How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[JonS]

13 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

I was thinking maybe it was something about that, but don't they also have loads of older, less saucy models in store?

There's no gravy to be had with that approach.

[Bulletpoint]

1 minute ago, JonS said:

There's no gravy to be had with that approach.

They should send them anyway, considering the gravyty of the situation.

[Battlefront.com]

1 minute ago, Butschi said:

Oh? Did I miss the news that AFU are now driving on Moscow? Or Sevastopol?

You're confusing situations.  There are basically three types of "Russian Soil":

1. areas that pretty much all Russians agree is theirs AND it is worth fighting over (e.g. Moscow)
2. areas that pretty much all Russians agree is theirs BUT isn't worth fighting over (e.g. some islands in the Pacific or perhaps even Kaliningrad)
3. areas that pretty much nobody in Russia agrees is theirs AND therefore not worth fighting over

If Ukraine started an armored thrust towards Moscow I bet a nuke would be dropped.  If Ukraine took over Crimea... unclear if Crimea really is #1 or #2.  We already have evidence that most of the annexed territories, possibly excepting Crimea, are in #3.

There's some evidence that Crimea is more-or-less in category 2 or maybe even 3.  What evidence?  Ukraine has already attacked Crimea and has it under constant threat of more attacks, yet the Russian people appeared fine with some counter strikes.  I think we would have seen a very different reaction if the center of Moscow got blown up.

1 minute ago, Butschi said:

Seriously, I don't get this kind of "logic". Since when does the fact that something hasn't happened yet proof that it won't happen in the future?

Because there's evidence that you aren't looking at.  Russia annexed Kherson and immediately lost it.  They lost most of Luhansk that they took in this war.  I don't see the Russian people screaming for nukes to be dropped, just the morons on Russian TV.

1 minute ago, Butschi said:

What you make of this is entirely up to you but frankly just ignoring the fact that Russia does have nukes is plain foolish and it is a good thing that apparently none of our (i e. Western) political leaders takes it as lightly as you do.

And by your logic apparently sending a box of ammo to Ukraine could touch off WW3.  Yet it hasn't.  Which indicates, quite strongly, that Russia is bluffing up to a point we haven't yet reached.

Steve

[The_Capt]

1 minute ago, Bulletpoint said:

They should send them anyway, considering the gravyty of the situation.

 

[Simcoe]

11 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Huh?  Most of what he just stated is opinion, some of which he has failed to back up and some of it completely contradictory with observable reality.  Have you even read the rebuttals to his supposed facts?

Riiiiight.  So how did Germany and Japan wind up losing the war?  I mean, they both looked pretty damned strong in 1944, didn't they?

Further, look at your argument with three words swapped:

"If the Ukrainians were as weak as they are made out to be here then Ukraine would be conquered  by now."

What this indicates is that reality is more complicated than just simple if/then logic.

And some of the "devil's advocate" posts here are also ridiculous.

Steve

I think the WW2 in 1944 is a good example. Both axis nations lost but it was a massive effort and took another year and a half and a nuke to end it.

neither myself or the person I quoted are being devils advocates. It’s just a reality check. Ukraine isn’t retaking Crimea next month. It’s going to be a grinding slog that will require a much great contribution from NATO to finish. We might even have this conversation again next year.

In the meantime, I just stay realistic and email my congressman about more aid to Ukraine.

[Kraft]

36 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Seriously, I don't get this kind of "logic". Since when does the fact that something hasn't happened yet proof that it won't happen in the future?

Because my understanding of your idea is: red line = homeland in peril. For which the definition of homeland came up, some suggest colonies arent. My point: if it is homeland (the not de-jure regions), there has been no response for close to a year - why should there be now. Because if you argue that tomorrow, he will nuke because Kherson remains in UA hands, then bring up a reason why that is the case, instead of saying, its always possible.

What makes you disagree on my point that this is about what Putin sees as his best personal outcome?

Why would Putin press his luck and see if the west is bluffing with the promised conventional retaliation ( a 100% lose scenario if it happens, for the upside of gaining a marginal, local, *not* war winning improvement on the battlefield).

Vs try to play it off as "established security understanding with partners in the west", much like he called his Kiev failures a "deescalation" with "respected partners".

