How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Calamine Waffles]

Depending on them, I would assume some went to the countryside (don't want to end up stuck in another potential Mariupol)

[kevinkin]

9 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

 

 

Interesting that a fellow named Scott Boston participated in the forum and scenario design in the early days (2002) of Combat Mission. Amazing how time flies! 

[Holien]

40 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

So you expect Ukraine to violate the agreed boundaries given them in exchange for the aid meaning they will cross into Russia in pursuit then pull back? Have not heard that one. 

Hmmm I did not see Ian write that,  you seem to be making things up, perhaps a bit like the leash comment.

How is Ukraine on a leash?

I would love to see a full explanation of that comment from you. What have I missed about the US relationship with Ukraine?

Edited September 10, 2022 by Holien

[Cederic]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

So I am not going to reopen the "tanks are dead...no they are not" debate...please gawd no.

However, is it just me or do light forces seem to be leading on this whole thing again?  I am sure there has been some heavy action but we still are not seeing big armor from the UA - unless I am missing something?

Until/unless we get video footage I'm not sure we can properly assess the contribution of heavy armour.

While it's tempting to suggest that highly mobile infantry are the difference, Blitzkrieg offers the obvious counter-example.

I suspect the answer lies in-between. Tanks supported breaking initial defensive lines, pace of attack with infantry to support established the breakthrough through inadequately defended rear areas.

Tanks may have had a role to play if Russia had deployed defenses in depth; I'm not seeing any evidence that they had.

At worse (for tank aficionados) it's thus 'insufficient data to draw inferences'.

[Letter from Prague]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

...But this is Russia, where the life of cog in state machine is nothing. On some Russian TV-show this well-fed man in costly suit says that: "The westerners and Ukrainains absolutely don't understand a fact, that for Russia such term like "unacceptable losses" just doesn't exist"

The saddest thing is that the Russians seem to be ok with it. Or ok enough that they don't strangle him with that tie (which is by itself a war crime).

[Cederic]

18 minutes ago, Maquisard manqué said:

They may not see much difference between being evicted or moving because they are afraid of reprisals. They’ll certainly think they had no choice but to leave.

That can look like forced migration, arguably is, and will get stretched to genocide too.

Another sad part of the human tragedy of this stupid war, and another reminder of why nationalism is  so toxic to peace and prosperity.

Sorry, but that's a weird interpretation.

This is not forced migration. This is not genocide.

As for nationalism, Russian nationalism led to this war. You're not going to convince me that Russian nationalists are the victims here.

[Calamine Waffles]

2 minutes ago, Cederic said:

Until/unless we get video footage I'm not sure we can properly assess the contribution of heavy armour.

While it's tempting to suggest that highly mobile infantry are the difference, Blitzkrieg offers the obvious counter-example.

I suspect the answer lies in-between. Tanks supported breaking initial defensive lines, pace of attack with infantry to support established the breakthrough through inadequately defended rear areas.

Tanks may have had a role to play if Russia had deployed defenses in depth; I'm not seeing any evidence that they had.

At worse (for tank aficionados) it's thus 'insufficient data to draw inferences'.

Or you can just take the Ukrainians at their word:
 

Quote

Tanks have not become useless, on the contrary, their role in the battle has become more significant, and the variety of the tasks that they perform has widened.

 

[kraze]

11 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

Interesting that a fellow named Scott Boston participated in the forum and scenario design in the early days (2002) of Combat Mission. Amazing how time flies! 

He probably played CMx2 and said "meh AI is unrealistic" - so he stopped playing and here we are.

[Cederic]

18 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Maybe I should use other word, but I meant a result of "unit combat cohesion" process )

The word you used correctly conveyed the meaning you intended.

That I'd never encountered it before is my failing, not yours. Thank you for expanding my knowledge.

[Maquisard manqué]

12 minutes ago, Cederic said:

Sorry, but that's a weird interpretation.

This is not forced migration. This is not genocide.

As for nationalism, Russian nationalism led to this war. You're not going to convince me that Russian nationalists are the victims here.

