How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[hcrof]

I look at that new Australian (?) Drone that can be launched out of a 40mm grenade launcher and I am starting to think that 40mm kamikaze drones with some form of image recognition would be a game changer. They could be launched en mass at an enemy position and they independently seek and kill anyone nearby. They could be fired by infantry small arms or dropped as a cluster munition.

Yes they are an expensive way to kill someone, but probably still cheaper than a barrage of 155mm or even thousands of rounds of 5.56. And scarily easy to use...

[keas66]

12 minutes ago, hcrof said:

I look at that new Australian (?) Drone that can be launched out of a 40mm grenade launcher and I am starting to think that 40mm kamikaze drones with some form of image recognition would be a game changer. They could be launched en mass at an enemy position and they independently seek and kill anyone nearby. They could be fired by infantry small arms or dropped as a cluster munition.

Yes they are an expensive way to kill someone, but probably still cheaper than a barrage of 155mm or even thousands of rounds of 5.56. And scarily easy to use...

 

Also  - anti-drone drones .... send out screens of "drone hunter"  drones ahead of you to clear the immediate battlezone of the larger  / non-disposable varients

[Calamine Waffles]

Quite a good talk held by RUSI on the Galician campaign of 1914 and parallels to today

https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all/russias-war-eastern-front-1914-precedents-current-ukraine-conflict

[Huba]

Some more details about the new $3B package to be announced today:

Would be cool if anti-aircraft systens turn out to be F-16s. But even if not, one could hope that at least the artillery finally means some dusted off 155mm stuff from the desert, in numbers that will make RU cry...

Edited August 24, 2022 by Huba

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, Grigb said:

So, you can easily do something like this. 

I like the thinking, let's keep that up, however - there are issues

Ok, so let's unpack this a bit .

Area.  So a mechanized combat team in the advance over open country has up to a 2km frontage - giver or take.  We then need to extend that bubble to at least 8km, so double the range of the ATGM, so that the next tactical bound is secured, or at least scanned, before the mech force gets there.  So adding that all up we are talking an op box of about 16 sq kms, or in more tactical terms: 16,000,000 sq ms.  Why sq ms?  Well a 2-man ATGM team such as Javelin, takes up about 4 sq m (and I am being generous - but maybe they have quad or buggy for quick get away).  So the game here is to try and spot two humans, with little or zero vehicles that take up a 4 sq m area in an overall area of 16 million sq ms...and sustain it.

Finding.  Finding two humans in cover on the a conventional battlefield is still the third hardest ISR challenge that exists.  Even with TI, which is not designed to find people it is designed to find vehicles, is going to be severely challenged in doing this.  The average human being runs at 36 and change degrees C, which is only about 10 degrees hotter than ambient air in summer in temperate regions.  Then they wear clothes, modern uniforms actually are designed for some of this (https://www.innovationintextiles.com/protective/hohenstein-develops-textiles-for-screening-against-ir-radiation-for-use-in-military-uniforms/).  Next they are trained to stay under tree canopy, or dig into the ground, tall grass etc.  So this is not like those wands at the airport that are going to squawk when they find your keys.  A number of 500m was tossed around for a Tac UAV to be able to spot a human with TI, but I seriously doubt it if that human is half decently trained and equipped.  UAVs are the best bet, but it will not be easy by any stretch.  Those humans on the ATGM-side do not have the same problem as mech is huge, hot and loud - we can see them from space-based now - so this is not an advantageous exercise for the attacker from the get go...tale as old as time. 

Fixing.  The next major problem with the proposal is the role of SF "infiltration" as the lead edge of this screen.  I like where this is going, very hybrid, however: 1) that is a lot of "SF" - in reality decently trained light infantry would fill this role - to cover off all that ground, even doing "spot" close recce.  They are also going to take casualties so they will need medivac and support, Sustaining this is not small but doable.  2) The entire mech force can now move at the speed of "SF Infiltration" which is damned slow compared to mech advances - think walking speed.  So now a mech force which is designed to punch holes and advance quickly to an enemies rear areas to bring the righteous hand of gawd almighty to REMFs is crawling behind light infantry infiltration...kinda defeats the point of mech in the first place.

