How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

45 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

It's been a while since we talked about the subtle ways Russia is screwed by sanctions.  Here's another one:

https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/russias-tanker-fleet-too-small-bypass-oil-price-cap-2022-11-23/

The short of this story is that even if Russia has overseas customers willing to purchase Russian oil, it doesn't have enough shipping capacity to get it to them with their own ships.  Even with ships from nations who haven't signed onto sanctions, the capacity is still way under what they theoretically need.  And then there's the problem with insurance, as ports aren't particularly happy about having an uninsured ship with 600,000 barrels of crude coming to their ports.  This means Russia is going to have to self insure and do so in a way that facilities have faith in.

Steve

The only thing I am sure of about Russian insurance is that they will never pay a dime. 

[Zeleban]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

The only thing I am sure of about Russian insurance is that they will never pay a dime. 

 

It's true, the vast majority of both Russian and Ukrainian insurance policies are a meaningless piece of paper. The imperfection of laws gives insurance companies the opportunity not to pay anything to their customers if they wish. But we have several companies that play by the rules and value their reputation (their services are very expensive)

[paxromana]

2 hours ago, dan/california said:

The only thing I am sure of about Russian insurance is that they will never pay a dime. 

Well, actually, the purpose of ALL (For Profit) Insurance policies (Mutuals are generally somewhat better) is to not pay out money ... tho Russia may be more rigorous in its application of the ideal of no payments of all.

[Bulletpoint]

6 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

An alleged video of mass mobik desertion is making the rounds:

 

Hopefully that's true, but how do we know this video shows a mass desertion?

[Kinophile]

Dimitri is still tracking RUS supposed withdrawal from ZNPP. 

Im curious... Should not Russia fortify/at least fight to hold the left Bank? Falling back from the Dniper is a binary decision, no? Once you let the Ukrs across then you're fighting on the defense in a topographical plain, in winter, against a mobile enemy,  and your lines are still not usefully shortened. Also RUS's throttled logistics would be now made far worse by letting HIMARS across the river. 

Of all the decisions RUS could do right now, pulling back from the Dniper seems like an extremely bad one.

Unless the intention is to pull all the way back to Crimea and to West of DLPRs, ie deliberately splitting the front. This could help with concentrating RUS forces in the Donbass while turning Crimea into a fortress. 

Avoiding inflicted defeat and destruction in the open country from Melitopol to the Crimea could be a good operational move. 

Edited December 3, 2022 by Kinophile

[Huba]

It's hard to imagine  that Ukrainians would be able to establish good enough logistics across the river to support any force that could seriously threaten RU forces on the left bank. If they try, they will soon find themselves in similar situation that RU was on the right bank. AFAIK Russians are not abandoning the right bank completely, but are leaving garrisons in the towns and some screening forces to monitor the situation, while keeping majority of their units outside tube artillery range. IMO it's a smart approach that will minimize their losses.

Edited December 3, 2022 by Huba

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, Huba said:

It's hard to imagine  that Ukrainians would be able to establish good enough logistics across the river to support any force that could seriously threaten RU forces on the left bank. If they try, they will soon find themselves in similar situation that RU was on the right bank. AFAIK Russians are not abandoning the right bank completely, but are leaving garrisons in the towns and some screening forces to monitor the situation, while keeping majority of their units outside tube artillery range. IMO it's a smart approach that will minimize their losses.

I agree.  The river itself is what keeps the Ukrainians on the right bank, not forward defending Russian forces.  They simply have to maintain enough force to interdict any push over the river quicker than it can establish itself.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Latest Russian propaganda fun... Ukrainians are welding hatches shut because their crews don't want to fight.  They then surrender at the first chance they get:

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

Hopefully that's true, but how do we know this video shows a mass desertion?

