How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Cogust]

I am 46 myself and that guy looks as old as my dad.

[LuckyDog]

I don't think that video is legit - the camera person seems to be standing where any return fire would come, and they are sheltering behind what looks like plywood. Or maybe they really are that inept!

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

This war is the end of the Russian Federation as we know it, but an overt civil war (e.g. thousands of people shooting at each other) is only one possible outcome.  I think it is increasingly the most likely outcome, especially in the Caucuses, but there are ways it could be avoided.  The thing is, every day this war goes on the chances that there's some other way to end the war without a full on civil war diminish.  As stated above, the forces looking to change the situation one way or another are being forced to become more extreme in their thinking.  This is not a good indicator that some sort of peaceful reconfiguration of the Russian federal system is possible.

When this war started I figured that Chechnya would break away and many of the Republics would seek to renegotiate their relationship with Moscow.  The benefits of being a part of some sort of united Russian state are definitely strong, so this should be the way it goes.  But as things get worse and worse at the front, it's stirring up all kinds of resentment in some of the most important and distant Republics.  At the very least I think they will push for far more autonomy than they would have 3 or 4 months ago of there had been a successful coup against Putin.

Put another way, the longer this war goes on the less likely anybody within Russia is going to want to compromise with the "other side".  That will diminish the possibilities of peaceful settlement of long standing disputes that are now more evident than they were prewar.

Still, if this does lead to civil war there is a huge range of possible results all the way from a massive bloody massacre, like 1917-1920s, or a fairly limited one like 1990 with specific horrors after.  I don't see it going much better than 1990-1998. 

Steve

These are very good points.

Just to summ up/ add some to this "tea leafs reading":

1) Lack of serious ideological background and general apathy of society toward engaging in politics make large, bloody civil war conflict unlikely. It would need someone to shut down internet completelly to force some of them to the streets, probably. Also, 1905-1920 crisis was effect of very long rot in the system, which still needed three massive and bloody wars to reshape itself anew. So yes, finally Nationalists may leave their mommies' cellars, gyms and sport clubs and do some shooting, but until now they don't seem to be a serious factor in politics. Crucially, there is no politician now who would seriously count on their support as basis of power. This can change, though, as others wrote (especially Medvedeev looks like clown, reinventing himself as new strongman version Nicholaus II)

2)Unfortunatelly, "kremlinlogy" once more proved to be dead science more similar to astrology than astronomy. As far I can tell, no two pre-war specialists can agree where real power and consensus at Kremlin sits right now, except it is Putin who is power broker (which is obvious). Various coteries, factions and "towers" may loose influence on him in a blink of an eye, or it can be revealed they never had it actually. Thus, telling Russia's future from current gossips is extremely hard.

3) Regarding Chechnya and treating Kayrov as pregnant test litmus paper of serious changes in Russian systems: fully agree that he is more loyal to Putin himself than to Russia as a state (in typical Caucasian fashion). He will be very loyal till Putin stands, but not later. On the other hand, personall power of Kayrov clan weights more on "making money fall from the sky" (re:conenctions at Kremlin), which allowed reconstruction of the country, than on military might. Despite all PR bravado, modern 30-40 years old Chechens are very far from grizzled mountain-fighters of the 90's. Kadyrov doesn't even play in the same league as his father, not even counting such legendary field commanders as Maschadov, Dudayev or Basayev (who would melt young R.Kadyriv with his sight alone...not kidding, reportedly Kadyrov has complexes regarding this long-dead guy). And many elders who remmber 90-2000's know it. In this martial society, even rogue IS fighters will be at the heart more respected than guy who is fake. So cuting off from Kremlin (=money run dry) may hurt Kadyrov more than benefit him, unless really everything in Russia somehow start to fall apart in pieces. In such total collapse, head of families may want to search for true warlord, not guy who wears Prada boots.

