How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Bulletpoint]

"This is where the craziness of the Russian command is most evident," Mr Zelensky said in his nightly address from Kyiv. "Day after day, for months, they are driving people to their deaths there, concentrating the highest level of artillery strikes."

Oleksiy Arestovych, an adviser to Mr Zelensky, said that on one day, Russian forces launched eight separate attacks on Bakhmut before lunchtime and had been pushed back on each occasion."

 

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-63408506

[Huba]

Viva la Español! Yeah, HAWK is ancient, but the Phase 3 version shouldn't be that much worse than early S300 that Ukraine uses, at least against most of the targets. And there should be a metric crapload of these spread across various countries - Wiki quotes that 40 000 missiles for it were manufactured. Comibined with NASAMS/ IRIS-T, and various lesser systems, as well as what remains of S300 Ukraine still retains, I can easily see their AD umbrella becoming thicker, not thinner in the upcoming months, same way as their arty has rather improved.

 

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Not necessarily.  I'll illustrate why:

"I need to rebuild my gravel driveway.  I am going to use my 1/2 ton pickup truck to transport a load of gravel and my tractor to spread it.  I need to do it before it rains at noon.  I expect it will take 3 hours to transport the gravel and 2 to spread it. I will start my work day at 7am."

The goal is clear and the means of achieving it look sensible, including the time necessary to achieve it.  Might be a little ambitious as there's no room for error (like truck breaking down, rain starting early, etc.), but it is logical and internally consistent.

I start my day at 5am as planned and arrive at the gravel pit a 1/2 hour later.  Uh-oh!  I find out the weight of the gravel exceeds the truck's ability to haul it.  Attempting two or more trips isn't feasible due to the time constraint and overloading the truck, even if the gravel can physically fit in the truck, will break the truck.  I need a new plan!

Was the original plan delusional?  No, but my planning process sure was flawed.  I should have found out what the weight/volume of the gravel beforehand and planned accordingly.  On the other hand, if I knew that my truck couldn't do the job as planned, and did it anyway, then it would be delusional.

 

Stepping away from the analogy for a sec, we may never know for sure, but I think Putin honestly thought that Ukraine wouldn't put up a significant fight.  This apparently was backed up by his intel people.  Should Putin have known better?  Hard to say, given that he's an autocrat of 20+ years surrounded by yes who all believe in Russia's inherent superiority over Ukraine at all levels.  Therefore, I'm going to give Putin the benefit of the doubt and say that he really did, honestly, believe Ukraine wouldn't put up a fuss.

Based on this plan everything we saw in the first few days of the war makes complete logical sense.  The plan required rapid advances over a huge expanse of territory with the forces on hand.  This resulted in penny packeted BTGs, 3 days of food, unsupported OMON "decapitation" missions, not worrying about air superiority, multiple unsupported helicopter VDV attacks, plans for air transporting supplies, etc. were all necessary for the plan to succeed. 

In fact, I think the plan was so well thought out, internally consistent, and within Russia's ability to execute that it probably would have worked if Ukraine's will to fight really was as poor as the Russians believed it to be.  And this is coming from a guy who thinks Russia Sux™

 

Believe it or not, I don't think the initial plan's primary flaw ("Ukraine won't resist") was the biggest mistake of the war.  In my view the award for worst mistake goes to trying to implement the original plan even after it was clear that the entire premise for it was utterly detached from reality.

We all saw this in action.  For the first few days Russia continued executing the original plan seemingly unmodified!  And when all of that inevitably failed, we watched for weeks as Putin doubled down on pressing harder thinking it would change the situation, even after the dead and wrecks were piling up without any noticeable gains.  This was delusional and I have no doubt Putin was in the loop the whole time.

Back to my analogy, Putin did the equivalent of me ordering the gravel pit guys to overload my truck because I believed my desire to get the job done would override basic physics.  Or perhaps I thought that I could make 2+ trips and still have time to spread it, thus believing time could be bent to my will.  Or maybe I figured the rain would magically hold off simply because I needed it to.  Any of that would be delusional.  And that's the sort of stuff Putin did.

 

I suspect the Lviv option was considered and found to be too risky even for the planners of this fiasco.  The primary likely reason is they thought that the western part of Ukraine WOULD resist, at least enough to bog things down.  If they had enough forces to bog down around Lviv and do all the other stuff on their wish list, perhaps they would have tried.  We know they didn't have even enough without Lviv, so I suspect they knew they couldn't do both.  Plus, if they had secured the east, Kyiv, and the Black Sea coastline then the rump state left around Lviv could be tackled later (perhaps years later) or just left to whither on the vine.  Either way, whatever remained of Ukraine wouldn't have the strength to liberate all the lands seized by Russia.  Lviv, therefore, wasn't important.

Exactly.  As much as I was sure that Russia would fail at a larger war, I thought they had a very good chance of winning (even if temporarily) a more limited one.  Again, this is coming from someone who ascribes to the Russia Sux™ school of thinking.

