How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Grigb]

Just now, Huba said:

This is perhaps the most disturbing part of all of that - the violence against the captives. What purpose exactly does it serve? Terror?

To relieve stress of absolutely horrific fear. They fear heinous foreigners and their spies/collaborators like Ukrainians. They expect heinous foreigners will brutally torture/kill them. So, they either drown that fear in vodka or they inflict horrible pain on anybody they suspect as a threat. Often, they combine two together. 

That's why there is no limit on horrible crimes they can commit - they fight for their survival and for that they will kill, maim, and torture anybody. 

[Huba]

I mean, when you read about it, the violence against the helpless/ weaker seems to be a very deeply rooted thing in the RU culture (at least the military one). I'm not up to a Galeev type analysis of that, but dedovschina, extortion of payments, commanders not caring of wellbeing and even lives of their soldiers, all that sets the tone for the whole organizational culture.

When you think of that, analogy to Imperial Japanese Army and their atrocities instantly springs to mind. I think the same dynamic is in play here.

Edit:

Also, a new (big) translation from Dmitry just appeared. @Grigb are you familiar with the source?

His analysis seems to be exceptionally sober and impartial, without the nationalistic mumbling of Girkin too. Makes you understand how scary this situation has to be from the RU perspective...

 

Edited July 15, 2022 by Huba

[AlsatianFelix]

8 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Why? Ego. Putin wants to be spoken of in the same breath as Peter and Catherine. Why now? Because he's 70 years old and in poor health.

1. Megalomania

2. Demographics:  declining birth rate means Russia has fewer and fewer young mean while their bloodthirsty Babushkas still act like they have eight disposable sons.

3. Mineral rights: Ukraine rejected Russia's demand that their oligarchs get the rights to the petroleum fields discovered recently in Eastern Ukraine.

[Grigb]

27 minutes ago, Huba said:

I mean, when you read about it, the violence against the helpless/ weaker seems to be a very deeply rooted thing in the RU culture (at least the military one). I'm not up to a Galeev type analysis of that, but dedovschina, extortion of payments, commanders not caring of wellbeing and even lives of their soldiers, all that sets the tone for the whole organizational culture.

When you think of that, analogy to Imperial Japanese Army and their atrocities instantly springs to mind. I think the same dynamic is in play here.

It is the same brutalization of soldiers and as result brutality as a norm. But we talked about absolutely horrible tortures and for that the answer is what I said - fear. Fear drown in vodka. 

 

27 minutes ago, Huba said:

Also, a new (big) translation from Dmitry just appeared. @Grigb are you familiar with the source?

His analysis seems to be exceptionally sober and impartial, without the nationalistic mumbling of Girkin too. Makes you understand how scary this situation has to be from the RU perspective...

No. I do not know him. But his assessment is so sober and impartial because he is a scientist: Candidate of Biological Sciences, Senior Researcher at the Paleontological Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Author of more than 30 scientific articles.

He is Centrist. He is neither Nationalist nor Liberal. This is the guy to read/talk when you want to go outside the bubble but do not want to waste time with real Nats. It is just he talks mostly about civilian staff I found less useful for this threat.

The situation is very scarry. And it will be even more scary. This is RU war. And RU war is ugly. 

[Harmon Rabb]

7 hours ago, LukeFF said:

Russia's replacement for McDonald's bans customers from taking photos after running out of fries and reportedly serving moldy burgers

I got to see a video posted by a video blogger from Moscow eating some food at their new replacement McDonald's recently and the burgers looked disgusting he could barely eat them.

This is saying something because it's not like the real McDonald's is fine dining.

[Huba]

5 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

I got to see a video posted by a video blogger from Moscow eating some food at their new replacement McDonald's recently and the burgers looked disgusting he could barely eat them.

This is saying something because it's not like the real McDonald's is fine dining.

So photographing a RusMac gets you to Gulag now ?  Can't make this up...

As for teasing Russians, starting today the Russian consulate in Krakow is located at "Free Ukraine Square":

 

[Billy Ringo]

Putin & Associates, LLC

With regards to the "why", from a financial perspective I was shocked that Putin made the decision to invade Ukraine.  He and his cronies were worth 100's of billions of dollars.  More money than they could ever spend and the freedom to live and behave in almost any manner they chose.  Virtually no limits to the level of extravagance and decadence they desired.  