4) Perhaps other ethnic minority regions in Russia may be actually prone to rebell faster than Chechnya. Dagestan for example had acceleration in grass-root islamization of society, that may blow in the face of current governors some day. Places like Ingushetia or North Ossetia may also found their ways even faster than Chechnya.

 

Edited July 27, 2022 by Beleg85

[danfrodo]

59 minutes ago, dan/california said:

one of the guys looks to be at least 40, too.

Another possibility of this video is it was made to convince commanders that these guys were engaged in deadly combat, while in fact they were just fine.  Like the firing down the stairwell to a point 10m away -- if there were UKR soldiers that close these guys would be hit w grenades by now.  So maybe this is simply used to fool folks up the chain of command.  

[panzermartin]

Just 40 plus people trying to make another cool tik tok video unsuccessfully. 

[Grigb]

Fresh Girkin assessment: the pause is over with RU started assaulting of Avdiivka.

Quote

The storming of Avdiivka. The battle for the initiative has begun.

So, the Russian military thought was marked by another brilliant military decision - while the Ukrainians are trying to achieve success in the Kherson direction (a breakthrough of the front on which, theoretically, promises a deep breakthrough and - at least - operational success), our military geniuses decided to storm Avdiivka head-on again.
Today, after several hours of artillery preparation, the remnants of the DPR infantry attacked it and the nearby "bastions".

Naturally, I wish our fighters maximum success. But even in the most favorable case (that is, after fierce street fighting and fighting in the depth of the enemy's prepared defense, our people will take Avdiivka, etc.), the front will only be able to move to the next enemy defense line - that is, the same line Slavyansk-Kramatorsk- Druzhkovka-Konstantinovka-Kurakhovo. Hardly deeper.
Although to me personally (knowing the state of the infantry of the Armed Forces of the DPR and the Armed Forces of RU), such success does not seem to be guaranteed at all.

Since I have already written dozens of times that even the complete "displacement" of the AFU from Donbass (without the defeat and encirclement/destruction of the group concentrated there) will not bring victory in the war and even  will not bring victory much closer, then I have to state that our move in the "Third-Effective Stage  looks like copying the "Second-Specific" [Stage - Donbass attack] and, as a result (if they will limit themselves with it), it will serve as a loss of the  main resource at the moment - TIME. Not to mention the irretrievable losses in people who will be sacrificed to the strategy implemented by the command of the Armed Forces of RU. Most likely, the "backbone" of our forces in this war - the infantry of the LDPR Armed Forces - will be "finished off" during the operation that has begun definitively. UKR, too, will undoubtedly suffer huge losses. But they have something to make up for them.

In any case, the "operational pause" has apparently ended. Both the enemy and our command have indicated where they will put their main forces in August-September. And only practice will show - whose decision will be more correct.

Personally, I am still ready to take part in the war in any capacity. What I remind you about in case someone is too tired of my criticism.

Edited July 27, 2022 by Grigb

[danfrodo]

Beleg, GribB, Steve, et al:  excellent posts on where RU could possibly go, I am really enjoying your discussion, thanks much.

I would like to see the Nats explain to the folks of RU, post Putin, hiow the only way to save RU is through 'victory' in UKR.  Folks won't be buying that nonsense for long w the economy & country falling apart around them, let alone w nationwide mobilization.  The Nats have no way forward.

The 'Prags' at least have something that makes sense on the surface, even if they are way too corrupt to actually pull it off -- end the war, blame it on Putin, and promise to improve life/economy for common Russians.  Of course, this will then lead to the Nats proclaiming the "stab in the back" line.  Fortunately in this case, the number of veterans to whom this would most appeal is a very small portion of the young male population, unlike after WW1, where just about every military age male was a veteran.

And on the subject of RU civil war, it seems we need different terms for the different types of civil war.  One is war over the gov't in moscow.  Another is war of separatist regions agitating for increased autonomy or even independence against whoever is in (a very weakended state of) power in moscow.  -- Imagine if the fossil fuel regions of RU federation managed to break away, there would be no economy left.  RU rump would be, what?  Afghanistan with empty shopping malls?