Murky, of course, but here's the translated version and apparently the original upload was removed (which could indicate authenticity):

 

[Battlefront.com]

I happened upon reports of a number of arrests of traitors in the Kherson region.  Below is one of them.  It is surprising to me that anybody who openly collaborated with the Russians would have stayed around.  Even leaving for someplace else in Ukraine would be smarter than staying put.

https://censor.net/en/news/3383712/deputy_mayor_of_kherson_from_team_of_traitor_saldo_who_worked_for_enemy_was_detained_sbi_photos

Steve

[kevinkin]

Perhaps the guy thought his help for the Russians went unnoticed? "suspicion of collaborationism". The title of deputy mayor perhaps clouded his judgement. When front lines go back and forth, some try to play both sides. Lord knows the entanglements the guy had. And the quest for even a trace of residual power can be a mind altering drug. The title of deputy mayor perhaps clouded his judgement. It has become his only world to live and die in. 

[Zeleban]

Mashovets published a new post.

South of Bakhmut, heavy fighting of the Armed Forces of Ukraine continues in the area of Kleshchievka, Andreevka and Kurdyumovka.

During the past week, the enemy managed to capture the last two settlements and advance in two general directions: towards Konstantinovka and along the direction of Kleschievka - Ivanovskoye. Obviously, the main goal of this enemy offensive is the desire to bypass Bakhmut from the south and cut the T-0504 road along the Konstantinovka-Bakhmut section at any convenient site.

In addition, the enemy, of course, is trying to hold his positions in the southeastern outskirts of the city of Bakhmut and conduct offensive operations from the villages of Zaitsevo and Pokrovskoye against the city itself. Heavy battles with varying success in the region of Opytne and Ivangrad convincingly indicate that, in fact, the enemy command is counting on the so-called close and long-range blockade of the city from the south in order to ensure further actions along the general direction to Chasov Yar and Konstantinovka.

At the same time, the enemy, acting between Bakhmutsky and Podgorodny, is trying to stubbornly break through towards the latter, having the ultimate goal of breaking through to the near approaches to the city of Bakhmut and from the north (Yagodnoye - Paraskoveevka - Krasnaya Gora - Podgorodnoye area). Which, in turn, will actually cut off the connection of the tactical group of the Armed Forces of Ukraine defending Bakhmut with Seversk and put the forward units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which are now operating in the area of Soledar, Spirne and Belogorovka, in a rather difficult position.

It is obvious that, in the opinion of the Russian command, the result of these actions should be a general withdrawal of units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces from the entire area of the city of Bakhmut. In this regard, I personally have no doubts that the enemy command is really carrying out a number of offensive actions according to a single operational-tactical plan with the ultimate goal of reaching the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk-Druzhkovka-Konstantinovka line.

I will not go into details now, list the forces and means of the enemy with which he operates in the directions and sectors I have mentioned, because this will tell little to the average reader, except for those who are closely following the course of this war (and this is far from all).

Factors that can decisively affect the overall results of what has been called the “battle for Bakhmut”.

The situation in the area of Kremennaya and Svatovo. Yes, the UAF’s presence in these places at the near approaches to Severodonetsk-Lysichansk, as well as the advance towards Starobilsk, in all likelihood, will simply neutralize the enemy’s efforts to the south and create a threat of “cutting off” the northern part of the entire Russian grouping of troops deployed in the Lugansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine. That is why in the Kremennaya area, the enemy is stubbornly trying to counterattack towards Torsky, Zarechny (towards Liman) and southwest of Svatovo. The Russians realized the significance of the fighting in the northern part of the Luhansk region.

 

Without moving through Marinka towards Kurakhovo and breaking through the Velika Novoselka-Ugledar line, all the bloody efforts of the Russians near Avdeevka and Bakhmut will be deprived of any adequate operational-tactical meaning. By and large, this is just pushing another batch of our own troops into a very, shall we say, uncomfortable position with quite menacing flanks. Of course, this is precisely why the enemy is trying, simultaneously with the attack on Bakhmut and Avdeevka, to ensure these actions in the flank operational areas, that is, in the Ugledar-Pavlovka area and north of the Bakhmut section.

