How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[sburke]

3 minutes ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Good list. I've been following Kofman and Lee for years. They're both fantastic. The only "problem" I see with them is that, as you noted, they almost never disagree with each other on anything substantive.

I like reading David Axe myself

David Axe (forbes.com)

[Beleg85]

23 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I absolutely can not conceive of how this could be 1:1 or even 1:2 overall.  Attackers often suffer higher casualties absent advantages which Russia doesn't appear to have.  We also know that Wagner was pushing untrained and unsupported convicts and Mobiks at Ukrainian positions in "recon by death" tactics.  Even the RU Nats have aknowledged this.  On top of this, these attacks have not yielded anything resembling a breakthrough or overrun of any size, which is usually where the attacker evens up the loss ratio.

To think that this would result in just as many Ukrainian deaths is incomprehensible to me.

That said, I have no clue where the actual loss ratio is.  However, I would bet it is closer to 1:7 than it is 1:1.

Steve

This is also mine reading as well (at least for early and middle stages of this months-long battle) and a reason guy get it heated in comments. However, let's still remember the artillery usage and heavy droning on both sides (not all UA positions were conviniently held in urban areas); add airforce, which seems to be active particulary in last weeks, deadly long-distance sniping utilitized by both sides, Russian termobarics and phosporus weapons, atgms used against infantry, frequent ammo shortages on Ukrainian behalf and finally constant,  raw firepower advantage on muscovite side for duration of whole battle. Perhaps defender/attacker ratio in this exteremely deadly environment is also different from what we are used to, at least from the time when moskals really contentrated their efforts in this area (aka. circa from December).

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, poesel said:

What is China's plan if the Russian Federation disintegrates?

There is an interesting side question about Japan and Kamchatka. If Russia was really cracking up the Japanese would pay some incomprehensibly large bribes to get Kamchatka back. Not to mention promising to turn the entire Island into a construction site. The Free Republic of the Kuriles" might have to last a whole month as an independent country before it was welcomed back to the bosom of the Rising Sun with literal cargo ships full of Yen. 

53 minutes ago, billbindc said:

And his personal arrogance around this town does not exactly burnish his reputation.

I have a completely silly hang up with Koffman.  He sounds like a crooked detective from Newark. I cannot get this thought/image out of my head when I listen to him. Lately he has been pretty strong on the idea that the Russians burned themselves out in Siverodonetsk, and never really recovered. Can't say i disagree with that. I really discount almost everything about conditions/plans on the Ukrainian side since the perfectly coordinated info op before the Kharkiv offensive. Maskirova is yet another Russian concept only the Ukrainians seem to understand.

21 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Some good news on the political side of things in Europe. The Estonian Reform party won 31% of parliamentary vote.

A bit concerning that the EKRE came in second place as they oppose sending military aid to Ukraine.

I'm hoping that Kaja Kallas of the Squirrel party remains PM while this war continues.

 

Do the Nordics/Baltics have football chants to the effect that" we have the hottest prime mister", nah, nah?

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

This is also mine reading as well (at least for early and middle stages of this months-long battle) and a reason guy get it heated in comments. However, let's still remember the artillery usage and heavy droning on both sides (not all UA positions were conviniently held in urban areas); add airforce, which seems to be active particulary in last weeks, deadly long-distance sniping utilitized by both sides, Russian termobarics and phosporus weapons, atgms used against infantry, frequent ammo shortages on Ukrainian behalf and finally constant,  raw firepower advantage on muscovite side for duration of whole battle. Perhaps defender/attacker ratio in this exteremely deadly environment is also different from what we are used to, at least from the time when moskals really contentrated their efforts in this area (aka. circa from December).

You have to include artillery ammo and barrel wear in the total cost calculations. If the Russians simply don't have the guns and ammo to oppose a big Ukrainian push in six weeks when the ground dries, Bakmuht is going to look like a VERY expensive purchase. And they don't have it yet, either...

[The_Capt]

29 minutes ago, BletchleyGeek said:

Definitely he sounds a lot like Peter calling wolf... yet, as recent events suggest, if the US/NATO is the (reluctant) Arsenal of Democracy, the other side may have China play the role of Arsenal of Tyranny. And like in 1941-45, when the Stumbling Colossus regained its feet and smashed the German Army in great part thanks to the arctic supply line, this "Sick Man of Eurasia" that is the Russian Federation may regain its feet too, and do even more damage.

