How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

12 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

While Russia is taking a moment or two for their operational pause, I think it's a good time for us to think about what comes next for this war.  I'll get the ball rolling...

Ultimately this war will end only when Ukraine or Russia can no longer effectively kill the other.  Since both believe this war will decide their fate as nations, I don't see either of them willingly seeking to end the war before they think they have won.  Therefore, it will come down to which nation can fight longer than the other.  I think I've been pretty clear I believe all the evidence of this war and the weight of history show Ukraine will be the ultimate victor.

Historians can advise on what the likely outcomes might be given a particular set of circumstances, but the larger scale the topic the more elusive predicting the timeframe is.  I said on Day 3 of this war that Russia has already lost it, but it would take some time for it to become reality.  I had hoped that it would have happened right around now, but sadly it hasn't yet happened.  Why?  Because there's just too many variables for Russia to play with to extend how long it is able to wage war.

Some might say "ah, Russia is finally learning how to fight!".  Not me.  I think Russia is fighting just about as poorly as it did in the first few weeks and months.  It hasn't learned much of anything.  The change in tactics we've seen are mostly because it no longer has the physical strength to fight they way it used to nor the way it wants to (i.e. quickly end the war through bold actions).  If 10 full strength BTGs magically appeared out of thin air, they would say "ah-ha!  Now we can make a bold and decisive attack without air cover, without coordination of arms, without favorable terrain, and without a demoralized enemy that isn't armed with often times superior defensive weaponry".  I do not think for a second they would do otherwise.

What Russia has been more successful at is figuring out how to not collapse.  I am impressed at how many tricks Russia has up its sleeve to keep the cannon fodder moving to the front, to put into service 60 year old weaponry, to keep the domestic population controlled, and to completely reject reality in the mistaken belief that Russia will eventually win because it's Russia.  However, all of these tricks are just that and tricks always have a limited number of times they can be used.  It is also true that when a new trick is required it is harder to find than the previous one.

Russia has many tricks up its sleeves, but sleeves always end at the shoulder.  There is a definite end to what Russia is able to do to keep this war going, we just don't know where that definite end is with any certainty.

Steve

 

My growing concern is that a full collapse, if it happens, will be extremely ugly.  Historically when a government has propped up a system with that much weight on an increasingly creaky scaffolding, when it breaks it breaks badly.  This and external pressure from the UA is increasing, not decreasing.  As more trained troops and western equipment move into theatre the strain on the Russian system will amplify.

So what?  This is not a guarantee of a nightmare scenario, Russia may be able to contract in good order and somehow hold onto something.  However, if a collapse is uncontrolled or cascades, this is when very bad things happen.  I said it before, there very well come a time when we will have to try and pull Ukraine off of Russia in order to avoid an uncontrolled escalation.  But that is one eventuality among many right now.

[Battlefront.com]

Here's what I think Russia will do after it lifts its operational pause:

I see the focus for renewed offensive operations being in the Donbas to take more territory in the Donetsk Oblast.  It's an obvious prediction   This is Russia's primary political objective it's sold the people on.  Trying to back away from that or shift elsewhere doesn't seem to be politically viable.  Plus, the bulk of its functional forces and hardware are already there.  Redeploying them en mas would take a long time and would be very obvious to Ukraine.

I'm thinking we'll see a broad frontal assault along the new N/S line going from the Siverskyi-Donets to prewar DPR border.  Bakhmut is no longer as important for Ukraine as it once was, but losing it early in the next phase would likely make long term defense north of the city more difficult.  Therefore, I expect to see continued frontal assaults in that direction with supporting pressure in the form of artillery and unsuccessful attacks north and south of the effort.

The big question for me is how much more they invest into taking Slavyansk.  It's a massive political objective for sure, but it also is also at the heart of Ukraine's ability to defend a rather large chunk of northern Donetsk Oblast.  So far the efforts to take the city have been painfully slow and costly.  Due to its importance I think we'll see some forces shifted through Izyum to try and make some significant progress towards taking Slvyansk from the north and west.  However, I'm not really sure they can do much more there than they already are doing. 

If Russia can't get anything moving towards Slavyansk relatively quickly then we are likely to see a repeat of the last month of warfare where they fought themselves to exhaustion without gaining very much.  I don't think they can do anything quickly, therefore a bloody frontal assault is what we'll likely see.  Well, at least if Russia has enough artillery shells and replacement artillery to keep it going.

The wild card is if Russia decides to make a new offensive in Kharkiv to draw forces away from the Donbas.  It does seem to be shaping up in that direction.  I think that will bog down quickly and become more of a liability to Russia than a plus.  Imagine Russia having to explain how they got kicked back to the Russian border twice in the same spot.

Kherson is also very important as it seems Ukraine will continue to apply pressure.  If Russia feels its grip on the western bank of the Dnepr slipping they will likely divert forces from the Donbas to try and stabilize the situation.  They will also likely strip more forces from Zaporizhzhia front, which is already dangerously under resourced.  That in turn gives Ukraine an opportunity to conduct at least a limited offensive in the area.