Well, given that a significant proportion of eastern Ukrainian people  identified as Russian in the last few decades of census’s, and that there have been plenty of collaborators for the Russian invasion, it’s quite likely they are fleeing more than just the immediate fighting.

As the people who identified more with Ukrainian than Russian Nationality fled the Russian occupation, those who maybe were happy to be Russian will now flee the Ukrainian reconquest.

Edited September 10, 2022 by Maquisard manqué

[TheVulture]

24 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Maybe I should use other word, but I meant a result of "unit combat cohesion" process )

Nothing wrong with "cohered" - it's a perfectly good word and used correctly.  But used rarely enough that a fair number of native English speakers don't know it. So Cederic is complementing you for being a Ukrainian who knows more  English words than he does. 

[Haiduk]

Here is a animated map of UKR offensive. I doubt it 100 % true about units set, but let it be

The quality of video is not proper, so I write UKR units from north to south (of course under "brigade" in real means "elements of brigade"):

- 112 TD brigade (Kyiv)

- 92nd mech. brigade

- 113th TD brigade (Kahrkiv oblast)

- 93rd mech.brigade

- 25th airborne brigade

- 3rd tank brigade

- 80th air-assault brigade

- 10th SOF detachment

- 8th SOF regimnent

- KRAKEN SOF

- Foreign Legion SOF

- two unrecognizable light/SOF units

- 3rd National Guard brigade

- some unrecognizable brigade

- 71st jager infantry brigade

- 40th artillery brigade as support in rear

Edited September 10, 2022 by Haiduk

[kevinkin]

6 minutes ago, Holien said:

How is Ukraine on a leash?

My understanding is that Ukraine can not violate Russian territory which is why the range of HIMARS missiles has been limited. Why advanced A/C have been withheld for example. There have been limited strikes on legitimate military targets like an air base inside Russia. But the notion of massed armored formations crossing and staying in Russia is not in the West's strategic thinking as of now. The West can't stop special ops inside Russia, but special ops can't hold territory in Russia. To be clear, Ukraine is not on a leash with respect to their own territory. They are just not heading to Moscow anytime soon. 

[Haiduk]

SBU Alfa special force in Kupiansk with UKR-designed Novator armored car

[Pete Wenman]

 

 

 

 

 

[dan/california]

21 minutes ago, kraze said:

He probably played CMx2 and said "meh AI is unrealistic" - so he stopped playing and here we are.

So much good news I can barely read it all, GrigB, Haiduk, Beleg, everybody providing translations is greatly appreciated.

This line from kraze was so funny I almost sent my coffee across The room.

GLORY TO UKRAINE!!!

[billbindc]

55 minutes ago, Huba said:

Didn't hear most of it myself, but VERY interesting:

 

Sushko is a clown. Ignore. 

[The_Capt]

49 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

I met the opinion of some western military analyst in twitter (alas can't find now) that this UKR offensive puts an end to discussion about either need tanks and armored vehciled in modern warfare or not, because UKR success was caused by PROPER WELL PLANNED using of armored spears.

47 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

I agree. The ZSU have been very consistent in reporting that tanks have been essential in every phase of the war

Well first off I am very wary of western analysts declaring anything "settled" in this war considering how much they got wrong in the first place.  By their metrics of tank-power Ukraine should be a puppet state of Russian by last Apr.

So I am curious as to how the tanks have been essential or have been employed.  For example, "15 tanks did the break in battle at Balakliya", that is a single Company, so what/how were they integrated into a break in battle that was kms wide?

It is not so much that the "tank is dead", it looks more like its role is evolving.  Nothing we have seen in this war looks like it was supposed to wrt mech and armoured warfare - so here we have a successful breakout battle and I am still not sure how it was integrated into it.  And then there is "what the hell happened with RA armor?", but by this point I doubt the Russian can keep theirs in gas, let alone in combat.

And then we have this Light Infantry/SOF breakout, unless some of these maps have been wrong.  We wont answer it here but the most dangerous thing we can do with this entire experience is validate pre-existing biases and promptly ignore all the other weird signals.  Especially when the validations might be the weird signals, not the main.