Yup, though I strongly suspect that this horrible war is the best for Ukraine long term.  Maybe even for Russia if it results in putting it on a path towards being better citizens a couple of generations from now.

Steve

I feel like we have switched sides in this debate - from the “It isn’t all about Russia sucking” side I think your analogy is missing some key elements that lead me to delusion, not plan.

In your analogy the missing facts are 1) you don’t own a dump truck, you have three guys and wheelbarrow, and 2) that is not your driveway.  So in this case you would be building a plan, a flawed rigid one even under your own delusion, that is detached from reality.  

To carry over to the war, Putin made (at least) three major strategic assumptions;

- Ukraine would fall quickly and resistance would be short, light and unorganized.  His force to time, space and objectives clearly points to that.  He tried to blitz conquer a nation larger than France with a population of 44 million with 300k troops and a laser light show.

- Any resistance would be quickly eaten by Russian bear and be pooped out as a happily subservient puppet satellite state.  Given the history of Ukraine, even recent history, the idea that he could control this country once he achieved victory through brutal oppression was, let’s say ‘flawed’ from the get go.

- The weak willed and dithering West would not be able to react and happily keep buying Russian gas and drop any sanctions through boredom before the war chest ran out, as Ukraine was violated and then dominated. 

From the loins of these brilliant assessments sprung a 5-6 operational axis assault with ridiculous LOCs and zero establishment of operational pre-conditions to disrupt, dislocate and isolate Ukraine - that is a fail on any operational planning staff exercise, I assure you.  The fact that the insane plan was rigid and built on a tactically messed up military was just the ice cream on this doomed poopy cake.

This was not red teamed nor acid washed, nor did it have a Plan B should any of those ridiculous assumptions prove to be false…this was and is the “hold my beer” military operation of the century…and given the history of the last 20 years that is saying something.  This makes shock and awe, and “they will greet us with joy in the streets of Baghdad” Iraq 2003 look like pure political and military genius in comparison.  Why?  Facts, not assumptions.

- The scale and scope of this military operation was risked by its very own ambition.  The levels of friction of a WW2 scale invasion with a fraction of the forces are immense.  Ukraine would not need to resist much for it to come under enormous strain. Russia has a large and expensive intelligence service that should have been working for years in this, the idea that it did not know the UA was set up for a hybrid resistance and being fed US ISR is laughable.  No, the political level did not want to hear facts on the ground, it was a delusion.

- the most likely Ukraine COA was to resist unconventionally while the political mechanism retreated to a safe country.  This means at a minimum Russia was going to have an organized insurgency and very loud external political opposition, while trying to control a conquered nation with 300k troops - aside: Ukraine is roughly 600k sq kms, that is 2 sq kms per Russian soldier in multi-dimensional conflict space.  And how long were they going to stay there getting IED’d and committing high profile warcrimes? Did Russia have a stabilization plan or post-war reconstruction plan?  W.T.F?!

- Russian and Putin completely failed to understand that this whole thing was not about them and Ukraine, it was about the global order (or maybe based on that annexation speech Putin did, and that makes it worse).  The West cannot remain “the West” if Russia is allowed to do this war.  In short, Putin did the one thing he absolutely should have avoided in the prosecution of this war…we backed us into a corner. That cut through the divisions and entitled ennui very quickly.  We had no other choice as the entire global drug deal of the western order hinges on P5/UNSC big powers behaving themselves.  Even US exceptionalism took a major hit in Iraq in 2003 as it found itself isolated and the global order fractured…and it went nowhere near as rogue as this clown show.  Russian exceptionalism is not a thing anywhere accept in Moscow, they did not have the global power or idiosyncratic points to pull off something that humbled the worlds last superpower.

And this is just me on a Thursday. Russia should have had roomfuls of political and military staff, armed with real time intel data.  Guys whose entire professional lives is understanding UA field kitchens, sitting next to a guy who could map the twitter feeds of Smalltown Ukraine down to the mayor’s dog walkies schedule - you are about to take on the single largest dice role of a global power since WW2 FFS, taking that on with iron clad assumptions of one 70 year old and a bunch of yes men is not planning it is a suicide cult.

Finally, as to Lviv.  I have no doubt it had point of failure and one tough bill. But compared to what Russia tried in reality it looks positively pedestrian.  A quick scan of the map shows two possible corridors of advance and about 270 kms to try and do a cut off.  A tough ask but frankly a much better place to get airborne and airmobile killed.  If you take Lviv and then up to the Carpathian Mts, Ukrainian resistance, which will come regardless, is going to supported by a trickle not the freakin flood they have on their hands now.

You are probably correct in that Russia thought it too risky but only because of their bizarro world view of reality.  Clearly resistance was almost universal and any intelligent organization that missed that was broken, or the political level who ignored them was…delusional.  In fact the whole Hard Power option was insane and we are living with the result.

So this was a “solid plan” like me becoming a super model is a “solid plan”…I need only drop a few pounds and de-age by 30 years and my dream will come.  And anyone who disagrees with me gets tossed out a window.