Finishing.  One big piece missing from the diagrams is indirect fires.   The logic of spotting small ATGM teams and then dropping the sky on them - rinse and repeat, makes sense even if it is at a human crawl.  However, that nasty indirect fire points in two directions.  The logistics train for a 2 man ATGM team hiding on 4 sq ms is pretty modest - like bag of trail mix and some toilet paper, modest.  The logistical train for this proposed hybrid advance mech model is pretty significant, and will also be seen from space.  So unless that SF infiltration extends out past artillery range, the tail of this mech force, the mech force itself, and with HIMARs, the parking garage said mech force was hiding in before it moved out, are going to get lit up and blown all to hell before the ATGM teams stop bird watching and start shooting. 

So we are back at Fog Eating Snow.

Why bring the mech force along at all?  In fact until you completely break an enemy line past the artillery support distance, mech forces would be held back until pre-conditions are met, namely - degrade enemy ISR, degrade indirect fires, collapse logistical system and crack the line.  This is firepower-attrition-to-manoeuvre, not the other way around which is in all our doctrine - [although honestly, I have to ask myself when have we ever actually done that?  We always lead with an air campaign that makes the Valkyries look like a chicken dance.] 

Anyway, SF infiltration, yes...slow but proven one of the few real ways to advance in this war.  Infiltration with all sorts of ISR to find, and then isolate any heavier force concentration - going to be a lot of screening battles, but their sneaky peeky ATGM teams do not matter...cause we didn't bring any "Ts" during this phase.  Instead of WW1 levels of dumb massed fires, back up that infiltration with precision fires to shtomp anything that they can find with accuracy - rinse and repeat, and continue to support with deep strike on anything that even looks high value - particularly C4ISR, EW, Logistics and throw in an airfield or two for the sunbathers.

You project this as a series of tactical undecidings of their operational integrity, until their system starts to collapse.  Here breadth is likely more important than speed.  You project corrosive force along their entire operational system, and when they buckle...then you send in the mech/armor to do the deep stabby work, before they can re-establish a defence line, tempo here will still matter...I think.

It is a theory, at least.  I have no idea if it would work - and it is not without problems of its own.

[Kinophile]

Slava Ukraina to our UKR friends! 

6 months later and not only is Ukraine unconquered, but celebrating Independence Day. 

FU Putler. 

PS

Also, @Haiduk's laptop and PC parts are now in Poland, with my mother in law in Przemsyl! 

 

[Beleg85]

8 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Galeev on a roll lately regarding magical thinking, 'martyrdom' and the silly season...

Yup, very underestimated factor in Russian decision-making may be this kind of archaic paleo-esoterism. Apart from corruption, echo chambers and self-delussional mania grandiosa (which blew up all usual metrics in last decade).

The whole concept of this war is extremely irrational anyway, if one looks at it from perspective. Frankly, every good politician and good commander should have basic understanding of anthropology, as he needs history, economics, etc. Especially when dealing with other nations.

[billbindc]

11 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Well, imagine where there is no rider at all and instead the vehicle is "manned" by a driver, a navigator, a weapons operator, and a commander sitting 1000 miles away in an air conditioned shopping mall.  Logistics for the crew?  Meal cards for the food court, free bathrooms, and a parking lot where they can safely drive back to a base housing that will never get attacked.

That is the future.  Or I should say near future.  It's coming very soon.

Steve

P.S.  if this is an American op there would be a lawyer added to the crew.

P.P.S. there would also be a lot more women as no problem with combat roles.

P.P.P.S. as long as the crew can get to the control room on time, the 25% of the population that is too fat and out of shape to get into the armed forces is now available for recruitment.

P.P.P.P.S. no problem having 60 - 70 year olds onboard either as typical age problems aren't relevant.  Can have dialysis or hip replacements without affecting operational tempo.

P.P.P.P.P.S. if you think I'm being snarky... you're wrong.

If you talk to the guys who handle US mil recruiting on a macro scale, this is all they talk about. "We need more nerds and fewer grunts" as a USMC general put it.