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Well first off I am very wary of western analysts declaring anything "settled" in this war considering how much they got wrong in the first place.  By their metrics of tank-power Ukraine should be a puppet state of Russian by last Apr.

So I am curious as to how the tanks have been essential or have been employed.  For example, "15 tanks did the break in battle at Balakliya", that is a single Company, so what/how were they integrated into a break in battle that was kms wide?

It is not so much that the "tank is dead", it looks more like its role is evolving.  Nothing we have seen in this war looks like it was supposed to wrt mech and armoured warfare - so here we have a successful breakout battle and I am still not sure how it was integrated into it.  And then there is "what the hell happened with RA armor?", but by this point I doubt the Russian can keep theirs in gas, let alone in combat.

And then we have this Light Infantry/SOF breakout, unless some of these maps have been wrong.  We wont answer it here but the most dangerous thing we can do with this entire experience is validate pre-existing biases and promptly ignore all the other weird signals.  Especially when the validations might be the weird signals, not the main.

Some of us hold out hope for a new simulation that incorporates data from this war, and explore these questions in detail. Alas it is still in closed beta or something, something.

And yes the other watch spring popped. 

[Calamine Waffles]

6 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Well first off I am very wary of western analysts declaring anything "settled" in this war considering how much they got wrong in the first place.  By their metrics of tank-power Ukraine should be a puppet state of Russian by last Apr.

So I am curious as to how the tanks have been essential or have been employed.  For example, "15 tanks did the break in battle at Balakliya", that is a single Company, so what/how were they integrated into a break in battle that was kms wide?

It is not so much that the "tank is dead", it looks more like its role is evolving.  Nothing we have seen in this war looks like it was supposed to wrt mech and armoured warfare - so here we have a successful breakout battle and I am still not sure how it was integrated into it.  And then there is "what the hell happened with RA armor?", but by this point I doubt the Russian can keep theirs in gas, let alone in combat.

And then we have this Light Infantry/SOF breakout, unless some of these maps have been wrong.  We wont answer it here but the most dangerous thing we can do with this entire experience is validate pre-existing biases and promptly ignore all the other weird signals.  Especially when the validations might be the weird signals, not the main.

It will be a while before we know for sure, but this:
 

suggests to me that they are being used more like self-propelled guns, for direct fire support against hardpoints/targets/lines  that cannot be bypassed, and also capable of providing indirect fire with drone support.

Edited September 10, 2022 by Calamine Waffles

[The_Capt]

1 minute ago, Calamine Waffles said:

It will be a while before we know for sure, but this:
 

suggests to me that they are being used more like self-propelled guns, for direct fire support against hardpoints/targets/lines  that cannot be bypassed, and also capable of providing indirect fire with drone support.

Ok, the mention of the US 9th Infantry is enough to melt western force developers for a generation.  This really resonates - high speed, low drag, shorter logistics tale and capable of dispersion - heavy in support for the grudge jobs...and all the ISR.  

[Calamine Waffles]

4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Ok, the mention of the US 9th Infantry is enough to melt western force developers for a generation.  This really resonates - high speed, low drag, shorter logistics tale and capable of dispersion - heavy in support for the grudge jobs...and all the ISR.  

The biggest lesson for the ZSU from 2014/15 I think is that they cannot out-mass or out-firepower the Russians, so they must find another way. And I think this is what they decided to go for.

Edited September 10, 2022 by Calamine Waffles

[The_Capt]

Just now, Calamine Waffles said:

The biggest lesson for the ZSU from 2014/15 I think is that they cannot out-mass the Russians, so they must find another way. And I think this is what they decided to go for.

It isn't massless, it is anti-mass...brilliant.

[Calamine Waffles]

 

[Battlefront.com]

I woke up to sooooo many pages I thought that maybe Ukrainian forces were in the Urals and shaking hands with Finns.  Alas, that was not the case.  But it's pretty darned close

Some quick thoughts on a bunch of different topics.