[Kinophile]

I've been on a mentall Hyundai gig, so not sure if this has already been posted. The HQ documents ISW references. 

 

[Beleg85]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

And this one is of particular interest to us here.  Reuters reviewed captured Russian documents from units in the Balakliia area at the start of the Kharkiv offensive.  Now we have some numbers to play with.  ISW cited this:

Quote

Reuters’ investigation found that Russian units near Balakliya were severely understrength, with a combat battalion at 19.6-percent strength and a reserve unit at 23-percent strength.

Ouch!

https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-russia-base/

Some of this information has started to come out in various Twitter feeds over the past few days, but this seems to be the most comprehensive account so far.

Steve

Interesting. Sergeant I translated several pages ago specifically mentioned Russians in Balaklyia as crack troops defending a town difficult to take. Neighoburoing Ukrainian brigade (80th) was reportedly considered "forlone hope" due to task of capturing the city and expecting bloody assaults.

Edited October 27, 2022 by Beleg85

[Huba]

DT machineguns on an anti-aircraft mounts. In 2022. 

 

[Zeleban]

New Mashovets post .

 

Today will be short (Svatovo district and a little about Kremennaya)...

In the area east of Terni, the enemy command deployed a fairly powerful tactical group - up to 3 BTGr (probably from the 20th CAA and 41st CAA). Obviously - in order to continue the attacks in the direction of Torskoye - Zarechnoye, as well as in the direction of Nevsky - Novosadovo.

After the forward units of the enemy, as a result of two-day battles, were forced to completely withdraw from the Zherebets River, the Russian command, apparently, quite seriously asked the question of maintaining the Chervonopopovka-Zhitlovka line and the Svatovo-Kremennaya road under its control.

 

In the Belogorovka area, the enemy managed to occupy several convenient positions (on the heights), from which he has so far been able to quite effectively control not only the eastern approaches to the settlement, but also, to a certain extent, even the delivery routes of our forward units in the Belogorovka area. However, the enemy still fails to achieve the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the village...

This also applies to the village of Dibrovo (southwest of Kremennaya), where Ukrainian troops approached Kremennaya at a minimum distance. Two rather significantly "shabby" battalions of the "mobilization reserve" from the 208th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Army Corps and the 119th Regiment of the 1st Army Corps are still unable to move the forward units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from this threatening direction ...

In the Svatovo area, the situation continues to gradually, but relentlessly worsen for the enemy. Moreover, which is typical ... the command of the enemy troops fully understands that in the near future they are unlikely to be able to prevent this, but instead of regrouping and concentrating forces and means in threatening areas, they continue to disperse them in attempts to small counterattacks ...

In particular, at the junction of the Lugansk, Kharkov regions and the territory of the Russian Federation, northwest of Svatovo, the enemy concentrated a grouping with 5-6 BTGr (possibly up to 8 BTGr) and up to 2 reinforced companies from the 18th Motor Rifle Division of the 11th AK and units of the 1st Guards TA, reinforced by separate forces and equipment of the 20th CAA.

Obviously, the enemy’s intention is to create a real threat of a powerful counter-offensive on the flank of the Ukrainian grouping, which is now approaching Svatovo from Kupyansk... as well as to ensure reliable control of the Nizhnyaya Duvanka area and the R-66 road in the Troitskoye-Svatovo section.

[Zeleban]

 

The appearance and deployment of this grouping was quite predictable. After all, 2 weeks ago, the enemy began to intensively restore his units from the 18th Motor Rifle Division and the 1st Guards. TA, which he had previously dragged to the area northeast of Svatovo (between it and Starobelsk).

The Russian command understood the fact that without holding the sector along the Seversky Donets north of Kupyansk - Svatovo could not be held either. Therefore, it was obvious that this "junction" would be held by the enemy under any circumstances ...

And this time, apparently, the enemy command, in the process of assessing the situation, decided to be creative... Instead of purely defensive actions, they quietly pulled troops to the north and at a convenient moment, obviously, expects to hit the left flank of the Ukrainian troops, which will try to "take Svatovo" along the road Kupyansk - Svatovo...

One thing these commanders did not take into account... At the same time, it is rather difficult to conduct an effective defense of a certain operational area and form a silent strike tactical group of troops from several restored battalions...

It is understandable, if you start regrouping troops into this grouping, the defense will weaken, if you concentrate on defense, the formation of the group will be delayed for an indefinite period ... And it is difficult to combine both processes...

For, there are very few ADDITIONAL reserves, and the "material for replenishment" coming in for resupply, such as chmobiks, or "prigozhin's falcons" in this sense is hardly particularly suitable for participating in complex types of hostilities...

 

It is quite possible to fill the regular number of units intended for the offensive with them, or to throw them into suicidal counterattacks near Svatovo instead of regular... but, in this case, one can hardly hope for "quality results"...