Kofman has been hit or miss in a lot of ways.  He started out this war within the mainstream assessments, which all turned out to be built on some pretty shaky assumptions.  They then spent the early part of the war trying to somehow line up reality with their assessments, as opposed to just looking at what was actually happening.  Back last early summer we heard the exact same narratives on how the RA was taking hits but its grinding offensives were in fact signs of success and a shift in the war.  We here on this forum disagreed vehemently, mainly because based on the reported RA mass they should have been seeing much larger gains, and the big one - still no actual break throughs.  In order to make an operational assessment one really has to see operational level evidence or build a framework that links tactical observations to operational ones consistently and effectively. 

We saw what happened last summer and what actually unfolded in the Fall.  The UA went from "barely holding on" to being able to conduct two successful simultaneous operational offensives over 500km apart.  I do not think most people realize just how hard that is to do and that the UA was nowhere near collapse, in fact all that time during Severodonetsk it would have been force generating and putting in place the architecture to make Kharkiv and Kherson happen.

But lets say, ok, we here got lucky - broken clock is right twice a day.  So what has happened since then to shift the calculus?  Well the RA did mobilize and now has somewhere in and around 350k troops in country - but this is not all about mass - we keep coming back to this.  Mass as we know it is not working in this war.  So once again we see the RA playing smash face on a tactical objective that is has been trying to take for months.  Their estimated losses at the low end are staggering.  They bled out Wagner, they are bleeding out their mobilized troops.  They are losing equipment they cannot get back - see tank production.  They have not shown any evidence of creating the C4ISR, logistics or deep precision fires needed to turn into a force that can fight this war on even ground with the UA.

So here we are back at "Russia re-gaining its feet" and UA on the ropes.  Firstly, Kofman is not going to see what he needs to at Bakhmut - this is war tourism and showboating (gawd we saw a lot of that in the day).  The actual data he needs to see to make accurate assessments are in strategic and operational HQs buried on hard drives and talking to the staff who work this problem. 

Second, the UA has been able to violate the historic force ratio losses attacker to defender, the RA has not shown any evidence of this.  I would need to see this before even listening to any "1:1" loss rations.  The steady stream of tactical anecdotes we see here do not support it, nor does open source intel collection.  So I am pretty convinced the RA is losing at some pretty high force ratios compared to the UA, and on stuff that really hurts.

Third, there is no evidence of UA bleeding out.  Force generation is going on in full swing in places like the UK and Poland.  There have been zero reports of shortages of manpower on the UA side, accept maybe right on the line units that in the teeth of this thing.

Fourth.  I do not care if Russia could mobilize a million men, they do not have the operational system to actually turn that into effective military capability in time for this war.  People keep pointing to WW2 and the re-emergence of the Russian bear.  Newsflash, war has changed a lot in the last 80 years.  Sure you can stick a teenager into a uniform and give them a rifle, point them at the enemy and hope for the best.  But today you need a lot of enablers in order to create decision.  Again stuff like C4ISR, logistics, engineering, force protection and projection.  You do not create these in the middle of a war this size without a lot of signaling.  These things also take years to build up to a 21st century competitive level.  The UA has, largely because they have plugged directly into western architectures - from force sustainment to generation.  All indications of what I have seen show the RA going the exact opposite direction. 

Fifth.  China.  Sending a few hundred self-loitering munitions and boots is also not going to change things.  Much in the same way a few dozen western tanks won't.  China has been working on the C4ISR architecture to actually challenge the US but by all accounts it is 1) not there yet, 2) pointed in other directions - see Taiwan, and 3) China likely is not going to give away its actual C4ISR capability arc on saving Russia's dumb @ss.  If China goes all in and somehow can link in the RA we will start seeing evidence.  Much more precise fires and campaigns - UA logistics nodes exploding instead of RA ones, up to and including the operational level.  Much more dynamic manoeuvre.  Far more streamlined logistics.  A lot more UA dislocation and disruption.  Levels of actual SEAD and air superiority.

