How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, JonS said:

Was this:

A) A good idea, or

b) Dumb as a box of rocks

Good idea, of course.  But nobody in Jolly Old England Tweeted a picture that it was just canvas and air

Seriously though, the Wagner dragon's teeth don't have the same effect since they don't look intimidating at all.  Average people, myself included, look at them and laugh at how pointless they are.  As someone called them... "Cope Pyramids".  They are there for domestic reassurance more than anything, but it's unknown if that was Russia's intention or not.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

15 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Ah you see our thinking has already shifted.  A modern breaching operation could easily be penetration by light infantry and hammering of logistics and support by PGM.  A full on combat breach may not even be required which points to Russia continuing to employ the old playbook rather than re-write one.  Russia may all sighted in ready to cover the obstacle when stuff behind them starts exploding and supplies get cut off. They then abandon the position in a reenactment of the Maginot Line and the UA dismantles it administratively.  But by the old playbook I see nothing inherently wrong with how they did it.

Oh, I agree that where Russia's forces can cover a section of mined dragon's teeth with fire, that point will be more problematic to take than it otherwise would.  In that regard, they have a purpose and might even be effective for a very short period of time.  And that's the key point... it won't make a hill of beans difference to this war even when they provide covering fire.

First, the line is huge if they build the whole thing according to plan (which should be doubted).  Russia lacks troop density to cover the entire line with anything even close to resembling enough forces.  It will take Ukraine a little longer to go through an undefended point with teeth than without, but we're talking maybe a half an hour.  The mines, if they do in fact mine them sufficiently, will cause more problems.  But they'd mine anyway, so that's a neutral factor.  In fact, the teeth might help identify where minefields are, which would be handy!

For the defended areas, there's going to be only a patina of coverage.  I can say that safely because that's been the way of this entire war for both sides.  When Ukraine goes to breach the line it will have a narrow area to look for enemy coverage, which increases the chances it will be discovered before breaching.  Once discovered, Ukraine has a number of proven capabilities to deal with them from a comfortable distance.

In the end, the traditional breaching operation that involves smoke and engineer vehicles with all kinds of other things thrown in, won't be necessary.  The dragon's teeth will present only a modicum of extra challenge to advancing on a defended point and, as I said, might actually make it a little easier.  Those dragon's teeth are like a big arrow pointing "here there be mines".

Steve

[acrashb]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

This and cyber.  What the hell happened with cyber?  They were supposed to be able to crawl thru my wifi into my house and wreck up the place - tilting pictures on the wall, dipping my toothbrush in the toilet etc.  Instead we got some weak disjointed DDoS stuff.

There have been some effective attacks, for example: https://www.wired.co.uk/article/viasat-internet-hack-ukraine-russia, but overall I agree that the whole arena has been underwhelming.

Why?

Cyber is a use-it-once family of weapons.  Attack someone, and they harden up not just the immediate code base but the processes to retain hardening - and almost all successful attacks are easy to defend against, just patch your equipment to remove known vulnerabilities.  Zero-day attacks, like the Iranian centrifuges, are rare and require high end capability and resources if they are even possible - contrary to popular belief, not all software is vulnerable and hackers can't just press the magic "crack this" button to  break things.  Of course there are non-technical attacks that rely on human carelessness (e.g., phishing) and coercion (bribery, blackmail, etc.) but to do things at scale it's technical attacks.

About six weeks before the ground assault, cyber attacks, almost all directed against critical infrastructure, were significantly elevated against baseline, and this was maintained for months into the conflict.  I don't know where it is now, because the lack of overall success has led my attention elsewhere. 

Russia has capable hacking groups, for example Fancy Bear.  Continued action of these groups has, as noted above, upped the investments made by critical infrastructure owners - as has an increasing mesh of legislation, regulation and industry associations (e.g., https://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/default.aspx ).

While it is possible that RA-affiliated hackers have something up their sleeves, if so they are waiting for a decisive moment, which IMO will not arrive.