 

In addition, it is obvious that the active actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine southwest and west of Svatovo (from Borovaya) have a significant impact on the plans of the enemy. Because he has to pull out a significant part of those forces that are intended for the formation of the northern strike tactical group, precisely for the "localization" of the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine...

This results in the "spraying" of forces, which I wrote about above...

Moreover, 2 days ago ... for example, it became clear to me that the corresponding Ukrainian headquarters also quite clearly calculated this enemy’s plan ... Because the Ukrainian troops carried out several specific actions in this area "to pre-empt" (of course , about their meaning and content .... I won’t talk), which resulted in the liberation of a number of settlements and now, any attempts by the enemy to go “on the flank and rear” of the Ukrainian group, which has already reached the near approaches to Svatovo. ... let's just say, it will be very, very significantly complicated ...

[Artkin]

Ukraine has captured almost 10 T-80BV alone this month. Food for thought.

[Taranis]

"Ukrainian soldiers in the Mykolaiv region (Ukraine), October 26, 2022. VALENTYN OGIRENKO / REUTERS"
*seems 59 Mec Brigade chevrons

[Huba]

13 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

 

The appearance and deployment of this grouping was quite predictable. After all, 2 weeks ago, the enemy began to intensively restore his units from the 18th Motor Rifle Division and the 1st Guards. TA, which he had previously dragged to the area northeast of Svatovo (between it and Starobelsk).

The Russian command understood the fact that without holding the sector along the Seversky Donets north of Kupyansk - Svatovo could not be held either. Therefore, it was obvious that this "junction" would be held by the enemy under any circumstances ...

And this time, apparently, the enemy command, in the process of assessing the situation, decided to be creative... Instead of purely defensive actions, they quietly pulled troops to the north and at a convenient moment, obviously, expects to hit the left flank of the Ukrainian troops, which will try to "take Svatovo" along the road Kupyansk - Svatovo...

One thing these commanders did not take into account... At the same time, it is rather difficult to conduct an effective defense of a certain operational area and form a silent strike tactical group of troops from several restored battalions...

It is understandable, if you start regrouping troops into this grouping, the defense will weaken, if you concentrate on defense, the formation of the group will be delayed for an indefinite period ... And it is difficult to combine both processes...

For, there are very few ADDITIONAL reserves, and the "material for replenishment" coming in for resupply, such as chmobiks, or "prigozhin's falcons" in this sense is hardly particularly suitable for participating in complex types of hostilities...

 

It is quite possible to fill the regular number of units intended for the offensive with them, or to throw them into suicidal counterattacks near Svatovo instead of regular... but, in this case, one can hardly hope for "quality results"...

 

In addition, it is obvious that the active actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine southwest and west of Svatovo (from Borovaya) have a significant impact on the plans of the enemy. Because he has to pull out a significant part of those forces that are intended for the formation of the northern strike tactical group, precisely for the "localization" of the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine...

This results in the "spraying" of forces, which I wrote about above...

Moreover, 2 days ago ... for example, it became clear to me that the corresponding Ukrainian headquarters also quite clearly calculated this enemy’s plan ... Because the Ukrainian troops carried out several specific actions in this area "to pre-empt" (of course , about their meaning and content .... I won’t talk), which resulted in the liberation of a number of settlements and now, any attempts by the enemy to go “on the flank and rear” of the Ukrainian group, which has already reached the near approaches to Svatovo. ... let's just say, it will be very, very significantly complicated ...

Thanks for the translation Zeleban! It is great to see that, contrary to some opinions, at least this front is far from being frozen and the prospects seem to be rather promising. If you'd ask me 2 months ago which city will be liberated first - Kherson or Severodonets, I'd of course say Kherson - now I'm not so sure

[Zeleban]

2 minutes ago, Taranis said:

59 Mec Brigade

Yes, that is right

[Beleg85]

Russian war journos constantly stealing jobs from enemy intelligence corps:

https://twitter.com/M0nstas/status/1585590109159784450

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Zeleban said:

In the Svatovo area, the situation continues to gradually, but relentlessly worsen for the enemy. Moreover, which is typical ... the command of the enemy troops fully understands that in the near future they are unlikely to be able to prevent this, but instead of regrouping and concentrating forces and means in threatening areas, they continue to disperse them in attempts to small counterattacks ...

Every time someone says that Russia learns from its mistakes I feel I should post something like this:

Russia has had 8 months to learn that platoon+ sized attacks do nothing but make for a platoon- surviving force.  I would guess Russia has lost as many forces to these attacks than they have to direct Ukrainian actions.  Perhaps even more.  And yet they keep doing them!  The quote above about Bakhmut is exactly the same thing, but on a larger and dumber scale.

If Russia did NO attacks at all.  None.  Just sat there and defended, with small counter punches against Ukrainian attacks, I think they would be doing significantly better than they are now.  Yet they keep on conducting suicidal attacks for net negative gains.

Whatever else Russia is learning doesn't seem to be good enough to compensate for not learning this particular lesson.  Like someone learning how to shoot a gun and refusing to stop pulling the trigger without checking to see if it is loaded.  It's a basic thing with obvious consequences, but it seems like it's just not going to happen.

