How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

13 minutes ago, poesel said:

From the full article is the information that Poland will deliver the promised tanks, but no spare parts and no training. If that is true and was their intent from the beginning - wow, that would be really cheap.

I would be truly shocked if this were actually the case, if anything I would expect the Poles started training Ukrainian tankers months ago. Now I am quite prepared to believe Poland is trying to stick Germany with the bill...

The larger issue with western tanks and IFVs though points out something a lot of Ukraine's supporters have been saying since March or April of last year, if XYZ system takes months to spool up the training and logistics train, START TODAY! 

[Beleg85]

40 minutes ago, poesel said:

From the full article is the information that Poland will deliver the promised tanks, but no spare parts and no training. If that is true and was their intent from the beginning - wow, that would be really cheap.

BS article playing into apparent German need of copium after Rammstein. Scholz is scholzing again, here article about crews soon starting training in Świetoszowo grounds:

https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/swiat/artykuly/8652922,czolgi-leopard-dla-ukrainy-mariusz-blaszczak-szkolenie-szef-mon-w-kijowie.html

According to different accounts (Blaszczak was in Kyiv yesterday and did several interviews) they already started. Not to mention various other crews and soldiers from Ukraine taking training already here- albeit we still don't know if they will be part of this new brigade raiding on post-soviet stuff or part of earlier programms.

Blame Poland n-time, playing on sterotypes. German media could get little more creative. *

*Not that critique is unsubstantiated in various other aspects, but c'mon...

Edited February 4, 2023 by Beleg85

[Offshoot]

25 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Interesting to see an "O" mark on the knocked out tank at the end of the clip.  I haven't seen one of those in a while.

I counted 8 vehicles in this clip, 3 being tanks and at least 3 IFVs.  Not sure about the other 2.

Steve

The Ukrainians got a second Russian Arctic TOR M2DT. It was curious to see a "V" on it. Maybe these systems have been operating in Ukraine for a while or are they still marking vehicles this way?

 

Edited February 4, 2023 by Offshoot

[Offshoot]

15 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

 

In his thread he says "The city is almost deserted save for the odd, usually older, civilian who refuses to leave."

The Kyiv Independent has a recent article talking to civilians still there. It makes for some grim reading in a way, but still interesting, especially in the context of discussions in this thread about what will happen with the civilian population if Ukraine takes back the Donbass.

https://kyivindependent.com/national/one-night-in-bakhmut-inside-the-bleak-world-of-citys-civilians-as-russia-draws-closer

[kevinkin]

Too cold out today ... let's head south:

https://news.usni.org/2023/02/03/u-s-destroyer-operating-near-the-black-sea-for-first-time-since-russia-invaded-ukraine

My blockade My Blockade! OK one ship, but a kick *** one at that. 

https://www.businessinsider.com/us-mq9-drones-to-greece-amid-ukraine-war-turkey-tensions-2023-1

And add a little spice. 

Supplies meant for Ukraine are often unloaded at the Greek port of Alexandroupolis and sent via rail through Bulgaria and Romania. The same network supports US deployments to the Black Sea region.

[dan/california]

 

Quote

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/02/03/europe-putin-ukraine-google-translate-00079301

Google translate has had a major effect on this war...

[kevinkin]

Long on history, but short on the raid:

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraines-uncrewed-raid-sevastopol-and-future-war-sea

Ultimately, uncrewed capabilities represent one vector among many in which navies are generating cheap mass. This makes sense as mass – to a much greater extent than technology – has been a historical predictor of success in naval warfare, and efforts to shift from forces built around a small number of exquisite capabilities to larger maritime force structures are understandable. Such efforts, which leverage commercial capabilities and in some cases personnel, also bridge some of the bifurcation between countries’ commercial maritime sectors and their military force structures.

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

True, it could be that Russia learned that the widespread use of small points of pressure strategy was not producing a net positive effect, causing them to change strategy rather than being obligated to because of shortages.

However, coupled with other evidence we've seen of shortages (in particular munitions and armored vehicles), I think it is pretty safe to conclude that part of why Russia is no longer attacking 100 places every day is that it can't.  At a minimum they would be keeping up the constant shelling of Ukrainian positions, but that's been off the menu for months now.

What none of this tells us is if they have sufficient stocks of munitions and equipment to conduct a large scale offensive or if it will just be mobiks with fixed bayonets screaming URAAAAAH!

