How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[billbindc]

5 minutes ago, NamEndedAllen said:

Thanks, Kevinkin-

I probably wasn’t clear enough on that point #1 - you refer to attack another country, not Ukraine. I am asking whether there is ANYTHING at all Russia can do to *Ukraine* that will convince the USA and European Allies to provide longer range weaponry to Ukraine.

Your second point I think relates to NATO attacking inside Russia, but that isn’t my question. It is bout supplying the long hoped for extended range weapons that would finally squeeze supply and support sources, including both air and ground launched missiles/Arty, or GLOC. Thus forcing invading Russian units within Ukraine to collapse or withdraw to Russia.    
 

So, “No, Russia can do anything it wishes WITHIN Ukraine (no matter how heinous)”?  Or are you implying Russia using WMD on Ukrainian soil would be the only trigger for changing the longer range weaponry ban?

 

It seems like the decision to provide Ukraine with more long range precision fires has already been made:

https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/11/29/ukraine-first-operator-precision-bomb/

[Billy Ringo]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

The problem with predictive analytics is with is capturing the variability based on minute variations of individual engagements. 

Steve

One of my very respected colleagues in retail predictive analytics/AI when referring to predicting the potential impact of various promotions for a large drug chain once said in a demo:  "I don't have a crystal ball, we'll never be perfect.  We simply aim to be directionally correct."      And that, my friends, was enough to win the deal.

This logic would seem to be relevant to warfare----it will never tell us exactly how a battle will be won.  But it should be able to help determine what general direction, combination of forces and mass should be applied.  And, even more importantly,  where and how NOT to apply resources.

 

[kevinkin]

11 minutes ago, NamEndedAllen said:

Thanks, Kevinkin-

I probably wasn’t clear enough on that point #1 - you refer to attack another country, not Ukraine. I am asking whether there is ANYTHING at all Russia can do to *Ukraine* that will convince the USA and European Allies to provide longer range weaponry to Ukraine.

Your second point I think relates to NATO attacking inside Russia, but that isn’t my question. It is bout supplying the long hoped for extended range weapons that would finally squeeze supply and support sources, including both air and ground launched missiles/Arty, or GLOC. Thus forcing invading Russian units within Ukraine to collapse or withdraw to Russia.    
 

So, “No, Russia can do anything it wishes WITHIN Ukraine (no matter how heinous)”?  Or are you implying Russia using WMD on Ukrainian soil would be the only trigger for changing the longer range weaponry ban?

Two triggers: attack NATO anywhere or attack with WMD anywhere. Other than WMD, what else can Russia do to Ukraine that has not already been done? Russia has cross an awful humanitarian threshold and Ukraine only has the range of HIMARs. No one likes what we are seeing. But, still no longer range stuff has been announced. There is something in the West's thinking that is preventing these transfers. It seems too simple a way to end the war on Ukraine's and the West's terms . Would love to sit in on those top secret or higher level meetings. It's almost as if Washington just wants Ukraine and Russia to beat themselves up then have no stomach for war ever again. But with Russia the clear loser in every aspect. 

[Huba]

19 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

It's almost as if Washington just wants Ukraine and Russia to beat themselves up then have no stomach for war ever again. But with Russia the clear loser in every aspect. 

Ever again seems too far fetched, but beaten enough so it won't be able to raise it's head for a decade or so might very much on the table. It is rapidly sliding into a pariah status, connected to the global economy just enough so we don't loose access to it's raw resources. It's losing it's influence in the near abroad. Some predictions expect it to default on financial obligations in the middle of 2023. I like @FancyCat interpretation that what's happening is Russia getting the slowly boiled frog treatment, which by definition takes time, but surely leads to the amphibian's demise.

 

Edited December 2, 2022 by Huba

[LongLeftFlank]

https://www.grid.news/story/global/2022/11/24/the-ukraine-war-in-data-after-9-months-of-war-what-the-data-tells-us/

There are more than 7.8 million Ukrainian refugees currently reported in other European countries. United Nations data indicates more than 15 million Ukrainians have crossed the border since the start of the war, but millions have returned home, largely from Poland.

6.5 million remained displaced within their own country. 

[Kinophile]

Including our friends Zeleban et al.  