1 hour ago, Zeleban said:

It is understandable, if you start regrouping troops into this grouping, the defense will weaken, if you concentrate on defense, the formation of the group will be delayed for an indefinite period ... And it is difficult to combine both processes...

For, there are very few ADDITIONAL reserves, and the "material for replenishment" coming in for resupply, such as chmobiks, or "prigozhin's falcons" in this sense is hardly particularly suitable for participating in complex types of hostilities...

This has been Russia's problem since the first day of the war and I know I've hammered on this point every single time that someone thinks Russia is going to somehow pull even a stuffed rabbit out of its hat.  It just doesn't have the manpower to do anything of significance!  Hence why I am so critical about their wasteful attacks.

When they do manage to concentrate a decent number of troops, it always comes at the expense of somewhere else. Kyiv took away from Kharkiv and Kherson, Donbas took away from Kharkiv and Kherson, now we see the continuing results of Kherson taking away from Kharkiv and Donbas.   The above quote shows this to be the same at the operational level and it's clearly evident from Russia's activities at the tactical level that it's true there as well.

1 hour ago, Zeleban said:

Moreover, 2 days ago ... for example, it became clear to me that the corresponding Ukrainian headquarters also quite clearly calculated this enemy’s plan ... Because the Ukrainian troops carried out several specific actions in this area "to pre-empt" (of course , about their meaning and content .... I won’t talk), which resulted in the liberation of a number of settlements and now, any attempts by the enemy to go “on the flank and rear” of the Ukrainian group, which has already reached the near approaches to Svatovo. ... let's just say, it will be very, very significantly complicated ...

Then there's this   Not only hasn't Russia learned that it's attacks are too small, too uncoordinated, and unrealistic to work... they apparently haven't learned, fully, that anything Russia does at the front is a) going to be detected and b) going to be hit effectively.  Concentrating does nothing more than make things easier for Ukraine to kill Russians.  And since this has been their #1 goal since the start of the war, Russia is deliberately conducting itself in a way that makes Ukraine's path to victory easier instead of harder.

Steve

[Zeleban]

 

[Huba]

No comment needed here. Great news!

 

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I feel like we have switched sides in this debate - from the “It isn’t all about Russia sucking” side I think your analogy is missing some key elements that lead me to delusion, not plan.

In your analogy the missing facts are 1) you don’t own a dump truck, you have three guys and wheelbarrow, and 2) that is not your driveway.  So in this case you would be building a plan, a flawed rigid one even under your own delusion, that is detached from reality.  

Ah, but I had already thought of that (though I chuckled at your choice of analogy hole poking!)

Let's not forget that Russia planned an upscaled 2014 Crimea takeover.  They were able to do that and I think it's pretty clear from the evidence that they could have done what they set out to do if Ukraine offered no resistance of note.  Would trucks still have broken down due to poor maintenance?  Yes.  Would units still have run out of fuel and had to wait around for fuel trucks?  Yes.  But not to the extent that would preclude what they were attempting to do.

Nope, the key element that was wrong with the plan wasn't the capabilities of the Russian forces to drive down paved roads and land at friendly controlled airports.  That they could do.  The flaw was they sucked at everything else.  A few thousand light infantry, punctuated with heavier forces here and there, was sufficient to kill the plan dead within a single day.

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

To carry over to the war, Putin made (at least) three major strategic assumptions;

- Ukraine would fall quickly and resistance would be short, light and unorganized.  His force to time, space and objectives clearly points to that.  He tried to blitz conquer a nation larger than France with a population of 44 million with 300k troops and a laser light show.

- Any resistance would be quickly eaten by Russian bear and be pooped out as a happily subservient puppet satellite state.  Given the history of Ukraine, even recent history, the idea that he could control this country once he achieved victory through brutal oppression was, let’s say ‘flawed’ from the get go.

- The weak willed and dithering West would not be able to react and happily keep buying Russian gas and drop any sanctions through boredom before the war chest ran out, as Ukraine was violated and then dominated. 

Yup, that sums it up succinctly.  I focus on the first of the three because that's the one that mattered the most.  The fact that Ukraine fought back (Point 1), did so better than Russia could handle (Point 2), meant Ukraine bought the time where outside help would be effective (Point 3).  If Point 1 was instead tipped in favor of Russia the other 2 wouldn't matter.

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

From the loins of these brilliant assessments sprung a 5-6 operational axis assault with ridiculous LOCs and zero establishment of operational pre-conditions to disrupt, dislocate and isolate Ukraine - that is a fail on any operational planning staff exercise, I assure you.  The fact that the insane plan was rigid and built on a tactically messed up military was just the ice cream on this doomed poopy cake.

Ah, but you're injecting Western thinking into this and that's the sort of mistake we all made when assessing what Russia was going to do with all the forces it put against Ukraine's border.