Steve

And it's also equivalently possible that they haven't learned a thing -  that they're only attacking in less places due to less resources and not out of any deeper insight. If  those resources increase then they might instinctively widen and increase their assault profile. 

This could happen mid-offensive - they start having some success, resources are increasing so they start to strike other objectives but at the cost of losing pressure on the initial primary targets or process. It wouldn't be the first time,  and they're susceptible to opportunism. 

I don't think it's safe to conclude anything like Russia is unable to attack because it can't. You're negating the possibility of a good decision on their end, which feels dangerous. 

One thing I'm very wary of is assuming that their current attack format (infantry/arty centric) is how they're going to fight for the rest of the year,  or even the rest of this burgeoning offensive. 

There's clear indications over the last 3 months that they've been holding back certain quantities of personnel and vehicles. Possibly arty ammo also. 

This could be basic sensible reserve building (to counter a UKR offensive), simple reconstitution of shattered units (we know of VDV being restocked and thrown back into Kremina - but not all the VDV from Kherson) and/or the building of an offensive reserve to reinforce local success and amplify exploitation. 

Once they achieve certain tactical opportunities they could start to incorporate those rebuilt forces and shift the nature of their assaults to more mechanized profile.

If UKR defense is set for optimal effect against infabtry/arty assault (due to necessity over the last few months)  then an abrupt shift at a tactical level to massed mech assault could create local successes that the UKR defenders might initially struggle to contain,  due to that posture. Operational the ZSU would adapt but still,  they'd be in the back foot and under increasing pressure. 

Edited February 4, 2023 by Kinophile

[billbindc]

14 hours ago, The_Capt said:

That is a solid deduction.  I have no doubt that there is price gouging going on with respect to Russia on both imports and exports.  Russia’s trade position is pretty vulnerable as its market has shrunk pretty dramatically.  As has been repeated here many times “well the whole world is not the west”, well that is true but the west does do business with the pretty much the entire world. This means that open and free trading with Russia at this point is going to get noticed and may have repercussions, both above and below water lines.  

Then those who do trade with Russia, they are going to be in a position to jack up prices or push exports from Russia down.

An anecdote from the shipping insurance business I heard recently: 

There is a non-government group in DC that normally works on Iran sanctions. In that realm they've become quite good at noticing what goes on bulk shippers. Friends in the shipping insurance business have started getting calls from them saying "Hey...just a tip, that particular bulk ship has what may be sanctioned Russian cargo. You might want to think about whether or not it's a good idea to insure that boat." If you are shipping insurer, what do you do that information? Well, you can't afford to mess with sanctions so you immediately send a quit notice and pull the ship's insurance. That sends the carrier into the secondary or tertiary...or god forbid...the Iranian/Russian insurance combine that's trying to get set up to secure insurance and if you don't, not port of any consequence will let you dock, fuel or unload. That's a huge pain in the ***, causes big delays and is very expensive. 

Now imagine that happening up and down the line at every stage of trade for Russia. I can easily see chips becoming 4 times as expensive. 

[sburke]

26 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Once they achieve certain tactical opportunities they could start to incorporate those rebuilt forces and shift the nature of their assaults to more mechanized profile.

If UKR defense is set for optimal effect against infabtry/arty assault (due to necessity over the last few months)  then an abrupt shift at a tactical level to massed mech assault could create local successes that the UKR defenders might initially struggle to contain,  due to that posture. Operational the ZSU would adapt but still,  they'd be in the back foot and under increasing pressure. 

what are the odds of UA missing a mech buildup by Russia for not just the mech units but their logistical tail on a scale to make any difference?

[The_Capt]

13 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

And it's also equivalently possible that they haven't learned a thing -  that they're only attacking in less places due to less resources and not out of any deeper insight. If  those resources increase then they might instinctively widen and increase their assault profile. 

This could happen mid-offensive - they start having some success, resources are increasing so they start to strike other objectives but at the cost of losing pressure on the initial primary targets or process. It wouldn't be the first time,  and they're susceptible to opportunism. 

I don't think it's safe to conclude anything like Russia is unable to attack because it can't. You're negating the possibility of a good decision on their end, which feels dangerous. 

One thing I'm very wary of is assuming that they're current attack format (infantry/arty centric) is how they're going to fight for the rest of the year,  or even the rest of this burgeoning offensive. 

There's clear indications over the last 3 months that they've been holding back certain quantities of personnel and vehicles. Possibly arty ammo also. 