The potential incremental financial gain from invading Ukraine was minimal compared to the wealth they had already achieved.  And the downside risk was massive.  And that has transpired.  Putin's and his oligarchs' wealth and freedom to do as they please has been devastated--and many will eventually face criminal charges.  They can move to Qatar or other semi-welcoming countries and try to maintain access to their wealth, but in the end they have and will continue to pay dearly for Putin's mistake. 

I'm not a military historian nor do I have any military experience.  I'm a business guy---and this invasion was an absolutely terrible business decision. 

 

 

[Huba]

13 minutes ago, Billy Ringo said:

Putin & Associates, LLC

With regards to the "why", from a financial perspective I was shocked that Putin made the decision to invade Ukraine.  He and his cronies were worth 100's of billions of dollars.  More money than they could ever spend and the freedom to live and behave in almost any manner they chose.  Virtually no limits to the level of extravagance and decadence they desired.  

The potential incremental financial gain from invading Ukraine was minimal compared to the wealth they had already achieved.  And the downside risk was massive.  And that has transpired.  Putin's and his oligarchs' wealth and freedom to do as they please has been devastated--and many will eventually face criminal charges.  They can move to Qatar or other semi-welcoming countries and try to maintain access to their wealth, but in the end they have and will continue to pay dearly for Putin's mistake. 

I'm not a military historian nor do I have any military experience.  I'm a business guy---and this invasion was an absolutely terrible business decision. 

 

 

Money is not everything I guess  Especially when you already have it. Putin feeling his mortality and looking for a legacy is the reason I think. He really didn't have much to show for his 20 years in power, he was becoming more and more like Brezhnev, slowly rotting away and pulling the country with him. Not a way somebody like him would like to be remembered.

Edited July 15, 2022 by Huba

[Butschi]

41 minutes ago, Billy Ringo said:

and this invasion was an absolutely terrible business decision. 

To be fair, successful business often depends on luck although afterwards people will say that it was planning, foresight, genius, hard work, sacrifice, a nose for money or any combination of those. Putin gambled and lost (game isn't over yet and although it doesn't look like he can win, still everyone can lose.)

Had he won, it would have been a good decision and all the positive things above would apply.

Edited July 15, 2022 by Butschi

[The_Capt]

42 minutes ago, AlsatianFelix said:

1. Megalomania

2. Demographics:  declining birth rate means Russia has fewer and fewer young mean while their bloodthirsty Babushkas still act like they have eight disposable sons.

3. Mineral rights: Ukraine rejected Russia's demand that their oligarchs get the rights to the petroleum fields discovered recently in Eastern Ukraine.

So let's discuss these in greater detail:

- Ego and one old man's fear of mortality.  A possible factor, particularly given the nature of the Russian political power regime; however, war is a collective undertaking and is rarely boiled down to the perspective of a single individual, at least in the modern age.  During the age of supreme god-king rule perhaps, but those days disappeared as soon as we started mass printing of books and literacy.  This war, like most wars, had to be negotiated with the micro-social elites, and they had a lot more to lose than one old man.  War is negotiation internally as well as externally, and the hypothesis Putin's driving motivation does not carry forward into negotiating it with Russia itself - "We are going to war because I am old and scared".  The people who make up the power blocks had to buy in, and I sincerely doubt Putin's control is so airtight that there were not other "sellable" reasons beyond the mass consumption nonsense coming out of the Kremlin.

- Demographics.  Well Russia is kind of upside down on demographics: 

(source - wikipedia)

And Russia is actually in a fighting-age male surplus right now, but not what one could call extreme.  For example the female surplus after WW2 was much larger.  An argument could be made that in order to shore up fading national power based on shrinking demographics Russia determined that pulling Ukraine into its fold tighter was required.  However, they could have done this a number of ways other than conventional warfare, and just about all of them would have worked better.  The Russian brain-drain, Ukrainian refugees and losses from the war, are going to make the problem worse, not better in the long term.  This is like solving your termite problem by burning your house down.  Finally, Russian demographics may be an issue, but it is not an immediate crisis that requires drastic solutions.

