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How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?


Probus

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11 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Ok so this is better how?  Are you telling me they picked up on the UA planning a Kharkiv offensive weeks ahead of time...and did sweet FA to stop it?! ...The references you are making are making it look worse for them.  They saw but were unable to do anything about the UA taking back what is now being reported 6000 sq kms, in a week

RU Nat forces are at different location. They basically saved RU regulars from collapsing toward Svatove (up north) when UKR pushed from south up. 

But their main problem is RU army does not give them any long-range weapons. So, they give info to RU regulars and wait for the result. And this is the one of the causes of the current RU political crisis - RU Nats are mad that they gave sufficient warning and provided targets, yet RU regulars did nothing and just collapsed. 

 

17 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

This is a tactical problem. 

It is not a tactical problem. UKR will cut the road to Kremmyna and RU Nat forces will bail out. 

The problem is that we saw how UKR collapsed swath of territories defended by RU regulars while struggling to knock out supposedly bunch of small groups. If UKR will not collapse these supposedly bunch of small groups in coming days, it means these small groups have plenty of fight left and talks about RU is done are premature. 

 

17 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

For example, who is securing their LOCs - which are about 100kms long back to Russia?  These guys are tough but without ammo they become a hilarious nuisance.  How is that logistical system doing?  Is it robust, multi-corridor, dynamic and self-healing?  Do these guys have any Deep Strike capability to threaten UA supply lines?  What ISR do they have beyond tactical?  I will give them the benefit of the doubt that they have decent tactical.

Their LOC is not toward RU but LPR. But the most critical is road to Kreminna. Dashed line is approximate front line. it is mess there but road to Kreminna is not cut yet.WKDltU.png

UKR are currently trying to cut the road at least in two places while pressing Lyman itself and pressing RU Nat forces at Bilohirka. Yet we see no collapse and I have read reports that RU regulars now are sending forces there to strengthened positions.

The key for RU nat logistical system is that additionally to centralized (very crapy) logistics they have decentralized network of volunters. As long as there are vehicles and people around, they will get critical supplies forward.

They have no deep strike capabilities except may be recently transferred Tochaks U but I do believe they are still under RU regulars control. RU Nats are trying to solve this by building network of horizontal contacts directly to immediate command of these weapons.

They rely on information from friendly locals + friendly RU regulars.  It seems they have eyes in most settlements except may be Western Ukraine settlements. I myself is very surprised as I tended to dismiss their claims until UKR started offensive exactly where RU Nat says UKR were concentrating forces. 

 

 

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6 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

How big are these factions, and would they be able to plunge Russia into civil war? Or are they just two small fringe groups? I've seen many people talk about these Russian Nationalists, but I can't really figure out if they are a faction to be reckoned with or just some keyboard warriors.

We've had quite a few discussions about these guys in the past 6 months and the simple answer is "nobody knows how much power they have".

What we do know is that they are important to Putin's regime from a PR and philosophical standpoint. These are the guys who form motorcycle gangs, beat up "liberals", and willingly promote the hardline Russian nationalist views at home and abroad.  They are the heart and mind of Putin's regime.  Losing any amount of them is likely a bad sign for Putin's stability.

What is less clear is how many of the people in positions of power within Putin's government are ardent RU Nats compared to run of the mill criminals, careerists of other types, etc.  The guess is that a LOT of the middle management of the regime likely align with the RU Nats to some extent.

The other problem about the RU Nats is their voice is the only one that hasn't been silenced over the years.  They have established channels of communications whereas the other groups do not.  Their voice, therefore, is heard and snuffing it out will likely only feed into the RU Nat narrative that the war is lost.

Steve

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23 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I was going to respond but then realized I disagree with every second or third sentence. Is "George Friedman" one of those AI writing programs?

And what is this claim that there are large number of russian troops beining trained in the far east? I did not hear that before. Any truth to that? Where are those troops coming from?

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54 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

These guys standing in Lyman now is the best possible scenario. They can be surrounded and killed. It might delay things a week. They would be far more dangerous if they were smart enough to dissolve into the wood work and start setting up a guerilla war now. As dead martyrs in the worst cause since the Confederacy they are a remarkably small problem. 

It is not the best scenario for UKR - they are preventing UKR from hitting left flank of RU forces to collapse RU defenses along Oskil river.

Once they are gone RU most likely will start rolling east toward Svatove 

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21 minutes ago, Grigb said:

RU Nat forces are at different location. They basically saved RU regulars from collapsing toward Svatove (up north) when UKR pushed from south up. 