Steve

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

My growing concern is that a full collapse, if it happens, will be extremely ugly.  Historically when a government has propped up a system with that much weight on an increasingly creaky scaffolding, when it breaks it breaks badly.  This and external pressure from the UA is increasing, not decreasing.  As more trained troops and western equipment move into theatre the strain on the Russian system will amplify.

So what?  This is not a guarantee of a nightmare scenario, Russia may be able to contract in good order and somehow hold onto something.  However, if a collapse is uncontrolled or cascades, this is when very bad things happen.  I said it before, there very well come a time when we will have to try and pull Ukraine off of Russia in order to avoid an uncontrolled escalation.  But that is one eventuality among many right now.

We have a lot. of leverage with the Ukrainians. The much bigger issue could be a three sided Russian civil war. Where none of the side involved will communicate with us, much less negotiate. Still, I don't think we can be afraid of winning. Ready to try and pick up the pieces would be good though.

[Vergeltungswaffe]

Hard to believe how clean it is in there.

 

[The_Capt]

16 minutes ago, dan/california said:

We have a lot. of leverage with the Ukrainians. The much bigger issue could be a three sided Russian civil war. Where none of the side involved will communicate with us, much less negotiate. Still, I don't think we can be afraid of winning. Ready to try and pick up the pieces would be good though.

It is not an issue of “winning” it is more one of Russia “losing by too much.”  A Russian Civil War is a very bad outcome, we covered this previously (e.g. loose nukes).  The endgame of this thing was somewhat easy to see a couple months ago, both sides posturing for a best position - Russia contained but claiming victory and Ukraine westward facing but living with minor territory losses.  However, this war has definitely become more existential for the Russians, or at least looks that way.  And the appetite for negotiation in Ukraine is drying up.  Now it looks more like the endgame might be far more tricky.

Edited July 11, 2022 by The_Capt

[dan/california]

I have stated a number of times I think the best scenario for Ukraine is the 2/24 borders with EU and NATO membership. It would just be a much easier country to run than if it got the 2014 borders that include a lot of unhappy Russian sympathizers. But the fundamental problem is that the Russian leadership is trying irrationally hard to get out this with something they can sell as a win, and they simply don't have the military power to achieve that. One of the most obvious consequences of this is that they are trying get every single male of even vaguely military age in the LPR/DPR killed in suicidal frontal attacks, and even more suicidal recon by death operations. This is opening up a possibility of Ukraine reconquering them at acceptable losses that just wasn't there before. I just don't see how you get the Russians to stop this until they run out of the bodies.

The genocidally barbaric behavior of the entire Russian military just makes it a really hard sell to the Ukrainians that they should be allowed to retreat in good order even if they had the sense to try and negotiate such a thing. Which they don't, or they would be trying to do it right now. Before ATACAMS or some other NATO system makes its way in country and makes their situation even less tenable. As you know far too well wars are easy to start and god awfully hard to end. All we can do is ride the tiger and hope for an opening to calm things down. Maybe we can arrange for the Ukrainians to take out the worst of their very justified need for justice/revenge on some unlucky piece of Wagner. 

[FancyCat]

Kamil had made several threads detailing Russian collapse scenarios, one was a loss of centralization but slowly and not as chaotic as one would think. I can't find it anymore but I find it useful since so far Russian broader society seems unwilling to do anything concerning the war so I'm doubting they will overthrow Putin or insist on reforms. Likely it will be infighting among the political class.

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

My growing concern is that a full collapse, if it happens, will be extremely ugly.  Historically when a government has propped up a system with that much weight on an increasingly creaky scaffolding, when it breaks it breaks badly.  This and external pressure from the UA is increasing, not decreasing.  As more trained troops and western equipment move into theatre the strain on the Russian system will amplify.

So what?  This is not a guarantee of a nightmare scenario, Russia may be able to contract in good order and somehow hold onto something.  However, if a collapse is uncontrolled or cascades, this is when very bad things happen.  I said it before, there very well come a time when we will have to try and pull Ukraine off of Russia in order to avoid an uncontrolled escalation.  But that is one eventuality among many right now.

This has been my concern since before Russia invaded, because for years I've believed a full scale war against Ukraine would be the ultimate end of the Russian Federation as we know it.  I'm convinced this will be the case, however there are so many different ways for it to happen it's impossible to know what form it will take.

For example, what happens if Belarus collapses into chaos before Russia does?  What if it collapses just after?  What happens if Kadyrov takes his units and declares Chechnya the new ruling state over all the Caucuses (or at least Chechnya)?  What if there is some sort of trigger event where the FSB loses control over public discontent about sanctions and/or the war and that sets off even larger events?  What if there is a coup that results in Putin's death and ultra nationalists taking the throne?

So on and so forth.

One prediction I am willing to make, though, is that at some point the current war in Ukraine will no longer be relevant to what goes on with Russia. 

First reason is that Russia is fighting with pretty much all of its resources from the Baltic to Pacific, Arctic to Caucuses.  And they are losing.  If there any disruption to any component of this delicate web of resources and logistics, Russia will not be able to keep the war going in Ukraine.  Therefore, any significant internal unrest in Russia is likely to result in military collapse in Ukraine.