[billbindc]

10 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

My money is still on GRU sending a message.  Even if something FSB looking comes up tomorrow or in the coming days, I don't think that means I'm wrong because this is Russia   For example:

Let's say that the FSB is about to mount a series of highly staged false flag attacks to coincide with Ukraine's Independence Day.  GRU has a bone to pick with RU Nats and sees an opportunity to bomb Dugin (Alexander or Darya), sending a message to the RU Nats, and sorta being in step with the FSB's plans while also making them look bad at the same time.

Alternatively, GRU did something on its own without knowledge of FSB plans.  In fact, FSB might not even have had plans in place until after GRU's attack on Dugin.  However, it sees an opening for one-upping their rivals and rushes something into being.

These explanations, as far fetched as they might be, do tie the various pieces together pretty well.  However, since there can be only one explanation in reality, I'm going to stick to my more simplistic view that what we just saw is GRU sending a message and anything that might come after is not directly related to it.

Steve

My money is on a non-state institutional actor (i.e. a oligarch's kvost, an internal fight among Russian nationalists over money, etc) with a lot of opportunistic after-the-fact action. What shall we bet? I'm partial to six packs of unfiltered IPA's myself. 

[Grigb]

So, the next Mashkovets map is ready. This time we are going back to Donetsk direction. And it is more like discussion of current RU tactical thinking and what UKR think about it.

[BletchleyGeek]

53 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

  Instead of WW1 levels of dumb massed fires, back up that infiltration with precision fires to shtomp anything that they can find with accuracy - rinse and repeat, and continue to support with deep strike on anything that even looks high value - particularly C4ISR, EW, Logistics and throw in an airfield or two for the sunbathers

So sneaky but packing a punch like 1918 stösstruppen?

Truth be told, those large armoured charges that seem to be the concept (illusion?) for much doctrine have very rarely worked IRL (Prokhorovka comes to mind) unless the defender lacked effective anti tank weapons.

As you say mech is too hot, too loud, too easy to spot. The obvious fix is to make it cooler, and stealthier. That would probably mean getting rid of the need of having a crew and elaborate armour. I don't think that Steve's scenario "overweight people fighting wars from the mall" is close at all... securing comms is not a trivial problem (if fixable at all). Droning ISIS bastards (or just poor bastards often I am afraid) is one thing, going after a nation state with significant cyber/EW/anti-satellite capabilities is another matter. I think we will see more things like a "Stugna on wheels" with the operator relatively close but out of LOF (e.g. relaying via a small UAV), and the UGV being semi autonomous to handle loss of comms situations.

Also, winning wars by 1) having the other side being the one that goes on the offensive into a KZ, and 2) making them so uncomfortable that they give up and go home, I think is both smart and progressive.

I think this thread is close to solving the Riddle of Steel, Ukraine 2022 edition.

By the way, a warm and heartfelt salute to all Ukrainian folk on this thread in this very important date!

Edited August 24, 2022 by BletchleyGeek

[Beleg85]

28 minutes ago, Grigb said:

So, the next Mashkovets map is ready. This time we are going back to Donetsk direction. And it is more like discussion of current RU tactical thinking and what UKR think about it.

Excellent maps! Very well made and transparent. I know you want to keep low profile, but perhaps we could find some way around so more people could enjoy them.

Short article about Dugina death from Radchenko. He seem to put this in the context of silencing any critical voices in Russia (not sure he is right, though).

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/daria-dugina-has-become-a-martyr-for-putin

Edited August 24, 2022 by Beleg85

[chrisl]

3 hours ago, riptides said:

Drones will be the final, disposable solution for hard kills, LEO satellites, parked over the battlefield will significantly improve in their role of ISR.

You can't park satellites in LEO over a location, but you can fill the sky with huge numbers of them (Starlink is just the beginning), pissing off the astronomy community and providing continuous hi resolution ISR.

[sross112]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

You project this as a series of tactical undecidings of their operational integrity, until their system starts to collapse.  Here breadth is likely more important than speed.  You project corrosive force along their entire operational system, and when they buckle...then you send in the mech/armor to do the deep stabby work, before they can re-establish a defence line, tempo here will still matter...I think.