 

For those who are interested, CISA is very well regarded, here is the entry page into their russo-ukraine war (a phrase I use that is not catching on - yet) guidance: https://www.cisa.gov/shields-up

 

Edited October 26, 2022 by acrashb

[Harmon Rabb]

3 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

Normally it would be for domestic consumption, but since TASS translated it...whole notion pretty well aligns with Kadyrov's call to jihad. There are already hundreds of satanists sects in Ukraine now, apparently.

 

Just in time for Halloween.

Now that RU propagandists have "established" that Ukraine is a nation of Satanists and Nazis. I would not be surprised if next we hear claims that Ukraine has its own "Castle Wolfenstein", complete with a "Doom" style portal to hell in the castles dungeon.

On second thought since RU propagandists seem to be getting their ideas from B-movies and video games maybe I should not give them anymore ideas.

Edited October 26, 2022 by Harmon Rabb

[akd]

Hard fight for a Russian bunker:

 

[ZPB II]

While the Satanism angle invites ridicule it makes a lot of sense.

QAnon cultists represent a significant domestic threat for the US and have been eating RUS propaganda for years. They will feel vindicated and reinvigorated. Stochastic terrorism and separatism in the US will likely increase after this move.

If there is one thing Russia is very good at, it's psyops.

[dan/california]

8 minutes ago, akd said:

Hard fight for a Russian bunker:

 

The fact that some Russians are willing to fight from their holes until the Ukrainians just kill them is why this war is going on.

[Zeleban]

 

[dan/california]

 

[dan/california]

https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-russia-base/

 By the end of August, the documents show, the force was depleted, hit by death, desertions and combat stress. Two units – accounting for about a sixth of the total force – were operating at 20% of their full strength.

Edited October 26, 2022 by dan/california

[Seedorf81]

57 minutes ago, akd said:

Hard fight for a Russian bunker:

 

Looks a bit like footage from ww2 Okinawa. Horrible for both sides.

Edited October 26, 2022 by Seedorf81

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

For the defended areas, there's going to be only a patina of coverage.  I can say that safely because that's been the way of this entire war for both sides.  When Ukraine goes to breach the line it will have a narrow area to look for enemy coverage, which increases the chances it will be discovered before breaching.  Once discovered, Ukraine has a number of proven capabilities to deal with them from a comfortable distance.

Exactly.  Through ISR and precision fires it is possible to see the forces defending the obstacle incredible high resolution, from freakin space, and then hammer them hard.  Do this is several places, infiltrate on main efforts and the breaching op becomes a route clearance job.  This is building on the theme of precision fires as a form of manoeuvre.

I personally think that static obstacles that take months to build are fading into extinction.  Smart mobile minefields or swarming dormant systems, now we are onto something.  Again Russia, in this specific case, is building a very professional looking linear complex obstacle….designed for a war 30 years ago.  I think this is a central theme throughout this thing.

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, acrashb said:

There have been some effective attacks, for example: https://www.wired.co.uk/article/viasat-internet-hack-ukraine-russia, but overall I agree that the whole arena has been underwhelming.

Why?

Cyber is a use-it-once family of weapons.  Attack someone, and they harden up not just the immediate code base but the processes to retain hardening - and almost all successful attacks are easy to defend against, just patch your equipment to remove known vulnerabilities.  Zero-day attacks, like the Iranian centrifuges, are rare and require high end capability and resources if they are even possible - contrary to popular belief, not all software is vulnerable and hackers can't just press the magic "crack this" button to  break things.  Of course there are non-technical attacks that rely on human carelessness (e.g., phishing) and coercion (bribery, blackmail, etc.) but to do things at scale it's technical attacks.

About six weeks before the ground assault, cyber attacks, almost all directed against critical infrastructure, were significantly elevated against baseline, and this was maintained for months into the conflict.  I don't know where it is now, because the lack of overall success has led my attention elsewhere. 

Russia has capable hacking groups, for example Fancy Bear.  Continued action of these groups has, as noted above, upped the investments made by critical infrastructure owners - as has an increasing mesh of legislation, regulation and industry associations (e.g., https://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/default.aspx ).