[Grigb]

17 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

1) Lack of serious ideological background and general apathy of society toward engaging in politics make large, bloody civil war conflict unlikely. It would need someone to shut down internet completelly to force some of them to the streets, probably. Also, 1905-1920 crisis was effect of very long rot in the system, which still needed three massive and bloody wars to reshape itself anew. So yes, finally Nationalists may leave their mommies' cellars, gyms and sport clubs and do some shooting, but until now they don't seem to be a serious factor in politics. Crucially, there is no politician now who would seriously count on their support as basis of power. This can change, though, as others wrote (especially Medvedeev looks like clown, reinventing himself as new strongman version Nicholaus II)

I do agree with the weakness of home front nationalists but we have one exceptions - Girkin and hardcore volunteers. Eastern UKR were apathic as well. And pro-RU forces were also weak. However, one smart ruthless Nat could start the war. And now he has cadre of hardcore fighters with skill level far above average RU soldiers.

He could start war in UKR. They could start war in RU. 

[Haiduk]

Avdiivka - the look from Donetsk.

Two hours of artillery shelling from almost all artillery/MLRS systems, including 240 mm SP-mortars. Several sorties of Russian aviations - maybe in first time they attacked not by single jets or pairs, but by groups in 4-6 planes and used toss-bombing/rockets firing. Enemy shelled not only Avdiivka, but also Pisky, Meryinka and Krasnohorivka.

After this DPR and partially Russian units launched direcr assault, but without visible success. On the eve of attacks artillery moving throug Donetsl was spotted - 5 2S7 on 25th of July and today 20 2A36 Giatsynt-B/ 2S5 Giatsynt-S

Yesterday UKR artillery or HIMARS hit oil depot on railroad in Donetsk

Edited July 27, 2022 by Haiduk

[danfrodo]

1 minute ago, Haiduk said:

Avdiivka - the look from Donetsk.

Two hours of artillery shelling from almost all artillery/MLRS systems, including 240 mm SP-mortars. Several sorties of Russian aviations - maybe in first time they attacked not by single jets or pairs, but by groups in 4-6 planes and used toss-bombing/rockets firing. Enemy shelled not only Avdiivka, but also Pisky, Meryinka and Krasnohorivka.

After this DPR and partially Russian units launched direcr assault, but without visible success. On the eve of attacks artillery moving throug Donetsl was spotted - 5 2S7 on 25th of July and today 20 2A36 Giatsynt-B/ 2S5 Giatsynt-S

Yesterday UKR artillery or HIMARS hit oil depot on railroad in Donetsk

I am greatly hoping that UKR counter battery will make them pay for this.  Two hours of shelling sounds like lots of weapons firing from same spot for extended periods.

[Grigb]

Interesting comment of local UKR regarding Avdiivka assault:

Quote

[Local]: Arty and ammo really became much less. Today is the first day for all the time after the capture of Lisichansk there was such a shelling, unlike the first months of the war, when they staged a slightly smaller Armageddon almost every day. And for 3 nights in a row, it was heard how the equipment was being taken there en masse.

[author]: So everything went to Lisichansk. Now they are back

[Local]: I can hear it coming back, but ammo is still not the same as before. Although it may be more concentrated this time. They used to shoot from the morning and almost until the evening, today there were several hard hours in the morning, then one kick at 3 o'clock, now they just shoot back and forth. I live nearby I can hear everything

Time for a Song

 

[Beleg85]

23 minutes ago, Grigb said:

I do agree with the weakness of home front nationalists but we have one exceptions - Girkin and hardcore volunteers. Eastern UKR were apathic as well. And pro-RU forces were also weak. However, one smart ruthless Nat could start the war. And now he has cadre of hardcore fighters with skill level far above average RU soldiers.

He could start war in UKR. They could start war in RU. 