This could be basic sensible reserve building (to counter a UKR offensive), simple reconstitution of shattered units (we know of VDV being restocked and thrown back into Kremina - but not all the VDV from Kherson) and/or the building of an offensive reserve to reinforce local success and amplify exploitation. 

 

This is the Russian Rabbit theory, that Russia has held back some sort of combined arms formation(s) that will spring when the conditions are right.  We know that this is very likely for the UA right now, the fact we are pushing enough western equipment and trained troops is a pretty good indicator.  However, for the RA things are a lot less clear.  First issue is that, "will combined arms even work for the RA?"  It has had a terrible track record along those lines in the first 6 months of the war - remember "Russian's suck" versus "Warfare has moved on" discussions?  So even if the RA does have a nasty rabbit, whether or not it will even run is a big question.  The fact that the RA is pretty much helpless to stop UA ISR means that any rabbits are going to be highly visible as they form up and that will mean deep strikes etc.

Second, does Russia have the capacity left for a meaningful combined arms heavy force?  I suspect they do but it is going to be of much lower quality than what we saw at the beginning of the war.  I would not be surprised if they can pull together some really elite looking units, but entire formations when their best forces were really badly chopped up could be a stretch.  Let alone the sustainment and support needed to make them competitive.  

As to why the narrower lines of operations happening now - well one answer is deliberate, the other is imposed.  In the end neither really matter as the narrower lines of operations are not really working any better than the broad ones we saw last summer.  The RA has not achieved breakthrough or a tempo that is outstripping the UAs ability to respond - at least not that we have seen.  We have seen extremely modest gains 5-10 km in a month is glacial, and not going to dislocate the UA who still has functioning transportation infrastructure and the deep pockets of the west for force generation and sustainment.

I think in the end this war has taught me that war is really a continuing negotiation with reality for all sides.  That reality is one produced by this enormous collision of human social systems - so artificial.  Right now both the RA, UA and West are negotiating with the reality of the situation.  Everyone is trying to evolve and adapt to a dynamic environment faster and better than the opponent.  Russia is likely doing human wave type attacks on narrow frontages because that is the best they can do while negotiating with this reality in the Donbas.  These do not look like probes or feints, they are all out assaults leading to WWI levels of daily losses (quiet days on the Western Front to be sure).   The UAs best play is to go defence.  (Weird eh?  We were thinking it was going to go the other way this winter.)  And let the RA crash on the their shores.  We will see a shift in negotiation strategies but remember they are going to be built on the current ones - you have to carry the baggage of the past with you.    

[The_Capt]

26 minutes ago, billbindc said:

An anecdote from the shipping insurance business I heard recently: 

There is a non-government group in DC that normally works on Iran sanctions. In that realm they've become quite good at noticing what goes on bulk shippers. Friends in the shipping insurance business have started getting calls from them saying "Hey...just a tip, that particular bulk ship has what may be sanctioned Russian cargo. You might want to think about whether or not it's a good idea to insure that boat." If you are shipping insurer, what do you do that information? Well, you can't afford to mess with sanctions so you immediately send a quit notice and pull the ship's insurance. That sends the carrier into the secondary or tertiary...or god forbid...the Iranian/Russian insurance combine that's trying to get set up to secure insurance and if you don't, not port of any consequence will let you dock, fuel or unload. That's a huge pain in the ***, causes big delays and is very expensive. 

Now imagine that happening up and down the line at every stage of trade for Russia. I can easily see chips becoming 4 times as expensive. 

Oh that is good.  Sanctions are not a tap that are turned off, they are wires that are pulled that force and opponent to re-wire.  COVID messed with global supply chains, and now we are projecting a continuation of this onto Russia.

[Beleg85]

Interesting thread about corruption in the Russian army on example of one (ugly as hell...) tracked vehicle:

 

[billbindc]

6 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Oh that is good.  Sanctions are not a tap that are turned off, they are wires that are pulled that force and opponent to re-wire.  COVID messed with global supply chains, and now we are projecting a continuation of this onto Russia.

What's interesting about it is that it's not at all official...or at least not directly. It's just a call from some folks at what amounts to a lobbying shop but it has very serious ramifications to costs of trade for Russia. People often imagine soft power is KPop or Hollywood and it is...but it's also something as tangible as this.

[Offshoot]

6 hours ago, JonS said:

Yeah, I did read the thread, but that graph has exactly the same issue: the info in it *might* the sanctions aren't working, but it could also mean they're working really well. That's the problem with using proxy measures, especially with something as inherently fungible as money.