If a Western staff officer brought forward an operational plan that assumed zero resistance, he would be forced to sit in the corner with a DUNCE hat on.  But Russia is an autocratic state headed by a guy who made it clear he wanted Ukraine before he died.  They planned out something that could theoretically work, provided Ukraine didn't resist.  Putin said "I like that idea!", then asked his intel people if they thought it was feasible.  Because the glorious leader was obvious keen on the idea, and Russia has a lot of windows, the intel people came back and said "yes, we believe Ukraine won't resist".  At that point the general staff produced a plan that was more of a parade than a military operation.

The plan was perfectly sound in relation to Russia's abilities and the goals asked of it.  If Ukraine had done as they expected the plan would likely have worked.  The flaw, therefore, was the totalitarian "yes man" system that allowed such a fundamental and consequential premise to be so poorly evaluated and/or dishonestly presented to Putin.  Nothing insane about it, just standard autocratic ass covering taken to an extreme.

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

This was not red teamed nor acid washed, nor did it have a Plan B should any of those ridiculous assumptions prove to be false…this was and is the “hold my beer” military operation of the century…and given the history of the last 20 years that is saying something.  This makes shock and awe, and “they will greet us with joy in the streets of Baghdad” Iraq 2003 look like pure political and military genius in comparison.  Why?  Facts, not assumptions.

Correct, which is why I say, and continue to say, that Russia Sux™ at war (as well as other things).  All of these things you stated are 100% correct, but aren't within Russia's capabilities as of late.  The Soviets had it, Russia lost it.

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

- The scale and scope of this military operation was risked by its very own ambition.  The levels of friction of a WW2 scale invasion with a fraction of the forces are immense.  Ukraine would not need to resist much for it to come under enormous strain. Russia has a large and expensive intelligence service that should have been working for years in this, the idea that it did not know the UA was set up for a hybrid resistance and being fed US ISR is laughable.  No, the political level did not want to hear facts on the ground, it was a delusion.

Correction... I think it is highly probable that the political level did not receive the facts on the ground.  We've discussed the likely FSB process of failure and it's complex.  Corruption and lack of professionalism isn't limited to the Russian military.

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

- the most likely Ukraine COA was to resist unconventionally while the political mechanism retreated to a safe country.  This means at a minimum Russia was going to have an organized insurgency and very loud external political opposition, while trying to control a conquered nation with 300k troops - aside: Ukraine is roughly 600k sq kms, that is 2 sq kms per Russian soldier in multi-dimensional conflict space.  And how long were they going to stay there getting IED’d and committing high profile warcrimes? Did Russia have a stabilization plan or post-war reconstruction plan?  W.T.F?!

This is an example of short term Russian thinking.  It is a hallmark of Putin's KGB thinking.  Set up conditions, pick the best one, go with it and worry about what happens because of it at a later time.  Then repeat the process.

You and I knew that even if Russia had somehow managed to take over all the terrain it planned for that it wouldn't hold it long term.  It would be Afghanistan and Chechnya all over again, but on a larger scale with more dire consequences.  Russia simply didn't care about this as it doesn't think like we do.  Russia is far more "I seez it, I wantz it, I will havez its!".  (say that with a Gollum voice for best effect).

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

- Russian and Putin completely failed to understand that this whole thing was not about them and Ukraine, it was about the global order (or maybe based on that annexation speech Putin did, and that makes it worse).  The West cannot remain “the West” if Russia is allowed to do this war.  In short, Putin did the one thing he absolutely should have avoided in the prosecution of this war…we backed us into a corner. That cut through the divisions and entitled ennui very quickly.  We had no other choice as the entire global drug deal of the western order hinges on P5/UNSC big powers behaving themselves.  Even US exceptionalism took a major hit in Iraq in 2003 as it found itself isolated and the global order fractured…and it went nowhere near as rogue as this clown show.  Russian exceptionalism is not a thing anywhere accept in Moscow, they did not have the global power or idiosyncratic points to pull off something that humbled the worlds last superpower.

Absolutely true, but this particular instance (war in Ukraine) is not any different than how Putin has handled other major things, such as diplomacy, trade, domestic industrial capacity, etc.  Putin has seen the West buckle and give him what he wants because of the money and leverage cheap energy brings to the table.  He completely does not understand how the West works and therefore doesn't understand limits.

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

And this is just me on a Thursday. Russia should have had roomfuls of political and military staff, armed with real time intel data.  Guys whose entire professional lives is understanding UA field kitchens, sitting next to a guy who could map the twitter feeds of Smalltown Ukraine down to the mayor’s dog walkies schedule - you are about to take on the single largest dice role of a global power since WW2 FFS, taking that on with iron clad assumptions of one 70 year old and a bunch of yes men is not planning it is a suicide cult.

This is where Biden Admin's preemptive move likely translated into real world consequences.  Putin wanted this attack to be a surprise.  In fact, needed it to be.  So as US and UK (at the start) officials started making it known that they had a clue what was going on, Putin clamped down on the flow of information.  He delayed the attack as well.  He kept orders from being drafted and disseminated ahead of time to keep them from falling into Western hands.  Etc.