Second, most of Russia's forces fighting in Ukraine do not want to be there.  It there's some sort of major disruption of their ability to continue fighting, they will likely abandon their positions and head home instead of being slaughtered by the Ukrainians.  In fact, Ukraine will likely offer safe passage for Russian units to return to Russia provided leave their stuff behind (which they probably would do anyway, as we saw even in February and March).  This will accelerate the collapse.

Third, the DLPR knows they can't fight Ukraine without massive aid from Russia.  In fact, they know they can't function as independent states without massive Russian involvement.  As soon as they feel that they can't count on Russia to keep them going, the DLPR leadership will likely try to save their own skins and try to negotiate with Ukraine.  I think Ukraine will listen, though for sure they are in the driver's seat.

Fourth, Kadyrov's forces are not fighting for Russia, they are fighting for Kadyrov.  The only thing Kadyrov has to gain from fighting in Ukraine is the power and money he gets from Moscow.  If Moscow is unable to provide that then there's every reason to get his forces back home and zero reasons to keep them in Ukraine.  That removes an important part of Russia's ability to control territory.

Fifth, partisans love the smell of weakness.  As Russian forces begin to figure out things are going from bad to worse, the partisans will make sure they understand how much worse it can be.  This puts more pressure on units to get out of Ukraine ASAP.

Sixth, rats know when a ship is sinking.  The traitors that are attempting to keep Ukrainian territory controlled for their Russian masters will try to disappear before they are caught.  They probably know full well that their names are on a list and staying put is akin to death or imprisonment.  This also accelerates the loss of control by Russia.

Seventh... then there's the Ukrainian Armed Forces.  Any sign of a local Russian unit surrendering or pulling out will mean a Ukrainian advance. 

All of this is what "sudden collapse" means.

After Ukraine gets back all of its lost territory, perhaps including DLPR but probably NOT Crimea right away, then there's not much will be interested in doing to aggravate Russia's decline.  They won't need to.

What happens within Russia is a topic for a different post

Steve

 

[FancyCat]

7 minutes ago, dan/california said:

I have stated a number of times I think the best scenario for Ukraine is the 2/24 borders with EU and NATO membership. It would just be a much easier country to run than if it got the 2014 borders that include a lot of unhappy Russian sympathizers.

Russia actually never wanted the Donbas annexed into Russia, what Russia wanted was leverage to prevent the Ukrainian state strengthening, and to ensure Russian influence persisted in Ukraine (case in point Crimea was annexed quick as hell). Now, if the 2022 invasion had been successful, maybe in some far off future, Russia might have annexed the Donbas, but only as part of a broader project absorbing the rest of Ukraine. The pre-2/24 borders that one could see maybe Russia and Ukraine reach a compromise are actually absolutely defeats for Russia, that cannot be waved away domestically. 

2/24 if you remember means Ukraine still retains control of parts of the two republics claimed de jure borders, and especially with Putin claiming such lofty goals like denazification, demilitarization, not to mention dreams of New Russia, and explicit immediate goals of liberating the republics territories still occupied by Ukraine, 2-24 is impossible for Russia to agree to as it is clear defeat. 

Also, 2-24 precludes major land important (economically) portions of those Oblasts, and economically not whole, both are utterly useless to Russia, annexing them may unlock economic gains (doubt) but that would remove the lever on Ukraine. 

2-24, the same reason Russia cannot accept it as a peace point, Ukraine cannot accept 2-24, for the fact that Russia still holds a lever to interfere in Ukraine via the republics if the republics are not annexed. Ukraine cannot cede any land and so the existence of the Republics poses a threat to Ukraine, more so than if annexed into Russia. But again, Russia will not annex useless territories. So 2-24 is sorta impossible so either Ukraine or Russia to formalize a agreement around. (Maybe a stalemate, but that would involve skirmishes, active military conflict)

2-24 is impossible from a negotiation standpoint, and if Ukraine reaches 2-24 from a military standpoint, there isn't a argument, I see for Russia being able to stabilize the front to prevent Ukraine from pushing further beyond 2-24 if Ukraine has reached the point of the 2-24 borders. 

[Battlefront.com]

45 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Kamil had made several threads detailing Russian collapse scenarios, one was a loss of centralization but slowly and not as chaotic as one would think. I can't find it anymore but I find it useful since so far Russian broader society seems unwilling to do anything concerning the war so I'm doubting they will overthrow Putin or insist on reforms. Likely it will be infighting among the political class.

I'd be interested to see them if you find references to his thoughts.

In my view there are very broad collapse scenarios:

1.  Catastrophic collapse

2.  Negotiated collapse

Catastrophic is the sudden and unrecoverable loss of centralized authority by Moscow (whomever claims to rule it).  Civil wars (plural) are what we'd see with this scenario.  Unlike the Bolshevik Revolution I expect the conflicts to be geographically based rather than ideological as it was in 1917-1920s.  Regions might fight amongst themselves, but it is probable they will commonly fight against Moscow's control.  This will force Moscow to pick and choose which regions its willing to fight for.  Providing, of course, that European Russia isn't itself fighting internally (St. Petersburg and Moscow don't get a long).