While it is possible that RA-affiliated hackers have something up their sleeves, if so they are waiting for a decisive moment, which IMO will not arrive.

 

For those who are interested, CISA is very well regarded, here is the entry page into their russo-ukraine war (a phrase I use that is not catching on - yet) guidance: https://www.cisa.gov/shields-up

 

I am not a cyber expert but promises where made dammit!  I had heard there was elevated activity but it really led nowhere decisive.  They did not establish the pre-conditions they needed to through cyber (or anything else for that matter).  I am wondering if the problem is what I suspect happened with all the cruise missiles - the whole thing has a disjointed C2 vibe to it,  a lot of lower level commanders playing “choose your own adventure”.  If the attacks in cyber space were as coordinated then the tepid results make more sense.

[hm_stanley]

20 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

how is this any different from every other war the Russians, err.. Soviets have fought?  none.  This is the Russian way of war and has been for centuries.

[dan/california]

13 minutes ago, hm_stanley said:

how is this any different from every other war the Russians, err.. Soviets have fought?  none.  This is the Russian way of war and has been for centuries.

They don't have the birth rate and population to support it anymore.

[Twisk]

Interesting article over recovered Russian documents
 

Quote

Another spreadsheet tracked equipment. Where there had been five drones on July 25, by the end of August there were only two. Eight armoured personnel carriers were reduced to three. The force had four “Fagot” anti-tank weapons systems left, down from 24 at the end of July. The one “Zoopark” system they had for suppressing enemy electronics systems was gone by the end of August.

 

Quote

The daily report on July 21 contained even more alarming news for Colonel Popov, the commander of the Balakliia force: Russian intelligence agency, the FSB had learned that Ukrainian forces were bringing to the area three highly accurate HIMARS missile launchers, supplied by the United States. And Ukraine had pinpointed the locations of one Russian command post and four warehouses that were being used by the Balakliia force.

Ukraine’s Defence Ministry and military did not respond to questions about weaponry and tactics.

Three days later, on July 24, the author of the handwritten notebook recorded that a HIMARS strike had killed 12 Russian soldiers belonging to the 336th marines brigade of the Baltic Fleet.

https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-russia-base/?utm_source=reddit.com

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Zeleban said:

it is obvious that in the near future the command of the enemy troops will try, under any circumstances, to cover this flank with additional forces and means. And by the way, this process has already begun.

Thanks again for the translations!

Interesting.  So it seems the facts on the ground indicate that Russia is not withdrawing fighting forces, but instead reinforcing them?  If the reports are accurate, and there's no reason to doubt them, it indicates that Putin is unwilling to do the sensible thing, militarily, and withdraw.  In fact, he's just giving Ukraine more opportunity to kill or capture Russians. 

It sounds like the fighting is going to get tougher for Ukraine, but I'm really unsure how much.  These units, even if fairly rested and equipped, are just as unlikely to stop Ukraine as the previous units were.  And as the Russian perimeter shrinks, it's easier for Ukraine to find and degrade the defenders.

The extra reinforcements puts additional strains on Russia's overstretched logistics.  That's not something they can magically fix.  Which means the units there are going to have to compete with the resources they need to keep fighting.

Kherson is definitely a battle I'm going to want to read about in great detail when the history books are written, that's for sure.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, acrashb said:

There have been some effective attacks, for example: https://www.wired.co.uk/article/viasat-internet-hack-ukraine-russia, but overall I agree that the whole arena has been underwhelming.

Why?

Cyber is a use-it-once family of weapons.  Attack someone, and they harden up not just the immediate code base but the processes to retain hardening - and almost all successful attacks are easy to defend against, just patch your equipment to remove known vulnerabilities.  Zero-day attacks, like the Iranian centrifuges, are rare and require high end capability and resources if they are even possible - contrary to popular belief, not all software is vulnerable and hackers can't just press the magic "crack this" button to  break things.  Of course there are non-technical attacks that rely on human carelessness (e.g., phishing) and coercion (bribery, blackmail, etc.) but to do things at scale it's technical attacks.

