How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, Jiggathebauce said:

Some folks would be surprised how easy it is to blend in and not be noticed just by being a trim, clean cut, "normal" looking young man as long as you don't draw attention to yourself in the workplace and in the community...

Knowing someone online and in the locker room versus just in passing at formations and at work, can be enlightening once they let their guards down.

He was there for at least 3 years and leaking information for almost that whole time by the looks of it.  I do understand how people with problems can fly under the radar for a while, but in a job this sensitive someone should have been paying attention.  The warning signs were most likely there and fairly obvious as this personality type does not inherently play well with others.  This guy was no Snowden.

Steve

[kevinkin]

This guy was an airmen direct out of high school (I guess). I know a young person that followed that path and was in air force intel working with raw data. I can't imagine her being able to, or being in position to obtain high level interpretive documents. Either they fell into his lap - others involved - or he actively found hole in the system to exploit. I would go with the former rather than the later. He can't be the sharpest arrow in the USAF quiver. 

[Battlefront.com]

More (possible) evidence that we'll see T-55s in action soon:

Steve

[kevinkin]

Here's one for ya:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russia-might-discuss-swap-for-jailed-u-s-reporter-a-diplomat-for-that-country-says/ar-AA19PP8P

[NamEndedAllen]

44 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

This guy was an airmen direct out of high school (I guess). I know a young person that followed that path and was in air force intel working with raw data. I can't imagine her being able to, or being in position to obtain high level interpretive documents. Either they fell into his lap - others involved - or he actively found hole in the system to exploit. I would go with the former rather than the later. He can't be the sharpest arrow in the USAF quiver. 

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/04/ukraine-leak-teixeira-massachusetts-air-national-guard/673720/ I Oversaw the Massachusetts Air National Guard. I Cannot Fathom How This Happened.

“From 2006 to 2009, as part of my duties as the homeland-security adviser to then–Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick, I oversaw the state’s Air National Guard. I have no idea why one of its members would even have access to the kind of high-level secrets that recently showed up on a Discord server.

Based on my experience, I am at a loss to explain why a 21-year-old member of the state intelligence wing, who does not appear to have been working in any federal capacity, would need access to the kind of materials whose release has so unnerved the Pentagon and supporters of the Ukrainian war effort. 

Despite Teixeira’s junior position, The Washington Post reported, he had access to the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, a computer network for top-secret Defense Department information. Investigations after the 9/11 attacks revealed a siloing of information within separate agencies and led to efforts to promote more sharing, but the Pentagon might have overcorrected.

State Air National Guard units have their own intelligence capabilities; an enemy could come by air, and sometimes errant flying balloons appear over U.S. soil. But it stretches any notion of homeland defense to think a low-level state Air Guard member should have access to materials about a war that the United States is not actively fighting and that poses no domestic risk.

I speak with profound admiration for the National Guard’s work. But if news reports are correct, the breadth of materials that Teixeira could view is unreasonable and unnecessary. If he took advantage of that access, that is his fault. But we are a nation that grants almost indiscriminate access to high-level intelligence, and that is our fault.”

Edited April 13, 2023 by NamEndedAllen

[kevinkin]

So the "others" are the Federal Government. Good grief. 

Air Force records listed Teixeira’s occupation as a Cyber Transport Systems Journeyman, responsible for the upkeep of hardware for military communications networks, including cabling and hubs.

 

While an anonymous defense official told the Associated Press Teixeira would have had a higher level of security clearance in that role due to his responsibility for ensuring network protection, questions are sure to be asked about how such a young service member — not even an intelligence analyst — could have access to such sensitive information.

One member of the channel insisted to the New York Times the leaker wasn’t a whistleblower and that he hadn’t meant for the sensitive materials to end up anywhere other than their group chat.