Negotiated collapse is when the central authority in Moscow realistically understands it has to devolve power in order to keep assured power for themselves.  This is what happened when the Soviet Union collapsed.  In our case now the governors of the various Oblasts would declare their intentions and collectively they would attempt to find a way to maintain the Russian Federation in a way they see as beneficial to their region (or even to themselves personally).  The regions that refuse to go along with the majority would break away and either join up with someone else or would go it alone.  The majority might not be interested or able to stop them from going their own way, depending on the region's importance.  In that case fighting might take place later on, as happened with Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine.

Which way this goes is largely dependent on how badly Putin runs down Russian Federation resources before there's a change of power.  It is possible that a collapse can be temporarily avoided if Putin is taken out soon by someone able to hold central power together (i.e. NOT like the 1991 coup!).  But since the probable replacement for Putin is likely to be even more Hell bent on waging war on Ukraine, I expect it would be short lived as it will have to resort to the very thing Putin fears will end his regime -> full mobilization.  Therefore a collapse is, in my view, likely.

Steve

[FancyCat]

24 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I'd be interested to see them if you find references to his thoughts.

In my view there are very broad collapse scenarios:

1.  Catastrophic collapse

2.  Negotiated collapse

Catastrophic is the sudden and unrecoverable loss of centralized authority by Moscow (whomever claims to rule it).  Civil wars (plural) are what we'd see with this scenario.  Unlike the Bolshevik Revolution I expect the conflicts to be geographically based rather than ideological as it was in 1917-1920s.  Regions might fight amongst themselves, but it is probable they will commonly fight against Moscow's control.  This will force Moscow to pick and choose which regions its willing to fight for.  Providing, of course, that European Russia isn't itself fighting internally (St. Petersburg and Moscow don't get a long).

Negotiated collapse is when the central authority in Moscow realistically understands it has to devolve power in order to keep assured power for themselves.  This is what happened when the Soviet Union collapsed.  In this case the governors of the various Oblasts would declare their intentions and collectively they would attempt to find a way that most of them would be able to live with.  The regions that refuse to go along with the majority would break away and either join up with someone else or would go it alone.  The majority might not be interested or able to stop them from going their own way, depending on the region's importance.  In that case fighting might take place later on, as happened with Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine.

Which way this goes is largely dependent on how badly Putin runs down Russian Federation resources before there's a change of power.  It is possible that a collapse can be temporarily avoided if Putin is taken out soon by someone able to hold central power together (i.e. NOT like the 1991 coup!).  But since the probable replacement for Putin is likely to be even more Hell bent on waging war on Ukraine, I expect it would be short lived as it will have to resort to the very thing Putin fears will end his regime -> full mobilization.  Therefore a collapse is, in my view, likely.

Steve

 

I think I found it. Two things stand out significantly for me, one, his invoking of the Spanish Empire but he did not elaborate on it I believe. Two, he does not in the thread go into detail on why the same sort of factors generated the breakup of the Soviet union don't apply here (mass action, etc, but I will say Russia socially does not nearly look close to 1991 Soviet Union in dissent and protests so I'm inclined to support that the Russian people will not attempt to change the course) He does point out that fraying economic ties and political elites attempting to make up for it will cause the factors for breakup later down the line. I know nothing about the exact circumstances of how regions interact in Russia so I am assuming he understands it more as a native.

His mention of the division between the mainlanders and the colonial subjects in the Spanish Empire, I do think there can be comparisons to the way Moscow exists with the other regions in Russia.

Spain of course had the collapse of basically all central authority and the large amount of wars that occurred, while perhaps this is how Russia falls apart, I don't see how the central authority collapses in such a manner as Spain to cause active military conflicts to arise and again, the people look unlikely to cause central authority collapse.

 

 

[FancyCat]

If we review the wiki article on the New Union Treaty, the attempt to maintain the USSR, the majority of potential members are independent states now, with smaller number still part of Russia.amd being quite small geographically. Not sure whatever remained part of Russia till today is viable as a potential state to engage in either catastrophic or negotiated collapse. Maybe engage in seeking more devolved powers but remaining as a federal subject of Russia. This devolved conflict I think would be much less worrisome than the feared 1991 breakup scenarios. In essence, Russia decays slowly with no fear of actual collapse.

[Battlefront.com]

Some side predictions for either a catastrophic or significant negotiated collapse...

Armenia is screwed.  Azerbaijan would accelerate it's moves to take over for the weakening Russian presence in the region.  It's already happening, so this is a pretty sure bet.

I think Transnistria would be effectively abandoned as with the loss of Ukraine it's barely tenable situation would go to zero.  Even a negotiated Russian collapse would likely entail too many distractions to resist a determined effort by Moldova to take over control.  Things are already moving in that direction so I'd put this as very likely.

Lukashenko likely gets ousted fairly cleanly.  I expect even the worst case scenario would involve some meaningful concessions to the existing political opposition.  Best case is the opposition takes full control.  I really don't see a civil war possibility for Belarus.

