How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Winged Horseman]

Poland seems to reinforce UA with one company worth of Leopard 2. 

Finally something moves on this topic.

Pending question is: when?

 

[FancyCat]

 

[Rokko]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

It is my hope that the reason we're not seeing a bigger effort to crush the Russians in the central Donbas front (Soledar/Bakhmut) is because there's something much grander in the works and Ukraine (correctly) doesn't want to get distracted by a bloody sideshow.

It is the second week of January and the weather is finally seeming like it will be stable for a while.  Hopefully we will see if Ukraine is being sensible an taking some short term pain for a larger long term gain, or if there's something else going on that isn't as positive.

Steve

It seems that Ukraine has had a hard time stockpiling shells, HIMARS missiles, etc. before, so it would make sense to try and defend Bakhmut/Soledar on a "shoestring budget", even if that is a hard choice to make probably, trading lives for basically being able to save up shells and so on for later. I remember reading somewhere, e.g., that they had to kick of the Kharkiv offensive with only 1/5th of the stockpiled ammunition they had initially wanted for it. Also, back in July/August HIMARS were working overtime, when targets were juicy still plenty and the Russians were yet to take effective countermeasures. Now they appear to strike much more rarely. Curiously, most HIMARS strikes I've read about in recent weeks were roughly in the Melitopol direction. Maybe some "discrete" shaping operations are already underway?

[FancyCat]

The Russian MFA spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, asked why Kazakhstan's embassy was helping Ukrainian civilians with what is essentially a place to charge phones, get hot food and be warm, and was told by Kazakhstan that the yurt was not set up by them, but also why is the yurt a issue in the first place?

A telling admission of the aims of the Russian air campaign especially for a MFA, aren't those where doves usually reside in?

 

 

[Rokko]

On 1/10/2023 at 3:55 PM, Zeleban said:

Yes, in the original version of the video, you could hear their commander correcting their actions, counting the number of Russians in the trench, telling them where to throw a grenade.

I think increasing the grenade does not make sense. After all, even despite the fact that a person survived after a grenade explosion, he was still put out of action and could not continue active resistance. Increasing the size of the grenade will make it heavier and the throw range will decrease.

For grenades that are meant to be actually thrown, you are probably right. Although they're was an awful lot of bickering and back-and-forth back in HQ whether this or that grenade did actually kill the guy, or "is he still moving", which is probably also not great for the guys on the ground trying to press the attack, although in this case the Russians were so clearly outmatched that it didn't really matter.

For drone-dropped grenades, I've seen way too many videos of "missed opportunities", i.e. a grenade lands square in middle of a bunch of guys, but 4 out off 5 manage to scatter with minor wounds at best. But commercial drones dropping hand grenades is a crutch solution anyways implemented only for lack of any better solutions, that are actually available.

[_Morpheus_]

1 hour ago, Winged Horseman said:

Poland seems to reinforce UA with one company worth of Leopard 2. 

Finally something moves on this topic.

Pending question is: when?

 

Does Poland need an approval from Germany to do that ?
 

Looks like Poland don't want to wait an approval because it could take time. Anyway, I would not believe Germany will say: NO we don't allow that.

[Huba]

11 minutes ago, _Morpheus_ said:

Does Poland need an approval from Germany to do that ?
 

Looks like Poland don't want to wait an approval because it could take time. Anyway, I would not believe Germany will say: NO we don't allow that.

Hopefully that will be enough, but you never know - unless Washington is doing it, Scholz migh still try to weasel out of it I guess. But I think US will jump on the bandwagon too and pledges some armor during upcoming Ramstein meeting.

Edited January 11, 2023 by Huba

[dan/california]

33 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

The Russian MFA spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, asked why Kazakhstan's embassy was helping Ukrainian civilians with what is essentially a place to charge phones, get hot food and be warm, and was told by Kazakhstan that the yurt was not set up by them, but also why is the yurt a issue in the first place?

A telling admission of the aims of the Russian air campaign especially for a MFA, aren't those where doves usually reside in?

 

 

It is a telling admission that that woman needs her very own lamp post, or at the very least an engraved seat at the Hague.

 

[danfrodo]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

And we are back to this.  The theory is that somehow if we had showered Ukraine in [Insert favored IFV, tank or whatever] that this war would be over by now.  This is gross oversimplification bordering on disinformation with an undertone of western biases that are frankly bordering on imperial prejudices.