But their main problem is RU army does not give them any long-range weapons. So, they give info to RU regulars and wait for the result. And this is the one of the causes of the current RU political crisis - RU Nats are mad that they gave sufficient warning and provided targets, yet RU regulars did nothing and just collapsed. 

 

It is not a tactical problem. UKR will cut the road to Kremmyna and RU Nat forces will bail out. 

The problem is that we saw how UKR collapsed swath of territories defended by RU regulars while struggling to knock out supposedly bunch of small groups. If UKR will not collapse these supposedly bunch of small groups in coming days, it means these small groups have plenty of fight left and talks about RU is done are premature. 

 

Their LOC is not toward RU but LPR. But the most critical is road to Kreminna. Dashed line is approximate front line. it is mess there but road to Kreminna is not cut yet.WKDltU.png

UKR are currently trying to cut the road at least in two places while pressing Lyman itself and pressing RU Nat forces at Bilohirka. Yet we see no collapse and I have read reports that RU regulars now are sending forces there to strengthened positions.

The key for RU nat logistical system is that additionally to centralized (very crapy) logistics they have decentralized network of volunters. As long as there are vehicles and people around, they will get critical supplies forward.

They have no deep strike capabilities except may be recently transferred Tochaks U but I do believe they are still under RU regulars control. RU Nats are trying to solve this by building network of horizontal contacts directly to immediate command of these weapons.

They rely on information from friendly locals + friendly RU regulars.  It seems they have eyes in most settlements except may be Western Ukraine settlements. I myself is very surprised as I tended to dismiss their claims until UKR started offensive exactly where RU Nat says UKR were concentrating forces. 

 

I'm with you that the LPR and DPR forces are, on the whole, better than the regular Russian military.  I also think the PMCs are a cut above regular Russian military as well, though for different reasons.  However, depending on the scenario I'm either only a little concerned about them or not concerned at all.

The thing we have to remember is that both the DLPR and PMCs require, and I do mean require, direct Russian aid.  If there is any disruption in the quality or quantity of those resources, they have absolutely no way of compensating with alternatives.  Russia can collapse, run out of something critical, or simply decide (for their own reasons) to reduce the level of support.  There isn't a damned thing DLPR or PMC can do about it.

The other thing is we know that DLPR and PMCs have limited potential for growth.  The phony republics have already gone to great lengths to simply keep their existing forces staffed with warm bodies.  They do not have the large Human reserves that the Ukrainians have.  Especially if a bunch of them bugger off to Russia.

Both of these show that the longer the war goes on the capabilities of the DLPR and PMCs will decline.  Given Ukraine's capabilities and resources, that right there means they will lose conventionally.  Unconventionally?  Yeah, I do worry about them big time.  Which is one reason I think Ukraine needs to think long and hard before it tries going in for the kill on either LPR or DPR, whereas going after Russians in the south is a no-brainer.

 

Now, when I look at the military situation as it is today I'm not very worried about LPR.  Yes, they seem to be more capable of defending against Ukrainian attacks, but for their survival they need to hold off Ukraine everywhere.  A massive new front just opened up against the LPR directly and it seems Russia isn't going to be much help there.  I seriously doubt LPR has the resources to establish a new frontline on their own.  If Ukraine wants to push in deep, militarily I don't think there is much LPR can do about it.  DPR, on the other hand, is pretty safe for now.

Steve

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46 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I was going to respond but then realized I disagree with every second or third sentence. Is "George Friedman" one of those AI writing programs?

Friedman wrote a book in 2009, "The Next 100 Years" where he in fact predicted that the Russian Federation would fracture and fall apart in the 2020's, 30's and 40's. Seems pretty likely right now that he nailed that analysis. Granted, there's plenty he said that hasn't manifested so far either. He didn't seem to be particularly concerned about China's rise in his book, and yet here we are with their military spending coming to par with the US.

I don't think he has any particular skill in military matters.

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Just now, Homo_Ferricus said:

Friedman wrote a book in 2009, "The Next 100 Years" where he in fact predicted that the Russian Federation would fracture and fall apart in the 2020's, 30's and 40's. Seems pretty likely right now that he nailed that analysis. Granted, there's plenty he said that hasn't manifested so far either. He didn't seem to be particularly concerned about China's rise in his book, and yet here we are with their military spending coming to par with the US.

I don't think he has any particular skill in military matters.