- Resources.  I did a long post awhile back on this and the entire "resources stupid!" argument simply does not add up.  In sum, Ukraine did not have enough of anything to make this war worthwhile to Russia.  Ukraine has about 3% of comparable Russian energy reserves - going to war over that is like going to war with a poorer neighbor for the change in their couch.  Further, let's say the Russia does take all that precious Ukrainian "stuff".  They 1) have to pay for the repairs/construction of infrastructure to get at it, 2) Somehow find people to work that infrastructure (see: fleeing from war) and 3) point it all east because their best customer just got covered in Ukrainian blood splatter.  Finally, if you want the stuff...why go conventional now?  They could have played the same backfield games they have before and been patient...where is the crisis?  Resource wise there isn't one.

So unless Putin has attained the centralized power of a Pharaoh, which we know he has not or Russia would have fully mobilized right now, then none of this makes any sense.  This war looks more like a geopolitical "suicide by cop" scenario than a rational action or "last argument of kings".  Clausewitz may be right in this war is an extension of Russian policy...but he does not answer "why now?" and "why by these means?" Or at least I can't see it.

Why does it matter at all Capt?  Who cares what the Russians think.  Well until one can figure it out, this war remains largely unnegotiable in any arena but violence and that is a dark equation that is getting dimmer by the day.

 

 

[panzermartin]

I was thinking Putin being a child of the Soviet Union, raised in the ruins of Leningrad, and getting older, maybe thought this was his chance to relive the glory of the Red Army and all the epic stories he was raised with. He wanted to relive Bagration or operation Uranus. He had all the wealth a child coming from a poor family could ever wish for, so decided to gamble for the last trophy and not withdraw as the Tsar who completely lost control of Ukraine and handed it over to the West. 

I think there was a lot of emotion in this decision. Despite not going as planned in the first place, whenever he appears he looks strangely happy and fulfilled like this war was his destiny and he is enjoying the historical moments.  

[Artkin]

5 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

1) have to pay for the repairs/construction of infrastructure to get at it

The Russians have already been seen rebuilding in their newly occupied areas. It's not offshore drilling rigs just yet, but since Russia is now economically closer to China I can absolutely see them receiving technical support from them somewhere down the line. 

The idea that this land is valueless to the Russians is laughable. They now deny Europe easy access to gas. As I said previously, the price will now be driven up. Maybe not substantially, but every bit counts. In general here in America corporations would go nuts for a 3% financial gain. 

I believe the purpose is to deny the West gas, not to supply the Russians even more. What do they need the surplus gas for? 

Economics is definitely not why this war was started. It was because Putin wanting to be remembered. I totally agree with this. 

However, if the Russians find steady buyers for their gas (Like India and China) then it's a win for them in some small way. That gas will pay for the losses in Ukraine and mucg much more. 

To disregard the gas part of this is nonsense, especially with the supply being cut, and European nations vowing to stop using Russian energy and food. It's obvious the Russians rely heavily on these two businesses. Coincidence? 

I'm no professional but I have been reading for a long time here. 

 

[Butschi]

7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So let's discuss these in greater detail:

- Ego and one old man's fear of mortality.  A possible factor, particularly given the nature of the Russian political power regime; however, war is a collective undertaking and is rarely boiled down to the perspective of a single individual, at least in the modern age.  During the age of supreme god-king rule perhaps, but those days disappeared as soon as we started mass printing of books and literacy.  This war, like most wars, had to be negotiated with the micro-social elites, and they had a lot more to lose than one old man.  War is negotiation internally as well as externally, and the hypothesis Putin's driving motivation does not carry forward into negotiating it with Russia itself - "We are going to war because I am old and scared".  The people who make up the power blocks had to buy in, and I sincerely doubt Putin's control is so airtight that there were not other "sellable" reasons beyond the mass consumption nonsense coming out of the Kremlin.

- Demographics.  Well Russia is kind of upside down on demographics: 

(source - wikipedia)

And Russia is actually in a fighting-age male surplus right now, but not what one could call extreme.  For example the female surplus after WW2 was much larger.  An argument could be made that in order to shore up fading national power based on shrinking demographics Russia determined that pulling Ukraine into its fold tighter was required.  However, they could have done this a number of ways other than conventional warfare, and just about all of them would have worked better.  The Russian brain-drain, Ukrainian refugees and losses from the war, are going to make the problem worse, not better in the long term.  This is like solving your termite problem by burning your house down.  Finally, Russian demographics may be an issue, but it is not an immediate crisis that requires drastic solutions.