1.  Ukraine has a large arms industry of its own: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_industry_of_Ukraine.  It is no doubt under stress but we have no reports it is falling apart.  It needs all the help it can get, so lets start there.

2.  Ukraine had pretty healthy mechanized force before this war started armed, not surprisingly with its own equipment. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_Ground_Forces.  They have sustained losses, but do we have any reports of the UA being critically short of anything?  Any major losses due to those shortfalls?  Ok, so lets not freak out with the "Ukraine is collapsing because they do not have Marders" thing.

3.  Ukraine has captured an obscene amount of Russian equipment - https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html.  If half of those Russian vehicles have been made fit for battle Ukraine likely has more of some natures that it did at the start of the war.  Any support we can to make that happen smoother, better and faster is a very good idea.

4.  Heavy's overall value proposition is in doubt in this entire thing.  The Russians had mountains of it and it made no difference.  The UA is much smarter so I suspect they have already figured out the right conditions for heavy to work and are working to set it up.  We should be aiming at supporting the UA in creating those conditions as a priority, exploitation of that is something I am pretty sure they can cover.

5.  Every sexy peice of western equipment comes with a heavy logistics bill (we have discussed this), and in large numbers that bill could make the UAs life harder, not easier to sustain this potpourri of western hardware.

This whole line of thought, though well intentioned, also smacks of western superiority complex - "well if we had simply given those poor dirty Ukrainian rabble our superior western equipment they would have put Ivan on the run by now...oh dear, shame on us." 

Ukraine has thousands of APCs/IFVs - 40 Marders is not going to magically turn the tide anymore than 100 Leo 2s, or 50 Bradleys or freakin M1s.

Should we give Ukraine support? Absolutely. Should that include complete capability force packages that they can build units around? - again, yes. Should we give them versions of what they already have and can sustain? - definitely.  Should we prioritize things that do make an actual difference?  Like ISR, long range fires, AD and how about simple money so that soldiers get paid and their families can buy groceries?  How about shoring up the existing Ukrainian arms industry and military architecture so they can stop being so dependent on western support? Should we train and support their force generation - oh, most definitely.  

If someone said we had to decide between training 75k Ukraine troops or another 100 Marders, I already know what the right answer is.  You cannot flood a military built on an entirely different fleet system, in the middle of a a war, and magically make it all go away.  You can wring hands and cry "oh dear, think about all the good Ukrainain boys who may have survived if they were in Bradleys", well that assumes a Bradley is shell, mine and ATGM proof as well as invisible to begin with.  It also fails to fundamentally understand how militaries are built, sustained and employed.

Ukraine needs broad holistic and comprehensive support on many levels.  Niche, hi profile sexy equipment donations are nice but we cannot lose sight of the fundamentals - the stuff that really makes a difference.  And when this war is over, that is when the real support will be needed.  We had better see as much hand wringing and noise on donating farm equipment, reconstruction infrastructure and economic stimulus as we have seen on Marders/Bradleys or there was no point to this whole thing.

Excellent points, TheCapt.  but we have already flooded UKR w mountains of western equipment of varying types.  And we've seen assaults going forward from HUMMVs & M113s firing 50 cals -- that is incredibly sub-optimum relative to what the west had available in large numbers.  Plus all the other dozens of other different vehicles that have been sent like MRAPS, Aussie-version of MRAPS, bunches of armored cars, etc.   What we're already doing is logistically complicated.

What I am saying is that we could've sent large numbers of one or two kinds of much, much better AFVs 6 months ago instead of the piecemeal b--s--t we've been sending.  We've got lots of bradleys that are in storage, for example.  We already have the logistics mess because every mechanized unit has a different mix of stuff.  It would've been better to settle and standardize on a couple AFVs early on.   Then we'd only have those two plus the typical soviet stuff that already exists.   And going forward we'll continually wish we had done this six months previous as we watch assaults going forward w MRAPS and HUMMVs.

[Twisk]

Re: Heavier equipement to Ukraine

One of the obvious benefits of giving Ukraine W. IFVs or tanks (although I think lighter IFV is better). Is superiority of thermals. Sure Ukraine has many BMP-1,2 and many Soviet style tanks but if CM can teach only one lesson is that thermals are king and western thermals are the best.

I think better argument is that Ukraine doesn't need heavier western equipment but does need western thermals. Replace guntruck in video with western MRAP with thermal CROW and that is big advantage.