So What?  I will not only draw a link to the UA spring-summer offensive, I will predict it will be catastrophic for the RA unless we see some real operational level indicators otherwise.  If the RA was smart, it would have dug in along the lines they really want to keep, hard.  They would have dug in those mobilized troops, mined everything and tried to drag this thing out.  Instead that went for a tactical objective and smashed thousands of forces against it. They lost several medium sized national militaries worth of equipment (https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html) - that is just insane by 2023 standards.  Good thing the T-34 takes a day to make because before this is over they may be driving them.  At this point they must have pulled from all down the line to try and take Bakhmut, their force density on that frontage was pretty thin, it is likely cut full of holes right now.  Once that mud dries they have a real problem covering it off.  And meanwhile the UA can see all those holes because they are linked into real time multi-spectral satellites being flown out of Vandenburg.

If the RA pull off a break through battle and get into the UA rear areas, or start a really good fires campaign to cripple Ukrainian rail or any signs the US is actually starting to buckle, then I will be the first in line to highlight it with red flags.  But we have not seen any of this.  In fact we are getting a steady stream of weird keening sounds out of the RA, and the UA is asking for engineering breaching equipment.

[kevinkin]

ET phone home?

https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1742654/Wagner-Group-Vladimir-Putin-Russia-Ukraine-frontline-Bakhmut-Prigozhin-latest

[The_Capt]

47 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Curious thing is that after joined trip to Bakhmut of several analysts (Kofman including), Konrad Muzyka now firmly states he assess Ukrainian and Russian casualties as 1:1 or 1:2 and refutes 1:5 or 1:7 ratios that lately appear even in NATO and Ukrainian officials statements. There is small ****storm on his twitter for this (again), but the guy is known to be rather cautious.

So we probably should forget about any, even proximate losses count for now, which in turn make our assessments of value of holding Bakhmut rather pointless. I am afraid this city already turned into meatgrinder for both sides; still hard to tell whom it favours in long term- perhaps nobody.

There is no way they are going to be able to deduce this going to Bakhmut.  They are going to see a bloody mess and a lot of carnage but in order to "firmly assess" the actual ratios they would need gain access to classified data at staff HQs in both the UA and RA.  Going on the ground, they are going to here a lot of warstories and some brutal anecdotes but even the local commanders in that storm, are not privy to every c-battery or deep fires mission that happens.

I have no idea what the ratio actually is, doctrine says 1:2-3 is the norm more towards the upper end in an urban fight but a lot depends on the type of tactics employed.  For example the Battle of Mosul was about 1:10 in favor of the attackers but they were deliberate and slow.  The RA has been pretty reckless by all accounts, and again the depth of the battlefield has changed dramatically.  The RA is slugging it out in the streets while getting HIMARsed in the rear.  In the end the critical attrition numbers are not the poor dog-faced infantry fed into this meat grinder - we can make more of them.  It is all the stuff in the back - (e.g. guns for the RA) that gets lost, that really hurts. 

[The_Capt]

Just now, kevinkin said:

ET phone home?

https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1742654/Wagner-Group-Vladimir-Putin-Russia-Ukraine-frontline-Bakhmut-Prigozhin-latest

Heh, well this Bakhmut thing may work out better than planned after all.  Now - if confirmed (seriously, feel like this has become the 21st century Information honorific) - this is what a strategic indicator looks like.

[The_Capt]

46 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

It pains me to say, that he was closer to the truth that the majority opinion on this forum, which predicted Russians to collapse in summer of 2022, then in autumn 2022.

Ouch, words hurt.  Well the RA did collapse as predicted, it just did not translate into a full strategic collapse.  Seriously - "what have you done for me lately"

To be fair to us, Kofman and others were all sounding the drums of doom back then as the Russian military was "just getting started" and drawing big red lines all over Donbas.

So who was less wrong in that little situation?

Edited March 7, 2023 by The_Capt

[kevinkin]

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-bakhmut-0713f4b6c03e04e88a9a7d589cf00000

The Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank, said Kyiv’s smartest option now may be to withdraw to positions that are easier to defend.

“Ukrainian forces are unlikely to withdraw from Bakhmut all at once and may pursue a gradual fighting withdrawal to exhaust Russian forces through continued urban warfare,” the ISW said in an assessment published late Sunday.