Why would he believe getting the Russian army, airforce and navy in Ukraine wiped out is a better situation for himself than calling the war a diplomatic success and pretending it solved something like hes been doing all this time.

For which do you think people in Russia would rather storm his palace?

Edited February 6, 2023 by Kraft

[Battlefront.com]

11 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

I think the WW2 in 1944 is a good example. Both axis nations lost but it was a massive effort and took another year and a half and a nuke to end it.

Fortunately we're not talking about war on this scale, though I agree that short of a collapse on either side this war will drag out into next year.

11 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

neither myself or the person I quoted are being devils advocates. It’s just a reality check.

Except that the person you quoted isn't operating in what could be described as "objective reality".  See the various posts trashing his opinions with either better informed opinions or facts.

11 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

Ukraine isn’t retaking Crimea next month. It’s going to be a grinding slog that will require a much great contribution from NATO to finish. We might even have this conversation again next year.

So you have read all these posts and have come to the conclusion that the weight of the arguments being made here is that we think Ukraine will get Crimea back next month or even at all?  Because that's not what I've been reading.

For me, personally, I have been pretty consistent that Ukraine should focus on regaining everything it lost since February and deal with the 2014 losses through negotiations before contemplating a military solution.  Like The_Capt, I don't think they are worth retaking by force.  I'm not even convinced yet that Russia handing over the DLPR territory on a silver platter is a good idea.

11 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

In the meantime, I just stay realistic and email my congressman about more aid to Ukraine.

Good!  It's worth the effort, especially if you are represented by someone who might waffle on support.

Steve

[The_Capt]

3 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

I think the WW2 in 1944 is a good example. Both axis nations lost but it was a massive effort and took another year and a half and a nuke to end it.

neither myself or the person I quoted are being devils advocates. It’s just a reality check. Ukraine isn’t retaking Crimea next month. It’s going to be a grinding slog that will require a much great contribution from NATO to finish. We might even have this conversation again next year.

In the meantime, I just stay realistic and email my congressman about more aid to Ukraine.

Solid points.  I think we knew this was going to be a long war about a month in and that has not changed.  My guess, and it is a guess:

We will see some sort of Russian offensive this winter/spring.  Too many things point to Russia making a hard push for March.  Brace yourselves because it may even include a Ukrainian setback, they do happen.  The problem the RA will have is exploitation.  If the UA has truly been badly attritted we will know then.  Because a local or even operational collapse will happen if it has.  The UA will most likely re-establish the front line.  Russia will then “declare Victory”, hold a parade and then blame everything that happens after as defensive against NATO aggression (see we told you so, they want our Borscht).  Russia will make weak attempts at renormalization and splitting western unity.

UA will then wait until late spring or early summer and bring out the hammer.  They will likely try the one-two punch starting on a flank, pulling RA in that direction because the RA does not have enough troop density along the line and will have to relocate.  And then they will punch down the middle and split the strategic land bridge, likely at Mariupol.  If they can make the coast then the Crimean Bridge is in GLSDB range and we have a new ballgame.  At this point things get dicey as Russia is approaching a “put up or shut up” point with its own people.  I am betting this takes up through the summer as this long jockeying to end game drags on.

Recall that the Allies knew the war was over by about 1943.  We all loved Saving Private Ryan but by 43 after Stalingrad the German Army was never coming back, Allied bombing was settling in, North Africa was done and the West was really just staking out its win with Normandy etc.  It took two years for everyone to fully see what winning losing looked like.

In the PTO some point to Midway, others Guadalcanal, but by mid 44 - definitely after Kohima, Japan was out of gas and going to lose.  How much and what end state took another year to figure out.

So to my mind, Fall 22 was a critical turning point in this war, and now we are just waiting for the finish.  But wars are uncertain affairs.  I accept that I am very likely wrong.  As I have said repeatedly - it is hard enough trying to understand what is happening right now.  Let alone make accurate predictions.

[Seedorf81]

Am I the only one who's a little worried about Haiduk being away for so unusually long? 

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, Seedorf81 said:

Am I the only one who's a little worried about Haiduk being away for so unusually long? 