Re: Ukraine being static

We saw maybe 9 month ago in this area (before Ukraine won Karhkov and Kherson) Ukraine suffer pushback in area of Donbass without reaction. We remember time when Russia "breakthrough" a TDF unit and gained few KM? Everyone was in big panic but reality was that it was not so critical.

Again Russia can attack and gain few KM at Bahkmut and fighting is very bloody. But Ukraine is killing Russians in the open and able to husband resources for bigger moves later while Russia expends a lot of energy for little gain. Like contextually we are literally talking about great russian victories of capturing a salt mine? This is like Stalingrad where Germans have big victory of capturing grain elevator even though front runs for 3,000 kilometer.

[RandomCommenter]

Surovkin is fired!

I guess he's lucky he didn't fall out of a window

From FT

Russia demotes ‘General Armageddon’ after battlefield failures

Valery Gerasimov replaces Sergei Surovikin, who was appointed in October as head of Ukraine campaign

 

Russia has replaced Sergei Surovikin after barely three months as head of its Ukraine campaign following a succession of battlefield setbacks and failure to turn the war in Moscow’s favour.

 

Surovikin, whose nicknames include “General Armageddon”, will be replaced by Russia’s highest ranking military officer, Valery Gerasimov. Surovikin will stay on as one of his deputies.

 

The reshuffle — the second since the start of the full-scale invasion in February, comes after the Russian army lost ground to a Ukrainian counteroffensive and sparked a domestic backlash over a deadly strike against newly mobilised conscripts in a barracks in east Ukraine on New Year’s Day.

 

When he was appointed to the top job in October, the 56-year-old Surovikin was expected to turn round Russia’s flagging assault through escalation and brutal tactics developed during his leadership of the country’s forces in Syria.

 

But in those three months Russia lost control of the southern town of Kherson, the only regional Ukrainian capital it had managed to capture, and struggled to provide basic equipment, accommodation and modern weapons for the 300,000 men it began conscripting in September.

 

Together with deadly military mistakes — such as the housing of hundreds of conscripts in a single building in the town of Makiivka, leading to the deaths of dozens in a rocket strike by Kyiv — territorial losses have led to harsh rebukes from the Russian pro-war rightwing.

 

Surovikin also oversaw an intense campaign of strikes on civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, regularly knocking out electricity in cities but not shaking up the balance of power on the front line.

 

Gerasimov, Russia’s 67-year-old chief of the general staff and its deputy defence minister, will take over as leader of the Joint Forces Group in the zone of the “special military operation”, the name Moscow gives to its invasion of Ukraine, which has entered its 11th month.

 

Oleg Salyukov, commander of the ground forces, and Alexei Kim, deputy chief of the general staff, were also appointed deputies to Gerasimov.

 

Russia’s defence ministry said the appointment of Gerasimov was a “raising of the status of the leadership” of the military force in Ukraine, a move “associated with the expansion of the scale of tasks to be accomplished”.

 

These tasks, it said, included “the need to organise closer co-operation between branches and services of the armed forces” and an “increase in the quality of all types of provision, and the effectiveness of management of troops”.

 

Since March, when Russia recorded its biggest gains, the territories seized and occupied by Moscow’s forces have more than halved in size, following significant losses in Kharkiv in the north east, and Kherson in the south.

 

Russian pro-war analysts were sceptical that the reshuffle would solve the problems its army is grappling with, which include inflexible and hierarchical leadership, equipment shortages and poor provisions.

 

“The sum doesn’t change by changing the places of its parts: this is the only thing that can be said about Gerasimov’s appointment,” wrote Rybar, a pro-Kremlin military analysis channel with more than a million subscribers on Telegram, and is run by a former member of the defence ministry press service.

 

The closest Russia has come to a battlefield victory since July has been its current push forward in the salt mine town of Soledar, near Bakhmut in Ukraine’s east.

 

But that fight has also revealed the faultlines dividing Russia’s forces in Ukraine. Evgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner private military contractor group, has insisted publicly that it is his men, rather than the regular armed forces, who have been fighting in the area.

 

Some of Prigozhin’s men have recently shared videos in which they criticise Gerasimov and the general staff for equipment shortages. Russia’s defence ministry on Wednesday said its troops were also fighting in Soledar: “Units of the Russian Airborne Forces have blockaded Soledar from the north and south, assault detachments are fighting in the city, the Air Force is striking at the strongholds of Ukrainian troops.”