While the plan was not deluded in a technical sense, by February it was clear that surprise was gone and since it was required that problems would arise from that fact.  No reevaluation of the plan because that meant going out a window and someone else signing the paperwork.

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Finally, as to Lviv.  I have no doubt it had point of failure and one tough bill. But compared to what Russia tried in reality it looks positively pedestrian.  A quick scan of the map shows two possible corridors of advance and about 270 kms to try and do a cut off.  A tough ask but frankly a much better place to get airborne and airmobile killed.  If you take Lviv and then up to the Carpathian Mts, Ukrainian resistance, which will come regardless, is going to supported by a trickle not the freakin flood they have on their hands now.

The importance of cutting off Lviv from the West was to prevent Ukraine from fighting effectively long term.  Since the entire goal of the operation was to take out Ukraine quickly, Lviv wasn't a relevant objective.

Here's the problem with this entire thing!  Russia's plan was so carefully crafted to suit what it could theoretically do that pulling on any thread of that tapestry would have unraveled the whole thing.  I think Russia knew, very solidly, that it with its standing force couldn't conduct a militarily opposed operation in Ukraine that would result in the capitulation of the country.  If someone said "we need to be concerned about Western weaponry, so let's cut off Lviv" then that someone was basically admitting that there was no chance they could take out Ukraine with what they had to work with.  Which meant that your alternative plan would have also failed, just failed in a different way.  Russia was simply not able to conduct a war against Ukraine, it was only able to conduct a driving exercise.

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

You are probably correct in that Russia thought it too risky but only because of their bizarro world view of reality.  Clearly resistance was almost universal and any intelligent organization that missed that was broken, or the political level who ignored them was…delusional.  In fact the whole Hard Power option was insane and we are living with the result.

Yes, in our view it is "insane" and "delusional" because we don't see our leadership being that stupid.  Then again, we have Afghanistan... so I'm not as confident as you are that the inherent problems don't exist in the West, even if not as in extreme form as in Russia.

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So this was a “solid plan” like me becoming a super model is a “solid plan”…I need only drop a few pounds and de-age by 30 years and my dream will come.  And anyone who disagrees with me gets tossed out a window.

Ah, but if you had a cadre of people and power behind you who planned on which publications were necessary to make this dream happen, and that cadre said they could bribe and/or threaten the decision makers and influences to support your desires, then it could work because the goal is to become a super model, not BE a super model.  I'd say it could result in a "solid plan".  Except for the fact that too many people found your looks so objectionable that the bribes and the threats didn't work.  That's where things went wrong, not with the plan itself.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

12 minutes ago, Huba said:

No comment needed here. Great news!

 

Amazing!  The Republicans learned from the Democrats by following their example of retracting an idiotic political statement designed to make hardcore minority happy and make the rest go "huh?  Are you serious?".  The world is a strange and mysterious place, but hey... I'm definitely going to take this as a good sign.

Steve

[cesmonkey]

8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Amazing!  The Republicans learned from the Democrats by following their example of retracting an idiotic political statement designed to make hardcore minority happy and make the rest go "huh?  Are you serious?".  The world is a strange and mysterious place, but hey... I'm definitely going to take this as a good sign.

Steve

Not exactly.  McCarthy said his comments were misinterpreted way back on the 19th, just one day after he said them:
https://thehill.com/homenews/house/3695482-mccarthy-defends-blank-check-remark-on-ukraine/

[billbindc]

30 minutes ago, Huba said:

No comment needed here. Great news!

 

I would read the entire article. The jury's still out.

[Beleg85]

Folks, it is worth to check Putin's speech at Valdai. Nothing surprisingly new, but still may be valid to analyses here as his mental state is serious factor in this war. Vlad is still unhinged and absolutelly convinved his "Special Military Operation" has more benefits than drawbacks "in the long run". Russians are truthful to the word and do not leave their own alone (yep, ditches and forests around Kyiv tell differetn story...). West is degenerate, elites are arrogant and pretending patriotism while secretly still want to make business with Russia (that may actually be partly true). It was "extremely rude" from the West to go into someone's else backyard(!), Russians would never do that (!!) to the West (!!!). Of course Ukraine is artificial creation, there is no such state. Interesting he talks about Hungarian, Polish and Romanian lands given to Ukraine by Stalin (he still has hopes somebody will think like him...).

EDIT: On second note, there was nothing interesting there. I expected something about Satan, but there will be questions by totally independent reporters so the issue may still perhaps pop up.

EDIT2: Ok, his second speech that was visibly targeted at "Third World" countries that could benefit from fall of "unipolar order" that Russia so heroically challanged.  I am dissapointed, still no satanism.