Kaliningrad is theoretically ripe to go for independence this time (as opposed to 1991) as the smart folks have different things to weigh now than they did before.  No doubt they've seen their neighbors get richer as they stagnated, so being a 4th Baltic state should be appealing to them.  They likely know none of their neighbors will attack them, and in fact might wind up protecting them.  As logical as this might be to become independent, Russia has made sure the ruling elite is loyal to Moscow, so I don't know which way this would go short term.

Kadyrov already has his own army.  It's a pretty safe bet that if the going gets tough in Moscow he'll use it to keep power for himself.  He'd likely prefer to stick with the current Moscow arrangement, but Moscow might not be in a position to continue making loyalty payments.  In that case, Kadyrov will likely calculate he's better of on his own.  I expect that Kadyrov would try to absorb neighboring regions in order to "protect them from Moscow".  I doubt the residual Federal forces would try to fight such moves any time soon (if ever).

What Kadyrov does will determine much of what happens in the Caucuses.  Some areas might try to stay loyal to Moscow, some might seek to align with Kadyrov, others might try for independence.  Cripes, we could even see South Ossetia and Abkhazia doing something with Georgia if things get really bad.  All bets are off in this region if Moscow loses control.

I can see the Far Eastern and Central Asian areas forming into two or more power blocs.  I don't know enough about the details of the various groups to know how they would align themselves.  It would become even more interesting if some of the "Stans" destabilized as there's a lot of cross border ethnic ties.

As for European Russia, I think at least initially they will stick together even if just to keep the old Imperialist dream of a massive country alive for some day in the future.  However, there are tensions so it is possible that internal cohesion might not survive Moscow doing something really stupid and selfish.

Well, that's all just a gut guess on where this could be headed in the event of catastrophic collapse.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

8 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

If we review the wiki article on the New Union Treaty, the attempt to maintain the USSR, the majority of potential members are independent states now, with smaller number still part of Russia.

Yes, for many regions it makes solid sense to stay aligned with Moscow, even if Moscow treats them like dirt.  However, they now have 30 years of living under the arrangement of the Russian Federation which they didn't have in 1991.  They also saw Putin change the conditions for local autonomy to be more and more Moscow controlled.  I think at a minimum they would insist on some major reworkings of the previous arrangement.  Perhaps so much that it might be the Russian Confederation in reality.

I think the thing that will determine catastrophic vs. negotiated collapse depends on how badly Putin runs the country down before he is eliminated.  If things get so bad that European Russia goes into anarchy, then the outlying regions will likely seek very different arrangements than the current one.  Putin is heading things in this direction, but his successor might put the foot on the accelerator.

Thanks for the Gaalev link!  He's not a completely reliable source, but he has insights for sure.  I'll check it out tomorrow.

Steve

[paxromana]

It is also possible that previuously quashed 'pan Mongolist' sentiments around Lake Bainal (Buryats) and there might want to form up on Mongolia ... which would give the latter direct control of the central portion of the Trans Siberian RR and, depending on events in the (ex) Russian Far East that could have some interesting economic consequences.

[dan/california]

9 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yes, for many regions it makes solid sense to stay aligned with Moscow, even if Moscow treats them like dirt.  However, they now have 30 years of living under the arrangement of the Russian Federation which they didn't have in 1991.  They also saw Putin change the conditions for local autonomy to be more and more Moscow controlled.  I think at a minimum they would insist on some major reworkings of the previous arrangement.  Perhaps so much that it might be the Russian Confederation in reality.

I think the thing that will determine catastrophic vs. negotiated collapse depends on how badly Putin runs the country down before he is eliminated.  If things get so bad that European Russia goes into anarchy, then the outlying regions will likely seek very different arrangements than the current one.  Putin is heading things in this direction, but his successor might put the foot on the accelerator.

Thanks for the Gaalev link!  He's not a completely reliable source, but he has insights for sure.  I'll check it out tomorrow.

Steve

 

8 minutes ago, paxromana said:

It is also possible that previuously quashed 'pan Mongolist' sentiments around Lake Bainal (Buryats) and there might want to form up on Mongolia ... which would give the latter direct control of the central portion of the Trans Siberian RR and, depending on events in the (ex) Russian Far East that could have some interesting economic consequences.

Always keep in mind that Russia east of the Urals is almost depopulated.There are several Chinese cities in Manchuria you have never heard of that have more people than the easternmost third of Russia. If things crack up in Moscow the only question is how quickly the Chinese move in.

[G.I. Joe]

I just bought John B. Lundstrom's The First South Pacific Campaign on Kindle and the epigraph struck me as rather fitting for Ukraine's situation right now:

"The 'defensive-offensive' may be paraphrased as 'hold what you've got and hit them when you can,' the hitting to be done, not only by seizing opportunities, but making them."

- Admiral Ernest King to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, February 8, 1942.