True that Girkin is charismatic, I would give him that. But taking down parts of Donbas with Russian support is very different than taking Russia itself. He could serve as standard/rallying banner, but where are massive connections, money and influence that could support or annoint him? Here the problem lies. Patrushev? This duck Medveedev? I don't think so... current RUS government is so devoid of charistamatic personalities (Putin took care of that) that hard to believe anybody would risk their career much less life in such risky endevour. Also oligarchs en masse genuinly despise Nats, sensing their ideological fury.

Of course the same is with Navalny on the other side. Both he and Girkin are in the end youtubers, not serious politicians. They may serve as symbols or emblems, but need serious political powers with money woking on their behalf.

But of course we all can be wrong, and at some point power will simply land on the streets- and the wheel of history will turn again.

 

On other note, Snyder small article:

https://snyder.substack.com/p/the-state-of-the-russo-ukrainian?r=f9j4c&s=r&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

Edited July 27, 2022 by Beleg85

[Haiduk]

17 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Time for a Song

Former comamnder of 46th special purpose battalion "Donbas-Ukraina" told in FB that HIMARS launchers usually drive without missile packages - containers with missiles are placed beforehand in points of firing. When HIMARS arrives to this point it mounts the packedge, launches it and drives away to the next. So, one launcher, moving on high speed from package to package have a time to shot several targets during the night. 

Edited July 27, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

UKR troops cross Inhulets by pontoon to Andriivka village, Kherson oblast. Todays report of General Staff about UKR control over Andriivka and Lozove was post-factum. Reportedly Lozove was two weeks so far under our controll and Andriivka 2-4 days. OpSec. 

In Andrivka area UKR troops ambushed two assault groups of 237th air-assault regiment of 76th air-assault division. Russians thouht UKR positins further and were taken by surprise. For last days Russian command moved to Kherson bridgehead several BRGs of 76th air-assault division, 98th airborne division, at least companty tactical group of 83rd air-assault brigade and 11th air-assault brigade as well as 7th air-assault brigade (mountain) were deployed there almost in full composition. Thus, now around Kherson Russians concentrated most large VDV grouping in comparison with other sectors of front. Looks like Russian have a real lack of motor infantry, so they forced to involve own elite units to prevent lossing of Kherson. 

In Kherson itself today resistance blew up IED on the way of the car, in which drove two local policemen, who defected to Russian service. One traitor got lost, other wounded.

Also other unit of resistance  probably elininated some officer and captured the table of codes and the map. It a bad quality, but it describes deployment of Russian troops in area of that part of Inhulets, where now UKR troops are expanding own bridgehead. From the code tables can derive information, that Snihurivka area keeps by elements of 205th MRB (recently there was information they are in Vysokopuillia area), 126 coastal defense MRB and 90th SAM brigade (Buk M2) of 49th CAA.

Edited July 27, 2022 by Haiduk

[Huba]

On 7/25/2022 at 7:04 PM, Haiduk said:

What happened with PL01 project? Looked like Startroopers vehicle ) You made decision to rise army capabilities as quick as possible and don't wait for this development? I wonder what we will do after war - either continue to develop some unclear "Molot" project (anyway based on 30-years old concept) or completely other tank will be started to develop "from zero", taking into account modern trends. Or we will buy foreign tanks like you. But our tank-producing lobby doesn't allow to do this 

 

(Un)fortunately this project consisted mostly of CV-90 chassis, a bit of cardboard and a whole lot of marketing. Apart from it being nowhere near even the prototype stage, the whole idea was conceived in times when the heavy vehicles were out of fashion and everybody was trying to substitute them with something lighter (meaning cheaper). After war in Ukraine broke out, we are back to proper tanks and IFVs.

[sburke]

44 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

I am greatly hoping that UKR counter battery will make them pay for this.  Two hours of shelling sounds like lots of weapons firing from same spot for extended periods.

maybe they are just urgently emptying the ammo dumps before they get hit.  use it or lose it kind of thinking.