Indeed. That is why the original source for the data is better than a cut and paste tweet. It includes a section describing why sanctions assessment is hard and others that discuss their methodology and limitations.

Edited February 4, 2023 by Offshoot

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

This is the Russian Rabbit theory, that Russia has held back some sort of combined arms formation(s) that will spring when the conditions are right.  We know that this is very likely for the UA right now, the fact we are pushing enough western equipment and trained troops is a pretty good indicator.  However, for the RA things are a lot less clear.  First issue is that, "will combined arms even work for the RA?"  It has had a terrible track record along those lines in the first 6 months of the war - remember "Russian's suck" versus "Warfare has moved on" discussions?  So even if the RA does have a nasty rabbit, whether or not it will even run is a big question.  The fact that the RA is pretty much helpless to stop UA ISR means that any rabbits are going to be highly visible as they form up and that will mean deep strikes etc.

Second, does Russia have the capacity left for a meaningful combined arms heavy force?  I suspect they do but it is going to be of much lower quality than what we saw at the beginning of the war.  I would not be surprised if they can pull together some really elite looking units, but entire formations when their best forces were really badly chopped up could be a stretch.  Let alone the sustainment and support needed to make them competitive.  

As to why the narrower lines of operations happening now - well one answer is deliberate, the other is imposed.  In the end neither really matter as the narrower lines of operations are not really working any better than the broad ones we saw last summer.  The RA has not achieved breakthrough or a tempo that is outstripping the UAs ability to respond - at least not that we have seen.  We have seen extremely modest gains 5-10 km in a month is glacial, and not going to dislocate the UA who still has functioning transportation infrastructure and the deep pockets of the west for force generation and sustainment.

I think in the end this war has taught me that war is really a continuing negotiation with reality for all sides.  That reality is one produced by this enormous collision of human social systems - so artificial.  Right now both the RA, UA and West are negotiating with the reality of the situation.  Everyone is trying to evolve and adapt to a dynamic environment faster and better than the opponent.  Russia is likely doing human wave type attacks on narrow frontages because that is the best they can do while negotiating with this reality in the Donbas.  These do not look like probes or feints, they are all out assaults leading to WWI levels of daily losses (quiet days on the Western Front to be sure).   The UAs best play is to go defence.  (Weird eh?  We were thinking it was going to go the other way this winter.)  And let the RA crash on the their shores.  We will see a shift in negotiation strategies but remember they are going to be built on the current ones - you have to carry the baggage of the past with you.    

Of all the various theories bouncing around, the above seems like it best fits the information we actually know.  Add in the theory, recent subject of a Perun video, that some of the russian decisions are as much political as strategic and it fits very well.  But I am still, sadly, thinking we won't really know much until the ground dries, which is sometime in April or May. 

 

[cesmonkey]

 

[danfrodo]

Summary here, not much we don't know.  Just reinforces our WW1 situation at kreminna.  RU pundits saying they've basically got Bakhmut in the bag & it will fall soon which will unhinge other sectors.  We'll see.  Little thing on the UKR T84.  I'm most interested in what's happening on Svatove-Kremmina line where RU is pushing back but everyone overall seems stuck due to mud.

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/2/4/2151035/-Ukraine-update-The-Ukrainian-supertank-is-still-on-the-prowl-but-there-simply-aren-t-enough

 

[Vet 0369]

On 2/2/2023 at 9:10 PM, The_Capt said:

Man these guys definitely have something for balloons.  So 1) slow…glacial compared to a LEO satellite, 2) highly visible with radars - big *** bag of gas, 3) at mercy of winds.

For operational ISR and GPS back up sure.  As a strat ISR platform…man I am not entirely onboard.

Not quite sure of this. Perhaps it is meant only for intelligence on “signals.” I’m sure that with Alaska and the contiguous U.S. and Canada being overflown, the signal traffic must be substantial. I remember many incidents in the 1960s of Soviet “Bears” flying just outside of U.S. and Canadian airspace, and watching Soviet “Trawlers” just 3 miles off the east coast of Massachusetts whose sole purpose was to gather signal intelligence. Not an uncommon practice. The Chinese ballon might be for the exact same purpose. What we don’t know about is whether or not it is “manned.” The payload is the size of three buses, so that is a distinct possibility. 
 

Additionally, I have heaRd a report that there is also one overflying South America, so perhaps they have two “errant weather balloons?”

