How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[JonS]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Let's do the math.  This is roughly 125km of frontage, which means the following per KM:

• 6 artillery over 100mm
• 1.7 MLRS

That's kind of the wrong way to think about artillery, although I am making the perhaps heroic assumption that the Russians aren't just using their guns in direct-fire mode.

The D-30 ("artillery over 100mm") has an effective range of about 15 km, so if it was right on the front line each gun could - theoretically - cover 15km to the left and 15 km to the right, for 30km total coverage. But it won't be at the front, so call the effective coverage 20km per gun, therefore at a minimum about 7 positions are required to cover the entire lineage. There are 763 guns in total, so at any point along that frontage you can expect to be opposed but about 110 guns, or about 10 battalions.

Similarly for the MLRS. Those have highly variable ranges, but 30km seems about typical. That gives 60km of maximal frontline coverage or 40km of effective coverage, so 3 positions minimum across the 125km, with 70 launchers at each position.

So, an attack anywhere along that front can expect to be be opposed by 10 battalions of barrel artillery and 6 battalions of MLRS, along with a battalion of ballistic missiles messing around in your rear area. Not 6 guns and 2 MLRS launchers.

Note1: Command and control arrangements can upset that; commanders might not be willing or able to share "their" indirect fire-support assets across divisional or higher organisational boundaries.

Note2: the above rough calcs assume a perfectly straight front line. Any wiggles and salients (convex or concave) will increase the average density.

Edited April 23, 2023 by JonS

[Battlefront.com]

8 minutes ago, JonS said:

That's kind of the wrong way to think about artillery, although I am making the perhaps heroic assumption that the Russians aren't just using their guns in direct-fire mode.

As far as I know they are being used indirectly.  The math is the (standard?) way of expressing troop density so as to do a comparison between sides.  Though, in this case, we can't do that because we don't have anything from the Ukrainian side.

Traditionally tanks and APC/IFVs would not be spread out any more than the artillery, so your comments about artillery normally would normally apply to them as well.  e.g. normally a tank company would not be chopped up into platoons and spread all over the front.  However, at this point in the war it seems that, unlike artillery, the Russians are indeed parcelling out their tanks in platoon sized increments.  I doubt they've spread them out evenly, so the density calculation I made is still just a rough measure.

At present, it seems probable that a large percentage of Russian artillery (50%?) is positioned within range of Bakhmut.  That means other sectors of frontage likely have very thin coverage with very poor response to multiple calls for fire within a decent sized frontage.

Steve

[JonS]

18 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Traditionally tanks and APC/IFVs would not be spread out any more than the artillery, so your comments about artillery normally would normally apply to them as well.  e.g. normally a tank company would not be chopped up into platoons and spread all over the front.

True, but speed of reaction and 'stickiness' of engagement matter. An artillery battalion can be engaging a target "over there" one minute, then switch to engaging a different target 25km away "over that'a way" literally 5 mins later, then back again 5 mins later, then to a third completely different location 5 mins after that.

Once you commit tanks or IFVs to a battle, they're pretty much stuck there for at least the rest of the day. You might be able to pull them out overnight and commit them to a different battle maybe 30-odd kms away tomorrow, but that's about the best you can hope for.

Quote

The math is the (standard?) way of expressing troop density so as to do a comparison between sides. 

Perhaps. That doesn't make it sensible though For one thing, it undercounts what can be expected by 1 or 2 orders of magnitude, it ignores C2 freedoms and constraints, and ignores qualitative differences in equipment. By that I mean that say - for example - both sides have exactly the same number of guns - 160 guns to cover 160km of front. In that case they are 'evenly matched' at 1 gun per km. But suppose one side has yewbeut guns and extended range ammo, which gives them twice the range; 60km vs 30km. Both still have 1gun/km, but one side can expect to face 80 guns anywhere along the front, while the other will only be opposed by 40 - a 2:1 advantage.

Edited April 23, 2023 by JonS

[danfrodo]

48 minutes ago, JonS said:

True, but speed of reaction and 'stickiness' of engagement matter. An artillery battalion can be engaging a target "over there" one minute, then switch to engaging a different target 25km away "over that'a way" literally 5 mins later, then back again 5 mins later, then to a third completely different location 5 mins after that.

Once you commit tanks or IFVs to a battle, they're pretty much stuck there for at least the rest of the day. You might be able to pull them out overnight and commit them to a different battle maybe 30-odd kms away tomorrow, but that's about the best you can hope for.