[Kinophile]

4 hours ago, acrashb said:

Don't know if "GENERALL SVR" is credible, but if so, bad day for Putin:

Telegram: Contact @generallsvr

 

 

Interesting gossip but... I'm always highly ware of anyone who paints supposed emotions onto world figures. Eg "Putin was upset".  Sure. Just one adjective and an exclamation point away from raw, below the fold clickbait. If an author is willing to embellish with that then.... 

[sross112]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Very good points and the technological issues will have to be solved.  Makes me wonder what the UA have been doing because apparently they are already there.

The only reason I can think of to give tanks the job of direct-indirect fires is mobility.  Nothing in the artillery inventory can match the mobility of an MBT. So lateral battlefield mobility with a breakthrough option at medium ranges kinda sounds better fitting a tank - although as you point out not optimized.

I suspect the new heavy will be a hybrid solution that has mobility and survivability but can hit at 10km first round kills.  I also like the idea of heavy as the energy carrying platforms for light, particularly unmanned - so mothership concept.  Particularly if UAS are really just ammunition, then heavy can carry and project that ammunition - this is similar to the carriers in the maritime domain.

With the tanks used for indirect fire; with the awesome stabilization ability for shooting on the move, could that be translated to shoot indirect fires accurately on the move? That would render the enemy's contemporary counter battery completely ineffective.

Earlier in the thread a couple references were made to how naval forces had to totally rethink their operations due to the change in the nature of the battlespace on water with long range strike ability. Would there be any theories from our blue water friends that would translate over so there is limited re-inventing of the wheel? 

[kevinkin]

24 minutes ago, Huba said:

boiled frog treatment

Cruel to Ukraine because the pace is slow. Frustrating too. Turn up the heat a notch and many lives could be saved from brutal ground warfare. BTW, for the boiled frog treatment to work, the frog does not realize what it is getting into. In the present case, Russia was the aggressor and knew full well what is was jumping into. Russia can jump out of the pot anytime since it knows the temperature is arising.  But the analogy does have merit in that Putin can't jump out due to internal forces keeping him and his armed forces slowly braising. 

[quakerparrot67]

6 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Mendacity is the perfect word. Nice. 

 

can't read that word  without  hearing burl ives and paul newman arguing  in 'cat on a hot tin roof',  lol

 

cheers,

rob

[NamEndedAllen]

2 hours ago, billbindc said:

 

It seems like the decision to provide Ukraine with more long range precision fires has already been made:

https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/11/29/ukraine-first-operator-precision-bomb/

Well, maybe…sometime in 2023. But no ATACMS  We talk about slowly boiling the Russian frog…while the Ukrainian civilians freeze all winter. Not to mention the grind and lives on the line of the Ukrainian military. The misery is unconscionable. Yes, it is Russia’s fault. But honestly, if Ukraine reaches out and touches Russia - as if it hasn’t already for months - does the West really need to fear Russian starting a war with NATO that Russia already knows it would be over almost before it started? 

 

“The US is reportedly considering sending the long-range precision bomb to Kyiv to help counter Russian offensives.

The GLSDB would allow Ukrainian troops to strike far behind Russian lines, reducing the possibility of being counterattacked.

It would also enable defending soldiers to hit valuable Russian military targets previously out of reach.

The US has repeatedly rejected requests to send the 300-kilometer (186-mile) Army Tactical Missile System to Kyiv over fears of provoking a wider war with Russia.”

Instead, Washington is considering the smaller-range GLSDB to address Ukraine’s request for long-range weapons.

The long-range missile could be delivered to the war-torn nation by 2023, according to documents obtained by Reuters.

[Huba]

48 minutes ago, NamEndedAllen said:

Well, maybe…sometime in 2023. But no ATACMS  We talk about slowly boiling the Russian frog…while the Ukrainian civilians freeze all winter. Not to mention the grind and lives on the line of the Ukrainian military. The misery is unconscionable. Yes, it is Russia’s fault. But honestly, if Ukraine reaches out and touches Russia - as if it hasn’t already for months - does the West really need to fear Russian starting a war with NATO that Russia already knows it would be over almost before it started? 