He was last online here on Wednesday, which is about 5 days ago.  He's had to take time away from posting before, so I am not worried (yet).

Steve

[Butschi]

14 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

You're confusing situations.  There are basically three types of "Russian Soil"

Um... no I am not. I made pretty clear what I mean by Russian soil: Russia (well, Russia before 2022) + maybe Crimea

15 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Because there's evidence that you aren't looking at.  Russia annexed Kherson and immediately lost it.  They lost most of Luhansk that they took in this war.  I don't see the Russian people screaming for nukes to be dropped, just the morons on Russian TV.

See above. Kherson is neither within Russia nor on Crimea (thanks Cpt. Obvious). You are arguing something I didn't say. Also, let me quote myself:

Quote

Since when does the fact that something hasn't happened yet proof that it won't happen in the future?

So, how is what you wrote evidence that because something didn't happen yet it will not happen in the future?

16 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

And by your logic apparently sending a box of ammo to Ukraine could touch off WW3.  Yet it hasn't.  Which indicates, quite strongly, that Russia is bluffing up to a point we haven't yet reached.

Come on, you are deliberately ridiculing my comment. Yes, of course by my logic it is not entirely impossible that at some point one crate of ammo may be one crate of ammo too much. But I think you know full well what I mean. We have sent a lot of ammo and while not impossible I think it is highly unlikely that a box of ammo will trigger WW3. I was talking about escalation and of course there can be a threshold that triggers nukes. Or maybe there isn't. But again, that we haven't crossed that threshold yet is no evidence that it doesn't exist.

And just to be clear: I am not saying that because Russia has nukes we can't help Ukraine or that Ukraine should negotiate for peace or whatever else. I am merely saying that it would be massively unwise to not keep in mind that Russia has nukes and to not let that make us plan accordingly. As poker seems to be the name of the game here: We are playing with pretty high stakes.

 

[danfrodo]

3 minutes ago, Butschi said:

See above. Kherson is neither within Russia nor on Crimea (thanks Cpt. Obvious). You are arguing something I didn't say.

Putin has explicitly stated that Kherson is part of Russia.  He has explicitly stated the same about Crimea for many years.

[Butschi]

27 minutes ago, Kraft said:

Because my understanding of your idea is: red line = homeland in peril. For which the definition of homeland came up, some suggest colonies arent. My point: if it is homeland (the not de-jure regions), there has been no response for close to a year - why should there be now. Because if you argue that tomorrow, he will nuke because Kherson remains in UA hands, then bring up a reason why that is the case, instead of saying, its always possible.

Ok, maybe there is a bit of a misunderstanding. By homeland I meant Russia as in Russia before 2022.

29 minutes ago, Kraft said:

What makes you disagree on my point that this is about what Putin sees as his best personal outcome?

I don't. What makes you think I disagree?

31 minutes ago, Kraft said:

Why would Putin press his luck and see if the west is bluffing with the promised conventional retaliation ( a 100% lose scenario if it happens, for the upside of gaining a marginal, local, *not* war winning improvement on the battlefield).

Vs try to play it off as "established security understanding with partners in the west", much like he called his Kiev failures a "deescalation" with "respected partners".

Why would he believe getting the Russian army, airforce and navy in Ukraine wiped out is a better situation for himself than calling the war a diplomatic success and pretending it solved something like hes been doing all this time.

For which do you think people in Russia would rather storm his palace?

I think we both assume Putin is still a rational player. If he was totally irrational, indeed there would be no point in worrying because having the wrong color of Fruit Loops for breakfast could make him press the button. But rational doesn't mean he applies the same metrics as we do. I don't know what Putin thinks is more likely to be his demise. He basically comes from a background where showing strength is important and so he may think that he must not appear weak. What does he care about a few 100,000 soldiers? Of course we shouldn't be paralyzed by fear but just ignoring an obvious danger is, IMO, just as wrong.

[Battlefront.com]

16 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Um... no I am not. I made pretty clear what I mean by Russian soil: Russia (well, Russia before 2022) + maybe Crimea

See above. Kherson is neither within Russia nor on Crimea (thanks Cpt. Obvious). You are arguing something I didn't say. Also, let me quote myself:

And I'm arguing that all of the stolen Ukrainian territories, including DLPR and Crimea, are probably not considered "Russia" enough to throw nukes around.  You said there was no evidence for this position, but I disagree and that's what my response was about.