- Resources.  I did a long post awhile back on this and the entire "resources stupid!" argument simply does not add up.  In sum, Ukraine did not have enough of anything to make this war worthwhile to Russia.  Ukraine has about 3% of comparable Russian energy reserves - going to war over that is like going to war with a poorer neighbor for the change in their couch.  Further, let's say the Russia does take all that precious Ukrainian "stuff".  They 1) have to pay for the repairs/construction of infrastructure to get at it, 2) Somehow find people to work that infrastructure (see: fleeing from war) and 3) point it all east because their best customer just got covered in Ukrainian blood splatter.  Finally, if you want the stuff...why go conventional now?  They could have played the same backfield games they have before and been patient...where is the crisis?  Resource wise there isn't one.

So unless Putin has attained the centralized power of a Pharaoh, which we know he has not or Russia would have fully mobilized right now, then none of this makes any sense.  This war looks more like a geopolitical "suicide by cop" scenario than a rational action or "last argument of kings".  Clausewitz may be right in this war is an extension of Russian policy...but he does not answer "why now?" and "why by these means?" Or at least I can't see it.

Why does it matter at all Capt?  Who cares what the Russians think.  Well until one can figure it out, this war remains largely unnegotiable in any arena but violence and that is a dark equation that is getting dimmer by the day.

 

 

All points true though partially only in hindsight. Remember that The Plan was to get all of this in 72 hours. And without much fighting. Then the costs in lives and rubles would have been much lower and the oligarchs would have a lot of juicy stuff to gobble down in addition.

But I also doubt that it was all about resources, economy, demographics. We westerners just can't stop viewing this from our rational, mercantile point of view.

An old man's fears are really nit a good selling point, but restoring the glorious future... ?

 

[Huba]

4 minutes ago, Artkin said:

I believe the purpose is to deny the West gas, not to supply the Russians even more. What do they need the surplus gas for? 

Exactly, his is what they could really gain from it. But so does Europe! Returning Ukraine to 2014 borders means securing additional huge gas supplies for all of us, and from country that has aspirations to becoming EU itself. This angle is of course not discussed much, and I bet Scholz wouldn't even dare to think about it, but it should definitely be something to consider.

Edited July 15, 2022 by Huba

[Harmon Rabb]

1 hour ago, Billy Ringo said:

Putin & Associates, LLC

With regards to the "why", from a financial perspective I was shocked that Putin made the decision to invade Ukraine.  He and his cronies were worth 100's of billions of dollars.  More money than they could ever spend and the freedom to live and behave in almost any manner they chose.  Virtually no limits to the level of extravagance and decadence they desired.  

The potential incremental financial gain from invading Ukraine was minimal compared to the wealth they had already achieved.  And the downside risk was massive.  And that has transpired.  Putin's and his oligarchs' wealth and freedom to do as they please has been devastated--and many will eventually face criminal charges.  They can move to Qatar or other semi-welcoming countries and try to maintain access to their wealth, but in the end they have and will continue to pay dearly for Putin's mistake. 

I'm not a military historian nor do I have any military experience.  I'm a business guy---and this invasion was an absolutely terrible business decision. 

 

 

I think before the war a lot of us thought of Putin as some master chess player who could see multiple moves ahead of his opponent. Now it seems like he was just a poker player all along who went all in and lost.

[billbindc]

12 hours ago, The_Capt said:

The interesting thing about Russia in the war is the ideological vacuum.  There are not great ideas here.  They definitely have nationalism and a weak tea “I will protect you from NATO” but lacks the power that communism or monarchy had back in 1917 by a wide margin.  Putin has worked hard for over 20 years to build a personal cult but he in nowhere near the level of the Kim King’s of NK.  Nor does Putin have a religion to hold everything together because it is the “will of God” such as they have in theocracies such as Iran.  Nor does Russia have democracy or an idea of liberal freedom.

So what ideology does Russia have beyond paranoia and a general zeitgeist of revelling in misery?  Maybe that will be enough but I think it is weak glue in the absence of an existential crisis.  Putin has, and will continue to make the argument that this is an existential crisis but it is a weak argument.  As the social lattice in Russia comes under increasing stress I have to wonder how long the social contract will hold.  Russians have proven they can take a lot, under the right circumstances; however, without a crystalline idea to hold them together outside the bonds of their intimate communities and micro-social spaces, I think they are in fact more vulnerable than many think.