Perhaps. That doesn't make it sensible though For one thing, it undercounts what can be expected by 1 or 2 orders of magnitude, it ignores C2 freedoms and constraints, and ignores qualitative differences in equipment. By that I mean that say - for example - both sides have exactly the same number of guns - 160 guns to cover 160km of front. In that case they are 'evenly matched' at 1 gun per km. But suppose one side has yewbeut guns and extended range ammo, which gives them twice the range; 60km vs 30km. Both still have 1gun/km, but one side can expect to face 80 guns anywhere along the front, while the other will only be opposed by 40 - a 2:1 advantage.

Oh, great, more comments from people that actually 'know things'.  This forum is the worst (disclaimer: this is a sarcasm)

JonS, thanks for educating us on a how to think about this stuff. 

[kimbosbread]

How does one search for artillery? I'm imaging the recon version of John Craven searching for frequently potential target locations, but that's only from spending too much time in school doing statistics.

[BlackMoria]

20 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

How does one search for artillery? I'm imaging the recon version of John Craven searching for frequently potential target locations, but that's only from spending too much time in school doing statistics.

Lots of ways.  Counter Battery/Mortar Radars.   Drones.  Satellites (if your C3 system is fast enough).  Sound Ranging (don't know if that is still a thing).  Crater Analysis. Recon/SF assets  Humint from locals.  Etc.

Edited April 23, 2023 by BlackMoria

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Let's do the math.  This is roughly 125km of frontage, which means the following per KM:

• 700 men
• 3 tanks
• 10 APC/IFV
• 6 artillery over 100mm
• 1.7 MLRS

Excluding support personnel and presuming everything is at the front it basically means that per KM of front there's roughly:

• 1x Rifle Company (dismounted)
• 1x Rifle Company (APC/IFV)
• 1x Tank Platoon
• 1x Artillery Battery

This is not a bad sized force for a 1km section of frontage, especially given the rough terrain.

Steve

If this is true then they have shifted forces dramatically into this area.  If we recall the intel leak on force density there was nowhere with greater than about 250 pers per km.  So in order to focus this force size the RA will have had to bleed off other areas of the line a LOT.  This is also a pretty dangerous concentration easily seen by the UA.  There must be other areas of the line that are basically abandoned.

So the RA clearly got the message on the “strategic land bridge”.  My bet is the UA will attack elsewhere to pull that density away and then attrit them as they try to relocate.

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, JonS said:

That's kind of the wrong way to think about artillery, although I am making the perhaps heroic assumption that the Russians aren't just using their guns in direct-fire mode.

The D-30 ("artillery over 100mm") has an effective range of about 15 km, so if it was right on the front line each gun could - theoretically - cover 15km to the left and 15 km to the right, for 30km total coverage. But it won't be at the front, so call the effective coverage 20km per gun, therefore at a minimum about 7 positions are required to cover the entire lineage. There are 763 guns in total, so at any point along that frontage you can expect to be opposed but about 110 guns, or about 10 battalions.

Similarly for the MLRS. Those have highly variable ranges, but 30km seems about typical. That gives 60km of maximal frontline coverage or 40km of effective coverage, so 3 positions minimum across the 125km, with 70 launchers at each position.

So, an attack anywhere along that front can expect to be be opposed by 10 battalions of barrel artillery and 6 battalions of MLRS, along with a battalion of ballistic missiles messing around in your rear area. Not 6 guns and 2 MLRS launchers.

Note1: Command and control arrangements can upset that; commanders might not be willing or able to share "their" indirect fire-support assets across divisional or higher organisational boundaries.

Note2: the above rough calcs assume a perfectly straight front line. Any wiggles and salients (convex or concave) will increase the average density.

This does assume that the RA can swing those guns to and from Close and General support quickly (building on your note #1)  Based on what we saw at Severodonetsk last summer RA fire planning seems pretty linear, which may lean more the way Steve added it up.  In fact I would bet good money that have plotted out rigid sector fire support that is pretty static compared to western doctrine.  RA C2 has not shone in this war, I have my doubts as to it somehow stepping out of the phone booth now. Of course the UA should help this along where they can.

[Kinophile]

 

Patriots active.  I'd love to know the general AO. ... 

Edited April 24, 2023 by Kinophile

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

If this is true then they have shifted forces dramatically into this area.  If we recall the intel leak on force density there was nowhere with greater than about 250 pers per km.  So in order to focus this force size the RA will have had to bleed off other areas of the line a LOT.  This is also a pretty dangerous concentration easily seen by the UA.  There must be other areas of the line that are basically abandoned.