Obviously we can not be absolutely sure what Russia might or might not do in a given situation.  And Russia wants it to be that way.  It's one of their strongest plays to make.  It's also typical Soviet doctrine to keep its enemies divided and hesitant.  It's worked well for Russia in the past and is, in fact, why we're in this war now instead of 10-15 years ago.  We need to recognize this is the game Putin is playing and call his bluff.

16 minutes ago, Butschi said:

So, how is what you wrote evidence that because something didn't happen yet it will not happen in the future?'

Because that is how we Humans plan for the future.  We make decisions about tomorrow based on the best information we have today and yesterday.   You are doing the same thing, just not using the same facts in the same way.

16 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Come on, you are deliberately ridiculing my comment. Yes, of course by my logic it is not entirely impossible that at some point one crate of ammo may be one crate of ammo too much. But I think you know full well what I mean. We have sent a lot of ammo and while not impossible I think it is highly unlikely that a box of ammo will trigger WW3. I was talking about escalation and of course there can be a threshold that triggers nukes. Or maybe there isn't. But again, that we haven't crossed that threshold yet is no evidence that it doesn't exist.

Sure, but that's true for your argument as well.  Currently, I think, there's more evidence to suggest that Russia is not going to use nukes any time soon even with Western escalation short of direct intervention.

16 minutes ago, Butschi said:

And just to be clear: I am not saying that because Russia has nukes we can't help Ukraine or that Ukraine should negotiate for peace or whatever else. I am merely saying that it would be massively unwise to not keep in mind that Russia has nukes and to not let that make us plan accordingly. As poker seems to be the name of the game here: We are playing with pretty high stakes.

So then I've lost your point of bringing up this.  We've had the nuke discussion probably 2 dozen times already and it's pretty clear to me that nobody here is dismissing the possibility that Russia might use a nuke under some circumstance or another.  But each time we've had this discussion someone has said "x might trigger a nuke" and that point comes and goes without a nuke being thrown.  Which seems to suggest that, so far anyway, the people thinking Russia understands that using a nuke means self destruction have a better read on the poker game.

Steve

[Simcoe]

29 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Solid points.  I think we knew this was going to be a long war about a month in and that has not changed.  My guess, and it is a guess:

We will see some sort of Russian offensive this winter/spring.  Too many things point to Russia making a hard push for March.  Brace yourselves because it may even include a Ukrainian setback, they do happen.  The problem the RA will have is exploitation.  If the UA has truly been badly attritted we will know then.  Because a local or even operational collapse will happen if it has.  The UA will most likely re-establish the front line.  Russia will then “declare Victory”, hold a parade and then blame everything that happens after as defensive against NATO aggression (see we told you so, they want our Borscht).  Russia will make weak attempts at renormalization and splitting western unity.

UA will then wait until late spring or early summer and bring out the hammer.  They will likely try the one-two punch starting on a flank, pulling RA in that direction because the RA does not have enough troop density along the line and will have to relocate.  And then they will punch down the middle and split the strategic land bridge, likely at Mariupol.  If they can make the coast then the Crimean Bridge is in GLSDB range and we have a new ballgame.  At this point things get dicey as Russia is approaching a “put up or shut up” point with its own people.  I am betting this takes up through the summer as this long jockeying to end game drags on.

Recall that the Allies knew the war was over by about 1943.  We all loved Saving Private Ryan but by 43 after Stalingrad the German Army was never coming back, Allied bombing was settling in, North Africa was done and the West was really just staking out its win with Normandy etc.  It took two years for everyone to fully see what winning losing looked like.

In the PTO some point to Midway, others Guadalcanal, but by mid 44 - definitely after Kohima, Japan was out of gas and going to lose.  How much and what end state took another year to figure out.

So to my mind, Fall 22 was a critical turning point in this war, and now we are just waiting for the finish.  But wars are uncertain affairs.  I accept that I am very likely wrong.  As I have said repeatedly - it is hard enough trying to understand what is happening right now.  Let alone make accurate predictions.