Agreed. His strength is in pulling together stuff from around the world to create a coherent political overview.  And he's pretty good in that realm.  But not on military stuff: he's been consistently wrong on the Ukraine war,  although not as badly as mainstream media. And he does occasionally have nuggets on information that you won't find mentioned elsewhere. 

I'm also curious about the claimed reserves training out in the East.  It's said like it's an established fact, but not one I've seen anywhere else. 

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1 hour ago, Probus said:

You've probably answered this previously Steve, but does this mean you think Russia is going to start a mobilization?

The most likely answer is "yes" because if Putin doesn't do it I think there will be a coup and whomever replaces him will give it a shot.  Since those people have only a casual relationship with reality, the fact that mobilization won't work isn't a deterrent.  Plus, what else do they other than nukes?  Not a thing.

Steve

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6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The most likely answer is "yes" because if Putin doesn't do it I think there will be a coup and whomever replaces him will give it a shot.  Since those people have only a casual relationship with reality, the fact that mobilization won't work isn't a deterrent.  Plus, what else do they other than nukes?  Not a thing.

Steve

We just need to Get Ukraine Abrams and other truly first line gear before Russia can round up a truly large mass of cannon fodder. However bad it is now in Moscow, it will be worse after another 300,000 casualties, and most of the far east declaring independence, or actively trying to get Chinese "protection".

Edit: Going all in and failing Guarantees a much smaller Russia in a year or four. 

Edited by dan/california
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43 minutes ago, Anon052 said:

And what is this claim that there are large number of russian troops beining trained in the far east? I did not hear that before. Any truth to that? Where are those troops coming from?

Mother Russia is apparently an endless source of asiatic hordes or somefink. AKA, I haven't the foggiest idea where this dreck is from.

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23 minutes ago, Homo_Ferricus said:

Friedman wrote a book in 2009, "The Next 100 Years" where he in fact predicted that the Russian Federation would fracture and fall apart in the 2020's, 30's and 40's. Seems pretty likely right now that he nailed that analysis. Granted, there's plenty he said that hasn't manifested so far either. He didn't seem to be particularly concerned about China's rise in his book, and yet here we are with their military spending coming to par with the US.

I don't think he has any particular skill in military matters.

The problem with 'futurists' is that it's pretty easy to look at a volatile gas station with nukes, a declining demographic situation and a complex ethnic composition and say..."hey, those guys are going to have a problem". And while I'm no big fan of the China-as-future-hegemon thesis (for similar reasons) it's clear China is a concern. Count me as profoundly meh.  

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22 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

I'm also curious about the claimed reserves training out in the East.  It's said like it's an established fact, but not one I've seen anywhere else. 

For some reason my FB feed has had some CCP propaganda posts in it recently, tooting the horn about joint exercises with the RF armed forces. Maybe he's gotten something twisted about that: exercises=training; claims of "largest ever" mean "hordes of recruits".

I somehow don't think he's that clueless, though.

Edit: though if he missed the threat to US primacy that China has obviously presented since it started getting its own back on the colonial powers, maybe he is that blinkered.

Edited by womble
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2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

RUMINT - Russia is pulling forces out of the south and redirecting them to or through Crimea.

 

Maybe it's just me (or UA PsyOps!), but there seems to be an immense tension in the air, like something absolutely huge was about to happen. 

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The Russians cut and run outside of Kyiv. They might be about to cut and run to 2/24 lines. There is a pretty good military argument they don't have any other rational choice. I assume they are going to try and hold Crimea. But if the contest for power in Moscow has kicked off for real who knows. Retreat to 2/24 lines would at least get their calls returned in Paris and Berlin.

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Speaking of full mobilization. That commie, who was screaming for full mobilization because it's war and not "special military operation" and russkies are losing bad - got absolutely smashed in comments all over the russian internets.

People were demanding for him to get arrested, go fight the war himself or just die - in no particular order.

As it turns out your typical russian "civilian" is more than happy to watch people get killed on TV from afar deep in his wooden barrack, but somehow doesn't want to take part in regroOpings and good will gestures himself.

Edited by kraze
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7 minutes ago, dan/california said:

The Russians cut and run outside of Kyiv. They might be about to cut and run to 2/24 lines. There is a pretty good military argument they don't have any other rational choice. I assume they are going to try and hold Crimea. But if the contest for power in Moscow has kicked off for real who knows. Retreat to 2/24 lines would at least get their calls returned in Paris and Berlin.