“This guy was a Christian, anti-war, just wanted to inform some of his friends about what’s going on,” one member told the paper. “We have some people in our group who are in Ukraine. We like fighting games, we like war games.”

https://nypost.com/2023/04/13/national-guardsman-jack-teixeira-arrested-in-us-intel-leaks/

Some clear pictures of the photos taken and posted. 

[Vet 0369]

On 4/12/2023 at 12:26 PM, Battlefront.com said:

Of all the Soviet weaponry, this is one of the systems I've always wondered why the West didn't copy.  It makes so much sense to have an indirect fire weapon capable of rapid RoF.  Having it on wheels is also helpful for avoiding counter battery fire.  However, I have faith that the reason why this idea "never caught on" with the West is that there is some significant downsides I've not thought of or had explained to me.

Steve

Speaking only from my own experiences with my M2 60mm mortar section (three tubes), the rate of fire per tube for a Final Protective Fire (FPF) was IIRC 30 rounds per minute. We did a few times during live fire training. The biggest limiting factor was that each round had four “increments,” one on each fin, that are used to vary range without having to change the set sighting. You would remove two opposite increments to reduce the range for a set elevation angle of the tube, and use all four for full range for that same elevation. My gunners would usually fire an FPF on charge four because we had to dig a pit to burn the excess charges before we left the range. I fired an FPF on the range once, and the tube got so hot that the sealant was liquified and bubbling out of the base of the tube at the base plate socket. I’m pretty sure the 81s were the same. An FPF was only used “when the s*** hit the fan.” For all those who don’t know what sound it makes when s*** hits a fan, it’s “Marrriiine!l

[JonS]

23 minutes ago, Vet 0369 said:

it’s “Marrriiine!l

I thought it was

"LEEEroooooy JENKinnnnnns!"?

Edited April 14, 2023 by JonS

[chuckdyke]

 

What about the system which made this possible?

[chuckdyke]

Russian Tanks Next Year. There is no such thing as an obsolete tank.

 

[danfrodo]

4 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

Russian Tanks Next Year. There is no such thing as an obsolete tank.

 

I actually love that tank   Big, bristling w guns.  Lacks asthetic qualities, I admit -- unlike cast sherman with those gorgeous curves. 

[chuckdyke]

1 minute ago, danfrodo said:

I actually love that tank

It's time ahead by almost a century you could engage three enemy tanks at the same time. A brilliant concept.

[danfrodo]

I am wondering now how the intel leak will play out.  Some loss, yes, but I bet my bottom dollar the clever TheCapt-type folks are thinking how they can turn this into a win.  RU has info but the attack is not imminent, especially considering how much rain has been coming down recently.  So UKR has time to change things, while also maybe making RU think it didn't change things.  Or didn't change things and makes it look like they did.  I bet those smart psyops/intel folks are gonna use this to actually confuse Putin more, to give him a tyranny of choice problem even worse than what he had before the leak.

[chuckdyke]

 

Who was responsible for the vetting process of this individual? It reminds me of another security breach.

 

[Battlefront.com]

I know it's impossible to get any sort of statistic sense from watching videos about how common something is/isn't, but I sure do feel like I've seen more videos of 5+ Russian soldier surrenders than I have since the Kharkiv offensive.  Here's what was probably the better part of a platoon or perhaps what remained of a platoon:

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/12l02rd/more_caputured_ruzzian_pows/

Steve

[Offshoot]

4 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I know it's impossible to get any sort of statistic sense from watching videos about how common something is/isn't, but I sure do feel like I've seen more videos of 5+ Russian soldier surrenders than I have since the Kharkiv offensive.  Here's what was probably the better part of a platoon or perhaps what remained of a platoon:

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/12l02rd/more_caputured_ruzzian_pows/

Steve

Apparently the number of Russians contacting the I Want to Live line spiked in March: for example, https://english.nv.ua/nation/record-number-of-russian-soldiers-used-ukraine-s-surrender-hotline-in-march-news-50316158.html - "“In March, we essentially broke a record – more than 3,000 appeals, which is twice as many as in 2022,” said Matvienko."