I would argue that monarchy and communism *were* much more powerful than Putin's vague blood and soil and siloviki ideology and they weren't enough either. WWI Russia collapsed and WWII Russia had the spectre of national annihilation Ukraine faces today. If Russia keeps it together it won't be driven by anything other than political/social inertia and that's a hell of a thing to base a dictatorship in a war on.

[Sojourner]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

This is like solving your termite problem by burning your house down. 

To expand on @The_Capt 's termite analogy...

Except it's not Putin's house that's infested with termites, it's the next-door neighbor's. So, burn the neighbor's house to keep the infestation from spreading and take his land (resources) - he doesn't need it, he just doesn't want his neighbor to be a threat again. Of course there are risks - the fire could spread, the neighborhood is pissed, but irrational hatred makes one blind to rational behavior.

 

(note this in no way reflects my view of Ukraine, merely a possible theory of Putin's mindset)

Edited July 15, 2022 by Sojourner

[billbindc]

54 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

 

Why does it matter at all Capt?  Who cares what the Russians think.  Well until one can figure it out, this war remains largely unnegotiable in any arena but violence and that is a dark equation that is getting dimmer by the day.

 

 

"Washington and its NATO partners more and more often resort in international relations to the policy of blackmail and crude pressure. They try to impudently force their will on other countries and nations. Imperialist bigwigs put forward adventurist doctrines of either a "limited" nuclear war or a war with the use of only conventional, non-nuclear weapons."

Great Putin quote, right? Actually...that's from Yuri Andropov in the early 1980's.

It's tempting to look at Russian history in long form or at the numbers but that often leads to pretty tendentious ideas about "national character' (don't get me started on the supposed Chinese penchant for long term planning). I would argue it's better to look at the formative experiences of the current political elite in Russia. For the most part they were part of the nomenklatura and security services at a time of rapidly declining Russian power and were led by profoundly paranoid people like Andropov. This was intertwined with an approach to the economic underpinnings of national power that vies with the Khmer Rouge and China's Great Leap Forward for hapless ineptitude. *That* is the school they learned statecraft in. If you want to find 'reasons' you need look no further than the fact that Putin and his clique simply didn't see any other options...going as far back as the early 2000's when a pivot to modernity and out of the paranoid security state model would have been a fairly obvious transition.

[Huba]

So, Reznikov says he's confident that UA will receive more HIMARS as well as ATACMS missiles, and that negotiations are ongoing on that. Might be just a strategy to push US into that, but I think the eventuality is quite probable. Assuming it happens, what effect will it have? The obvious target for ATACMS is Crimea, if we exclude it for some reason, having the missiles doesn't make much sense (unless as a "fleet in being", a looming escalation threat? Rather unlikely in my opinion). 

So wrecking Sevastopol harbor, and any BSF ships would be a primary target IMO, with the goal of at least forcing them to retreat to the very eastern part of the Sea (Novorosyisk and definitely Tuapse are out of range). Second target is of course the bridge (and nearby ferries?). RU will still be able to supply the peninsula by sea I guess, there's a number of harbors there, but they will live in constant fear of being attacked. Additionally, occupied UA ports on the Sea of Azov would stop being usable, that might hurt RU supply situation, and make stealing UA grain and steel harder. Then of course going after airbases, ammo depots and other high value targets would happen, depending on the ammo supply. \

It would be interesting to see how S400 would deal with these, it was supposedly designed specifically to address this type of threat. S300V even more so. OTOH I imagine Ukrainians would be launching missiles in rather big salvoes, given the nature of the targets.

Overall, I think that at this point introducing ATACMS is not that needed, GMLRS has a lot to chew through before it exhausts it's potential. Great thing about MGM-140 is that with HIMARS logistics in place, it can appear at any moment without prior warning. Given that, I'd guess that it might make it' debut at the eve of UA counteroffensive, to amplify the "shock and awe" effect.

I imagine RU would retaliate, primarily against Dnipro bridges (to keep situation symmetrical), and remaining UA ports. Probably general missile campaing might intensify for a while. And of course there would be moaning. In the Solovyov's program they already discussed the eventuality, and said that then they'd have no choice, but to continue the offensive till they reach Warsaw - meaning they won't do anything really, just continue the war.