Totally agree. Ukraine is in the driver seat but the Russians still have teeth. The offensive you mentioned feels like Kursk. Stalingrad proved Germany would lose WW2 and Kursk dictated the terms of defeat.

[FancyCat]

Again, France considered Algeria a part of the French homeland, until it wasn't. If France can let go of a 132 year old part their homeland and not nuke it in vengeance, I'm sure Russia can give up a 9 year part of their homeland as well. 

On that note, Russia still adopts the Soviet stance that the Baltic states were annexed willingly into the Soviet Union. Can we really sit and rely on the assertions of the Russian government that Crimea is forever Russian and totally a red line? 

old opinion piece, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/07/14/how-russia-sees-baltic-sovereignty-a48143

Certainly, Putin's actions in annexing Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts should be considered. He has diluted the claim of all Russian annexations of Ukrainian territory in a action to desperately try and stave off Western support. Clearly, annexation isn't a big red line. 

 

[The_Capt]

9 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Ok, maybe there is a bit of a misunderstanding. By homeland I meant Russia as in Russia before 2022.

I don't. What makes you think I disagree?

I think we both assume Putin is still a rational player. If he was totally irrational, indeed there would be no point in worrying because having the wrong color of Fruit Loops for breakfast could make him press the button. But rational doesn't mean he applies the same metrics as we do. I don't know what Putin thinks is more likely to be his demise. He basically comes from a background where showing strength is important and so he may think that he must not appear weak. What does he care about a few 100,000 soldiers? Of course we shouldn't be paralyzed by fear but just ignoring an obvious danger is, IMO, just as wrong.

On a lot of this: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-update-february-5-2023

Very interesting analysis/assessment and speaks to a dictator that is either very risk adverse after making a big gamble and losing, or is much more politically hemmed in than many think.

[JonS]

Uh, they did nuke Algeria.

[The_Capt]

6 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

Totally agree. Ukraine is in the driver seat but the Russians still have teeth. The offensive you mentioned feels like Kursk. Stalingrad proved Germany would lose WW2 and Kursk dictated the terms of defeat.

All war is communication and negotiation.  Yes, what happens this years is going to shape the end state, possibly dramatically.  There is a version of the future where this conflict essentially freezes in location.  If for example, the UA completely fails in a drive for Mariupol.  That might just trigger a lot of sidebar conversations at the political level where tying this whole thing off starts to make more sense.  

All sides are communicating through violence right now.  Violence is a fundamental form of communication in itself.  How that communication translates into reality on the ground - a pliable concept, is going to likely shape the outcome of this war.  Kursk was an enormous exchange of violent information that shaped both sides afterwards.  It shaped them physically, psychologically and socially/politically.  It shaped the negotiated end-state dramatically - if Germany had won, the Soviets may have been down a road to a negotiated end-state.  And it was all wrapped up in sacrifice - how righteous the cost was in the face of the certainty of what the desired end state was.

And we are right in the middle of the same situation, right now.  Different scale, but extremely high stakes.  I have been a tactical commander on the ground in two wars, studied war and warfare my entire adult life, and teach it now to the next generation.  And this war, unfolding on these 2000 pages has likely taught me more in a year than the 3+ decades before.

[kevinkin]

Just a breaking report - I think.

https://www.jpost.com/international/article-730768

"Russia probing alleged Ukrainian use of chemical weapons"

False flags might start increasing this year.

[dan/california]

15 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

All war is communication and negotiation.  Yes, what happens this years is going to shape the end state, possibly dramatically.  There is a version of the future where this conflict essentially freezes in location.  If for example, the UA completely fails in a drive for Mariupol.  That might just trigger a lot of sidebar conversations at the political level where tying this whole thing off starts to make more sense.  

All sides are communicating through violence right now.  Violence is a fundamental form of communication in itself.  How that communication translates into reality on the ground - a pliable concept, is going to likely shape the outcome of this war.  Kursk was an enormous exchange of violent information that shaped both sides afterwards.  It shaped them physically, psychologically and socially/politically.  It shaped the negotiated end-state dramatically - if Germany had won, the Soviets may have been down a road to a negotiated end-state.  And it was all wrapped up in sacrifice - how righteous the cost was in the face of the certainty of what the desired end state was.