Self-reporting by the Ukrainians of course and how many of those contacts went on to actually surrender is another story.

[Battlefront.com]

This short article makes that point and underscores that the assessments of Russia's economy by international and Western institutions are based on official Russian government data.  The article also points out that Russia has always lied about how well its economy is doing, but especially now.  There are ways to fact check Russia to some extent, but lazy institutions do what lazy institutions do... regurgitate.  Unfortunately, this makes generally credible organizations party to Russian disinformation campaigns:

https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/russia-economy-data-lies-propaganda-vladimir-putin-inflation-ukraine-sanctions-2023-4?utm_source=reddit.com

And this is really nice to see.  Ukrainian Hacktivists got into the personal accounts of the leader of Russia's GRU "Fancy Bear" group.  Yup, the same Fancy Bear that hacked the DNC servers and did other things to interfere in the 2015 elections.  Not only did the grab a whole bunch of useful information, which they forwarded onto the FBI, but they also humiliated him by doxing him using his own social media accounts.  Funnier still, they used his Alibaba Express account to order and have shipped to him a bunch of FBI themed items.  Nicely done

https://informnapalm.org/en/hacked-russian-gru-officer/

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, Offshoot said:

Apparently the number of Russians contacting the I Want to Live line spiked in March: for example, https://english.nv.ua/nation/record-number-of-russian-soldiers-used-ukraine-s-surrender-hotline-in-march-news-50316158.html - "“In March, we essentially broke a record – more than 3,000 appeals, which is twice as many as in 2022,” said Matvienko."

Self-reporting by the Ukrainians of course and how many of those contacts went on to actually surrender is another story.

Yup, but it is as good an indicator as anything else provided the methodology and honesty has been consistent since the line was set up.

Steve

[NamEndedAllen]

I’m puzzling over the vetting process and clearances this Teixeira jerk would have been through.  Some of you guys have various clearances. Please correct me where I’m wrong. He was recruited for the ANG out of high school in 2019. In the military, would he have immediately been vetted for TS, Sensitive Compartmented Information clearance, at its higher Levels? Basically, when he is an entry level kid? If not, wouldn’t he have gone through at least one more heavy duty investigation more recently? And if he did, and passed it after all the Snowden and other thefts and leaks, does this mean the clearance process for access to even these highly sensitive (Level 4?) materials and SCIFs is really really badly flawed?

Also, how many other IT types with his same/similar duties would normally be working at the 102nd Wing? They would know each other well enough, right? I imagine investigators would have a lot of questions for him.

[Battlefront.com]

ISW's report from April 13 had a number of important points to make (what's new, eh?).

Various sources, including Ukrainian, remind people that if Russia really wants to bleed itself to death in Ukraine and wreck its economy to keep the war going, theoretically it can.  It has the people and the resources to do that, though increasingly more like "stone age" warfare due the the dwindling quality of both soldiers and equipment.

Following this statement ISW repeated that, at present, the Russians seem to be dedicating themselves to "half-measures" that are not going to last much longer.  They cited that in some regions the "crypto-mobilization" (as they are calling it now) have failed miserably to meet quotas.  They cited the realization by people that casualties really are high in Ukraine, not just enemy propaganda.  Elsewhere in the report there was mention of Russian and Iranian drones increasingly being found to have older foreign sourced tech in them as Russia's industry struggles to make things on its own.

If you put these two sentiments together, Putin will have to go with yet another large mobilization again this year if the Ukrainian counter offensive does what we hope it will do.  Further, Putin will have to do something about making the Russian economy basically slave to the Ukraine war first and supporting Russia's civilian population second.  Which is obviously not good for Putin's regime standing in the eyes of the public and rivals.