 

Recommended News in-depthWar in Ukraine ‘Untrainable’: Russian army faces backlash over conscripts’ death in Ukraine attack A person close to Russia’s defence ministry said the move to appoint Gerasimov as the leader of Russia’s regular forces in Ukraine reflected organisational struggles at the heart of the war effort, rather than a new direction.

 

“They are just shuffling the deck because they are in a dead end and have no idea what to do,” the person said. “These guys are all old men pushing 70 and they don’t know how to fight a modern war.” The person likened the reshuffle to a classic Russian parable about a group of forest animals who form an incompetent instrumental quartet and ask a nightingale for advice, only to be told: “Arrange yourselves any way you like; it will make no difference. You will never become musicians.”

 

But Sergei Markov, a pro-Kremlin analyst, said Surovikin would retain a crucial leadership role on the ground, as Gerasimov would remain in an office position in Moscow. However, by giving control of the operation in Ukraine to the army’s chief of general staff, the defence ministry hoped to reduce bureaucratic delays, seen as a critical disadvantage compared to Kyiv’s more nimble structure.

 

“The defence ministry hopes that this will allow the army to dramatically increase the speed of decision-making,” Markov wrote. The ministry could have been inspired by the Wagner group, he said. “Thus, the success of Wagner and Prigozhin forces the Russian army to fight differently, in a more modern way,” Markov wrote on social media.

[Bulletpoint]

1 hour ago, danfrodo said:

And we've seen assaults going forward from HUMMVs & M113s firing 50 cals -- that is incredibly sub-optimum relative to what the west had available in large numbers. 

Where are Ukraine's own tanks? And the hundreds they captured from Russia? At least 440 MBT captured according to Newsweek.

Have they been knocked out or broken down in large numbers or are they being held back in preparation for an offensive?

I'd think that at least they would send some to Bakhmut. Maybe not Western quality, but surely better than assaulting with HMMWs?

(Not arguing we should not send tanks - just wondering)

[FancyCat]

I'm interested in how western equipment fares vs Soviet equipment in survivability. I've seen western MRAPs be praised by Ukrainians for keeping their crews alive.

We know reports have come in stating Ukraine has lost lots of veterans in the summer dealing with Russian artillery superiority. The earlier we could have sent more heavy equipment, the easier it would protect Ukrainian soldiers.

But definitely this depends on how the stuff fares vs what Ukraine has and so far I haven't seen any data to suggest Soviet and western are on par, only hearsay and anadotes largely praising western equipment.

[The_Capt]

3 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Excellent points, TheCapt.  but we have already flooded UKR w mountains of western equipment of varying types.  And we've seen assaults going forward from HUMMVs & M113s firing 50 cals -- that is incredibly sub-optimum relative to what the west had available in large numbers.  Plus all the other dozens of other different vehicles that have been sent like MRAPS, Aussie-version of MRAPS, bunches of armored cars, etc.   What we're already doing is logistically complicated.

What I am saying is that we could've sent large numbers of one or two kinds of much, much better AFVs 6 months ago instead of the piecemeal b--s--t we've been sending.  We've got lots of bradleys that are in storage, for example.  We already have the logistics mess because every mechanized unit has a different mix of stuff.  It would've been better to settle and standardize on a couple AFVs early on.   Then we'd only have those two plus the typical soviet stuff that already exists.   And going forward we'll continually wish we had done this six months previous as we watch assaults going forward w MRAPS and HUMMVs.

We have also seen assaults with BTR 80s and BMPs.  As to "incredibly sub optimum", based on what?  We are back to "glorious western equipment is better" when that assumption is unfounded, except possibly for the ranged fires stuff we have sent.  They UA managed to take back a larger peice of real estate than Ireland and cripple a larger heavier opponent with all that "sub-optimal support".

Did it ever occur that we did not send 1000 Bradleys because 1) Ukraine did not have the bandwidth to integrate them while fighting for its life - it is like being in a gunfight and having someone come along and say "hey tries these rifles out". And 2) they did not need those Bradley's because they would have provided enough advantage over the Soviet-based equipment fleet the UA already had to justify the cost, at the time? 

I do agree that deciding on a single set of platforms, and then sticking to that would be a good idea...but we kind already did.  Remember all that soviet-based equipment coming in from Eastern Europe?  Finally, we have reports of UA forces dismounting 1km away from its vehicles on the offence.  Is this because they have sub-standard vehicles, or just the realities that big hot metal on the battlefield in this environment is tricky to manage no matter what the version?