The problem is that Ukraine, even if provided with ATACMS and whatnot,  hardly has a chance to seriously affect the RU missile campaign. Engels base in Saratov is 700km from UA eastern border, and even if they got some JASSM or similar system, RU can re-base their strategic bombers to Murmansk, or even freakin' Vladivostok without serious degradation to their ability to launch the strikes.
Now striking back at RU in eye for an eye manner, while certainly appealing and in my (non-Christian) opinion morally justified, wouldn't really achieve nothing except quenching the thirst for vengeance. No way Ukraine could launch a campaign significant enough to physically destroy RU warfighting capability. And anything less than that will just rally public support for the war in the RU civilian population, as proven by multiple historical analogies. It would also feed RU propaganda and could diminish the moral highground that UA currently occupies, which int turn could have really serious impact on the Western support, at least from some countries. IMO the best course of action for Ukraine is to just take it, shoot down as many missiles and rebuild as fast as possible, while kicking Russian *** on the ground.
I really have high hopes for the GLSDB though - it seems to have just enough range and destructive power to completely wreck RU rail GLOCs leading to Ukraine, forcing them to channel all rail traffic through Volgograd and Rostov, basically strangling them. It will put entire land-brigde in range, and after it's broken allow attacking the whole Crimea including the bridge and base in Sevastopol. IMO this is as much long range firepower as UA needs to wreck RU logistics beyond the point of usefulness and push them out of it's territory.
In the meantime, let's see how mobilized Russian masses do during the winter. IMO the endgame of all of this, apart from UA physically re-taking it's territory, is creating enough instability in Russia to force it to concentrate on internal problems (meaning threatening, or even toppling the regime) as more immediate and agreeing to humiliating peace - and achieving that should be done is as non-volatile way as possible, which unfortunately means the "boiling the frog slowly" approach.

In the meantime, B21 unveiling ceremony is taking place:

https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/air/b-21-raider/
 

Edited December 3, 2022 by Huba

[chrisl]

19 minutes ago, Huba said:

The problem is that Ukraine, even if provided with ATACMS and whatnot,  hardly has a chance to seriously affect the RU missile campaign. Engels base in Saratov is 700km from UA eastern border, and even if they got some JASSM or similar system, RU can re-base their strategic bombers to Murmansk, or even freakin' Vladivostok without serious degradation to their ability to launch the strikes.
Now striking back at RU in eye for an eye manner, why certainly appealing and in my (non-christian) opinion morally justified, wouldn't really achieve nothing except quenching the thirst for vengeance. No way Ukraine could launch a campaign significant enough to physically destroy RU warfighting capability. And anything less than that will just rally public support for the war in the civilian population, as proven by multiple historical analogies. It would also feed RU propaganda and could diminish the moral highground that UA currently occupies, which could have really serious impact on the course of the war.
I really have high hopes for the GLSDB though - it seems to have just enough range and destructive power to completely wreck RU rail GLOCs leading to Ukraine, forcing them to channel all rail traffic through Volgograd and Rostov, basically strangling them. It will put entire landbrigde in range, and after it's broken allow attacking the whole Crimea including the bridge and base in Sevastopol. IMO this is as much long range firepower as UA needs to wreck RU logistics beyond the point of usefulness and push them out of it's territory.
In the meantime, let's see how mobilised Russian masses do during the winter. IMO the endgame of all of this, apart from UA physically re-taking it's territory, is creating enough instability in Russia to force it to concentrate on internal problems (meaning threatening, or even toppling the regime) as more immediate and agreeing to humiliating peace - and achieving that should be done is as non-volatile way as possible, which unfortunately means the "boiling the frog slowly" approach.

In the meantime, B21 unveiling ceremony is taking place:

https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/air/b-21-raider/
 

If they can hit the port in Sevastopol they can hit subs in port.

[Huba]

16 minutes ago, chrisl said:

If they can hit the port in Sevastopol they can hit subs in port.

True, but Russians could just move them to Novorossyisk or Tuapse (or even Sochi if they get the yachts out of the port). And in worst case scenario they could probably use a floating dock to move them up the Don and to Casspian sea, or improvise some contraption to launch the missiles without the subs at all.
IMO it will really boil down to RU running out of missiles stock at some point, and only launching few now and then, at the pace they are able to produce them.