And we are right in the middle of the same situation, right now.  Different scale, but extremely high stakes.  I have been a tactical commander on the ground in two wars, studied war and warfare my entire adult life, and teach it now to the next generation.  And this war, unfolding on these 2000 pages has likely taught me more in a year than the 3+ decades before.

On general note about the threads value and possible long term utility for studying the conflict after it ends, is it being archived in a relatively secure way? It isn't one bad drive in one random data center from being corrupted? There are probably a couple of Phd theses, and quite a few staff college article to be extracted from it all. 

Edit: I mean the first step would be to throw ninety nine plus percent of my stuff right out, but still..

 

Edited February 6, 2023 by dan/california

[Butschi]

13 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

You said there was no evidence for this position, but I disagree and that's what my response was about.

Then you are disagreeing with something I didn't say.

13 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Because that is how we Humans plan for the future.  We make decisions about tomorrow based on the best information we have today and yesterday.   You are doing the same thing, just not using the same facts in the same way.

By your logic (we are doing that way too often...): When driving along a straight road in poor visibility you can always go as fast as you can because, so far nothing happened and that is how we humans plan. Ok, now I am deliberately making fun of your comment. Altough this all pretty much sounds like the story of the man who jumps down a very high building and at each story he passes says: "See, so far, everything has gone well."

20 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Currently, I think, there's more evidence to suggest that Russia is not going to use nukes any time soon even with Western escalation short of direct intervention

I agree. But that's why we (the West) escalate cautiously, right?

28 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

So then I've lost your point of bringing up this.

I didn't even bring it up. I commented on this:

6 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

I'm not saying we should all just bend the knee to Putin. I'm saying that Perun seems to misunderstand what people generally are afraid of when they talk about escalation. In the video, it sounds like he is a bit baffled about this.

And down the line reacted to this

3 hours ago, Kraft said:

Just because Putin declared they consider some parts of Ukraine as Russian doesnt mean he will start ww3 for it

by saying that it also doesn't mean that he doesn't.

Note that I also said this:

1 hour ago, Butschi said:

Anyway, this part of the discussion is going round in circles.

So, yeah, we've had this discussion too often without coming to a conclusion. Might as well agree to disagree.

[Kraft]

2 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

Just a breaking report - I think.

https://www.jpost.com/international/article-730768

"Russia probing alleged Ukrainian use of chemical weapons"

False flags might start increasing this year.

There were some RU posts about a ukrainian video showing a DIY suicide drone assembly line with containers that could contain gas, I have no clue on this subject - but there has been no video of it in use. (It would be weird to film the assembly of it, but not publish the results)

 

[FlemFire]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

If you are going to start throwing statements like these around you need to put out the facts:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_financial_crisis_(2014–2016)
https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/RUS/russia/gdp-gross-domestic-product

GDP contraction in 2015 (post sanctions) was somewhere in neighbourhood of 2-2.5%.  It was around 3-3.5% contraction in 2022:

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/impact-sanctions-russian-economy/

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russias-economy-end-2022-deeper-troubles

Inflation.  In 2015 inflation increased to about 13%  (see Wikipedia page on Russian Financial Crisis 2014-2016).  In 2022 annual inflation in Russia - 13.7%

https://www.rateinflation.com/inflation-rate/russia-inflation-rate/

Russia’s capital market has taken a serious hit, dropping by 1/3 and has not recovered (see Impact-sanctions-Russian-economy on the consilium site).

So the reality is that beyond some Ruble propping which comes with some risks as I understand, your central premise is not backed up by facts.  The Russian economy, based on some central indicators like GDP growth, inflation and capital markets has take hits equal to or worse than “the immediate shock of 2014”…and this is without the drop in oil prices that occurred then.  

The entire argument falls apart out of the gate at this point.

Ok, another big statement “we all know” without any foundations in facts.

First off Russia is currently holding about 87 thousand sq kms of Ukraine right now…about 18%.  So on the surface, “oh my that is scary”.  Well it skims over the fact that within that 87 thousand sq kms is the original occupied territories in the Donbas and Crimea, which come to about 42 thousand square km…which they have occupied since 2014.  So in reality the gains in this war come to about 45 thousand sq kms or roughly 7.5% actual gains within Ukraine that they did not have before this war.  Based on 350k dead or wounded, that is about 46k per percentage gained, or 6k sq kms.  I do not know where the Russian finish line is but it had better be close at those loss rates.