My gut tells me exactly that ( but hey, it's just a gut...). If that was about to happen, I wonder what is next. If UA goes for Crimea, it's going to be a very tense moment escalation wise - but I'm positive they will try. I wonder if DLPR would be willing to negotiate surrender if Russia leaves them out to dry? 

Edited by Huba
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3 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

RUMINT - Russia is pulling forces out of the south and redirecting them to or through Crimea.

 

If they've decided they need to pull the "much vaunted" 3AC out of the centre and push it North, is Crimea-Kerch-[Russian transport network]-Donbass the best displacement route? Seems an awful long way around. ISTR some suggestion that communications routes into the Donbass from the south aren't too good.

Though the 3AC is symptomatic of the RU army malaise: even if it's as top-notch as the Kremlin would like it to be, they seem to be committing it haphazardly and piecemeal.

Maybe the rumour is an attempt at deception to draw the notional 3rd striking force out from behind Zaporizhzhia. Or maybe it's not a deception and Berdyansk lies open.

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5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I'm with you that the LPR and DPR forces are, on the whole, better than the regular Russian military.  I also think the PMCs are a cut above regular Russian military as well, though for different reasons.  However, depending on the scenario I'm either only a little concerned about them or not concerned at all.

The thing we have to remember is that both the DLPR and PMCs require, and I do mean require, direct Russian aid.  If there is any disruption in the quality or quantity of those resources, they have absolutely no way of compensating with alternatives.  Russia can collapse, run out of something critical, or simply decide (for their own reasons) to reduce the level of support.  There isn't a damned thing DLPR or PMC can do about it.

The other thing is we know that DLPR and PMCs have limited potential for growth.  The phony republics have already gone to great lengths to simply keep their existing forces staffed with warm bodies.  They do not have the large Human reserves that the Ukrainians have.  Especially if a bunch of them bugger off to Russia.

Both of these show that the longer the war goes on the capabilities of the DLPR and PMCs will decline.  Given Ukraine's capabilities and resources, that right there means they will lose conventionally.  Unconventionally?  Yeah, I do worry about them big time.  Which is one reason I think Ukraine needs to think long and hard before it tries going in for the kill on either LPR or DPR, whereas going after Russians in the south is a no-brainer.

 

Now, when I look at the military situation as it is today I'm not very worried about LPR.  Yes, they seem to be more capable of defending against Ukrainian attacks, but for their survival they need to hold off Ukraine everywhere.  A massive new front just opened up against the LPR directly and it seems Russia isn't going to be much help there.  I seriously doubt LPR has the resources to establish a new frontline on their own.  If Ukraine wants to push in deep, militarily I don't think there is much LPR can do about it.  DPR, on the other hand, is pretty safe for now.

Steve

We all agree on the main things:

  • RU regulars are comprehensibly defeated (but most likely will try to do last one dumb offensive)
  • RU L-DPR + Volunteers forces will hold longer but will be defeated as well

But next is where we depart.

Previously I got painful lesson from RU Nats - I expected RU forces to start collapsing July-August. Also, I expected RU Nat forces around Lyman to collapse in short order. In both cases I was wrong as I underestimated RU Nat capabilities. They did not collapse in summer. They prevented RU regulars from collapsing around Lyman now. 

Still not enough to dramatically affect the outcome. But what if we add another factor into the mix - Prigozhin. This is where I depart from you and @The_Capt.  I believe Prigozhin is significant factor that will affect (or already affects) RU Nat forces. He is a possible RU Nat power line that will pump anything that is needed for to keep RU Nat forces at least afloat and force UKR and West to the negotiation table. 

You need to understand that Prigozhin right now is second most powerful man in RU. He got carte blanche from Putin. And he is focusing on L-DPR.

We are not dealing anymore with just RU Nats. We are dealing now with RU Nats that are increasingly backed up by second powerful man in RU. 

Can I be wrong? Yes, I can - if UKR will defeat shortly RU Nat forces at Lyman-Kremenna it means most likely RU Nat forces are spent. Otherwise, we must expect somewhat longer war with significantly improved RU Nat forces at the expense of RU regulars.  One scenario I already explained - fortify L-DPR and make as much of UKR wasteland as possible. 

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19 hours ago, sross112 said:

War.......war never changes.....