Information Warfare - some Twitter guy pointed out that Russia spent weeks messaging about Kherson.  They knew the big offensive was coming (Ukraine announced it long ahead of time!) and this allowed the Russians to form at least some narrative of what was to come.  The offensive started and the messaging was consistent with reality ("tough fighting, our forces are heroically holding") in the Russian sense of reality (i.e. selective and distorted).  This allowed the RU Nats and the general populace to mostly feel OK with what was happening.  Kharkiv, on the other hand, had ZERO messaging ahead of it and the disaster was both quick and decisive.  The Russian MoD had NOTHING to give the RU Nats to feed off of, yet they can't stay quiet because they are realtime observers.  Lacking direction from the MoD meant they had to go with what they had in front of them and what they had in front of them was a disaster for their cause.  We've seen how this is playing out and it's really bad for the Russia sense of stability.  To the point that they are now calling Putin a "traitor".  Russian MoD's lack of planning for this eventuality is directly responsible for this.

No preparations  - it's been noted that the offensive was fairly obvious.  We, here, noted it but figured that either it was to distract the Russians from Kherson or would be more-or-less local attacks at weak points in the Russian lines.  Either way, the Russians SHOULD have prepared for something, yet they didn't.  People here correctly asked why they didn't.  Well, I think the answer is two fold; inability and denial.  The simple fact is that Russia doesn't have the forces to spare for defending everything all at once, therefore they couldn't have beefed up the defenses in Kharkiv even if they wanted to (until very recently.  See next point). 

The forces there could have prepared better, but likely didn't have the resources to do so.  They certainly didn't have reserves that could create rearward defenses AND still defend the frontline.  This is where denial comes in... can't do what you need to do?  Then deny that you need to do it and hope for the best.  This is how the Russians have been behaving since the 1st day of the war with only periodic instances of facing up to the facts.

Hopes pined on 3rd Army Corps - the Russians are supposed to be on the offense.  From an imperialist, chauvinistic standpoint this is extremely important.  Admitting that Russia is on the defensive is a form of defeat even if the frontline is stable.  That's the boat Putin put everybody in when he launched this war.  If the powers inside the Kremlin and the populace don't see gains then, by default and inference, Russia has been defeated in concept and spirit.  Therefore, the 3rd Corps was developed SPECIFICALLY to show the people that Russia could restart offensive operations and "finish off" the Ukrainians.  This mentality (political in nature) required that the 3rd Corps be deployed with offensive operations in mind. 

However, it is clear that senior Russian military leaders realized that the fight in Kherson would be tough and that Ukraine might swing a fist into the otherwise quiet southern line between the Dnepr and Donetsk.  So they temporarily (likely in their mind) parked a lot of the force north of Crimea to wait and see how the Kherson offensive played out.  The rest of the ready force went to Donetsk South to get ready for some hoped for exploitation attack.  Parking any substantial part of this in Kharkiv would be counter to the political purpose of the 3rd Corps, so obviously they didn't go there.

What this did was put the bulk of the 3rd Corps into positions that could not respond to a Ukrainian attack they conveniently hoped wouldn't happen.  Ukraine, on the other hand, might have waited until Russia had committed the forces before launching Kharkiv, maybe they didn't care.  It's a good question to have answered after the war.

Reality is a real thing - in total, this meant that Ukraine was able to conduct the planning and initial execution of the Kharkiv offensive without much consideration for Russian's doing anything to complicate either (for reasons mentioned above).  Because the Ukrainians properly sourced their offensive with capable and well equipped forces, in sufficient quantity, with appropriate planning... the results are not all that surprising.  This is exactly the sort of thing I've been waiting for Ukraine to do, but lacked the OSINT to know when they would be ready to do it.

Final thought - this is collapse and it is as expected.  Russia is totally fooked.  The Ukrainian offensive will eventually run out of steam and, if they are smart (and they show no reason to doubt their intelligence), they will stop when they sense the head of steam is petering out.  Even if the Russian lines have not reformed, better to stop before the enemy has a chance to counter attack and reverse some of the gains (this happened in Kharkiv North this spring).  My hope is that they have more steam than we might guess they have and that the offensive will continue for at least another week, maybe two.

This whole war has been fascinating for so many reasons.  I expect Ukraine is not done fascinating us.  Nor is Russia, but not for good reasons

Steve