This is what I mentioned this morning but called it a local insurgency fielded by UA's cream of the crop. Almost a suicide mission. But everything in this war is almost a suicide mission given the modern battlefield. 

[dan/california]

Truly crazy suggestion, could Wagner be bought? Pay them in diamonds to just run for the Russian border and whatever their plan is for a mini state. Let the AFU just pour through gap to split the Donbas?

[The_Capt]

Just now, dan/california said:

Truly crazy suggestion, could Wagner be bought? Pay them in diamonds to just run for the Russian border and whatever their plan is for a mini state. Let the AFU just pour through gap to split the Donbas?

Oh, now we are talking my language.  That ain't crazy at all.  Tricky and with a thousand points of failure, but I like where your heads at.

[dan/california]

 

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

Oh, now we are talking my language.  That ain't crazy at all.  Tricky and with a thousand points of failure, but I like where your heads at.

Can i add this to my forum Sig line?

[danfrodo]

30 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

ET phone home?

https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1742654/Wagner-Group-Vladimir-Putin-Russia-Ukraine-frontline-Bakhmut-Prigozhin-latest

Is Prig so stupid he doesn't realize how totally expendable he is??  As if no one else can run the wagner circus.  If he keeps running his mouth he's gonna be dead.

[FancyCat]

truly, i wonder how much is misinformation and what isn't. and certainly war tourism or fact finding mission, these can also be spun or faked. also applies to the russian side. 

[danfrodo]

10 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Truly crazy suggestion, could Wagner be bought? Pay them in diamonds to just run for the Russian border and whatever their plan is for a mini state. Let the AFU just pour through gap to split the Donbas?

Well, they are, quite literally, for hire.  

[The_Capt]

Just now, dan/california said:

 

Can i add this to my forum Sig line?

Go nuts.  I think we should all get the "Hot Thread" ribbon in our sigs once this is done.

[danfrodo]

Summary from this feller for today.  He wants to pull out of Bakhmut to the hills to the WEST.  Hard to say right move here, but he believes the mud could hinder a withdrawal and make a mess for UKR, so says get out now.  Some graphics showing the local elevation and supposed new defense lines.

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/3/6/2156587/-Ukraine-update-It-s-time-to-pull-back-from-Bakhmut

 

Edited March 7, 2023 by danfrodo

[sburke]

9 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Summary from this feller for today.  He wants to pull out of Bakhmut to the hills to the east.  Hard to say right move here, but he believes the mud could hinder a withdrawal and make a mess for UKR, so says get out now.  Some graphics showing the local elevation and supposed new defense lines.

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/3/6/2156587/-Ukraine-update-It-s-time-to-pull-back-from-Bakhmut

 

freudian slip there.  Charge!!!  

[danfrodo]

4 minutes ago, sburke said:

freudian slip there.  Charge!!!  

indeed, indeed.  fixed.

[cesmonkey]

3 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Video of HIMARs strike on Russian column on 11th of September. 

10:19 UAV crew has spotted single tank on the road to Kupiansk and becomes to track it

10:22  Russian tank led  UAV crew to column (8 tanks, 6 BMP-3, 1 Msta-S, 1 IMR, 4 BAT), which forming and awaiting other vehicles. Information about place of columns and it compositions transmits to command point for decision to attack. During next 15 minutes the crew provides additional recon and clarification of coordinates. For this time the column has grew on 5 BTR-82, MTLB and trucks. 

10:35 Command center didn't have artillery, which can reach this target and there is no time to redeploy. It made a decision to attack column with full load of HIMARS  - 6 missiles at last 6 tanks.

12:09 - aftermath of strike (no exact time of strike on video) - preliminary assesment - 5 targets were hit. The smoke doesn't allow to clarify results, UAV got new task, but crew have to return. 

12:16. The crew returned, smoke is mostly gone. 2 tanks were destroyed with direct hits as well as IMR, SP-howitzer and truck.

 

Heh... Manner of speech and music reminded my radio translations of 80th ))))

   

 

 

Nice trade of 6 GMLRS rockets for what they destroyed if this Wikipedia reference is accurate:

Quote

$168,000 per one M31 GMLRS (FY 2023)[5]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M142_HIMARS#cite_note-5

[danfrodo]

and yet another opinion about what's going on around Bakhmut.  denys Davydov says UKR massing to the north around Siversk for possible penetration toward Bakhmut via Soledar to cut off RU forces.  I doubt it during this mud, but maybe ISR shows a wide open flank?  Probably just UKR messing w Prig's head, using Denys D to push some fake narrative.  I guess we'll find out, hopefully soon.