I agree that operational tempo will still be one of the keys. The fog needs to eat the snow as quickly and efficiently as possible to keep them on the back foot and keep them from piling in more snow. Once they buckle, do you still need the heavy mech to exploit and chew up the rear? The reserve/exploitation battalion of light fighters get mounted up in their lightly armored, fast, wheeled all terrain vehicles armed with their javelins, NLAWs and manpads and go on safari. Afterall, any resistance or reserve units of the enemy will have to be dealt with in the same manner as the enemy at the front was so your mech exploitation starts off at the same disadvantage that it had that resulted in the light fighters needing to break the line. Then add to that much larger logistic requirements and the 8km bubble that you need to provide for it at all times and it becomes an unwieldly and much slower exploitation, which in turn defeats the tempo that you are trying to achieve with the breakthrough in the first place. 

Light forces with excellent long range indirect support and coordinated supporting air would be much more effective. The big mech really doesn't add much and just becomes a big bunch of very expensive slow glow in the dark targets.

41 minutes ago, BletchleyGeek said:

I don't think that Steve's scenario "overweight people fighting wars from the mall" is close at all... securing comms is not a trivial problem (if fixable at all). Droning ISIS bastards (or just poor bastards often I am afraid) is one thing, going after a nation state with significant cyber/EW/anti-satellite capabilities is another matter. I think we will see more things like a "Stugna on wheels" with the operator relatively close but out of LOF (e.g. relaying via a small UAV), and the UGV being semi autonomous to handle loss of comms situations.

That has been my opinion of the weak link as well. And the closer you have to move the control center to the front the more vulnerable it becomes. Not to mention the control centers will be horribly expensive as each control cubicle will have to be greatly enlarged and painstakingly recreated into clones of the operator's mom's basement so they don't have anxiety attacks from having to leave their safe spaces. Then the use of 70+ year olds and gen z gamers will severely affect your tempo of operations and limit your operational window from 1200 to 2000 hours. The old guys won't be able to stay awake past 2100 and the young ones won't get out of bed until 1100. 

 

Edit:

From @The_Capt : Finding.  Finding two humans in cover on the a conventional battlefield is still the third hardest ISR challenge that exists.  Even with TI, which is not designed to find people it is designed to find vehicles, is going to be severely challenged in doing this.

 

I forgot to relate to this. I've been blessed with being able to operate a FLIR on multiple occasions from a helicopter on search and rescue missions. Mostly looking for lost hikers or assisting rural law enforcement looking for bad guys in badlands, forested hills and open plains. Vehicles are super duper easy to spot from very long ranges but people have a pretty small cross section from the top down. If they aren't moving they look like another rock and boy howdy are there a lot of freaking rocks on the surface of this planet. Not to mention all the man made clutter. So Thermal Imaging is really cool and really useful but is not a magic wand that will allow immediate identification of all enemy infantry in the grid with a simple fast fly over. 

Edited August 24, 2022 by sross112

[chrisl]

38 minutes ago, BletchleyGeek said:

As you say mech is too hot, too loud, too easy to spot. The obvious fix is to make it cooler, and stealthier. That would probably mean getting rid of the need of having a crew and elaborate armour. I don't think that Steve's scenario "overweight people fighting wars from the mall" is close at all... securing comms is not a trivial problem (if fixable at all). Droning ISIS bastards (or just poor bastards often I am afraid) is one thing, going after a nation state with significant cyber/EW/anti-satellite capabilities is another matter. I think we will see more things like a "Stugna on wheels" with the operator relatively close but out of LOF (e.g. relaying via a small UAV), and the UGV being semi autonomous to handle loss of comms situations.

That's where the asymmetry comes in.  Right now and for the foreseeable future, it takes a good fraction of the world's military spending to be able to set up the precision ISR/targeting/kill chain. That's not likely to change because a) money, and b) energy.  It takes enormous resources to put together the systems that make it possible, and it's not like there's a small, well defined set of stuff you can go buy to do it.  Given how distributed microelectronic manufacturing is, I'm not even sure if the US could do it alone within any reasonable future.  Countries will gradually figure out that wars of aggression are counterproductive and join the alliance, which might eventually be referred to as a "federation", gradually decreasing the number of wars on Earth to zero.  And then there will be Rollerball. 