There is a lot to unpack in that quote. I never meant to imply that war never changes. It does. It changes a lot. I was emphasizing how much it changes due to factors other than time/technology. But just because my emphasis was on how much variability there is in wars even in the same time period, that doesn't mean there isn't also a considerable amount of variability in war between different time periods. War changes both in time and space, and according to dozens of other factors that are difficult to account for.

I assume the point of that quote, when it was first uttered in a Fallout cutscene, was to emphasize that brutality and misery have always been a constant presence in war. And that's true enough. But a lot of people seem to take it to mean that absolutely nothing in war ever really changes. And that's total garbage.

At first there appears to be some supporting evidence to the claim that "war never changes". There are certain elements that seem to remain more or less constant in any war. Numbers have always mattered. River crossings have always posed a significant challenge. War has always taken a psychological toll on those who participate in it. High ground has always been important. Logistics, communication, and coordination have always posed serious challenges.

But even those elements that appear, at first glance, to remain constant have had significant changes in their weighted importance, in how they manifest, and in how they are addressed. Numbers have always mattered. But changes in technology have significantly altered how much of a numerical superiority it takes to overwhelm a determined defense, or how few troops you can get away with using to hold a choke point. Changes in the mobility of armies, and in the mobilization systems of nations, have effected how quickly a relative numerical balance can be altered. River crossings have always been a delicate operation, but changes in the firepower available to armies has changed their ability to support a crossing from the opposite bank, while changes in the available recon assets have changed how easy it is to determine where your enemy will attempt a river crossing. War has always taken a psychological toll on its participants, but the nature and causes of that toll and how we address it has changed. A thousand years ago soldiers faced the terror of edged weapons in close quarters on tightly packed battlefields, while modern firearms with supersonic projectiles produce a suppressive effect that has never been seen on the battlefield before (the tiny sonic boom (crack) of supersonic bullets suppresses enemy infantry far more effectively than even the subsonic bullets that were in use until the late 19th century (noise seems to be more important than lethality for producing a psychological effect)).

And then there are things that are completely different. Entire new domains of warfare that have cropped up in the last hundred or so years (air, space, cyber, etc...). Air and naval combat are both completely different, to the point of being unrecognizable, to how they were 70 years ago. A full description of how war has and hasn't changed (and there is a decent amount to be said on both (smaller scale stuff seems to change more rapidly than larger scale stuff, with considerations on the tactical layer changing more rapidly than operational considerations, and operational considerations changing more rapidly than strategic considerations)) would require a full book (or possibly a series of books), but this post is probably long enough for now.

Edited by Centurian52
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1 hour ago, Grigb said:

If UKR will not collapse these supposedly bunch of small groups in coming days, it means these small groups have plenty of fight left and talks about RU is done are premature. 

Well I guess we will see.  This is not about small groups holding out, this is about whether or not the RA, as whole, can re-establish a level of operational integrity.  If it can't do that, then smaller isolated forces, relying on an ersatz volunteer logistical corps may be heartburn tactical problems but they are not going to be able to hold the UA back.

Also now that Ukraine is winning, the west is likely to double down on support to finish the job - hopefully we conduct a decent follow through.  No one is questioning giving aid now - our guy is kicking ass. 

My guess is that maybe the RA has one good defensive left in it.  If they were smart they would pull back the entire western front into that bottleneck at the Crimea and try to hold onto what they took in 2014.  That is really messy ground up there and they would stand a chance, even as shot up as they are.

As to LNR/DPR - the trigger will be when they split from Russia and we start hearing rumors of side negotiations.  I am not sure Ukraine would want them back because they sided, at least a significant number did with the invading force.  However, that is a Ukrainian political decision with all sorts of issues that I would not even try to unpack.  

When/if the UA can cut a third axis towards Melitopol and cut the two AOs, then we will really know this thing is coming to an end.

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51 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

Agreed. His strength is in pulling together stuff from around the world to create a coherent political overview.  And he's pretty good in that realm.  But not on military stuff: he's been consistently wrong on the Ukraine war,  although not as badly as mainstream media. And he does occasionally have nuggets on information that you won't find mentioned elsewhere. 

I'm also curious about the claimed reserves training out in the East.  It's said like it's an established fact, but not one I've seen anywhere else. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Coming_War_with_Japan

To be frank I would stay away from predictions of any pop-realists of his kind. They have almost zero methodological discipline, and if they happen to have some, urge to make money on generalized and flattened worldview understandable to common public is too strong too resist for them anyway. Not provide names of the rest but Friedman is one of the worst.

 

Edited by Beleg85
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