[G.I. Joe]

9 hours ago, Huba said:

We have 2 batteries of NSM. And main Baltic Fleet base in Kaliningrad in range of 155mm, and a nice fleet of mine countermeasure ships. Apart from that I agree that Navy is kinda a solution in search of a problem. One advertised task for it is securing shipments of LNG and oil, as after cutting Russia off, all of that has to go through ports. Realistically though, in case of conflict with Russia we'd need much more than 3 Arrowheads 140 that we are getting to secure anything outside the Baltic. If It was up to me, I'd swallow my pride, and instead got a maritime strike squadron.

Agreed, it does seem like the logical place to trim some of the budget. I can see the argument for the Polish Navy having surface combatants, but in the confined spaces of the Baltic with support from allies practically assured, I don't see the need for anything bigger than corvettes (i.e. something along the lines of the Visby-class or Braunschweig- / Magen-class ships).

Sometimes cost-benefit analysis needs to prevail over national prestige, like New Zealand passing up the chance to buy F-16s to replace their A-4s or Ukraine not wasting a ton of money to finish the Moskva's sistership Ukraina...

Edited July 11, 2022 by G.I. Joe
Added link

[Grigb]

On 15 of July Duma is going to hold an urgent unplanned meeting. It looks like even deputies do not know what the topics will be. Some say following:

"I think some critical mass of undecided bills in the field of economics and finance has accumulated. [If not accepted now] it may be late by the autumn, so the State Duma should urgently issue them," said the source of the newspaper in the State Duma office.

Let's see.

 

[Huba]

1 hour ago, G.I. Joe said:

Agreed, it does seem like the logical place to trim some of the budget. I can see the argument for the Polish Navy having surface combatants, but in the confined spaces of the Baltic with support from allies practically assured, I don't see the need for anything bigger than corvettes (i.e. something along the lines of the Visby-class or Braunschweig- / Magen-class ships).

Sometimes cost-benefit analysis needs to prevail over national prestige, like New Zealand passing up the chance to buy F-16s to replace their A-4s or Ukraine not wasting a ton of money to finish the Moskva's sistership Ukraina...

As for Visby or such - we have a bunch of FACs armed with RBS-15, the Orkans, which still have some life left in them. One lesson for naval forces that comes from war in Ukraine is that ships without proper air defence are almost useless and it is probably even more true for the more confined waters of the Baltic. All those small ships that operate there are therefore in dire need of upgrades to stay relevant, including Visby's.

As I said, Polish Navy doing convoy escorts alone outside the Baltic is just crazy talk, but perhaps in the Baltic itself a few anti-aircraft ships could protect the traffic from Denmark to Szczecin moderately well. It's harder to justify the subs - I guess 2 or 3 would be enough to close off the whole Gulf of Finnland, but with Finnland in NATO it is no longer an important consideration anyway. Maybe hunting other subs in the Baltic? A very narrow specialty.

There's another argument for keeping the token navy though, and it is being able to participate in NATO/ allied missions. Poland follows this policy since we accessed the alliance, sending contingents for all operations (including anti-piracy mission off Somalia), with the idea being that if push comes to shove, we'll be lend assistance too. Keeping this capability is quite important politically I guess, even if not directly useful in war with RU.

And of course, ending the proud tradition of Free Polish Navy of WW2 would not be that easy politically, it's like calling for disbanding USMC... Having said all of that, I still think that from purely rational standpoint keeping it doesn't make sense. For participation in NATO operations, something like Absalon would serve us much better.

 

[Grigb]

Checked recent Girkin video. Notes are below. As usual take is with a grain of salt.

Quote

HIMARS/Arty Work

• [Already published]
• Around 8 Army-Corp level arty-rocket/missile warehousers were destroyed.
• A lot of Oil terminals were destroyed.
• Some (few) higher than battalion HQs were destroyed.
• Several Air defense targets were destroyed.
• UKR recon-saboteur groups are bombing/exploding bridges [looks like not much currently but it is ongoing process]
• Concluded that one sided RU game of hitting UKR rear targets has finished.
• LDNR locals are fully aware of the scale and impact of UKR strikes - they observe resulting fire and detonations (implying the information he says is very well known by anyone there)
• [Unpublished]
• UKRs are good at using HIMARS
• UKR are hitting RU targets with exceptional performance. Practically every hit is successful. Comparing to previous months UKR is much more successful in hitting even RU territory in many places.
• Claims UKR are using "Heavy" HIMARS missiles with range longer 70 km [stated there are already few examples UKR using such missiles]. Mentioned that  Shahtersk big warehouse and Torez warehouse were safe from even long-range tube artillery but were HIMARSed.
• Claims that UKR were barraging Snake Island with everything they got (including Tochkas - implying it was really big arty group). Now this group went to Donbass. [Looks like RU propaganda is spreading stories that Snake Island was barraged into oblivion by impossible to defeat large arty group]
• Stated that to his surprise RU Air Defense weapons have difficulties dealing with this artillery group (says too much for RU AD)
• Confirmed that Severodonetsk-Lisichansk required a very large amount of ammo (which is not available now). Claims all ammo warehouses at 30-40-50 km distance are destroyed.
• He does not exaggerate the effect of western arty. Says he is getting info from colleagues who are there under the shelling. They do think Girkin exaggerated it.
• Claims HIMARS are coming with NATO crews. [He believes it probably because RU propaganda meme is that Western weapons are too complicated for a user and RU weapons are superior because they are as simple as sharp sticks]