[Grigb]

1 minute ago, Beleg85 said:

True that Girkin is charismatic, I would give him that. But taking down parts of Donbas with Russian support is very different than taking Russia itself. He could serve as standard/rallying banner, but where are massive connections, money and influence that could support or annoint him? Here the problem lies. Patrushev? This duck Medveedev? I don't think so... current RUS government is so devoid of charistamatic personalities (Putin took care of that) that hard to believe anybody would risk their career much less life in such risky endevour.

The initial support of Girkin from RU was overestimated (or so I have heard). RU being RU screw it (or did not really want to go that far yet). You remember that Kozytsin torturer? He was supposed to channel weapons but instead decided to keep some for himself and send others back to RU black market. By the time Girkin got real support war had started.

Now, they were discussing the possibility of grabbing power during social unrest for several years. I do not believe they did not prepare storages. So, their starting position this time will be better.

Look, I am not saying you are wrong. I myself for a long time was dismissing the guy exactly for the reasons you said. So, I do support what you say. But then I started translating his/their stuff. I was reading and listening. And I got uneasy gut feeling that this is Lenin/Hitler/Bin Laden type of guy, and they are RU Al Qaeda/ISIS. Now they nobody, next minute boom and Houston, we have a problem.

 

1 minute ago, Beleg85 said:

Of course the same is with Navalny on the other side. Both he and Girkin are in the end youtubers, not serious politicians. They may serve as symbols or emblems, but need serious political powers with money woking on their behalf.

Navalny is not even a fighter. He consciously avoided any responsibility for starting a rebellion (he was explicitly begged in 2012). Though we also should not underestimate his influence. In the Moscow region his support is not insignificant. And for that he might become face of Prags to convince West to remove at least some sanctions.

Throw Putin under the bus, put Navalny in front. Start pro-western rebellion for freedom and Democracy>Good Press>Ease of Sanctions. Might work. Maybe it is even the only way out for them. 

 

1 minute ago, Beleg85 said:

But of course we all can be wrong, and at some point power will simply land on the streets- and the wheel of history will turn again.

Yes, but I do believe we are often much closer to truth than many official experts. 

[Battlefront.com]

Quote from Girkin as translated by Grigb:

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

Not to mention the irretrievable losses in people who will be sacrificed to the strategy implemented by the command of the Armed Forces of RU. Most likely, the "backbone" of our forces in this war - the infantry of the LDPR Armed Forces - will be "finished off" during the operation that has begun definitively. UKR, too, will undoubtedly suffer huge losses. But they have something to make up for them.

Here's a thought.  Maybe Putin has been convinced that there's no practical way to get back the rest of the Donbas and is angling for yet another redefinition of success that requires that part of the front going quiet.  Minsk 3 or at least a unilateral ceasefire.  If so, then hardcore DLPR forces might become a liability as they might not be willing to "freeze" the frontlines.  That would then cause a ripple effect of headaches for Putin.  The traditional Russian way to address such a problem is to get as many of the problematic guys killed in combat as possible.  The remains will be too weak and/or demoralized to cause Putin problems.  Russia did this in 2014/2015 with troublemaker units, but on a grander scale it did this to partisans in WW2.  "Thank you for your service, now kindly march into that enemy machinegun position so we can honor your sacrifice to mother Russia".

Obviously this theory is highly speculative as there's no real evidence that Russia has decided to shift gears towards freezing the conflict.  It just struck me that if there was this is one of the ways we might see it play out on the battlefield.

Steve

[sburke]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Put another way, the longer this war goes on the less likely anybody within Russia is going to want to compromise with the "other side".  That will diminish the possibilities of peaceful settlement of long standing disputes that are now more evident than they were prewar.

Still, if this does lead to civil war there is a huge range of possible results all the way from a massive bloody massacre, like 1917-1920s, or a fairly limited one like 1990 with specific horrors after.  I don't see it going much better than 1990-1998. 

Steve

one item that will be curious as it how it plays out is sanctions.  what regions might see an opportunity to get out from under sanctions if they leave the federation?  

Umm we have Dagestan on the phone... they'd like to apply for EU membership.....  