Edit: it seems that something might be happening at the Luhansk front, there were reports of UA forces dangerously near to Kreminna yesterday already :

 

Edited December 3, 2022 by Huba

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, sross112 said:

With the tanks used for indirect fire; with the awesome stabilization ability for shooting on the move, could that be translated to shoot indirect fires accurately on the move? That would render the enemy's contemporary counter battery completely ineffective.

Earlier in the thread a couple references were made to how naval forces had to totally rethink their operations due to the change in the nature of the battlespace on water with long range strike ability. Would there be any theories from our blue water friends that would translate over so there is limited re-inventing of the wheel? 

I am not as well steeped in maritime warfare theory as I would like; however, I suspect the answer is a cautious “yes”.   The clouds of ISR, counter missile and protection and weapon ranges are becoming similar.  I suspect a lot could be derived from the over the horizon naval warfare approach, as well as collective protection.

However, the environment shapes both the capabilities and their applications.  Naval warfare has much higher capability densities on each platform, this appears due to the nature of the physics of fluids.  The maritime domain can do small and dispersed capability, however it is very limited in mobility ranges.  Given that the navy has to basically haul itself very long distances, burning a lot of energy while it is doing so, they are forced to create much higher denser capability.  Further, the surface in the maritime domain is dynamic - unlike the land, land has waves but they are essentially “frozen” in the timescales we are talking about.  Maritime has to contend with a dynamic surface which means more energy per platform just to survive and move. 

Land warfare is much more distributed due to the fact that the ground can only bear so much practical moving weight, much less than water.  So the primary challenge is moving all that distributed energy around in any sort of structure.  Navies also have formation issues but with much bigger blocks, on land it is each individual soldier that must be kept in formation.  Land warfare is therefore limited in how much energy density it can put in one place but it has better option for broad dispersion.  In the past dispersion meant less lethal energy packages but that is changing.

I think the “death of surprise” is definitely a cross-cutting theme.  Navies have essentially lost the element us surprise for years - big hit steel on an empty ocean.  Submarines the notable exception.

Over the horizon initial engagements and unmanned leading edges are also likely a common theme.  How each treats AirPower could also be interesting.

To be honest I am not sure how much can be pulled over, at least as a start point but I am thinking of spending more time on naval warfare theory.

[cyrano01]

10 hours ago, sross112 said:

I definitely see AirPower facing a similar situation where this war has some lessons learned that need to be paid some serious attention. It looks like the helicopter is in about the same position as the vehicle when it comes to survivability near the FEBA. The longer range more lethal manpads pretty much spell the end of the tree top level CAS. The conventional air war will have to move up to a minimum ceiling around 20,000+feet for the planes to mitigate risk. 

It seems to be a common thread across almost all platforms that the lethal ranges are dramatically increasing. The new SIG rifle with Vortex optics is supposed to allow the regular foot soldier to reliably engage targets at 800m. Javelin type ATGMs that fire and forget on targets out to 4km. Manpads with 20,000 ft ceilings. Indirect fires at 80+km. If both sides have these sorts of ranges with good ISR the FEBA is now 100+km wide? It is hard to wrap my mind around that big of a battlespace.

I think that AirPower probably has an advantage when referring to packaging lethal energy, if you have an air force. The ground based systems have definitely acted like a poor man's air force and do have advantages. A country probably needs to make a choice between fielding a large and capable air force or don't bother and focus on air space denial and ground based long range PGM fires. If you go the air force route you need to solve for SEAD/DEAD, period. Russia has proved that without that effective capability you have simply wasted a lot of money on an ineffective tool. If you can solve for that and gain air superiority your air based platforms have the advantage of being based out of indirect fire range and can haul a lot of packaged lethal energy PGMs. 

Probably the most economical route for future is light and land based. How the problem is approached and solved will probably depend a lot on the budget the solvers have to work with.

Pretty much agreed, Imperial War Museum say something rather similar here, although nothing that hasn't been discussed at greater depth on this thread.

If you go the air force route you need to solve for SEAD/DEAD, period. Russia has proved that without that effective capability you have simply wasted a lot of money on an ineffective tool.