Logistical and human factors. The consequences of the “partial mobilization” that is currently being carried out in Russia are already quite obvious (yes, I was not mistaken, it continues). The command of the enemy troops is ALREADY able to create a fairly significant and tangible advantage in manpower in certain sectors and directions, due to which its offensive actions acquire very important features - the continuity and gradual increase in their intensity (in some places the ratio of people is already fixed - 1: 7, 1:5, not in favor of the Armed Forces of Ukraine).

And the intensity of the Russian command raking out stocks of the main types of weapons and military equipment from all possible sources - from Lukashenka's bins to their own BHVTO, has acquired the character of a total revision (in a number of brigades and divisions, regular weapons and military equipment consist of 68–70% of equipment and weapons removed from a long time or restored repaired after damage during the battles), the share of weapons and military equipment “developed and produced in previous years” in some cases is up to 30-33%.

[Zeleban]

So let's recap...

The situation in the Bakhmut region today has received a persistent downward trend. The enemy is stubbornly trying to block the city, both from the north and from the south, in order to further break through to Chasovoy Yar and Konstantinovka, and so far he has succeeded. Albeit very slowly, with heavy losses and super efforts, but the Russian troops stubbornly crawl forward south of Bakhmut.

However, the situation north of this sector, in the Kremennaya area, west of Lisichansk, and even further north in the Svatovo area, looks completely opposite to the enemy. It is obvious that this kind of "bash on bash" is more likely to play in favor of the Armed Forces of Ukraine than in favor of the enemy. I'll explain why.

It is no coincidence that the Russian command is trying to seek out its main troops in the northern part of the Lugansk region at an unusual operational depth, placing its main reserves somewhat “pulled” from the front line and actively equipping defense areas (nodes) even at the operational-tactical depth of the entire operational structure of its main forces. I have no doubt that the flight from Balakliya taught them something.

The main reason for this decision is obvious - even in the event of a breakthrough of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in certain directions and sections, for example, between Kremennaya and Svatovo (which, by the way, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are quite close to), such an operational formation will minimize these breakthroughs, relying precisely on these reserves and units prepared in depth defense.

In other words, this will slow down a hypothetical Ukrainian offensive in this operational direction. According to the plan of the Russian command, this should have a “positive” impact on the situation, both near Bakhmut and to the south - in the Avdiivka area and in the Ugledar area. After all, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, shackled by heavy battles to “gnaw through” the systemic defense in the north of the Lugansk region, will simply not be able to resist the massive offensive of Russian troops south.

That is, the main task of the group of troops in the area of Svatovo and Kremennaya is to get the shock tactical groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine bogged down in this "defensive quagmire." However, in reality, the Russian command simply does not succeed. Simply because the Armed Forces of Ukraine “do not get stuck” and continue to advance in areas and directions that are sensitive to the Lugansk grouping of the enemy. The advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are already located 7–8 km from Kremennaya and 10–12 km from Svatovo.

Therefore, the current “exchange of offensives” is more likely in favor of the Armed Forces of Ukraine than the Russian troops, because the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from Bakhmut does not bring anything decisive in the operational-tactical sense for them, except for the emergence of a potentially dangerous performance for them in the Soledar-Seversk region. But the “fall” of Kremennaya and Svatovo can radically affect the entire course of the war in the Donbass and, first of all, by the fact that the entire “Northern Lugansk” GV may be cut off from the rest of the Russian grouping on the territory of Ukraine, combined with it only through Russian territory (because it is unlikely that everything will be “limited to Kremennaya”).

[kevinkin]

Thanks for the recap above!