 

Quote

Donbass Offensive Operation review

• Before the Second phase (Donbass offensive) RU propaganda claimed that UKR army will be destroyed in Donbass region and Luhansk with Donbass territory will be freed. In reality RU managed to free only a minor part of Luhansk region, almost nothing in Donetsk (just some tactical gains, mostly village and no cities except Popasna. But Popasna assault started in March long before second phase. And Volnovakha was freed in 1 phase).
• According to approximate best-case calculation - only 1/3 of what was planned was freed. On other hand UKR forced RU to fight battles that were advantageous to UKR - defensive battles based on prepared echeloned defensive positions conducted by most experienced UKR troops. [Girkin is upset that RU generals acted like brainless rams hitting prepared UKR brick walls instead of hitting where UKR is weakest]. Concludes that UKR forces conducted not very successful (even unsuccessful) defensive battle but manage to achieve some objectives - they preserved majority of frontline (from Ugledar till Avdeevka). They failed only at the Northern flank but not catastrophically. No formations of Battalion or bigger were destroyed completely. All 6 brigades managed to retreat to the next defensive line despite serious losses and losses of all vehicles [questionable claim - RU struggling to produce video/photo of UKR serios vehicle losses]
• Result of Second phase cannot be compared even to Mariupol battle (where all defenders were either killed to taken POW)
• [His contradictory statements about UKR defeat/UKR achieving its goals is probably because he cannot publicly admit serious UKR success. As I understood he got warning for his defeatist talks]
• UKR used a lot of TD units to close gaps. Those units suffered significant losses.
• 7/8 of UKR army did not participate in Severodonetsk-Lisichansk battle
• UKR did what Grikin did in 2014 - he saved his people by retreating from Slavyansk and was able to hold the rest of territory.
• For 2 months UKR army retreated 30-40-50 km max in best [for RU] cases. If UKR retreats like this till Kiev this will be a long war.  

 

Quote

Current situation overview

• After 4 months of war there is parity in many frontline areas and the enemy is superior in some (including artillery and tanks but he did not want to specify).
• UKR still have reserves - they have not thrown all units into the battle yet.
• Girkin expects UKR to put them in battle shortly.
• At Ugledar RU was pushed somewhat by UKR. But this direction is not critical. It is stabilized. Frontline is static again. It is unlikely anything will happen there next.
• RU army cannot deploy all vehicles to UKR as it has to keep reserve in case of NATO attack.
• Assessed UKR is having no less than 500,000 men in armed forces and only 200,000-300,000 at the front.
• RU navy is not able to make amphibious operation in the mouth of Danube given UKR forces put antiship missiles in Odessa.
• Explained that to defend Odessa UKR held 3 brigades +serious artillery and aviation forces. So, the decision was made to land in Berdyanks.
• RU have some reserves as rotation is happening (slowly)
• Mobiks morale is degrading slowly as RU command does not care about them (no rotation)

 

Quote

Expectations

• RU forces cannot free Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Karachun without replenishing and reinforcing. The defense of Slavyansk-Kramatorsk is much stronger than Severodonetsk. It will be difficult, and losses will be huge. It would take 2-3 months to take. RU Severodonetsk group suffered to many losses of men and vehicles, majority of ammo as expended. On other hand capture of Slovyansk-Kramatorsk does not solve anything [means it will not allow RU to finish war quickly]
•  Girkin do not expect any RU serios losses anywhere. Reasons are: UKR army is not as good as they say (heavy RU artillery strikes cause serious UKR motivation issues) and RU aviation still able to inflict serios losses to UKR forces in case of deep penetration. Still UKR forces are able to push somewhat RU forces and inflict serious losses.  However, he holds no opinion where (Kherson, Belgorod, or other weak point such as Zaporoje: direction Gulya Pole-Pologi-Vasielevka) UKR will try to advance.
• Expect RU will hold Kherson till the end.
• Girkin does not fear UKR breakthrough and RU army collapse but long war/WW1 meat grinder. He says long war is dangerous because RU economy will break, RU population will stop supporting the war because they do not really understand why RU started the war, production will stop, sanction will complete the job [of RU economy collapse].
• Say overall situation is not good because NATO forces are being increased, Sweden and Finland armies are in NATO now, RU stuck in Syria against Erdogan, potentially RU has front against Talibs, supposedly friendly Kazakhstan is switching sides, in Far East there are problems with Japanese.         
• RU cannot be on defensive. It must hold initiative otherwise UKR NATO artillery will destroy RU position piece by piece while being out of RU artillery range. RU aviation cannot deal with it due to UKR AD. [I believe that while on paper RU arty has comparable range, the dispersion at max range make is much less effective than NATO arty for CB] 
• Says that RU gov is in a difficult position because it must cover with AD all RU border cities (it is not possible) while UKR gov needs to cover only Kiev and places where new units are being trained. [He cannot say it, but issue is UKR gov does not lie to UKR citizens about UKR AD capabilities, while RU gov does lie constantly. As result RU population expects from RU gov that no cities will be hit]. So, RU gov has to order RU army to advance somewhere to take the heat from RU cities.
• Girkin does not see any conflict among Western countries. He does not believe western support of UKR will decrease.
• Girkin does not believe that UKR army will collapse soon [RU propaganda meme - UKR army is about to collapse]
• Claims UKR is increasing forces at Kharkov front.
• Says if nothing is done RU front can collapse in half year.
• RU cannot create numerically superior force in UKR. RU tried to win using superior technology but due to Western help UKR technology is already superior in many areas. As soon as West supply antimissile weapons RU Caliber missiles will be much less useful.
• RU economy for sure will not last even 5 years of war.
• In the best case RU is capable of following without mobilization - unlikely to reach Dnieper and take Dnepro. Maximum is one of the following with max concentration and effort: 1) Taking Nikolaev 2) Push UKR out of Donbass 3) Capture Kharkiv. 