That's how I think it will unravel - thoughts?

 

 

 

 

[Butschi]

43 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

I think before the war a lot of us thought of Putin as some master chess player who could see multiple moves ahead of his opponent. Now it seems like he was just a poker player all along who went all in and lost.

This exactly. I always thought of Putin as a master chess player. Maybe he was, maybe not. I must admit part of me (the (war)gamer?) was disappointed to discover he was playing poker this time and that he is so bad at it. And I think that is what a lot of people still find difficult to grasp and so still expect some brilliant plan behind all this.

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

LNR police Lt. Col. Nikolai Vatsyk, head of Special Purpose Center of the Rapid Reaction Forces:

 

[Bearstronaut]

6 minutes ago, Huba said:

So, Reznikov says he's confident that UA will receive more HIMARS as well as ATACMS missiles, and that negotiations are ongoing on that. Might be just a strategy to push US into that, but I think the eventuality is quite probable. Assuming it happens, what effect will it have? The obvious target for ATACMS is Crimea, if we exclude it for some reason, having the missiles doesn't make much sense (unless as a "fleet in being", a looming escalation threat? Rather unlikely in my opinion). 

So wrecking Sevastopol harbor, and any BSF ships would be a primary target IMO, with the goal of at least forcing them to retreat to the very eastern part of the Sea (Novorosyisk and definitely Tuapse are out of range). Second target is of course the bridge (and nearby ferries?). RU will still be able to supply the peninsula by sea I guess, there's a number of harbors there, but they will live in constant fear of being attacked. Additionally, occupied UA ports on the Sea of Azov would stop being usable, that might hurt RU supply situation, and make stealing UA grain and steel harder. Then of course going after airbases, ammo depots and other high value targets would happen, depending on the ammo supply. \

It would be interesting to see how S400 would deal with these, it was supposedly designed specifically to address this type of threat. S300V even more so. OTOH I imagine Ukrainians would be launching missiles in rather big salvoes, given the nature of the targets.

Overall, I think that at this point introducing ATACMS is not that needed, GMLRS has a lot to chew through before it exhausts it's potential. Great thing about MGM-140 is that with HIMARS logistics in place, it can appear at any moment without prior warning. Given that, I'd guess that it might make it' debut at the eve of UA counteroffensive, to amplify the "shock and awe" effect.

I imagine RU would retaliate, primarily against Dnipro bridges (to keep situation symmetrical), and remaining UA ports. Probably general missile campaing might intensify for a while. And of course there would be moaning. In the Solovyov's program they already discussed the eventuality, and said that then they'd have no choice, but to continue the offensive till they reach Warsaw - meaning they won't do anything really, just continue the war.

That's how I think it will unravel - thoughts?

 

 

 

 

I’m wondering if eventually we reach a point where the Russians decide that going after NATO supply points in Poland is worth it to them. 

[Grigb]

RU industry outlook

• The non-primary industry of Russia will experience the strongest collapse in the last 13 years
• "For the whole year...manufacturing production may decrease by about 6% this year... bigger fall of output (outside the raw material export) was in Russia only in 2009 (by 15.2%)
• In these conditions, according to Manturov [Minister of Trade and Industry], it is necessary to "abandon the market industrial policy" and displace imported goods into machinery. At the same time, he assured that there would be no return to the planned economy of the USSR, despite the elements of "manual control".

Quote

The government predicted the strongest industrial collapse in 13 years

The non-primary industry of Russia will experience the strongest collapse in the last 13 years, the Ministry of Industry and Trade predicts.

By the end of the year, production in the manufacturing sector will decrease by 6%, said the head of the department Denis Manturov on Friday at an extraordinary meeting of the State Duma. In reality, the drawdown will be even greater, because the final figure includes the military-industrial complex, which works in three shifts to support the war.

According to the results of January–May, factories and plants of the non-primary sector increased output by 2%. But this is inertia due to the fact that stocks of materials and components are still preserved, Manturov warned deputies who are going to raise him to the status of deputy prime minister.

The drop in exports and the closure of Western markets "will lead to a decrease in volumes in the most capacious industries, including metallurgy, chemical complex and timber industry," Manturov said. According to the minister, the automotive industry, where 18 out of 20 plants have stood up, will end the year with a 50% decrease.