Here is a somber opinion article from the NYT:

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/02/opinion/america-world-war-iii.html?unlocked_article_code=C82_fhoXQpbDvuvbnqj5IRlfmpqkos5YIFRss8Ho3LbnMK16hcWD51cFx4TOAMEZShMjZmfuCDoapoPSrgLIblI_fjldiN6ylt9-Ro36Adep9sBahfutQ-VV6KGUbAZWX4fWaeWhgGWB5CbV-PlI56SnacjDyzxMvYYHBrwTZY1EllhSZEhlajRxpHPy4Vu_cNPiNe_HxvnBItct72FHnV7RpqYpXCtDhxk2i6xUrETrIW0pNhO2RtEvgMbjvvSSfdYa8uj-mJvZhJK3I8VJYsxOUZTMqRQAlRUHAB3vEmSY7jZQb9yR1fSUNGIV209IKRzcWsjWQyCCSiTG0oUN

The article offers no solutions. Instead it tries to take the pulse of the US and West today based on the past and the writer's view on current concerns of those populations. He begs the question: does a people shape the world (and how aggressively) or just wait for the world to shape them.

PS I copied the text if you can't get through. 

 

[Kinophile]

RUS pulling back from the bank to towns south just invites UKR light forces to cross and roam?  Everytime the Ivan falls back the Ukrs follow close behind, staying right on their ***.

When they thin out a line and repo forces back/away the ZSU infiltrate with light/SOF forces, penetrate and constantly degrade LOCs using LRFs and tactical superiority, until the defence is Swiss cheesed. 

If RUS does fall back from the bank then a localized UKR "offensive" could steadily develop over a couple of months, looking to isolate and destroy individual RUS garrisons. Defeat in detail,  etc. 

It's a dangerous area to let any UKR presence develop.There's already a decent partisan movement in the region, albeit probably somewhat suppressed right now, but obviously latent.

A UKR force across the Dniper south of Enerhodar is a stumbling block in the Spring that the AFRF cannot ignore. 

 

Edited December 3, 2022 by Kinophile

[danfrodo]

47 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

So let's recap...

The situation in the Bakhmut region today has received a persistent downward trend. The enemy is stubbornly trying to block the city, both from the north and from the south, in order to further break through to Chasovoy Yar and Konstantinovka, and so far he has succeeded. Albeit very slowly, with heavy losses and super efforts, but the Russian troops stubbornly crawl forward south of Bakhmut.

However, the situation north of this sector, in the Kremennaya area, west of Lisichansk, and even further north in the Svatovo area, looks completely opposite to the enemy. It is obvious that this kind of "bash on bash" is more likely to play in favor of the Armed Forces of Ukraine than in favor of the enemy. I'll explain why.

It is no coincidence that the Russian command is trying to seek out its main troops in the northern part of the Lugansk region at an unusual operational depth, placing its main reserves somewhat “pulled” from the front line and actively equipping defense areas (nodes) even at the operational-tactical depth of the entire operational structure of its main forces. I have no doubt that the flight from Balakliya taught them something.

The main reason for this decision is obvious - even in the event of a breakthrough of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in certain directions and sections, for example, between Kremennaya and Svatovo (which, by the way, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are quite close to), such an operational formation will minimize these breakthroughs, relying precisely on these reserves and units prepared in depth defense.

In other words, this will slow down a hypothetical Ukrainian offensive in this operational direction. According to the plan of the Russian command, this should have a “positive” impact on the situation, both near Bakhmut and to the south - in the Avdiivka area and in the Ugledar area. After all, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, shackled by heavy battles to “gnaw through” the systemic defense in the north of the Lugansk region, will simply not be able to resist the massive offensive of Russian troops south.

That is, the main task of the group of troops in the area of Svatovo and Kremennaya is to get the shock tactical groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine bogged down in this "defensive quagmire." However, in reality, the Russian command simply does not succeed. Simply because the Armed Forces of Ukraine “do not get stuck” and continue to advance in areas and directions that are sensitive to the Lugansk grouping of the enemy. The advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are already located 7–8 km from Kremennaya and 10–12 km from Svatovo.