This in spades, as the oft-repeated quote said, “Air Power is like Poker. A second-best hand is like none at all – it will cost you dough and win you nothing.” Tough to do though, possibly even for the US. Also  having the best air force will get you nothing if it isn;t good enough relative to the ground-based air defences.

 

Edited December 3, 2022 by cyrano01

[chrisl]

20 minutes ago, cyrano01 said:

Pretty much agreed, Imperial Warm Museum say something rather similar here, although nothing that hasn't been discussed at greater depth on this thread.

If you go the air force route you need to solve for SEAD/DEAD, period. Russia has proved that without that effective capability you have simply wasted a lot of money on an ineffective tool.

This in spades, as the oft-repeated quote said, “Air Power is like Poker. A second-best hand is like none at all – it will cost you dough and win you nothing.” Tough to do though, possibly even for the US.

 

They didn't say anything about the Ukrainian air observation networks - the NATO AWACS and other observation platforms that can track aircraft from untouchable airspace, and babushkanet.  The speed of communication that Ukraine seems to have on the ground enhances the effectiveness of MANPADs - we've seen it in a few videos where the guys on the ground know that a plane is coming and have time to get ready with their MANPADs for when it comes into targeting range.

[JonS]

3 hours ago, sross112 said:

With the tanks used for indirect fire; with the awesome stabilization ability for shooting on the move, could that be translated to shoot indirect fires accurately on the move? That would render the enemy's contemporary counter battery completely ineffective.

For guided munitions, this is already a solved problem - for one thing, the round guides itself after it leaves the delivery platform, and for another the airforce have been doing this in a 3-D environment since the 60s.

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, billbindc said:

 

It seems like the decision to provide Ukraine with more long range precision fires has already been made:

https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/11/29/ukraine-first-operator-precision-bomb/

It's about time the West starts providing Ukraine with untried and/or experimental weapons.  Wars allow someone to try something new in real battlefield conditions, learn from it, and make informed production decisions based on solid information.  So far the West has only provided Ukraine with systems that are straight forward yet untried in combat (PzH2000 for example), stuff that's seen low intensity combat (Javelin lots of other stuff), or stuff that's simple enough that there wasn't much doubt about performance (Matador, NLAW, etc.).  At most, these things are evolutionary.  Giving Ukraine things like the German's UGVs, on the other hand, is an opportunity that should not be wasted.

Of course I'm not saying that this is the only thing Ukraine should receive.  Far from it.  They should be armed to the teeth with the most effective weapons, be it M4 rifles or mothballed 105mm howitzers as well as higher tech stuff.  What I am saying is that the West should not waste this opportunity to have Ukraine try out the weapons we think are going to be dominate for the next 20+ years.  If they work as well as hoped, then Ukraine benefits right now.  If they don't, everybody benefits long term.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, Billy Ringo said:

One of my very respected colleagues in retail predictive analytics/AI when referring to predicting the potential impact of various promotions for a large drug chain once said in a demo:  "I don't have a crystal ball, we'll never be perfect.  We simply aim to be directionally correct."      And that, my friends, was enough to win the deal.

This logic would seem to be relevant to warfare----it will never tell us exactly how a battle will be won.  But it should be able to help determine what general direction, combination of forces and mass should be applied.  And, even more importantly,  where and how NOT to apply resources.

 

I agree.  I expect that CM can be used to make such determinations.  It provided me with a pretty informed opinion that a light force armed to the teeth with precision ATGMs could shred a Russian invasion.  I'm sure it will show the relative strengths and weaknesses of something like UGVs as well.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Huba said:

The problem is that Ukraine, even if provided with ATACMS and whatnot,  hardly has a chance to seriously affect the RU missile campaign.

I don't think there is anything the Ukrainians can do to proactively solve the problem of Russia's attacks on the power grid other than improving SEAD to reduce the amount of damage and having the West provide replacement equipment ASAP.

The only proactive thing I can think of Ukraine doing is a propaganda campaign within Russia pointing out that Russia is breaking the rules of war and that it must stop or Ukraine will be forced to respond in kind.  That won't do anything itself, but it will lay the groundwork to further erode Russian support for this war when Ukraine blows up their electrical and gas infrastructure.  How they carry out such attacks is a tricky question, but I believe they can do some damage to major Russian population centers.