 

Quote

RU incompetence and corruption

• Calling for Military Tribunal for incompetent RU generals for the current conduct of war.
• Angrily jokes that covers for T-62 [absent on recent videos] were sold and money was used to get drunk, and no new covers were provided.
• Tells an example - according to his contact one LDNR mobilized battalion has commo nets (because of volunteer supplier) but next to it RU regular battalion has neither camo nets nor field kitchens.
• While RU Army in 1st phase was able to take huge territories, in the 2nd phase it manages to take only insignificant amount of territory.
• RU command could not realize significant RU superiority of over UKR. That lead to static [WW1 style] war
• Current RU gov war support activity is unacceptably slow
• Currently RU military is forming new battalions but to defeat UKR RU needs to form Corps simultaneously replenishing current losses. But it is not possible without mobilization.
• Comments on poor RU state of maskirovka. Says to hide from NATO ISR RU needs to use weather to organize movement of big units (implying that it needs to be combined with other methods of maskirovka and EW interference).
• Comment that current RU gov policy of hiding failures is counter productive and does not work.
• Claim there are a lot of UKR agents still in LDNR. Claim they are using the available UKR mobile network (saying it is not suppressed, implying it is kind of secret agreement-conspiracy staff).
• Says current RU political Elite is much worse than USSR political elite. [Agree - USSR Party clan was just dumb, current one is both dumb and corrupt] [context is Current elite will make collapse scenario much worse than it was with USSR]
• Rants about RuU unable to destroy UKR infrastructure [being RU grunt Girkin has inflated expectation of what RU aviation/missiles systems can do]
• Rants that due to Putin geopolitical projects RU supplied a lot of weapons/vehicles to foreign customers without getting anything useful back.
• Middle level officers swear when talking about RU high command
• Very few cases when RU high command is competent
• Lack of initiative and responsibility is the main problem of RU army [It is not an accident. It is built in feature of RU Army because it is easier to control them]
• RU command made a mistake claiming Snake Island is important. After that it could not backpedal and so was forced to try to fortify it.
• Believes Putin is not getting real information from frontlines due to lack of Putin actions against Shoigu and other generals.

 

[Haiduk]

777 destroyed positions of Russian Nona-K platoon and probably local ammunition dump in border village Hoptivka, Kharkiv oblast (22 m north from Kahrkiv). Huge fireball at the end. 

 

Edited July 11, 2022 by Haiduk

[panzermartin]

4 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

777 destroyed positions of Russian Nona-K platoon and probably local ammunition dump in border village Hoptivka, Kharkiv oblast (22 m north from Kahrkiv). Huge fireball at the end. 

 

Are Ukrainians happy with the 777 so far? I've read conflicting reports that a lot of are out of action at the moment due to wear, maintenance, or enemy fire. The latter its hard to confirm as there are non existent visual clues and the russian videos are of bad quality. 

[AlsatianFelix]

Interesting article for its context. Donbas front. Friction between Ukrainian Greek Catholics and Russian Orthodox civilians. Most of the people remaining in this front line town are the latter and eager for the Russian Army to arrive. This conflict playing out in every village will be a factor in how "easy" it will be to settle the borders at the end of this. Also explains Ru's ethnic cleansing operations.

A Ukrainian priest splits Sundays between church and the front lines

[photon]

One thing that's been eyebrow raising to me is the nadir angle of so many of the drone videos - it looks like at least some of the drones are flying right over the things they're recording at relatively low altitudes. There are certainly some low-angle obliques, which makes sense to me. It looks like the nadir shots are often recon/targeting, and the low-angle shots are BDA?

And the people whom the drone sees often don't respond in the way I'd expect (getting out of the way of the likely soon incoming rounds). Which suggests that not only do they not have effective anti-drone weapons, but they don't have a system to detect when they're being observed by drones *flying right over them*.

German submarines suffered because our centimetric radar was invisible to German radar-detectors, a problem they never really solved. I wonder what systems to detect drone-based observation would look like? Even if you can't shoot the drones down reliably, knowing when you're being observed would be valuable I'd think?