[danfrodo]

New YT video, poor quality, of Springsteen & band playing somewhere.  The only reason I am sharing is because guitarist Steven Van Zandt has a very pro UKR paint job on his stratocaster.  Well played, Mr Van Zandt.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EygSxgytxm4

 

 

[Erwin]

FWIW:  The US remorselessly grinds into action:

"President Biden said Saturday that the U.S. would address the suspected Chinese surveillance balloon, with an official saying that the  administration is considering shooting down the craft once it is over the Atlantic Ocean later today." 

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-considers-shooting-down-chinese-spy-balloon-over-atlantic-11675536746?mod=hp_lead_pos1

"“We’re gonna take care of it,” Mr. Biden said..."

Edited February 4, 2023 by Erwin

[Zeleban]

New message from Mashovets. This time he paid attention to the Russian special forces on the territory of Ukraine, as well as the aviation group on the territory of Belarus.

The 2nd separate brigade of special forces - a separate consolidated tactical detachment is fixed, deployed in the area of the village of Valuyki, and its reconnaissance and sabotage groups (RSG) regularly roam along the border of Ukraine and the line of contact in the Kharkiv and Kupyansk directions.

3rd separate Special Forces Brigade - at least twice recorded southwest of Kremennaya, another RSG operated in the area of the village of Bogdanovskoye

10th separate Special Forces Brigade - seen in the area of the village of Razdolnoye east of the city of Novaya Kakhovka (probably, in the area of village of Zeleny Pod, the base of the combined tactical detachment of the brigade is deployed)

14th separate Special Forces Brigade - its units are deployed in Donetsk, at least everyone sees it there regularly, most likely they "work on short notice" to the west of the city, and their base is in the city itself

16th separate Special Forces Brigade - probably its units use the area of the village of Troitskoye to base their forward base, it is quite possible that the main base is deployed in the city of Gorlovka.

22nd separate Special Forces Brigade - based on Tokmak (forward group), but the main base, apparently, is located in Berdyansk.

24th separate Special Forces Brigade - most likely aimed at Seversk - Liman, Kramatorsk, at least it was seen in the area of Lysichansk. It probably operates with at least one consolidated tactical detachment, precisely in this direction.

45th separate Special Forces Brigade - its RSGs began to be regularly fixed in the direction of Orekhovo and to the east. Apparently, at least one combined detachment of the brigade was deployed in the Zaporozhye direction quite recently, now it is they who are very actively wandering around the "gray zone" in the Orekhovo region.

All 4 naval reconnaissance points of the naval forces of the Russian Federation are deployed in those directions where the main forces and means of the brigades of the marines (coastal defense) of the respective fleets operate (for example, the naval reconnaissance point of the Black Sea Fleet near the city of Volnovakha, pretends to be a "unit" 155 th arr MP of the same Black Sea Fleet).

A more interesting position of the forces and means of the special operations forces of the armed forces of the Russian Federation in particular:

part of the forces and means of the special operations forces (most likely a separate detachment / special training center "Senezh") and some command group of special operations forces deployed in the Belgorod-Valuyki area, not far from the subsection of the 2nd separate special forces brigade)

special training center "Kubinka-2" and another forward group, starting from January 8, appeared in the Brest region (Belarus), while "studying the combat area".

It is quite likely that in the near future we should expect an intensification of reconnaissance and sabotage activities of the enemy in these directions.

To date, the activity of units and subunits of the Special Forces of the RF Armed Forces as part of an enemy force grouping is recorded only in certain directions and sectors, which is quite possibly due to several reasons:

 

losses

 

the desire to hide the main areas of "interest" of the command of the Russian troops

the need to re-equip the relevant units and units of special forces, respectively, bringing their combat abilities to some more or less acceptable level.

Among the main tasks for which the Russian military command uses SPP units are the following:

Guidance and adjustment of "high-precision" means of destruction of Russian troops, including UAVs, AOS. Yes, very often, the Russian command uses groups of "special forces" as banal spotters of artillery fire at the tactical level.

Moreover, it is not uncommon for the Russian command to throw units of its "special forces" into assault attacks or "put them on the defensive for reinforcement." In fact, he uses his special forces as "elite" infantry.

Conducting search and reconnaissance operations in tactical and very rarely the nearest operational zones. This is recorded from time to time (Russian special forces have slipped into banal military intelligence, there have been cases when they purposefully "worked" on individual platoon strongholds, company strongholds), etc.