So the RA clearly got the message on the “strategic land bridge”.  My bet is the UA will attack elsewhere to pull that density away and then attrit them as they try to relocate.

One could imagine something along the lines of a river crossing would be a quick way to create uneasiness about badly defended sectors.

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, JonS said:

True, but speed of reaction and 'stickiness' of engagement matter. An artillery battalion can be engaging a target "over there" one minute, then switch to engaging a different target 25km away "over that'a way" literally 5 mins later, then back again 5 mins later, then to a third completely different location 5 mins after that.

Once you commit tanks or IFVs to a battle, they're pretty much stuck there for at least the rest of the day. You might be able to pull them out overnight and commit them to a different battle maybe 30-odd kms away tomorrow, but that's about the best you can hope for.

Perhaps. That doesn't make it sensible though For one thing, it undercounts what can be expected by 1 or 2 orders of magnitude, it ignores C2 freedoms and constraints, and ignores qualitative differences in equipment. By that I mean that say - for example - both sides have exactly the same number of guns - 160 guns to cover 160km of front. In that case they are 'evenly matched' at 1 gun per km. But suppose one side has yewbeut guns and extended range ammo, which gives them twice the range; 60km vs 30km. Both still have 1gun/km, but one side can expect to face 80 guns anywhere along the front, while the other will only be opposed by 40 - a 2:1 advantage.

Rules of thumb never survive the point of contact with details.  I could cite a dozen more reasons why the per KM math is not a good indicator of capability.  It's simply there to give a rough assessment based on historical concepts of force size and ratio.

As such, the math I did gives us a pretty good sense that, from a historical standpoint, Russia's available forces in the central eastern sector are likely adequate for defense.  At least superficially.  We might find that the northern portion of the eastern sector is not all that bad either, however I very much suspect the numbers don't look good for the south.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

If this is true then they have shifted forces dramatically into this area.  If we recall the intel leak on force density there was nowhere with greater than about 250 pers per km.  

Yup.  And looking at the pure math I think we can see why Ukraine isn't making much progress with its counter attacks.  Even if they wipe out a specific Russian force, there's another one to take its place.  Likewise, when Russia attacks and loses heavily, there's more to take their place too.  Last year this was not the case when Russia had to rob resources away from other sectors to replace losses.  Ukraine also had lower density at the time so that helped Russia maintain the status quo as there just wasn't enough Ukrainian forces to exploit Russian weaknesses.  More on this...

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So in order to focus this force size the RA will have had to bleed off other areas of the line a LOT.  This is also a pretty dangerous concentration easily seen by the UA.  There must be other areas of the line that are basically abandoned.

I am sure this is why Ukraine has a foothold on the left bank of the Dnepr.  It is also why Russia has launched no meaningful offensive activities west of Vuhledar since the campaign of failure earlier last year after the lines stabilized.  I also doubt there's much in the way of reserves anywhere near what they will need once Ukraine goes on a general counter offensive in a particular sector.

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So the RA clearly got the message on the “strategic land bridge”.  My bet is the UA will attack elsewhere to pull that density away and then attrit them as they try to relocate.

Even better is to draw them to hit Russia in multiple places on opposite ends of the front.  The classic method is to ensure they have to commit assets or lose ground by not, then hit another sector far away hard enough that they have the same options.  Russia likely doesn't have enough meaningful reserves to be able to hang back and wait to see what happens.  Ukraine has been doing this with Bakhmut, much to Russia's frustration.

Steve

[panzermartin]

Regarding the recent trench videos, not sure if this was posted. I found the analysis interesting. 

[Fenris]

Just in time for the discussion over the past page or so, today's ISW post goes into detail on what RU units are committed in Ukraine, where they are located and the what shape they're in.

TLDR is they're not in great shape after months of relatively fruitless local actions and are going to have a hard time defending against a large mechanized offensive.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, Fenris said:

Just in time for the discussion over the past page or so, today's ISW post goes into detail on what RU units are committed in Ukraine, where they are located and the what shape they're in.

TLDR is they're not in great shape after months of relatively fruitless local actions and are going to have a hard time defending against a large mechanized offensive.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2023

Some interesting tidbits in there. The RA is clearly pretty banged up in some areas.  The employment of Spetsnaz as front line infantry is particularly telling, however employment of SOF in those whole war has been different.  Spersnaz are supposed to be the Russian military Tier 1 guys.  Simply sticking them on the line as infantry is pretty odd.