My point being is that this "send in the west" camp is resting on a lot of unproven, and in my opinion dangerously uniformed assumptions.  We should definitely support Ukraine; however, we should do it in a way that makes sense.  If we are going to build a western-equipment based division, yes we will have to start that now and it will take months. But it will need a full logistical integration plan and should not bleed off higher priority support requirements- the budget is finite.

   

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Twisk said:

We saw maybe 9 month ago in this area (before Ukraine won Karhkov and Kherson) Ukraine suffer pushback in area of Donbass without reaction. We remember time when Russia "breakthrough" a TDF unit and gained few KM? Everyone was in big panic but reality was that it was not so critical.

Yup, which is why I was here ridiculing the Russian "breakthrough" as being just like all their other ones before... completely non-existent.  The same is true for Bakhmut, Soledar, or anywhere else Russia might take some ground.

The issue is how many men Ukraine is losing to hold this pointless bit of terrain.  For sure the Russians are suffering far worse casualties, but it seems the bulk of them are prisoners and untrained mobiks.  Which brings to mind Bismark's often quoted saying of "not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier".

I have faith that the sacrifices Ukraine are making in this sector are part of a larger plan that will, hopefully soon, change the overall situation to be more favorable than it has been for the last month.

Steve

[danfrodo]

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

We have also seen assaults with BTR 80s and BMPs.  As to "incredibly sub optimum", based on what?  We are back to "glorious western equipment is better" when that assumption is unfounded, except possibly for the ranged fires stuff we have sent.  They UA managed to take back a larger peice of real estate than Ireland and cripple a larger heavier opponent with all that "sub-optimal support".

Did it ever occur that we did not send 1000 Bradleys because 1) Ukraine did not have the bandwidth to integrate them while fighting for its life - it is like being in a gunfight and having someone come along and say "hey tries these rifles out". And 2) they did not need those Bradley's because they would have provided enough advantage over the Soviet-based equipment fleet the UA already had to justify the cost, at the time? 

I do agree that deciding on a single set of platforms, and then sticking to that would be a good idea...but we kind already did.  Remember all that soviet-based equipment coming in from Eastern Europe?  Finally, we have reports of UA forces dismounting 1km away from its vehicles on the offence.  Is this because they have sub-standard vehicles, or just the realities that big hot metal on the battlefield in this environment is tricky to manage no matter what the version?

My point being is that this "send in the west" camp is resting on a lot of unproven, and in my opinion dangerously uniformed assumptions.  We should definitely support Ukraine; however, we should do it in a way that makes sense.  If we are going to build a western-equipment based division, yes we will have to start that now and it will take months. But it will need a full logistical integration plan and should not bleed off higher priority support requirements- the budget is finite.

   

damn you w all your facts & logic.  (smiley face + thumbs up) -- since you don't like emojis.  I just wants to see some bradleys shredding some baddies w their bmps & such.

[The_Capt]

10 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

damn you w all your facts & logic.  (smiley face + thumbs up) -- since you don't like emojis.  I just wants to see some bradleys shredding some baddies w their bmps & such.

Ok gotta admit that would feel really good and look sexy as hell, so peace on that.

As mentioned previously the power of the political signalling and demonstration of resolve is the real value of those 50 Bradley’s.  They also provide an note of escalation threat to the Russians.  Also we are going to hit the bottom of available Soviet-based kit at some point, so thinking longer term (I.e. this war really drags out, or post-war) western equipped formations in the UA is not a bad idea, but we should not race to failure here or buy into “Ukraine is losing without our super duper stuff!”

[Battlefront.com]

News blurb about 1200 US armored vehicles departing Amsterdam for Poland.  These, at least at the moment, are supposedly not for Ukraine, but standing up a US unit (2/1st Cav):

https://news.yahoo.com/u-military-tanks-dutch-port-135449981.html

Steve

[Twisk]

46 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The issue is how many men Ukraine is losing to hold this pointless bit of terrain.  For sure the Russians are suffering far worse casualties, but it seems the bulk of them are prisoners and untrained mobiks.  Which brings to mind Bismark's often quoted saying of "not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier".

Is an untrained mobik worth less than a trained Ukrainian soldier or does it just mean that Ukraine has enough slack in the system to spend time training their troops?