In fact, the current state of units and subunits of the Special Forces of the RF Armed Forces does not allow the Russian military command to use them for something more serious and "deep" than tactical (military) intelligence. And in some cases, it tritely uses its "special forces" as an elite assault infantry (for example, such cases were recorded in the 22nd and 24th special forces brigades).

[Zeleban]

the command of the Belarusian troops currently has the following aviation component:

61st Fighter Aviation Brigade, Baranovichi Air Base (AB), up to 8 combat-ready MiG-29s and 4 Su-30SMs;

116th assault aviation brigade, AB "Lida", up to - 17 Su-25s (of which 11-12 are in combat readiness) + up to 10 Yak-130s and up to 8 L-39s combat-ready (out of 11 and 10, which in general, respectively);

for direct support of ground troops, the forces and means of army aviation (AA) - the 50th mixed aviation brigade, AB "Machulishchi" - in combat-ready condition, up to 10 Mi-8 and 5 Mi-24. From its composition, up to two Mi-8s and 5 Mi-24s were deployed at the forward airfields "Luninets" and "Osovtsy", respectively.

Deployment of forces and means of air defense of Belarus in the zone of responsibility of the operational command "South", which continues to unfold:

 

Bereza airfield - S-300PS/PT;

 

Luninets village area - S-300PS / PT battalion (cover the deployment area of the Iskander OTRK)

 

district of the city of Brest - S-300PS / PT battalion;

 

Zamshany village area - S-300PS/PT battalion;

Zyabrovka airfield - S-400 battalion, S-300PM battalion;

 

Bokov airfield (Mozyr) - S-400 battalion, S-300 battalion.

aviation component of Russia on the territory of Belarus:

AB "Baranovichi" - up to 8 Su-34s (of which at least 2 are "under repair", together with 3 MiG-31K is the main "strike" element of the Russian aviation component in Belarus), as well as up to 5 Su-30SM (2 units are constantly on combat duty, + 1 reserve, the main purpose is to escort and protect the Su-34, MiG-31K and A-50, during their combat use);

Machulishchi AB - up to 3 MiG-31K (of which at least 1 is "under repair"), 2 Su-24MR (regularly conduct reconnaissance along the Ukrainian border), 1 AWACS A-50U aircraft (as far as I I understand that it is directly related to the use of the X-47M2 airborne aeroballistic complex - either it is needed to guide the missiles themselves, or without this "saucer", the MiG-31 simply "do not navigate in space" at the right level);

at the Luninets airfield, a deployed group of Russian army aviation - up to 10 Mi-8s, and a link (of 4 units) of attack Mi-24s, of which at least 1 - "got a little sick." This is for those mobilized boobies who study "military science in a real way" at Belarusian training grounds, and also to strengthen the Belarusian AA itself.

[Zeleban]

Among the main military events that have occurred (are taking place) on the territory of Belarus recently, in addition to the daily movement of forces and means of Belarus and Russia, 2 events have attracted my attention:

in the Training Center of the Special Forces of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus "Losvido", the military personnel of the 103rd Airborne Brigade of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus continue some training with Russian military units (as far as I understand - from the composition of the Russian Airborne Forces mobilized into the ranks of the Airborne Forces). And this can not only tell a lot to someone who understands this, but even raise certain questions in this sense. For example, what can Belarusian paratroopers teach Russians if they really "did not fight and did not take part" in the so-called NWO ...? Or, since when did the Russian airborne troops run out of their own instructors with combat experience, and so much so that it was necessary to pull their paratroopers to Belarus so that the local paratroopers, who a priori allegedly "did not fight" and "are not going to" fight " , taught and prepared them for the war in Ukraine?What kind of training and mobilization perversion is this?

and the second event, this is the approaching end of the "field exit on alarm" in the area of city of Borisov (227th training center) of the tank company of the 355th separate tank battalion of the 120th motorized rifle brigade from Uruchcha (Minsk). This is already the fourth (or even the fifth, because, to be honest, I have already lost my count a little) "field exit on alarm" (at least 2 of them were associated with a march to a fairly distant distance) of tank and motorized rifle units armed forces of Belarus, which followed within a very short period of time, even despite the official "end", the so-called "combat readiness exercises".

 

[_Morpheus_]

Today Ukraine returned 116 people from the Russian captivity. They didn't taste any fresh fruits or vegetables for a ~year

How little is needed to make a person happy....