Based on their assessments of RA line strength Russia has pretty much burned itself out over the winter.  If the UA is sitting on 9 fresh and fully gunned up Bdes this spring offensive could be a real barn burner.  Looking at the map I am honestly wondering if the UA is not going to go for the Dnipro river crossing assault. Risky and tough to secure but the RA is extremely thin and broken on that front.  This is likely due to risk-creep around the river obstacle.  The RA looks pretty weak on the far east of that line too.

[akd]

Battle for Position “Cyclops,” part 2:

 

[Seedorf81]

Dutch newssite quotes Washington Post:

'Ukraine was planning to attack Moscow on 24th of Februari, to "bring the war closer to the Russians", but didn't after US disapproved.'

 

Edited April 24, 2023 by Seedorf81

[Kinophile]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Some interesting tidbits in there. The RA is clearly pretty banged up in some areas.  The employment of Spetsnaz as front line infantry is particularly telling, however employment of SOF in those whole war has been different.  Spersnaz are supposed to be the Russian military Tier 1 guys.  Simply sticking them on the line as infantry is pretty odd.

Based on their assessments of RA line strength Russia has pretty much burned itself out over the winter.  If the UA is sitting on 9 fresh and fully gunned up Bdes this spring offensive could be a real barn burner.  Looking at the map I am honestly wondering if the UA is not going to go for the Dnipro river crossing assault. Risky and tough to secure but the RA is extremely thin and broken on that front.  This is likely due to risk-creep around the river obstacle.  The RA looks pretty weak on the far east of that line too.

Yes the units defending from Melitopol to Donetsk seem very disjointed,  weak, inherently uncoordinated (many different command threads).  There seem to be a lot of exploitable breakpoints between formations, not just physicality but between adjacent command structures.

Those irregular volunteer units and PMC s strike me as very vulnerable to shock and panic. Existing outside regular army structures possibly makes them unsure of higher support if Ukraine suddenly starts punching. Uncertainty breeds fear,  fear breeds panic, panic births collapse. 

Something Russia has shown,  and is a historic feature,  is its willingness to absorb attacks through sheer casualty count and still remain operationally effective, then steadily push back. 

Whatever Ukraine does this year needs to hit a difinitive geographic or geopolitical objective. Simply taking ground just means the Trench lines have moved but nothing's actually changed. Fields can always be retaken... 

That ISW post was really informative,  gets my vote for best post of 2023 so far. 

Love to see their review of ZSU posture and OOB. 

 

 

Edited April 24, 2023 by Kinophile

[kevinkin]

Bit of a summary:

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kherson-counteroffensive-offensive-29a3970be1b09e5dfb4cabbb8165dcce

Mentions a "bridgehead" at Oleshky from an ISW post Saturday. The position has secure supply. Is that even possible so close to Kherson? AP speculates it's just a SOP photo op. I think probing around the RA rear areas is a good thing prior to a an offensive. So either way, it has to pee off the Russians. 

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Yes the units defending from Melitopol to Donetsk seem very disjointed,  weak, inherently uncoordinated (many different command threads).  There seem to be a lot of exploitable breakpoints between formations, not just physicality but between adjacent command structures.

Those irregular volunteer units and PMC s strike me as very vulnerable to shock and panic. Existing outside regular army structures possibly makes them unsure of higher support if Ukraine suddenly starts punching. Uncertainty breeds fear,  fear breeds panic, panic births collapse. 

Something Russia has shown,  and is a historic feature,  is its willingness to absorb attacks through sheer casualty count and still remain operationally effective, then steadily push back. 

Whatever Ukraine does this year needs to hit a difinitive geographic or geopolitical objective. Simply taking ground just means the Trench lines have moved but nothing's actually changed. Fields can always be retaken... 

That ISW post was really informative,  gets my vote for best post of 2023 so far. 

Love to see their review of ZSU posture and OOB. 

 

 

Oh definitely.  I think we are past corrosive here, at least in the finish.  One could argue the UA has been conducting corrosive warfare all winter on defence - and Oryx lists seem to support this - and the spring offensive is more egg cracking.  Ukraine needs a big win and Russian defence sector collapse again as a min (they pulled off two last fall).  The RA seems prime for it. I doubt they really can do c-moves quickly and are so beat up in some sectors that they are relying on obstacles in some sort of weird mass-force multiplication sense, but warfare is moving past all that or at least how we understood it to be.

We wont have to play "Who do We Eat First" for much longer I think.

[Kinophile]

Bit of a fluff piece on the Neptune ASM (it is the Kyiv Post after all). 