About six weeks before the ground assault, cyber attacks, almost all directed against critical infrastructure, were significantly elevated against baseline, and this was maintained for months into the conflict.  I don't know where it is now, because the lack of overall success has led my attention elsewhere. 

Russia has capable hacking groups, for example Fancy Bear.  Continued action of these groups has, as noted above, upped the investments made by critical infrastructure owners - as has an increasing mesh of legislation, regulation and industry associations (e.g., https://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/default.aspx ).

While it is possible that RA-affiliated hackers have something up their sleeves, if so they are waiting for a decisive moment, which IMO will not arrive.

 

For those who are interested, CISA is very well regarded, here is the entry page into their russo-ukraine war (a phrase I use that is not catching on - yet) guidance: https://www.cisa.gov/shields-up

 

It seems that in addition to all of this there were known vulnerabilities that were deliberately left alone until just before the war or after.  Nothing better than letting an adversary invest heavily into something you know that with a flip of a switch can shut down when the time comes.  I remember reading several stories of Russian offensive cyber bot farms and relay servers being shut down many months ago, though I forget the details.

Steve

[Commanderski]

31 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

It seems that in addition to all of this there were known vulnerabilities that were deliberately left alone until just before the war or after.  Nothing better than letting an adversary invest heavily into something you know that with a flip of a switch can shut down when the time comes.  I remember reading several stories of Russian offensive cyber bot farms and relay servers being shut down many months ago, though I forget the details.

Steve

It's been quoted before" Never interrupt your enemy while they are making a mistake"...

[Mattias]

As a regular reader of this splendid thread I felt very much at home in the reasoning, but I think many of us can still pick up a nugget or two here:

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Ok, but these are also all strategies adopted by weaker sides of a confrontation, some straight out of Mao’s playbook - who he ‘borrowed’ from others.  I have no doubt the UA was planning an unconventional resistance and if we recall the early days of this war, they were kinda scrambling.  I think what surprised everyone one was just how well it worked.  It morphed from a resistance to a new form of defence/corrosive warfare that I am not sure anyone was ready for.  

I think what we saw was, more or less, what Ukraine had in mind for the Russians long before they rolled across the border.  I do think the Ukrainians were likely surprised by how well it worked, mostly because the Russian top to bottom failures were exactly the sorts of shortcomings Ukraine's strategy was designed to exploit.  Penny packeting forces, poor morale, key components victimized by corruption, exposed logistics, lack of cohesion, etc. all perfect fit for what Ukraine long planned on doing. 

However, I think much of the groundbreaking resistance we have all noted and been astonished by was all part of Ukraine's pre-war plan.  It did not morph into it, rather it just took a few days to get going.

Drones are a prime example.  I remember seeing a Ukrainian special ops team driving into a forest outside of Kyiv and using a drone and a light mortar to target a Russian unit that they already knew (roughly) where it was.  Light mortar means the enemy was only a couple 1000m or so away!   After firing their rounds, they climbed back into their SUV (not even a military vehicle!) and buggered out.  None of this was improvised.

This was within the first few days of the war.  Week at most, because the Russians were still advancing on Kyiv.  There was no "morphing" into this sort of thing, it was part of Ukraine's plan from the start.

This sort of stuff shocked many and even caused raised eyebrows on this forum, but obviously it was bog standard for Ukraine.  I was one of those who wasn't surprised to see it as I've been paying attention to what Ukraine has done with drones for the past 8 years.  Yet even I didn't fully appreciate what this sort of tactic could do on a grand scale.

Another non-surprise for me, but for many others, was Ukraine's understanding of the threat enemy drones posed on their forces.  I watched a video of a volunteer unit using a homemade EW "gun" in the Donbas against DLPR drones somewhere around... 2019?  This thing looked like it was put together by a special effects department of a run down movie studio, but it worked.  I believe it was microwave based.