Why do I think this might work to lessen Russian resolve when I do NOT think similar attacks will lessen Ukrainian resolve?  Because Ukrainians know this is about their survival and so they have to prevail.  I do not think the average Russian has the same belief.  I could be wrong, but hey... even if I am, at least I'd feel better having a few million Russians freezing their butts off this winter

Steve

[Simcoe]

To some of the people calling for longer range weapons etc. The stuff the US has been unwilling to send so far. 

I have no sympathies for Russia but I don't think people comprehend how close we are to nuclear war right now. We are facing a government that is backed into a corner and with nothing to lose.

I for one am glad that the US has been conservative with the systems that they've sent so far.

[Battlefront.com]

It's been a while since we talked about the subtle ways Russia is screwed by sanctions.  Here's another one:

https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/russias-tanker-fleet-too-small-bypass-oil-price-cap-2022-11-23/

The short of this story is that even if Russia has overseas customers willing to purchase Russian oil, it doesn't have enough shipping capacity to get it to them with their own ships.  Even with ships from nations who haven't signed onto sanctions, the capacity is still way under what they theoretically need.  And then there's the problem with insurance, as ports aren't particularly happy about having an uninsured ship with 600,000 barrels of crude coming to their ports.  This means Russia is going to have to self insure and do so in a way that facilities have faith in.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

An alleged video of mass mobik desertion is making the rounds:

 

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

It's about time the West starts providing Ukraine with untried and/or experimental weapons.  Wars allow someone to try something new in real battlefield conditions, learn from it, and make informed production decisions based on solid information.  So far the West has only provided Ukraine with systems that are straight forward yet untried in combat (PzH2000 for example), stuff that's seen low intensity combat (Javelin lots of other stuff), or stuff that's simple enough that there wasn't much doubt about performance (Matador, NLAW, etc.).  At most, these things are evolutionary.  Giving Ukraine things like the German's UGVs, on the other hand, is an opportunity that should not be wasted.

Of course I'm not saying that this is the only thing Ukraine should receive.  Far from it.  They should be armed to the teeth with the most effective weapons, be it M4 rifles or mothballed 105mm howitzers as well as higher tech stuff.  What I am saying is that the West should not waste this opportunity to have Ukraine try out the weapons we think are going to be dominate for the next 20+ years.  If they work as well as hoped, then Ukraine benefits right now.  If they don't, everybody benefits long term.

Steve

We seem to have a truly enormous level of paranoia about anything getting captured and making its way to China. This would be understandable if the Chinese were not already outstanding at stealing our technology directly from the manufacturers. I suspect a fair bit of this concern is about the political hit of the Russians capturing anything recognizably American and parading it around while the "the opposition" loses it mind over it on TV. I think winning the the bleeping war faster and easing at least some of the resulting economic dislocation would count for a hundred times more, but...

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

I don't think there is anything the Ukrainians can do to proactively solve the problem of Russia's attacks on the power grid other than improving SEAD to reduce the amount of damage and having the West provide replacement equipment ASAP.

The only proactive thing I can think of Ukraine doing is a propaganda campaign within Russia pointing out that Russia is breaking the rules of war and that it must stop or Ukraine will be forced to respond in kind.  That won't do anything itself, but it will lay the groundwork to further erode Russian support for this war when Ukraine blows up their electrical and gas infrastructure.  How they carry out such attacks is a tricky question, but I believe they can do some damage to major Russian population centers.

Why do I think this might work to lessen Russian resolve when I do NOT think similar attacks will lessen Ukrainian resolve?  Because Ukrainians know this is about their survival and so they have to prevail.  I do not think the average Russian has the same belief.  I could be wrong, but hey... even if I am, at least I'd feel better having a few million Russians freezing their butts off this winter

Steve

Kamil Galeev wrote a great thread about how the entire Russian system is designed solely and only to feed the ruling class in Moscow. The ruling class there regards the rest of Russia as serfs to be exploited to the point of failure or alcoholic misery. Therefore Moscow is the place the power needs to go out. Anyplace else gives the Russians a propaganda advantage without any actual pressure on the people that matter. Put the power out in Moscow for the month of January though, and a lot of people who matter are going to start making different choices. Triply so if Europe would do a real visa ban.