Therefore, the current “exchange of offensives” is more likely in favor of the Armed Forces of Ukraine than the Russian troops, because the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from Bakhmut does not bring anything decisive in the operational-tactical sense for them, except for the emergence of a potentially dangerous performance for them in the Soledar-Seversk region. But the “fall” of Kremennaya and Svatovo can radically affect the entire course of the war in the Donbass and, first of all, by the fact that the entire “Northern Lugansk” GV may be cut off from the rest of the Russian grouping on the territory of Ukraine, combined with it only through Russian territory (because it is unlikely that everything will be “limited to Kremennaya”).

The whole Bakhmut front for UKR seems like hard, cold calculation to me.  I think UKR could put an end to RU offensive operations here if they chose to put resources into that effort.  The fact that they don't seems to me that UKR is building up for offensive actions elsewhere in the (near?) future.  RU keeps getting tiny little victories, which entice RU command to continue to shove forces into the grinder, which may be exactly what UKR command wants.  But it's a cold hearted strategy, as the poor slobs on the Bakhmut front are constantly pounded, though I suppose I'd order the same thing. 

RU better hope for a muddy winter and not a frozen one.

Steve's video of alleged mutiny feeds into my hope that when UKR does strike, they will find a lot of very brittle sectors that will fold under steady pressure.  I am still thinking of the 'kidnapped'  RU men who will have suffered months of abuse, neglect, deprivation, and winter conditions with inadequate clothing & shelter & weapons..  How (and why) will they fight hard?  And for how long?

[kevinkin]

38 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

“exchange of offensives”

If I read correctly. Russia is attacking at an indecisive point in the line (Bakhmut) , while holding at a decisive point (Svatovo). Whereas, the UA is doing the opposite. So the UA is taking on less risk seeking larger reward. While RA is bleeding its new troops and addon equipment to season them with limited meaningless advances while taking on a risk to their entire position. Appears to be a big roll of the dice by Russia. 

 

[Zeleban]

4 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

The whole Bakhmut front for UKR seems like hard, cold calculation to me.  I think UKR could put an end to RU offensive operations here if they chose to put resources into that effort.  The fact that they don't seems to me that UKR is building up for offensive actions elsewhere in the (near?) future.  RU keeps getting tiny little victories, which entice RU command to continue to shove forces into the grinder, which may be exactly what UKR command wants.  But it's a cold hearted strategy, as the poor slobs on the Bakhmut front are constantly pounded, though I suppose I'd order the same thing. 

RU better hope for a muddy winter and not a frozen one.

Steve's video of alleged mutiny feeds into my hope that when UKR does strike, they will find a lot of very brittle sectors that will fold under steady pressure.  I am still thinking of the 'kidnapped'  RU men who will have suffered months of abuse, neglect, deprivation, and winter conditions with inadequate clothing & shelter & weapons..  How (and why) will they fight hard?  And for how long?

Both sides carry out symmetrical, "mirror" actions. Ukraine advances in the Svatovo area and defends in the Bakhmut area. While Russia, on the contrary, is defending itself in the Svatovo region and is advancing on Bakhmut. The successful actions of the Russians in the Bakhmut region will not be of strategic importance if there is no success in the other directions listed in the Mashovets post. I believe that success in these battles will be won by those who have a higher motivation (Putin's rookie is poorly provided for and fighting for his dictator's regime, or a well-equipped fighter of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and fighting for his homeland). Of course, Ukraine could concentrate its efforts in the Bakhmut area and stop the advance of the Russians.

But it seems that our General Staff has its own ambitious plans in another direction.

[Zeleban]

16 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

If I read correctly. Russia is attacking at an indecisive point in the line (Bakhmut) , while holding at a decisive point (Svatovo). Whereas, the UA is doing the opposite. So the UA is taking on less risk seeking larger reward. While RA is bleeding its new troops and addon equipment to season them with limited meaningless advances while taking on a risk to their entire position. Appears to be a big roll of the dice by Russia. 

