEAD".  Well true but even our SEAD cannot solve for things like MANPADs and IADS, especially when they are hooked into a C4ISR architecture that can see everything.  The cost gets too high very quickly.

"Well we won't go there"...whoops, that is never the right answer.  If we can't go "there" someone else will. So when we go there we will have to accept less than total air dominance, in fact we might have to live with air denial above certain altitudes.

And then there is the below 2000 feet problem.  It is the freakin Wild West for air power right now and no one is controlling it in any meaningful way.  We get some denial but those UAS are so cheap that they can just keep lobbing them at the problem indefinitely.  So we are looking at denial risks above 2000 feet and not being able to control below 2000 feet...none of this is good news that magic western might is going to wave away.  Someone is very shortly going to figure out how to mount a Starstreak on a modest UAS and then we have a whole new set of problems.  And then there is ersatz airpower in the form of long range strike.  No one has the technology for whatever version of Chinese HIMARs looks like ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PHL-03 that took seconds).

Bottom line is that I, personally, do not think that the air denial and control problems we are seeing in Ukraine are specific to this conflict.  The technology is moving too fast.  We are likely going to have to accept that the airpower picture is going to be compromised and that we are vulnerable to whatever it is becoming and its cousins in long range strike.  We do not have a magic suite of capability that can erase what we are basically arming the Ukrainian's to do against the Russians.  I do no think the western assumption of air superiority, or space superiority, or EW/Cyber superiority or good old fashion land power mass and manoeuvre superiority are currently safe regardless of what conflicts we see them in. 

It is clear that the aircraft that have been employed in this war have really struggled to survive in this airspace. But there may be multiple interpretations to that, and which interpretation is correct may not be resolved until the next war. The prevailing interpretation is that the airspace over the modern battlefield is extremely dangerous for aircraft. Another interpretation is that the airspace over the modern battlefield is extremely dangerous for 4th generation aircraft.

We are seeing aircraft struggle to survive, and reasonably conclude that aircraft now have to struggle to survive. But what we may actually be seeing is 4th generation aircraft struggling to survive in an environment that should really only have 5th generation aircraft in it by now. Something has clearly changed. That something is either, we need to rethink what airpower can realistically accomplish, or, stealth is no longer optional.

[Huba]

Perhaps he meant the whole Donbas - in any case, these numbers are staggering.

 

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, billbindc said:

What is your best assessment of what happens when/if Ukrainian *air* defenses get degraded as reported in the next few months? Is the Russia AF able to do FA? Will it gain some advantages at high altitude lobbing, etc but not much else? 

Well if the UA loses the ability to deny air space then Russia will likely fall back on "airplanes = artillery" doctrine and start using that a lot more.  That said though, as far as I can tell Russian airpower is not what one could call a highly integrated and precision force.  When they say "artillery" they mean Soviet artillery.  Pick a grid square and hammer it.  This will be problematic as the UA tends to disperse up and take advantage of Russian ISR asymmetry.  It could definitely effect the UAs ability to concentrate and attempt a breakout battle.  Assuming that Russia can glue together a better integration of air and land power, which has not really been that great.

Now as to what "Ukrainian air defenses get degraded" well I suspect that is a spectrum.  It may free up higher altitudes, but the lower one goes MANPADs start to kick in, and below that UAS space.  So sure more high altitude strikes, likely low precision but massed much like we saw the use of artillery last summer.  But the Russians are likely going to be pretty cautious.  Aircraft are really expensive and hard/long to replace.  Russia has a big sky problem and cannot lose too much in Ukraine or risk holes in their ability to control their own airspaces. I guess we will have to see if the Ukrainian air defenses really do start to fold- and if they do shame on us.  It would be like investing in a car with only two wheels.  I mean you buy the whole damn car or what is the point? 

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, Centurian52 said:

It is clear that the aircraft that have been employed in this war have really struggled to survive in this airspace. But there may be multiple interpretations to that, and which interpretation is correct may not be resolved until the next war. The prevailing interpretation is that the airspace over the modern battlefield is extremely dangerous for aircraft. Another interpretation is that the airspace over the modern battlefield is extremely dangerous for 4th generation aircraft.

We are seeing aircraft struggle to survive, and reasonably conclude that aircraft now have to struggle to survive. But what we may actually be seeing is 4th generation aircraft struggling to survive in an environment that should really only have 5th generation aircraft in it by now. Something has clearly changed. That something is either, we need to rethink what airpower can realistically accomplish, or, stealth is no longer optional.

I honestly think someone is going to put a brain on these AD systems at which point stealth will require "invisibility".  Stealth is very effective against radar; however it gets worse against thermal - airplanes burn a lot of gas.  Even though they shield some heat, physics is a harsh mistress.

Once you get into multi-spectral imaging coming out of a JADC2 type system and attach it to a onboard "AI brain"- and frankly that is right in front of us.  Then anything big, manned and hot is going to need to stay way back, much like tanks are having to do now.  Now small 5th gen UAS, now were are talking turkey.

As to the whole "war shifting" thing.  We have been seeing this coming from a long way out (e.g. RMA).  It is just that every time someone is ready to call it we get into a fight that demonstrates that "it is not there yet".  This war is really the first time that there are unavoidable phenomenon occurring. The central question remains, how much is unique to this war, and how much is more general and will apply to every war after this one?  And I do not claim to be able to answer that one.  All we can do is not what we are seeing and try not to talk ourselves into a false-certainty.