Edited October 27, 2022 by Beleg85

[danfrodo]

11 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Stepping away from the analogy for a sec, we may never know for sure, but I think Putin honestly thought that Ukraine wouldn't put up a significant fight.  This apparently was backed up by his intel people.  Should Putin have known better?  Hard to say, given that he's an autocrat of 20+ years surrounded by yes who all believe in Russia's inherent superiority over Ukraine at all levels.  Therefore, I'm going to give Putin the benefit of the doubt and say that he really did, honestly, believe Ukraine wouldn't put up a fuss.

Based on this plan everything we saw in the first few days of the war makes complete logical sense.  The plan required rapid advances over a huge expanse of territory with the forces on hand.  This resulted in penny packeted BTGs, 3 days of food, unsupported OMON "decapitation" missions, not worrying about air superiority, multiple unsupported helicopter VDV attacks, plans for air transporting supplies, etc. were all necessary for the plan to succeed. 

As I stated 1000 or more pages ago, I think Putin's plan was excellent on paper, like Steve's gravel plan.  But it wasn't about the BTGs alone.  It was about internal treason/assassination squads cutting the head off UKR in Kyiv and many provinces.  This was in conjunction w the SOF forces coming in via air & sea to secure vital facilities -- the critical one was Hostemel airport, which allow RU to move in large numbers of infantry very quickly into the Kyiv.  Then the BTGs come in to suppress whatever disjointed, leaderless resistance starts to form.  Of course we all know how this went.  Maybe with surprise it would've gone better but that was rather impossible once US was screaming to the world that Putin was going to attack.  

He had no surprise, his assassination squads failed, treason seems to have only made a significant difference in Kherson.  Hostemel turned out to be a disaster, along w multiple other SOF attempts (WHEN IS HOSTEMEL GONNA BE IN CMBS??!!!  ).  And the BTGs, well, turns out Putin attacked when it was muddy and the roadbound columns were ambushed everywhere, along with all the other hundreds of local RU tactical disasters.

[sross112]

10 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I would read the entire article. The jury's still out.

In reading the article it says he thinks we should be sending more weapons both sooner and faster. Pretty sure that is what a bunch of us here have been saying since the beginning.

Then goes on to say that he thinks there should be oversight of the money being sent. In the last few days there have been several conversations on here that talked about the pallets of cash to Afghanistan that either disappeared or weren't spent the way they were intended. Overall the gist was those pallets were a waste. Isn't it reasonable to want to make sure that the actual money sent is being used for what it is meant for and trying to keep the graft and corruption to a minimum? Haven't we pointed out how corruption is a rot that will mess up the entire system if let go unchecked? 

The way I interpret this is just responsibility and accountability. I don't know why anyone on either side of the political isle wouldn't think that is a good thing. I know as a taxpayer I want my taxes used responsibly by our government and lawmakers. I didn't see anywhere in the article about cutting off support or sending less, just having oversight on the money and how it is used. 

Sounds pretty reasonable to me. If it weren't for partisan politics and media spinning it would probably sound pretty reasonable to most people, but this is the world we live in. So I suppose I should get down off my high horse of reasonableness, responsibility and accountability (terms that surely show my antiquated 20th century boomer coerced mentality) and start flinging mud at one side or the other no matter what they say or do. 

[TheVulture]

25 minutes ago, sross112 said:

Sounds pretty reasonable to me. If it weren't for partisan politics and media spinning it would probably sound pretty reasonable to most people, but this is the world we live in. So I suppose I should get down off my high horse of reasonableness, responsibility and accountability (terms that surely show my antiquated 20th century boomer coerced mentality) and start flinging mud at one side or the other no matter what they say or do. 

It does sound pretty reasonable - at face value.

I suspect the cynicism comes from the fact that US practice for decades seems to have been to be willing to shovel pallet loads of money in to 'their' side without much concern for efficient use, and the people who want to cut off the money hose usually frame it in terms of wanting to be responsible with the tax money and to use of effectively.

So it's not the meaning of what he said that gets a reaction. It's people thinking that what he says sounds like the standard 'code' for "let's stop doing this". 

Edited October 27, 2022 by TheVulture

[chrisl]

2 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

It does sound pretty reasonable - at face value.

I suspect the cynicism comes from the fact that US practice for decades seems to have been to be willing to shovel pallet loads of money in to 'their' side without much concern for efficient use, and the people who want to cut off the money hose usually frame it in terms of wanting to be responsible with the tax money and to use of effectively.

So it's not the meaning of what he said that gets a reaction. It's people thinking that what he says sounds like the standard 'code' for "let's do doing this". 

It's hard enough to maintain a lot of insight and oversight with big aerospace contractors when you're not in a war zone and you can even have a group of people on site for an extended period.  Doing it in a war zone is a non-trivial task.  The mitigating factor for a lot of the Ukraine aid is that the bulk of it actually is spent domestically where you can have as good of oversight as is possible while the aerospace contractors put together all the fancy stuff, with the transportation costs being the main overseas part of the expenses.  Direct cash aid tends to be a smaller part of the aid budgets (though not trivially small) and is probably hard to oversee, but even that is likely to go through established aid organizations to help refugees and displaced persons.