"For the whole year, even taking into account the tangible growth in the defense sector, manufacturing production may decrease by about 6% this year," Manturov said (quoted by Interfax). According to Rosstat, this will be the second largest collapse since the beginning of the XXI century: bigger fall of output (outside the raw material export) was in Russia only in 2009 (by 15.2%).

Official statistics already record the industrial stupor into which industries that are deprived of access to imported supplies fall. In May, the production of cars collapsed by 97%, fiber—optic cables — by 81%, buses - by 77%.

Russian Railways suppliers have been left without foreign bearings and are massively curtailing production: diesel locomotives — by 63%, freight cars — by 52%, passenger cars — by 40%.

According to Rosstat, glass production collapsed by 60%, washing machines by 59%, refrigerators by 58%, electric motors and televisions by 50%, elevators and baking equipment by 35%.

Metallurgy, the industry's second largest contributor to GDP after oil and gas production, has become unprofitable: all major companies operate with negative profitability, sources in Severstal, NLMK and MMK told Kommersant.

Steel and alloy production collapsed by 20-50% in June, said Andrey Leonov, vice president of the Russian Steel Association, which unites the largest metallurgical companies in the country. Due to sanctions that closed export markets, Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works stopped two blast furnaces out of eight and reduced pig iron production by 30%. Severstal has lost 20-25% of its load.

In these conditions, according to Manturov, it is necessary to "abandon the market industrial policy" and displace imported goods into machinery. At the same time, he assured that there would be no return to the planned economy of the USSR, despite the elements of "manual control".

 

[Huba]

7 minutes ago, Bearstronaut said:

I’m wondering if eventually we reach a point where the Russians decide that going after NATO supply points in Poland is worth it to them. 

It would be much easier and less escalatory to go after supply lines near the border on the UA side - and they hardly even tried. RU is almost out of long range precision cruise missiles ( Kh-22 doesn't help much here), and is definitely not willing to risk using manned platforms. They might some strikes to make a statement, but I doubt they could whip up anything truly effective...

[Beleg85]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

  During the age of supreme god-king rule perhaps, but those days disappeared as soon as we started mass printing of books and literacy.  This war, like most wars, had to be negotiated with the micro-social elites, and they had a lot more to lose than one old man.  War is negotiation internally as well as externally, and the hypothesis Putin's driving motivation does not carry forward into negotiating it with Russia itself - "We are going to war because I am old and scared".  The people who make up the power blocks had to buy in, and I sincerely doubt Putin's control is so airtight that there were not other "sellable" reasons beyond the mass consumption nonsense coming out of the Kremlin.

I am not so sure if our post-modern concepts of "power as negotiation" are not doing us disservice when trying to understand decision-loops in cultures like Russian or Chinese (and military is a culture in itself). Our modern (=western) sociological theories are almost universaly builded on default perception of individuals living in communities that has at least some agency over their fate -they know better what is good for them/usually know how to achieve it. Even if poor and wretched, they have their own substancial existance and will  that eventually cede to state (or military structure) in exchange for protection/regulation.

But this was never the case in places like Russia, where power shaped people's and not the opposite. Without external push, such society is passive and willing to endure great hardships uncomparable to  western ones. The same is with army- it's full of meagre personalities and uncharismatic commanders that will rather wage pointless war for years than do somethign about it and rebell.

What my point is that fatalism is ultimate resource at least in Kremlin perception, both at grand strategic and even tiny tactical levels. They dwell on it many times in history- sometimes it backfired, but often did not (1812, "Great Patriotic War"). And I know they can be wrong, that modern Russians are different and they are not Tsar's subjects nor Soviets any more. But still decision-makers like Putin will base their strategy on existence of this resource. Without understanding of this fundamental underlaying assumption our analysis is always flawed.

There are of course also other more materialistic factors that unfortunatelly forecast long, gruelling and brutal conflict that will drag and drag on for years, even with Western help to Ukraine.

So this thread can become several thousand page long as time will go.

 

Another troubling issue is the existence of Putin's successor. Surprisingly, he seems not to calculate this factor at all in his strategic vision of Russian future.

 

BTW, pretty good and worthy report aboout Russian preparations from Rochan Consulting:

https://icds.ee/en/russias-war-in-ukraine-when-russia-went-to-war/

Edited July 15, 2022 by Beleg85