[Kinophile]

I'd say absolutely  yes you need armor to gut the enemy once the knife is through. Nothing destroys enemy formations and morale like having AFV/MBTs rampaging through undefended rear areas. They move fast, can do wayyy more damage in a short time than athm buggies and can firm fighting defenses. 

Li and buggies are great and all, but if I can get even a platoon of M1A(Z) and/orBrad 3.0 onto a hostile  GLOC i can do far, far more damage in a far large area  far quicker than Light Infantry. Sure I'll get attrited but gimme those 120s gorging on a sausage line of tanker trucks,  articulated lorries and ammo dumps. Think of the Instagram posts! 

[The_Capt]

18 minutes ago, sross112 said:

I agree that operational tempo will still be one of the keys. The fog needs to eat the snow as quickly and efficiently as possible to keep them on the back foot and keep them from piling in more snow. Once they buckle, do you still need the heavy mech to exploit and chew up the rear? The reserve/exploitation battalion of light fighters get mounted up in their lightly armored, fast, wheeled all terrain vehicles armed with their javelins, NLAWs and manpads and go on safari. Afterall, any resistance or reserve units of the enemy will have to be dealt with in the same manner as the enemy at the front was so your mech exploitation starts off at the same disadvantage that it had that resulted in the light fighters needing to break the line. Then add to that much larger logistic requirements and the 8km bubble that you need to provide for it at all times and it becomes an unwieldly and much slower exploitation, which in turn defeats the tempo that you are trying to achieve with the breakthrough in the first place. 

Light forces with excellent long range indirect support and coordinated supporting air would be much more effective. The big mech really doesn't add much and just becomes a big bunch of very expensive slow glow in the dark targets.

So now we land on the concept of synthetic or artificial mass.  The big advantage here is that it can remain distributed and very hard to hit while still delivering what we used to get from concentrated organic mass (i.e. steel).  This has been played around with for years, the US had an experimental division back in the 80s but it never really went anywhere.

The question is: has its time arrived?

I am not sure.

The theory would be to eat snow at a rate faster than it can be shoveled - hence deep strike as an operational manoeuvre.  Once the enemy collapses, the theory is then that their ISR bubble would collapse too.  So the requirement for the big protection bubble should reduce and traditional heavy manoeuvre is back on the menu...theoretically.   However, as you note, Light is..er light and can move faster, with less logistical support requirements.  If you empower this with ISR and precision, technically it could do what heavy used to be able to do, maybe better.  I think the USMC is heading this way with the removal of tanks from their inventory.

However, you really want to be sure.  Could the enemy pull a 'bastion' at some really inconvenient geographic point that light could not handle?  Would a now-possible heavy assault guarantee all enemy COAs better?  A whole lotta unknowns and some leaps of faith there...hence why we are all watching this war so closely. 

I can tell you that at modern joint staff colleges the students are wrestling with this exact problem and only in the last year have I seen the answer change from what it has been for years - away from heavy towards lighter, but you need to guarantee massed integrated precision to some extent as a pre-condition.

Edited August 24, 2022 by The_Capt

[The_Capt]

9 minutes ago, chrisl said:

good fraction of the world's military spending to be able to set up the precision ISR/targeting/kill chain

I was with you until this war.  What Ukraine did via crowd-sourced ISR was frankly terrifying in its potential.  We only have a bunch of social media/OS content and a few decent early analysis right now.  However, what role did the cellphone and civilian cell networks play in Phase 1 of this war?  I saw social media picking up Russian forces and then light Ukrainian infantry/SOF going out and hitting those forces...damn near everywhere at once.  That is not a traditional military kill chain, but damn if it did not work - to the point that it led to Russian operational collapse.

This leads to "What is the cost of the killchain?" and "What is the comparative/competitive costs of the killchain?"

But right now this is conjecture until a full AAR can be done on that whole thing.  My sense is that high precision killchain costs are going down, not up, as every element within them gets smaller, cheaper and more powerful.  Unless you are a western military industrial complex that needs to spend billions on what a few thousand can already do. 