My understanding is that Russia has a demographic problem (old population, lack of young people, men in particular die younger) so the starting point is probably fewer fighting age men than you might expect for the population of its size. Then consider that the Kremlin officially acknowledged 700,000 men fleeing the country  of course the article points out that men are now coming back  into the country but lets say 1/3rd is permanently gone. So effectively the draft induced 200,000 "casualties" to the Russian manpower system. Mark Milley says Russia (as of Nov.) suffered greater than 100,000 combat casualties.

Combine those and we have 300,000 Russian "casualties". I'm not sure where a reasonable breaking point is for the Russian system. Of course the Ukrainian system too must be considered but my gut feeling is that these mobiks aren't "free manpower". This may just be the Russian repeating the summer of profligate artillery usage only to find out that there was in fact a bottom to their bottomless well.

 

 

Edit: given the corruption of the Russian State I wonder if there is not an insignificant number of men who are untouchables for whatever reason? They know someone or are inducted into a private military force. I have not followed but the Chechens had a force running around Ukraine making a lot of noise but doing little actual fighting. So while these men are nominally under arms they were in effect out of the fight. being reserved as the palace guard for top Chechen political actors. So Russian men removed from the combat induction system may be greater than suspected.

Edited January 11, 2023 by Twisk

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, Twisk said:

Combine those and we have 300,000 Russian "casualties". I'm not sure where a reasonable breaking point is for the Russian system. Of course the Ukrainian system too must be considered but my gut feeling is that these mobiks aren't "free manpower". This may just be the Russian repeating the summer of profligate artillery usage only to find out that there was in fact a bottom to their bottomless well.

I generally agree, although with Russia's much larger population and Ukraine not rounding up people by force, I expect Russia has a lot more men to lose than Ukraine before there's a problem in Russia.

My point is not so much about the exchange of casualties as a ratio, but as an absolute number for Ukraine to suffer.  No matter how many Russians they are taking out in the process, Ukraine losing so many men in a short period of time is not a good thing.

Steve

[danfrodo]

37 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Ok gotta admit that would feel really good and look sexy as hell, so peace on that.

As mentioned previously the power of the political signalling and demonstration of resolve is the real value of those 50 Bradley’s.  They also provide an note of escalation threat to the Russians.  Also we are going to hit the bottom of available Soviet-based kit at some point, so thinking longer term (I.e. this war really drags out, or post-war) western equipped formations in the UA is not a bad idea, but we should not race to failure here or buy into “Ukraine is losing without our super duper stuff!”

I'd like to make clear my thoughts on the western AFVs.  I am not thinking UKR will lose w/o this stuff.  I mainly just think UKR would have better offensive capabilities w better AFVs.  Ending this war on good terms for UKR means UKR has to take defended ground and I'd much rather be in a unit w better AFVs that have the most lethality (firepower,optics) that I can get.  That's w/o me including tanks like leo2s, etc, which have a much longer lead time & logistical tail.   

Edited January 11, 2023 by danfrodo
typo

[Butschi]

2 hours ago, _Morpheus_ said:

Does Poland need an approval from Germany to do that ?
Looks like Poland don't want to wait an approval because it could take time. Anyway, I would not believe Germany will say: NO we don't allow that.

They do need an approval and as of now they don't have it. Duda even admitted this himself. Hard to predict if our government will fold. Sadly this is certain to further damage the German-Polish relationship.

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

They UA managed to take back a larger piece of real estate than Ireland

That's twice now! 

[Fenris]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

It is my hope that the reason we're not seeing a bigger effort to crush the Russians in the central Donbas front (Soledar/Bakhmut) is because there's something much grander in the works and Ukraine (correctly) doesn't want to get distracted by a bloody sideshow.

It is the second week of January and the weather is finally seeming like it will be stable for a while.  Hopefully we will see if Ukraine is being sensible an taking some short term pain for a larger long term gain, or if there's something else going on that isn't as positive.

Steve

 

This is my hope also.  The current situation feels similar to Sievierodonetsk last year.  RU pushing hard for small gains in a meat grinder battle.  Not much of an apparent response from UKR.  A good deal of doom saying and anxiety in the online commentary.  Fingers crossed there's something similar to the Kharkiv operation in the works. 

[dan/california]

24 minutes ago, Butschi said:

They do need an approval and as of now they don't have it. Duda even admitted this himself. Hard to predict if our government will fold. Sadly this is certain to further damage the German-Polish relationship.

The Poles have risen to the moment. Scholz has had to dragged.