I have posted the economic realities of the Donbas, which was one of the lowest economically performing areas of Ukraine pre-war and realities of the Crimea so many times that you can do the work to go dig them out.  But essentially we have debunked the entire “it is all about oil and gas” more than once.  Russia did not need those reserves, or in the case of the Black Sea, already had control of them.  And the costs of accessing them are going to exceed any gains for a very long time, maybe never at this rate.

”The reality” is a lot of people with a quick finger on their favourite Reddit or wherever get these “facts” and then repeat them so that they become “known”.  Few of these people actually put in some time on research and get enough facts to create context.  So a lot of your initial premises are in fact flawed, which unfortunately means that your deductions have got some problems too.  I would respectfully suggest that you need to revisit some of this and then come back to the discussion.

I’m always fascinated whenever I run into people who vomit links and graphs and numbers without even understanding what they mean. You have my thanks for posting those graphs, even if you and apparently a lot of other people do not grasp what they actually mean. I can simplify it for you, though. If you look at the economic metrics of Russia in 2014 and on, you might notice they continue into 2015, 2016, etc. This is called a crisis.

For reference, I suggest dialing back your google searches to 2014 to understand how obvious and apparent this was quite literally immediately. Remember, Russia annexed Crimea in March. By April, that is 1-month later, IMF was already ringing alarm bells and claiming Russia to be in a recession:

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-27221345

 

Note, the financial crisis itself hadn’t even set its teeth in yet. That would be another half-year away as the ruble plummeted in value and investors started abandoning ship at great speed heading into 2015. This is why those graphs show a horror show straight running into and through 2016. Keep that in mind: 2014, 2015, 2016, absolute nosedive.

 

 

Now let’s look at today.

https://www.grid.news/story/global/2023/02/01/russias-economy-is-now-forecast-to-grow-faster-than-germanys-and-britains-in-2023-how-is-that-possible/

 

Pray tell, did you see such forecasts in 2015? In the same way Russians mistakenly thought Zelensky would flee and Kiev would fold, the West mistakenly thought Russia’s economy would buckle. Note, the sanctions in 2014 were small-ball. The sanctions in 2022 are the veritable decoupling of Russia from the entire West. Do I have to explain the gulf of difference there in terms of severity? Do I need an additional 1,000 words to explain the STARK difference between the resultant two data sets that unfolded after? Feel free to let me know.

The rest about lost territories is embarrassing. I grow tired of the propagandized sides of this conflict who fail to see reality for what it is. Losing 1/5th your territory is not to be taken lightly. I just don't really understand what mindset is required to be so cavalier in dismissing that. As for resources: Russia is an oil-state. Its economy is entirely centered around its natural resources, but we're going to sit here and pretend it carving itself access to a shale reserve and natural gas deposits is definitely not in their objective sets. Alright. Whatever. The fact people subsequent to this post make points about Russia losing access to foreign experts still, truly, do not at all grasp what is going on. The global oil market was shunted and shifted and yet people are not recalibrating their thinking at all. 

[Seminole]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Absolutely.  See my previous post.  Even if the West didn't supply Ukraine with equipment there would be an insurgency and that insurgency doesn't need HIMARS or Abrams to defeat Russia.  A lack of Western support simply draws out the conflict much longer.

Plus, there are no realistic scenarios where the West doesn't help Ukraine in a significant way.  If there was, we'd already have seen it.  Support might slacken off in the coming years, but it will never go down to zero.

Steve

I don't discount the practicability of an insurgency in thwarting a conqueror, but do you expect an insurgency to materialize and achieve Ukraine's maximalist goals in Crimea, for example?

 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Afghanistan mostly did as well.  The amount of aid flowing in from neighboring countries was helpful, not critical.

Steve

118 planes along with 333 helicopters weren't brought down with AKs alone.

I think we'd agree the Afghans would have fought on with or without Stingers, but I think they factored in Soviet decision making more critically than you're allowing.