I also suspect that the communications network to collect ISR from the TDs and populace, then disseminate it effectively to combat units, was in place well before the invasion.  There was an example of a home owner noticing Russians using his house outside of Kyiv as a base of operations, so he called it in to a tip line, it was communicated down to a local unit, they sent a drone in to confirm, and then hit it with a highly accurate artillery strike.

We also have to remember that Ukraine identified Javelin, specifically, as a critical system for its strategy and lobbied HARD for these weapons well ahead of the war.

So on and so forth

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Further when Phase I collapsed, recall the RA did withdraw back to the border.  Even with all the abandoned gear they were not driven there by any conventional offensive waged by the UA.

Correct.  This is why I say I'm not specially impressed with Russia's performance.  Being able to drive a vehicle back along the way it came is something all militaries are supposed to be able to do, even ones from 100 years ago.

I know why you point this stuff out, and it's good to do so, but I am the sort that doesn't believe all kids on a sports team should get a trophy.  Showing up and performing the basic functions of that sport should not be sufficient grounds for accolades.  Russia sucks at war, so I'm certainly not going to hand it a trophy for doing things that militaries for 100 years have been able to do.

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I am not sure the Ukrainians knew the true state of the Russian military well in advance; I am not even sure the west did to be honest.  We could see it here on the forum about 72 hours in (I still have a copy of some of those posts).

For sure.  I expected Ukraine to do amazing things, I didn't expect Russia to suck as badly as it did, therefore the results we saw did surprise me in detail and (less so) strategic outcome.

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Jumping to the end - ok, I think we agree on more than we disagree on these points.  One area that I do think the Russians did entirely get in their own way and frankly even with the force they have could have done much better, maybe even pulled off what they were looking for, was in the arena of military strategy.

They had several strategic COAs going into this from which everything that followed was a direct result.  They chose - typically Russian - a strategy of overwhelmtion (yep, it is a word that I did not just totally make up).  5-6 operational axis of advance and massively deep penetration requirements was ridiculous overreach for both the size of the force and the enablers they had available to them. NATO would be really stretched to pull off such a fight - if I recall correctly we only had 3 axis of advance in CMSF.  The Russian way overestimated their forces and way underestimated what modern equipped defence could do (they were not alone in that).  All of this was exacerbated by very poor operational level targeting and logistics, and as you not abysmal tactical C2 - frankly I am not even sure how the managed the road move, let alone contact.  And to your point, this over reach may still have failed if the UA was less capable - I say may because it would have been a much closer run thing, as you note straight up mass and speed still count for something.

Correct.  However, the strategic goals required the dispersed forces.  If the forces were instead consolidated, then Putin's dream of taking over eastern Ukraine (including Kyiv!) within 2-3 days without raising additional forces ahead of time, was simply impossible.  So the plan fit the objectives.  Their presumptions about Ukrainian resistance, likely shaped to please Putin, made the plan technically feasible.  But they got the intel wrong, so everything else fell apart.  It fell apart more quickly and more embarrassingly because Russian forces were not up to this sort of offensive even if Ukrainian resistance was not as well organized.

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Now if the Russian military had done two strategic things, this war may have turned out differently.  1) Establish preconditions.  This costs time but hitting key transportation and communication/information infrastructure and power production and distribution.  Economic/finance systems.  And finally actually tried something nuanced in the diplomatic space other than “lie, lie, still lying..and now I am going to prove I was lying…”. To this add build a competitive C4ISR architecture that feeds a joint targeting enterprise and then get some unity of command going to control the whole thing.  All this and keeping the political level - with zero military expertise - from micro managing.

2) Isolate Ukraine.  Once you make the nation go dark and even with everything Ukraine already had, you focus on cutting them off from all support.  I find it baffling that Russia not only did not do this in the diplomatic space, they did not do it as part of military strategy…here Russia sucking was a definitive factor.  Put the main effort on a drive to Lviv and cut the western corridor approaches.  Reduce the axis of advance to Lviv, Kherson and Kyiv, which is still very ambitious.

If they did that from Day 1, I am still not sure they would have achieved success, best case they are fighting an historic insurgency-from-hell fully backed by the west.  But this clown show they are in might have had a few less acts.