 

It looks like it is

[Zeleban]

Russian telegram channels report that three powerful groups of Polish and German mercenaries have been identified in the Kremennaya area at once. So a new force enters the arena - German mercenaries . Based on this, it can be assumed that the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kremennaya area is developing successfully.

[Zeleban]

Meanwhile, in the Kherson region, the Special Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not seem to be going to give rest to the Russian troops in this area

[Huba]

4 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

So a new force enters the arena - German mercenaries

These guys !? Russians have every reason to be scared!

Edited December 3, 2022 by Huba

[dan/california]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I happened upon reports of a number of arrests of traitors in the Kherson region.  Below is one of them.  It is surprising to me that anybody who openly collaborated with the Russians would have stayed around.  Even leaving for someplace else in Ukraine would be smarter than staying put.

https://censor.net/en/news/3383712/deputy_mayor_of_kherson_from_team_of_traitor_saldo_who_worked_for_enemy_was_detained_sbi_photos

Steve

Intelligence is not a requirement to work for the Russians, rather the opposite actually.

[Zeleban]

In vain in Europe they are afraid of Russia. As you can see, the Russians are very afraid and respect the military from Europe. Some time ago I listened to a funny interception of a Russian military conversation (most likely it was just a joke, but who knows). This guy said that Russia was very lucky that the Americans had not yet guessed to send movie heroes from the action movies of the 80s to Ukraine. (Schwarzenegger, Stalone, Van Damme, Dolph Lungren and others). Then the Russian troops would have had a very hard time.

[NamEndedAllen]

19 hours ago, Huba said:

The problem is that Ukraine, even if provided with ATACMS and whatnot,  hardly has a chance to seriously affect the RU missile campaign.

Thanks for your extensive and informative comments! Much appreciate your elimination of countering missile attacks. But that’s why I included artillery/ missiles (should have specified GLSDB and all)and GLOCS as well. . I am pretty sure Ukrainians, even while suffering cold this winter would be heartened to know that the Russian invaders were being cut off,  starving, and freezing. Now. Right now. Or yesterday.

19 hours ago, Huba said:

No way Ukraine could launch a campaign significant enough to physically destroy RU warfighting capability. And anything less than that will just rally public support for the war in the RU civilian population, as proven by multiple historical analogies.

Respectfully, I am not sure this is entirely accurate. Destroying the Russian invaders’ supplies within and their GLOCS sooner than later is a good start. And I am definitely not convinced that turning Russian lights and heat off will unite them in love for their government. 

21 hours ago, Huba said:

what's happening is Russia getting the slowly boiled frog treatment, which by definition takes time, but surely leads to the amphibian's demise.

True. Except we not trying to live and fight in Ukraine, in our homes and workplaces are also getting slowly cooked - even if our resolve isn’t weakened. Our sons and daughters, mothers and fathers are being killed, raped, stolen, “filtered”. Our cities ruined. My question remains, is there NOTHING that Russia can do to Ukraine that will trigger the Allies to deliver the modern Leopards, Abrams, F-16s, much longer range artillery/missiles that are being withheld? 
 

16 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

erode Russian support for this war when Ukraine blows up their electrical and gas infrastructure.  How they carry out such attacks is a tricky question, but I believe they can do some damage to major Russian population centers.

Why do I think this might work to lessen Russian resolve when I do NOT think similar attacks will lessen Ukrainian resolve?  Because Ukrainians know this is about their survival and so they have to prevail.  I do not think the average Russian has the same belief.  I could be wrong, but hey... even if I am, at least I'd feel better having a few million Russians freezing their butts off this winter

This! And in the context of, “isn’t there *anything* that the Russians will do to Ukraine that will convince the Allies to open the weapons bag for a closer to NATO level capability?” Personally, Russia crossed that line several times, but decisively with the missile barrages against the civilian population. This should not stand!