[Grigb]

I finally managed to finish last Girkin video from 22 July. It was mostly useless chit chat with Evgeny Mikhailov, Managing Director of the Council of Ministers of the DPR. Below are the most useful bits.

 

Quote

RU issues

• RU can only defend against UKR offensive. No offensive operation is possible due to manpower shortage. Main reason for losses is 500ths. A lot of 500ths losses from ending of 3-month contracts. There is no improvement with manpower. If there is no replenishment soon the defeat is inevitable. RU makes trick - transfer Mobiks to RU regular army. It makes unit looks full but does not add any new manpower. RU Divisions and Brigades are often nothing more but battalions. Some battalions are companies or even platoons
• Stream of refuseniks bigger than stream of reinforcements 
• There is not offence toward Nikolaev - not enough men.
• Kharkov has issues with manpower as well.
• Confirm that zeks are being asked if they want to go to fight instead of going to prison. They are being send to normal units [I translated story about urks in RU marine units] 
• RU still has some reserves (not much)
• Volunteers are bringing in the supply's (implying more advanced staff, not simple stuff like food)
• RU does not produce commo nets - RU MOD budget does not have funds allocated for it.

UKR 

• UKR has the ability to advance in multiple places. UKR is massing forces on Kherson, Zaporojnaya and Kharkov and North Kharkov directions.
• Claims If Antonovsky bridge is destroyed  humanitarian catastrophe is possible [probably the reason UKR did not cut it completely]. His guest added that the civilian supply issues due to bridge strike can cause RU significant political troubles.
• All RU volunteers report that UKR aviation exists. Noticeably smaller than RU but still exists and regularly strikes.
• Claims UKR got 777 much more than UKR stated. He said UKR has a lot of artillery and shoots very accurately. UKR CB is excellent due to western equipment (radars).
• Claim UKR trying to create Arty Group to hit important targets
• RU tried to fight CB without much success. URK shots more accurately because they have everything they need (implying CB equipment)

RU competence

• Mentions that Unknown tank unit has 1 tank that goes to Tank Biathlon. It consumes all POL for the battalion so nobody else is trained. Mentions that in one specific place UKR tankers are not as highly trained as RU biathlon tankers, but they have more tanks (implied that several average UKR tanks are better than one or two elite RU).
• RU does not hit bridges like at all [I got feeling that accuracy of RU missiles is such that they are afraid to strike bridges to exposes it]
• RU launch missiles just to launch them somewhere [show activity]
• Says RU AD is good, but they do not have enough to cover everything
• RU has removed the dumbest generals
• VDV commander Serdukov is replaced due to sheer incompetence

Misc

• Expect front to lengthen from Kharkov to Belarus. Second front will appear in Transnistria and third one is Belarus.
• Believe Shoigu is the heir due to the fact that he started to perform many other tasks except military
• Anecdote - officer-cadets are being given medals for parades. They have more medals than he himself
• Anecdote - DNR Minister of internal affairs Dikiy is drug user and drug dealer. And marauder. Still no arrest [context UKR traitor Selivanov was arrested not for living with 17 years girl - nobody gets arrested for stuff like this]

 

[Haiduk]

Some strange is going on in the rear or Russian Izium grouping.

- A day ago there are rumors appeared in local TG chats as if Russians are abandoning own positions in Yaremivka, Studenok and even in Lyman, Shchurove, Brusivka, telling to locals "Yours will be here soon"

- Today our General Staff in evening report wrote "In area of Pasika Russian recon group tried to uncover positions of our troops, but was eliminated". According to ALL maps Pasika now is a close rear of Russians - 6...8 km

- report of Military Land - Russians removed pontoon bridge on Siverskyi Donets in Yaremivka.  

 

I wonder, our troops advanced from Bohorodychne? Or from northern bank of Siverskyi Donets? King-size OpSec...

 

[Grigb]

2 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Some strange is going on in the rear or Russian Izium grouping.