There was also this tidbit:

Quote

Ukrainian assessments confirm ISW’s longstanding assessment that Russia cannot conduct multiple offensive operations simultaneously at this time. Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Ukrainian General Staff Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov stated on April 13 that Russian forces deployed unspecified Russian forces from the Avdiivka area of operations to reinforce offensive operations around Bakhmut and that Russia has lost about 4,000 Wagner and conventional personnel in Bakhmut since around March 30.[9] Hromov’s statement supports ISW’s longstanding assessment that the Russian military — in its current form — is unable to conduct large-scale, simultaneous offensive campaigns on multiple axes.[10]

Russia continues to attack in the same places it has been attacking since this years combat really started.  And it isn't doing well.  Some small gains in each area, but not much and at very high cost.

The question I have about Wagner's losses... I don't think they have many, if any, convicts still under their command.  They've either died or been sent back to Russia.  So these casualties must be coming from Wagner's normal personnel.  Given how the Russian MoD is behaving towards them, I wonder how long Wagner can keep going before it collapses due to an inability to adequately recruit replacements?

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 minute ago, NamEndedAllen said:

I’m puzzling over the vetting process and clearances this Teixeira jerk would have been through.  Some of you guys have various clearances. Please correct me where I’m wrong. He was recruited for the ANG out of high school in 2019. In the military, would he have immediately been vetted for TS, Sensitive Compartmented Information clearance, at its higher Levels? Basically, when he is an entry level kid? If not, wouldn’t he have gone through at least one more heavy duty investigation more recently? And if he did, and passed it after all the Snowden and other thefts and leaks, does this mean the clearance process for access to even these highly sensitive (Level 4?) materials and SCIFs is really really badly flawed?

Also, how many other IT types with his same/similar duties would normally be working at the 102nd Wing? They would know each other well enough, right? I imagine investigators would have a lot of questions for him.

What I want to know is when we'll stop seeing his IT role used as an excuse for why he had access to this stuff.  I've worked in IT enough to know it is complete BS that the tech guy needs to have access to the software that is being utilized on the equipment.  Sure, he might be needed to get things set up, but in that case he is given permissions that authorize him to work with the software and NOT permissions to work with the data.  If he was needed for something that involved data, then he should have been granted permissions only until the work was complete, then the permissions removed.

At some point someone will make mention of this in the mass media.  But for now, it's being used as a lazy excuse as to why this numbnuts kid had access to such stuff even beyond the larger questions as to why this unit had access to high level products at all.

Steve

[Offshoot]

In addition, are their server admins able to see what files are accessed by which person? If they are, how come no audits identified him as accessing this info over several months?

[chrisl]

2 hours ago, Offshoot said:

In addition, are their server admins able to see what files are accessed by which person? If they are, how come no audits identified him as accessing this info over several months?

For all we know he works for someone who doesn't deal with computers and has him print everything out to read/review/trash.  It's not so common anymore, but it wasn't so long ago that there were managers who would have their secretaries print their email then dictate replies or handwrite and have the secretaries transcribe.  

That's less likely with emails now, but not too unusual with reports and presentations, and they could be printed for an officer who likes to read them on paper instead of a screen. It wouldn't raise any eyebrows, and then he can make off with some of the paper copies if they don't have some other audit mechanism to make sure that everything that gets printed is either stored properly or destroyed.  If the data were never printed it would be easier to restrict and track access by login.  If it's encrypted at-rest it would be possible to keep him from being able to see it, even if his boss could read it on a tablet or laptop by having the appropriate permissions and password or key.

 

[DesertFox]

3 hours ago, Offshoot said:

In addition, are their server admins able to see what files are accessed by which person? If they are, how come no audits identified him as accessing this info over several months?

AFAIK he only got access to printed out hardcopies, not to digital documents. Makes you wonder how that alone was possible.

[chrisl]

2 minutes ago, DesertFox said:

AFAIK he only got access to printed out hardcopies, not to digital documents. Makes you wonder how that alone was possible.

Pulled out of burn bags in a SCIF?