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/16061

But there's a very nice tidbit inside:

Quote

Ukrainian Navy Commander, Rear ADM. Oleksiy Neyizhpapa

"Personally, I thought it wouldn’t sink, because it was a such a large ship and our calculations were that it would take at least six cruise missiles to destroy a vessel of that class. Two missiles hit the target which, of course, wasn't enough, but there was a chance because the ship wasn't new, to put it mildly, and because we knew how manning on the Black Sea Fleet ships was organized."

They knew how bad was training, command and control.  In an older ship you need very well trained crews to cover for its weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

Good training requires good command and lets just say that sticking the Moskva with no escorts, on a repetitive course near a hostile coast was pretty indicative... 

Edited April 24, 2023 by Kinophile

[dan/california]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Some interesting tidbits in there. The RA is clearly pretty banged up in some areas.  The employment of Spetsnaz as front line infantry is particularly telling, however employment of SOF in those whole war has been different.  Spersnaz are supposed to be the Russian military Tier 1 guys.  Simply sticking them on the line as infantry is pretty odd.

Based on their assessments of RA line strength Russia has pretty much burned itself out over the winter.  If the UA is sitting on 9 fresh and fully gunned up Bdes this spring offensive could be a real barn burner.  Looking at the map I am honestly wondering if the UA is not going to go for the Dnipro river crossing assault. Risky and tough to secure but the RA is extremely thin and broken on that front.  This is likely due to risk-creep around the river obstacle.  The RA looks pretty weak on the far east of that line too.

 

41 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Yes the units defending from Melitopol to Donetsk seem very disjointed,  weak, inherently uncoordinated (many different command threads).  There seem to be a lot of exploitable breakpoints between formations, not just physicality but between adjacent command structures.

Those irregular volunteer units and PMC s strike me as very vulnerable to shock and panic. Existing outside regular army structures possibly makes them unsure of higher support if Ukraine suddenly starts punching. Uncertainty breeds fear,  fear breeds panic, panic births collapse. 

Something Russia has shown,  and is a historic feature,  is its willingness to absorb attacks through sheer casualty count and still remain operationally effective, then steadily push back. 

Whatever Ukraine does this year needs to hit a difinitive geographic or geopolitical objective. Simply taking ground just means the Trench lines have moved but nothing's actually changed. Fields can always be retaken... 

That ISW post was really informative,  gets my vote for best post of 2023 so far. 

Love to see their review of ZSU posture and OOB. 

 

 

The potential for even a credible threat to cross the Dnipro and move straight for the choke points at the top of Crimea to cause the above mentioned panic is the thing that could turn the spring offensive into a truly war changing event. Match it with a hard push anywhere from Melitopol to Mariupol, and all of a sudden every Russian unit in between is looking at being cut off except for highly interdict-able seaborne supplies. A lot of them might decide it is time to leave. The best case scenario would the "Highway of Death Part II" with Ukrainian units trying to outdo their Finnish exemplars in eating Russian columns from two and a half sides at once.

Edited April 24, 2023 by dan/california

[Kinophile]

4 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

The potential for even a credible threat to cross the Dnipro and move straight for the choke points at the top of Crimea to cause the above mentioned panic is the thing that could turn the spring offensive into a truly war changing event. Match it with a hard push anywhere from Melitopol to Mariupol, and all of a sudden every Russian unit in between is looking at being cut off except for highly interdict-able seaborne supplies. A lot of them might decide it is time to leave. The best case scenario would the "Highway of Death Part II" with Ukrainian units trying to outdo their Finnish exemplars in eating Russian columns from two and a half sides at once.

The Ukies do have a predilection for doublling up attacks. It would be very important to interdiction around Melitopol,  prevent it becoming a Fortress city and attractive rallying point. 

[Kinophile]

https://kyivindependent.com/https-kyivindependent-com-ghost-editor-post-644571c51c85292359c2551c/

A very good domestic step forward for Rule of law.. I'm not sure what extradition from Ukraine to EU is like but if it's put in force and smooth then the EU legal structures and law enforcement institutions will really help with transnational crime and domestic enforcement. UKR will be less of a safe haven for mafioso types. 

One of those "small" events that locks in long term, generational improvements. 

Edited April 24, 2023 by Kinophile

[akd]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

The employment of Spetsnaz as front line infantry is particularly telling, however employment of SOF in those whole war has been different.  Spersnaz are supposed to be the Russian military Tier 1 guys.  Simply sticking them on the line as infantry is pretty odd.

Spetsnaz brigades are likely just assault infantry now.  Can’t remember if it was posted here, but there was a report on two of the brigades being effectively destroyed over the last year, with approx. 75% losses.  No way they regain much of their specialist capabilities for a very long time.