- A day ago there are rumors appeared in local TG chats as if Russians are abandoning own positions in Yaremivka, Studenok and even in Lyman, Shchurove, Brusivka, telling to locals "Yours will be here soon"

- Today our General Staff in evening report wrote "In area of Pasika Russian recon group tried to uncover positions of our troops, but was eliminated". According to ALL maps Pasika now is a close rear of Russians - 6...8 km

- report of Military Land - Russians removed pontoon bridge on Siverskyi Donets in Yaremivka.  

 

I wonder, our troops advanced from Bohorodychne? Or from northern bank of Siverskyi Donets? King-size OpSec...

 

Fingers crossed. Also found new art for my wall.

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

These are very good points.

And some good ones from you too

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

Just to summ up/ add some to this "tea leafs reading":

1) Lack of serious ideological background and general apathy of society toward engaging in politics make large, bloody civil war conflict unlikely.

At least initially, I agree.  But Grigb pointed out the uncomfortable fact that not all the Nats are "just talk".  Quite a large number have been fighting in Ukraine for nationalist reasons.  Having them come back into Russia with a new purpose could push things over the edge.  But I'll say more about that in my next post

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

2)Unfortunatelly, "kremlinlogy" once more proved to be dead science more similar to astrology than astronomy.

Yup.  One of the things that this war underscored is how different things are at the top in the last few years than in the last few decades.  I hinted at this with my comment about Pragmatists likely being a mix of people we would normally think of as Nats, siloviki, military, etc.  There are bound to be some pretty strange bedfellows, as we say in the US.

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

3) Regarding Chechnya and treating Kayrov as pregnant test litmus paper of serious changes in Russian systems:

I expect Chechnya to be a right terrible mess for the reasons you said.  No loyalty to the Russian state, but not necessarily rank and file loyalty to Kadyrov either once the Moscow money train stops arriving in Grozny.

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

4) Perhaps other ethnic minority regions in Russia may be actually prone to rebell faster than Chechnya. Dagestan for example had acceleration in grass-root islamization of society, that may blow in the face of current governors some day. Places like Ingushetia or North Ossetia may also found their ways even faster than Chechnya.

 

The number of smaller conflict zones in the Caucuses is probably equal to the number of political entities (federal subjects of different designations) times at least two.  This is what happens when a regime tries to keep the peace through threats, intimidation, and alliances with local criminals

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

8 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Some strange is going on in the rear or Russian Izium grouping.

- A day ago there are rumors appeared in local TG chats as if Russians are abandoning own positions in Yaremivka, Studenok and even in Lyman, Shchurove, Brusivka, telling to locals "Yours will be here soon"

- Today our General Staff in evening report wrote "In area of Pasika Russian recon group tried to uncover positions of our troops, but was eliminated". According to ALL maps Pasika now is a close rear of Russians - 6...8 km

- report of Military Land - Russians removed pontoon bridge on Siverskyi Donets in Yaremivka.  

 

I wonder, our troops advanced from Bohorodychne? Or from northern bank of Siverskyi Donets? King-size OpSec...

 

 

Hmm.  Maybe a second piece of evidence that Putin has decided it's time to tighten up the line and try to freeze the conflict?  I can't think of any other reason why Russia would withdraw from this area if it was intent on taking back all of Donbas as stated.

At the very least this could be a sign of another Kyiv pullback in order to avoid collapse.

Steve

[Billy Ringo]

51 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

On other note, Snyder small article:

https://snyder.substack.com/p/the-state-of-the-russo-ukrainian?r=f9j4c&s=r&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

From the article, (and thanks to Beleg for sharing).

"Most of the territory that Russia has occupied during this war was won in the first four weeks -- indeed, if you start the clock from the end of March, Ukraine has taken back more territory than it has lost (most of it north of Kyiv, but some around Kharkiv and Kherson, plus Snake Island).   "

I found this very telling.  Based on what I've read it seemed the Russians have continued to take more ground albeit very slowly and at a cost.