[poesel]

1 hour ago, billbindc said:

If you talk to the guys who handle US mil recruiting on a macro scale, this is all they talk about. "We need more nerds and fewer grunts" as a USMC general put it.

In the 80s, we were warned that video games would only prepare us for the military. Who knew they were right?

Also, a lesson learned for the next nation to fight a war for occupation is to put the destruction of the public phone & internet networks rather high on your to-do list. Else you'll have a million spies working against you.

[sross112]

29 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

I'd say absolutely  yes you need armor to gut the enemy once the knife is through. Nothing destroys enemy formations and morale like having AFV/MBTs rampaging through undefended rear areas. They move fast, can do wayyy more damage in a short time than athm buggies and can firm fighting defenses. 

Li and buggies are great and all, but if I can get even a platoon of M1A(Z) and/orBrad 3.0 onto a hostile  GLOC i can do far, far more damage in a far large area  far quicker than Light Infantry. Sure I'll get attrited but gimme those 120s gorging on a sausage line of tanker trucks,  articulated lorries and ammo dumps. Think of the Instagram posts! 

So maybe the the new heavy force could be something like LAV based? Now, I'm with you. The 120 vs the fuel tanker does make for the best instagram content, but do you need a 120 to defeat said articulated lorry? A LAV with a 50-90mm gun system could do the same job.  With the anti armor systems out there it really doesn't matter if you are in an M1 or an LAV the result will pretty much be the same. Seems like anything vehicle based is suffering from a distinct disadvantage right now so the less logistics and cost for the same result appears to make sense. 

 

14 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I was with you until this war.  What Ukraine did via crowd-sourced ISR was frankly terrifying in its potential.  We only have a bunch of social media/OS content and a few decent early analysis right now.  However, what role did the cellphone and civilian cell networks play in Phase 1 of this war?  I saw social media picking up Russian forces and then light Ukrainian infantry/SOF going out and hitting those forces...damn near everywhere at once.  That is not a traditional military kill chain, but damn if it did not work - to the point that it led to Russian operational collapse.

This leads to "What is the cost of the killchain?" and "What is the comparative/competitive costs of the killchain?"

That worked great for Ukraine, but not so great for the RA. I believe you are from Canada so your model of crowd sourced ISR would probably be sufficient as Canada isn't known for it's aggressive wars of conquest. However, if you are wanting to warmonger a little and invade someone else the crowd sourcing is generally not going to work in your favor so you will need to spend the big bucks so you can bring your own ISR along. That form of ISR was also only possible due the the RA not blacking out Ukraine right away, which I think we all agreed was a mistake on their part. 

So really the kill chain model question is the same as the force composition question for a nation and the answer is very specific to that nation and its intentions.  

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Grigb said:

I read RU Nats post that top brass already approved general ideal of equipping every AFV with personal drone.

It's a good plan.  By the time they get the drone prototype ready they'll probably only need a dozen to outfit all their AFVs

That's a good analysis, thanks.  It's pretty clear that Drones Are Not Just For Recon Anymore™ (Americans of a certain age, insert chuckle here).  They are a weapon system, even if unarmed.  Their mere presence is enough to qualify as an "area denial" tool.  Soldiers see drones overhead and they freak out, legging it to somewhere other than where they are at that moment.  This will change when soldiers at the squad level have reliably effective tools to keep drones from being right on top of them, but that will take some time to achieve.

I think the main point for AFVs is about range.  Currently the best ATGMs can outrange the best AFVs.  Couple this with the superior positioning and concealment inherent with ATGMs and absent for AFVs, the chances are that an AFV will be destroyed by the ATGM without having an opportunity to respond, not to mention even know where the ATGM is.

I agree that the key to AFV survivability and effectiveness as a weapons platform is to put stress on the ATGM team's ability to set up unobserved/unopposed at an extreme range.  There are multiple ways to achieve this.

You sketched out one that many are moving towards... increasing the sensor range of AFVs so they have some reasonable chance of detecting an ATGM before coming within LOS and range of it.  Drones seem to be the correct option to focus on, but there are others (integrated force wide sensors, for example).