 

[Halmbarte]

57 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

Nice trade of 6 GMLRS rockets for what they destroyed if this Wikipedia reference is accurate:

After this much time their tactical dispersion is still ****e. I think the UA did kill all the professionals last year and this year they are killing the amateurs. 

H

[LongLeftFlank]

On 3/5/2023 at 1:29 PM, LongLeftFlank said:

Cliffs notes. First, the usual stuff, let's get it out of the way:

• Ukraine’s reserves are in a tenuous state right now (especially given their politically imposed mandate to try and accumulate a force for an offensive against the land bridge to Crimea)
• All the combat in the east is occurring under an umbrella where Russia’s supply lines and ISR are robust, creating conditions where Ukraine continues to trade at abysmal loss ratios.
• Russia is currently driving the attrition of the Ukrainian army and denying Ukraine any chance at regaining operational initiative, while at the same time pursuing important shaping objectives. 

This part is actually interesting:

• Moderate, but not catastrophic organizational disorder and restructuring in the Russian armed forces [are] delaying its readiness to launch a large scale offensive.
• The Battalion Tactical Group was designed to allow [parent formations] to fight without their conscripts [who] cannot be deployed in combat outside of Russia without a declaration of war.
• The BTG (being infantry poor) has to fight from behind a thin screen, and inflict defeats on the enemy with its ranged fires... Relatively low losses in infantry or tanks make them unsuitable for further combat tasks. 
• Russian forces had difficulty fully sealing the front [in forested areas].
• Mobilization finally [gave] Russia the deployable manpower that it needed, to pivot away from infantry poor BTGs and begin conducting large unit operations.
• But it is clear that the organizational process for incorporating mobilized personnel into the army and assembling large units (brigades and higher) has not been efficient. 
• Some were sent to existing units in the operations zone as replacements, others were placed into new units comprised entirely of mobilized personnel. The result is a grab bag of variegated units that have yet to be organized into large units for offensive operations.
• [Shoygu issued a] decision to begin converting existing brigades into divisions. [This reverses a downsizing of ex-Soviet divisions to brigades that occurred under Serdyukov post-2008].
• The maintenance of attritional death pits (like Bakhmut) [ED: for which side?] under the safety of Russia’s ISR and fires umbrella in the east... will continue until the regular Motor Rifle and Tank units are ready for attacking operations.
• This is why, at the moment, much of Russia’s offensive duties are being handled by units at the high and low end of the unit spectrum - that is, either elite units like VDV (airborne) and Marines, or irregular units like Wagner and the DNR/LNR.
• The middle rung of the ladder - regular motor rifle units - are mostly visible holding defensive positions. 

Big Serge's pro-Russian Looking Glass War: 'Moderate But Not Catastrophic Disorder' edition! 

Setting aside the usual topsy turvy "Tis But a Scratch" stuff, the Serge does discuss one rather interesting point that I don't recall being discussed much here, although it may have been in the ISW papers or Perun....

that in addition to canning the BTG, the Russians have been attempting to move back from a brigade to a division-centered structure. This reverses a downsizing of most post-Soviet army divisions to brigades (which in turn concentrated their peacetime manpower into BTGs) that occurred under Serdyukov in 2008.

https://bigserge.substack.com/p/russo-ukrainian-war-schrodingers

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Big Serge's pro-Russian Looking Glass War: 'Moderate But Not Catastrophic Disorder' edition! 

Setting aside the usual topsy turvy "Tis But a Scratch" stuff, the Serge does discuss one rather interesting point that I don't recall being discussed much here, although it may have been in the ISW papers or Perun....

that in addition to canning the BTG, the Russians have been attempting to move back from a brigade to a division-centered structure. This reverses a downsizing of most post-Soviet army divisions to brigades (which in turn concentrated their peacetime manpower into BTGs) that occurred under Serdyukov in 2008.

https://bigserge.substack.com/p/russo-ukrainian-war-schrodingers

Putin: "so you're saying there's a chance?  And with just this one little trick?"