Again, they couldn't do these things because Putin's goals were not compatible with the alternatives.  There wasn't enough force available to drive to Lviv as well as Kyiv, for example.  In fact, there wasn't enough forces to drive on Kharkiv and that was just across the Russian border opposite their primary logistics hub!

We also have to credit the Biden Admin and the intel services for making many of Putin's options moot or at least less effective.  This was particularly evident in the geopolitical space.  Even the doubters of a full invasion knew Putin was up to something dodgy.

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Military strategy is clearly the one area where Russia “sucking” is all on them.  Operationally and tactically I think it gets a lot more complicated and frankly the Ukrainian defence (and then offensives) will be studied for years to fully understand what just happened.  I am not sure anyone could solve for the Ukrainian resistance to be honest.  The fact that the RA itself was a key factor in them failing faster, I totally agree with.

As you say, we agree more than we disagree.  Especially because those failings you mentioned and are thinking of were systemic ones, not just "Yuri forgot to show up with his radio" sorts of things.  Yuri didn't have a radio to forget because his commander sold it on eBay.

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I personally think that warfare has changed - the needle has moved - I think it has shifted much farther and faster than we ever expected, which is actually normal.  I think things as basic as force ratios and principles need to be revisited (Surprise, for example…what does one do with that?). 

Totally agree.  As ready as I was for this war in terms of assessing how each would fight, with what weaponry, and likely outcomes... I'm still trying to process all of what happened!  The term "sea change" isn't sufficient to describe what we've seen in the past 8 months.

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Seriously, you guys should, start thinking about the Op Research game.  Training Cbt Tm commanders is cool, but I think there is going to be a serious market for OR - of course you will need to make CM massively bloated, less user friendly and cost over a billion dollars in order for western militaries to buy in.

We would also have to choose our customers very wisely.  Then again, the Russians were using our 20+ year old WW2 game for tactics training instead of our our modern warfare titles.  I'm sure it's because they could steal CMBO for free and would have had to pay $60 for CMBS   So as long as we keep the price point at $60 we're probably safe from Russia using such a game.

Steve

[Zeleban]

 

[billbindc]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I am not a cyber expert but promises where made dammit!  I had heard there was elevated activity but it really led nowhere decisive.  They did not establish the pre-conditions they needed to through cyber (or anything else for that matter).  I am wondering if the problem is what I suspect happened with all the cruise missiles - the whole thing has a disjointed C2 vibe to it,  a lot of lower level commanders playing “choose your own adventure”.  If the attacks in cyber space were as coordinated then the tepid results make more sense.

I have a clear recollection of some very sober (or not very sober) conversations where I was solemnly assured that the US, Russia, China (in descending order) had incredible cyber offensive capabilities but that defense was for all practical purposes impossible. There are only two options right now; either the Russians are exercising careful restraint or US cyber defenses (in expeditionary mode!) are far more robust than we were led to believe.  

[A Canadian Cat]

3 minutes ago, billbindc said:

There are only two options right now; either the Russians are exercising careful restraint or US cyber defenses (in expeditionary mode!) are far more robust than we were led to believe.

There is a third option too: Russian cyber capabilities are also overblown and not nearly as good as they claimed.

[Battlefront.com]

11 minutes ago, IanL said:

There is a third option too: Russian cyber capabilities are also overblown and not nearly as good as they claimed.

Probably a combo of all of the above.

We do know, for sure, that NATO clearly communicated to Putin that cyber attacks on public infrastructure is grounds for Article 4 declaration.  They also know how good the West's forensics are and that the chances of them conducting such an attack AND avoiding detection would be slim to none.  They probably know that in the event that they do manage to avoid detection, the victim will blame Russia anyway and probably so will the rest of NATO.

I suspect Russia knows very well that once that happens it's game over.  Therefore, I suspect Russia is deliberately holding back some of its capacity out of fear it might escalate out of its control.  If Article 4 is triggered through some other activity, such as a conventional attack, then we'll likely see more cyber stuff affecting NATO countries.

Steve