An unarmed drone can at least hope to identify an ATGM's position so that the AFV can plan movement accordingly and call upon supporting arms to deal with threat.  This requires good communications and that requires more equipment, training, and supporting platforms (I'm going to call "infantry" a platform in this context).  That's a traditional weakness in Soviet style militaries, so that should be kept in mind.

An armed drone provides the AFV with a direct ability to deal with the threat itself.  This is theoretically possible, but I think in a high temp combat operation it will be impractical without a dedicated drone operator and FREQUENT halts on the move.  AI or semi-AI controlled drones with extra sensors might help, but that means more expensive and sophisticated drones.  Again, this reduces the chances that Soviet style military is going to wind up with such capabilities.

To me, this indicates that a country like Russia is going to remain significantly disadvantaged on the battlefield for the foreseeable future.  It has shown no historical capability to incorporate sophisticated combined arms tactics as a component of permanent readiness.  It has also show no ability to consistently develop, deploy, and support the use of robust and sophisticated communications capabilities.  The West, on the other hand, has shown it can do both.  Therefore, Russia is unlikely capable of fielding an armored force that is practically useful on the modern battlefield.

Steve

[holoween]

6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I agree that the key to AFV survivability and effectiveness as a weapons platform is to put stress on the ATGM team's ability to set up unobserved/unopposed at an extreme range.  There are multiple ways to achieve this.
 

Does everyone collectively keep forgetting that aps do exist but are currently not used in ukraine be either side?

Because they do fix the core survivability vs infantry issue tanks currently have.

[akd]

Interesting look at the US Army’s planned transition to new divisional structures by 2028-30, especially in light of the current war in Ukraine:

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So we are back at Fog Eating Snow.

Why bring the mech force along at all? 

I keep returning to this over and over again, as do you.  I don't know what the proper axiom is from some smarter fellow than I, but "if I keep unintentionally returning to the same point repeatedly, I'm either lost or it's the right place for me to be".  How was that?

What I just wrote about sensors and what not is the technical concept for how to keep AFVs in the fight.  For a country like the US it is doable, even with the major shortcomings you pointed to (in particular volume of space and pacing).  However, the question keeps being raised... if you need to do all of that, and even then you're not sure it will work, then maybe you should refocus on battlefield needs without preconceptions of what systems should be involved.

It's like the old joke:

Patient - "doctor, it hurts when I do this"
Doctor - "then don't do that"

Trillions of Dollars and almost 100 years has been poured into heavily armored vehicles that can directly engage the enemy's forces one on one.  As time has gone on the ability to do that has become more difficult, more expensive, and less certain in outcome.  With technology the way it is going it's vastly easier to figure out how to blow up a large metal object driving around a battlefield than it is to prevent its destruction. 

I am absolutely onboard the "armor is dead" bandwagon.  Or more accurately, "armor as we know of it today is dead, but armor itself likely still has a role".  Heavily armored, fast moving vehicles that can bring self sufficient infantry from A to B, then bugger off to safety is where my mind goes.

There's a series of Sci-Fi books that I am reading.  It is "The Damned Trilogy" by Alan Dean Foster.  To cut a long explanation short, after 1000s of years of technological warfare they arrived at a stage where "if it flies it dies".  The result is that all their strategies, tactics, weaponry, and forces are tailored to fight on the ground in fairly close quarters battles for individual planets lasting (sometimes) hundreds of years.  This conceptualization of future warfare is the exact opposite of most Sci-Fi where everything is basically an analog to WW2 warfare.  The details of the books are fun to explore (and imperfect for sure), but I'm skipping them to focus on our reality with armor.

These books got me thinking that the best thing to do is abandon the concept that armor is a direct fire, direct support platform.  Take that completely out of the equation for land battles and see what can be done with the remaining elements, either existing or emerging.  Figure out how to use non-armored elements to achieve battlefield victories and then see how armor might fit back into the mix, though with one provision -> armor must not be assigned a role that only it can fulfill.  Yup, that's right... armor must be viewed as a "it's nice to have" instead of "it's a must have".

Steve

[Huba]

Nova Kakhovka bridge is done: