How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

This tracks pretty much what we have been seeing.  This is not so much an in the field problem for the Russians right now, as it is a Force Generation problem.  Most militaries would need months, maybe years to re-set from the war so far, Russia does not have that kind of time.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9

If they send in those ad hoc restructured units or totally Green untrained ones, they are simply going to kill them faster.  Further skill sets like logistics planning and execution are even harder to replace, let alone engineering and gunnery.

All without Joint integration (something a military does not do overnight either) or operational pre-conditions.  

[sross112]

There was a lot of talk earlier about computer chips and them being a major stumbling block for Russian manufacturing of armament. Can computer chips be repurposed? Would a chip out of my F150 be usable or be able to be made usable for a weapon system of some sort? Just wondering if they would be able to cannibalize other existing stuff to fuel their production short term.

[LongLeftFlank]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I really like this guy but on this one I have to diverge on his analysis somewhat.  I think he has got a lot right in this video.  I do disagree on his assessment of the Russian military around the 30 min mark but that is because I do not think he fully sees the distance that it needs to go to "re-tool" in order to fight the war it is in, due in large part to how Ukraine is prosecuting it...but we can save that for another day and frankly Steve has already covered a lot of this.

I will say that I totally agree with his caveats and cautions going into this sort of discussion on "who is winning".  However, Perun is employing technical metrics largely based on strength and their application in achieving stated political objectives but misses the realities of a "collision in motion".  As I noted, political objectives can shift (they did) based on will to sacrifice and desired end state, this is the continual negotiation I was speaking of.  When a war ends, people can argue forever (and will) who won based on the sorts of political objectives lens Perun is employing; however, in the middle of it one needs a somewhat more nuanced set of metrics, in my opinion.  For argument sake I will present four that I teach:

Options, Decisions, Power (Will, Strength, Relationships), Negotiating Position.

Options.  There has not been a war in history that I can think of where the losing sides options compressed, eventually to a single one - loss, and the winning sides options were either sustained or expanded.  Pick a war, any war and trace the strategic options spaces of each side and you will see this trend.  In this one, again "in motion", it looks very much like Russian strategic options have continued to collapse, to the point they had to re-write political objectives, while Ukraine has sustained and in many cases expanded theirs particularly in the form of further mobilization, offensive action, an ability to hit Russian SLOCs and even prosecute targets within Russia (allegedly).  Strategically Ukraine is options healthy, it can give ground and then re-take it.  Politically, they have already begun to re-design what security guarantees mean: all healthy options.  Russia has been the inverse on almost every option space metric.  So what?  Well unless Russia can regain strategic options spaces while compressing Ukrainian ones, this war is not going in their favour.

Decisions.  So far there have been, by my count, 3-4 strategic decisions made in this war so far.  1) The quick 72 war - decided very quickly against Russia, 2) The move to besieging Kyiv and major urban centers -and with the exception of Mariupol pretty much has failed, 3) The collapse of the Russian Northern front - a decisive withdrawal that many were somewhat skeptically waiting for, and 4) The decisive proof of Russian war crimes in re-captured areas - changed the tenor and nature of this fight, including its end-states while galvanizing western support.   None of these have gone in Russia's favor.  This is not to say Russia cannot achieve a decisive outcome in the future but in war you live with the decisions of the past and at least so far they are not pointing to Russian "winning".

Power.  A very complex piece that encompasses a lot of components.  Most focus on Strength - the ability to communicate effects but I will focus on Will and Relationships.  Here Ukraine has the upper hand significantly and the trend is accelerating - time is on the Ukrainian side with respect to Will and Relationships.  Ukrainian Will has further steeled in the last 40 days while Russian Will is stressed.  Relationships do not need much elaboration but it is easy to see Russia's relationship position in comparison to Ukraine.  The reality is that one can have enormous Strength but if you do not have the Will or Relationships to bring it to bear that Strength is worth much less. When it comes to Power, I am arguing that Ukrainian power relevant and employable in this war is rising while Russia's is waning.

Negotiating Position.  This one is kind of a summary of all of the above.  Who has the stronger negotiation position both internally (ie. with itself) and externally?   Negotiation position is reliant on Power but it is also highly effected by Options and Decisions.  I would argue that right now Ukraine has the stringer position.  There are indications of this in how Ukraine's negotiation narrative has changed with Russia and how the tenor within Ukraine itself amongst the population has changed.  Russia's position is again the inverse, its negotiating position continues to weaken both externally through violence and threat of violence and, more importantly, internally - hence why all the lies.

So when I look at all four metrics, to my eyes this war is not going in Russia's direction.  These are the things it needs to be "winning" at in order to achieve its objectives (i.e. The Means) and it is not at least as far as I can see.  This does not mean that this thing is hard-wired but it points to a position where Russia must climb an ever increasingly steep hill while Ukraine need only stand on top of it.

Many thanks for this.

This framework -- or having  a framework -- is more than just an academic exercise. 

...I notice a lot of the more prolific folks here making a lot of increasingly strident 'What Now Must We Do?' statements, usually beating drums for full on Western/NATO intervention, or uparming Ukraine with 'strategic' weapons like antiship missiles. With each atrocity bringing a higher wave of 'Ya see? Ya see???!!!!' confirmation bias.

At the hard end of Certainty on here, we have the We [White] Men of the Civilised West MUST Unite Now To [Repel? Neutralize? Civilise? Exterminate?] These Mongrelized Asiatic Hordes line.  Which carries its own implications and limitations: no compromise with the Orcs who are only mindless animals, take revenge, cleanse out the traitors among us, raze Moscow! And then on to Beijing! (scroll up a few posts)

Which preemptively removes a lot of rather more actionable options from the table. And also limits the space for those umm-we-aren't-in-fact-Orcs Russians who might otherwise be pushing a 'Make peace, you fools!' solution at home (a few of them tried to speak up here and got angrily slapped down).  Well if they're just all storybook Orcs, who cares? but if they *can* precipitate a withdrawal without a 2 year stalemate and 25,000 Ukrainian dead, then...

Short of that, you also have the 'Balkan interventionist' line -- we must halt the killing at once, even if it means leaving the existing lines and injustices in place (not 'finishing the Job, whatever 'the Job' was).

And then you get the War Is Hell attrition line, best captured by Steve's early comment that ultimately all the Ukrainians must do in the end to prevail is to keep killing Russians, which will eventually precipitate a collapse and withdrawal. 'Eventually' being an evolving term, of course.

Anyway, sorry if this sounds incoherent, I'm just dashing it off. But what's important is to reflect on what courses of action one's Certainties and self evident truths are taking off the table. The opportunity cost, as it were.

[chris talpas]

Putting aside Boris Johnson’s own political motives, I think his appearance strolling the streets of Kyiv with President Zelensky projected a powerful message of strength and courage.  This beacon of hope, Kyiv, which fiercely resisted and drove back the dark forces of Sauron, is being shown to the world as still being free.

But the flame of freedom needs to remain fuelled; I’m glad the Zelensky was not left empty handed.  I thank the Peoples of the UK for their support of Ukraine.

It is fitting for the Brit’s to up the aid ante by now offering the means to project counter sea-denial operations.  No longer will the Russians operate on the Black Sea with impunity!

This expands their ability to cause Ivan some pain.  Not only Russia’s naval forces but couldn’t merchant traffic even be called fair game.

Fitting too that it be done by a NATO member with their own sovereign nuclear force.

The frog continues to slowly boil.

 

[dan/california]

At the hard end of Certainty on here, we have the We [White] Men of the Civilised West MUST Unite Now To [Repel? Neutralize? Civilise? Exterminate?] These Mongrelized Asiatic Hordes line.  Which carries its own implications and limitations: no compromise with the Orcs who are only mindless animals, take revenge, cleanse out the traitors among us, raze Moscow! And then on to Beijing! (scroll up a few posts)

 

I never said on on to Beijing, I said we make it clear to Beijing that taking Taiwan is going to be too costly to even think about. The rest of it is almost right, but only applies to the Russians in Ukraine, and maybe Belarus if we can kick off a real rebellion there, too. I concede the current regime, or one that it is direct descendant is probably running Moscow for the foreseeable future. I just want that regime to spend the next fifty years thinking large scale military activity in Europe is a TRULY awful idea. We have tried tolerant engagement with Russia. Anybody think is has worked out well?

[chris talpas]

Ironic that I was composing my prior post while Longleftflank did his.  

[LongLeftFlank]

4 minutes ago, chris talpas said:

Ironic that I was composing my prior post while Longleftflank did his.  

Hey, I think the symbolism is great, and the Russian invaders are indeed evil in case anyone misconstrues me as apologising for them.

But I guess I'm saying, we also need to consider what's achievable in terms of 'compeling the enemy to fulfil our will' vs. our ideals (Certainties).

[dan/california]

 We have tried tolerant engagement with Russia. Anybody think is has worked out well?

There are huge cost to kicking Moscow out of the civilized world ,oil and gas are not the only resources where Russia has become a huge portion of the world supply. We are looking at more defense spending, and less economic efficiency, for as far as the eye can see. The Russian people are going to suffer real deprivation and greatly diminished horizons for generations. All of this is awful. I am simply stating that Ukraine II in five years, With Warsaw flattened, and an order of magnitude worse refugee problem than the one we have now would be worse.

[G.I. Joe]

11 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Many thanks for this.

This framework -- or having  a framework -- is more than just an academic exercise. 

...I notice a lot of the more prolific folks here making a lot of increasingly strident 'What Now Must We Do?' statements, usually beating drums for full on Western/NATO intervention, or uparming Ukraine with 'strategic' weapons like antiship missiles. With each atrocity bringing a higher wave of 'Ya see? Ya see???!!!!' confirmation bias.

At the hard end of Certainty on here, we have the We [White] Men of the Civilised West MUST Unite Now To [Repel? Neutralize? Civilise? Exterminate?] These Mongrelized Asiatic Hordes line.  Which carries its own implications and limitations: no compromise with the Orcs who are only mindless animals, take revenge, cleanse out the traitors among us, raze Moscow! And then on to Beijing! (scroll up a few posts)

Which preemptively removes a lot of rather more actionable options from the table. And also limits the space for those umm-we-aren't-in-fact-Orcs Russians who might otherwise be pushing a 'Make peace, you fools!' solution at home (a few of them tried to speak up here and got angrily slapped down).  Well if they're just all storybook Orcs, who cares? but if they *can* precipitate a withdrawal without a 2 year stalemate and 25,000 Ukrainian dead, then...

Short of that, you also have the 'Balkan interventionist' line -- we must halt the killing at once, even if it means leaving the existing lines and injustices in place (not 'finishing the Job, whatever 'the Job' was).

And then you get the War Is Hell attrition line, best captured by Steve's early comment that ultimately all the Ukrainians must do in the end to prevail is to keep killing Russians, which will eventually precipitate a collapse and withdrawal. 'Eventually' being an evolving term, of course.

Anyway, sorry if this sounds incoherent, I'm just dashing it off. But what's important is to reflect on what courses of action one's Certainties and self evident truths are taking off the table. The opportunity cost, as it were.

Voices of reason are always welcome in my books. To clarify my own position, I don't see Harpoons as a "strategic" weapon... they're much shorter ranger than a Tomahawk TASM (Tactical Anti-Ship Missile [emphasis mine]), and I don't see engaging the Black Sea Fleet in or near Ukrainian waters while it's blockading Ukraine's ports as any kind of escalation over and above engaging land forces or air units invading Ukrainian soil or airspace. Sinking a few ships (with the crews hopefully surviving to be POWs for the duration) would definitely put the Ukrainian Navy, which is likely going to have to rebuild more or less from scratch, in a much better strategic position postwar and Ukraine in a stronger negotiating position...

[db_zero]

2 hours ago, chuckdyke said:

Here is an educated Russian I won't have a guess of the level of education of the armed forces.

 

We're in a new world. Putin won't stop till he wins or get offed.

Even if he eventually loses there is going to be serious damage to the global economic system.

On a personal level you better be prepared for higher gas prices, higher food prices, recession, potential loss of job, stock market volatility to name just a few things that are probably going south. This couldn't have happened at a worse time. 

Unless this war stops soon-and I don't see that happening the damage economically and the suffering like starvation and chaos in the less developed world is going to be great, perhaps catastrophic. Even if Ukraine wins, its not going to be quick so the economic damage is something we probably can't avoid.

The absolute worst case...we all know what that is.

Unlike Iraq and Afghanistan where 1% were affected while the other 99% went about their lives unaffected, this war is going to hurt everyone one way or another.

Edited April 10, 2022 by db_zero

[chris talpas]

Want to add my thanks as well for the excellent analysis provided by TheCapt and Steve

[sross112]

5 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Many thanks for this.

This framework -- or having  a framework -- is more than just an academic exercise. 

...I notice a lot of the more prolific folks here making a lot of increasingly strident 'What Now Must We Do?' statements, usually beating drums for full on Western/NATO intervention, or uparming Ukraine with 'strategic' weapons like antiship missiles. With each atrocity bringing a higher wave of 'Ya see? Ya see???!!!!' confirmation bias.

At the hard end of Certainty on here, we have the We [White] Men of the Civilised West MUST Unite Now To [Repel? Neutralize? Civilise? Exterminate?] These Mongrelized Asiatic Hordes line.  Which carries its own implications and limitations: no compromise with the Orcs who are only mindless animals, take revenge, cleanse out the traitors among us, raze Moscow! And then on to Beijing! (scroll up a few posts)

Which preemptively removes a lot of rather more actionable options from the table. And also limits the space for those umm-we-aren't-in-fact-Orcs Russians who might otherwise be pushing a 'Make peace, you fools!' solution at home (a few of them tried to speak up here and got angrily slapped down).  Well if they're just all storybook Orcs, who cares? but if they *can* precipitate a withdrawal without a 2 year stalemate and 25,000 Ukrainian dead, then...

Short of that, you also have the 'Balkan interventionist' line -- we must halt the killing at once, even if it means leaving the existing lines and injustices in place (not 'finishing the Job, whatever 'the Job' was).

And then you get the War Is Hell attrition line, best captured by Steve's early comment that ultimately all the Ukrainians must do in the end to prevail is to keep killing Russians, which will eventually precipitate a collapse and withdrawal. 'Eventually' being an evolving term, of course.

Anyway, sorry if this sounds incoherent, I'm just dashing it off. But what's important is to reflect on what courses of action one's Certainties and self evident truths are taking off the table. The opportunity cost, as it were.

Agree.

I think that direct intervention by any western or European country is the worst thing we could do. Yes, everyone can argue that weapons and aid is direct intervention but I mean by committing our military forces against the RA. As much as I'd like to see a couple ABCTs smash whatever is left of the RA in Ukraine while the RuAF is cleansed from the sky and the RuN is feeding the fishes, it is completely counter productive.

First off, it actually legitimizes and strengthens Putin. He gets to use the "See, I told you the western Nazis were going to attack us!! Unite for the motherland!!" bull. Attacking a country usually generates a negative opinion of the attacker by the attackee (see Ukraine since 2003 for reference). It will solidify their resolve to resist not make them magically depose of their crappy leader. It just makes the problem bigger and last longer.

Second, NATO does not have the manpower to conquer and control Russia. Take the area of Ukraine times about 24 and sprinkle in 4 times the population hating our warriors and trying to kill them. It becomes a worse idea than Putin attacking Ukraine. China (the real threat) would love to see every trained soldier and reservist of the entire free world tangled up in an unending conflict in Russia. Pretty much allows them to do whatever they want to whoever they want whenever they want. And yes, they would feed a Russian resistance high tech weaponry as fast as they could, so would Iran and everyone else around the world that hates us and could. 

The worst part is the faster and more complete we whoop them, the more likely we end the world as we know it. Back Putin into a cave in the Urals and give him nothing to lose and see how long it takes him to push the button. 

Lastly, like said above, it takes all other options off the table for a settlement. We attack and it is to the death, probably of everybody.

So Ukraine sadly needs to win this one on their own. We should give them every bit of material that we can. I don't know why we haven't stripped our National Guard bare and sent every bit of kit we can to them to arm up and protect all the reserves they are mustering. What will make this war last longer than it has to is the lack of equipment for the UA and especially it's reserves. 

By Ukraine fighting this on their own with only material help from the west and winning it they destroy Russia. They destroy the myth of Russia. Russia being beat by a little neighbor not even a third of it's size is going to be really hard to sell to the people, the elite and the army. Best of all, the whole world knows it. Russia becomes a non-entity and the whole world thumbs their nose at them. Most likely their federation would fall apart. If they value strength as much as it seems they do in their mythology, this is the worst thing that can happen to them as a country. 

It's also the best way to negate Putin. He won't be arrested and tried by the Hague, we all know that. It is unlikely that he will be deposed of right away no matter how bad the RA gets beat. But by handing Russia this big defeat it puts into question everything about Russia and Putin. Now he will be too busy internally to be a problem to anyone externally and in the long run will probably be deposed, but I don't think it will come quickly.

[danfrodo]

Whoa, invade Russia?  Attack China?  I certainly am not calling for any of that.  I do want to see NATO drone & air forces attack Russians inside Ukraine -- yeah, that's maybe over the top & irresponsible but at this point this war is so heinous I don't care. 

Only a lunatic would talk of invading Russia.  And only a greater lunatic would talk of invading China.

I also advocated early on military forces from willing countries, w invite of Ukraine, to set up a safe zone for displaced Ukrainians in western Ukraine.  Daring Putin to attack those safe zone forces. 

China may or may not decide to become increasingly aggressive.  China is and the rest of the world are very strongly interdependent economically, so it would be really stupid to push too far.  And Xi or whoever is next hopefully is not as personally empowered as supreme dictator Putin.

[G.I. Joe]

I will also add, echoing some of the concerns that @LongLeftFlank raises, that I personally don't care to talk in terms of "the West" so much as "the Free World:" Japan and South Korea are key players in that framework, Taiwan is the "other Ukraine" we're all concerned about, most of SEA is varying shades of democratic, for all the worrying trends there India is still fundamentally a part of the Free World, many demographic and economic indicators point to Africa being the next Asia (and the continent is already far more democratic than a few decades ago), etc...

[Erwin]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

"...ultimately all the Ukrainians must do in the end to prevail is to keep killing Russians, which will eventually precipitate a collapse and withdrawal."

My concern is that most of the comments we are making sound like a repeat of the errors the Germans made in WW2, as well as we did in Vietnam etc.  It is fatal error to project our own western morals and values onto other nations and cultures.

Re attrition, the Russians have proven in the past their ability to endure losses that the west will not.  If Putin's Russians can exchange one Ukrainian death for several Russians, eventually the Russians will win. Putin himself is essentially like the Al Capone of the world.  Surviving (and flourishing) for decades in a ruthless culture where any weakness will result in destruction means that it would be foolish to assume that Putin is not very well-protected from the dangers of a coup. 

For an example of how that can be accomplished, look at Roman Abramovich.  There was a wonderful picture in the UK press some years ago that showed him walking in a port surrounded by numerous vice-presidents of his companies.  They all looked like the heavily-armed thugs that they almost certainly were.   

Am sure that the people around Putin were given options: 1) You and your family do what I want and you become fabulously wealthy thru stocks options held in my companies. 2) If I die or you betray me, you lose all your stock options, and a hit is taken out on you and all the members of your family - wiping out everyone you love.

For the above reasons, I think it is overly optimistic to think that Putin will be removed, and that it is likely that the Ukraine war will drag on... and on...  until we in the west get fed up.  

The even more dangerous development has been that the Ruble has now returned almost to pre-war levels.  Together with the Chinese and with tacit support from India, the Middle east, Iran etc. a new financial system is being created that will challenge the USD hegemony. 

The Ukrainian war will mot be won by military battles.  As in Vietnam, the Ukrainians may win all the battles, but we are in danger of losing the war.  The fact that to date, AFAIK Germany and maybe other EU nations are STILL paying billions to Russia for oil and gas purchases says a lot about western resolve, or lack thereof.  

.

 

Edited April 10, 2022 by Erwin

[danfrodo]

So again night falls in Ukraine w/o any breakthroughs or dangerous advances by Russia.  And every day it doesn't happen it seems to me less like to happen at all.  UKR bringing in reserves and building defenses in depth I presume.  So RU taking a village or a couple kilometers at heavy cost are probably part of URK game plan.  Stay dispersed, ambush, use depth.

[dan/california]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9

ISW is even more negative on the condition of available Russian forces than what I would loosely describe as the thread consensus. A lot of detail about units just refusing to go back in the fight.

[db_zero]

If Russia didn’t have nukes NATO led by the US would do a 1991 Sadam job on Putin.

If China didn’t have nukes an Xi got out of line the West would just remind Xi what we did to Sadam and Putin.

This is why China is ramping up its nuke arsenal and why the West has been trying so hard to stop Iran.

Back in the day the nuclear club was just limited to 3 players. Now its 9 with more on the way. 

Edited April 10, 2022 by db_zero

[dan/california]

This is hilarious!

[LongLeftFlank]

36 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

So again night falls in Ukraine w/o any breakthroughs or dangerous advances by Russia.  And every day it doesn't happen it seems to me less like to happen at all.  UKR bringing in reserves and building defenses in depth I presume.  So RU taking a village or a couple kilometers at heavy cost are probably part of URK game plan.  Stay dispersed, ambush, use depth.

Well if both sides are able to settle down in place because it turns out (not yet proven btw) that mobile offensive warfare on the steppes is too costly, then I'd say that's basically a 'Russian win' (using a goalpost-shifting Russian definition, remember), even if shelling and raiding continues for some time.

They keep their land corridor, Putin keeps running Russia for the rest of his days.  He and his oligarchs reorient to their new role as China's resource trough, trading their opulent (confiscatable) London and Miami real estate for Hong Kong hi rises. [Kiss the tundra and Arctic ocean biosphere goodbye btw. The Bomb that may kill us all may be clathrates. But I digress]

And if China truly becomes the new Enemy, who knows? Maybe Putin angles to betray them and weasel his way back into the 'Western' tent on his own terms. Uncle Sam has proved more than cynical enough to play such games.

Edited April 10, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[sburke]

10 minutes ago, dan/california said:

This is hilarious!

No country Ray!!

 

[db_zero]

Deleted 

Edited April 10, 2022 by db_zero

[dan/california]

8 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Well if both sides are able to settle down in place because it turns out (not yet proven btw) that mobile offensive warfare on the steppes is too costly, then I'd say that's basically a 'Russian win' (using a goalpost-shifting Russian definition, remember), even if shelling and raiding continues for some time.

They keep their land corridor, Putin keeps running Russia for the rest of his days.  He and his oligarchs reorient to their new role as China's resource trough, trading their opulent (confiscatable) London and Miami real estate for Hong Kong hi rises. [Kiss the tundra and Arctic ocean biosphere goodbye btw. The Bomb that may kill us all may be clathrates. But I digress]

And if China truly becomes the new Enemy, who knows? Maybe Putin angles to betray them and weasel his way back into the 'Western' tent on his own terms. Uncle Sam has proved more than cynical enough to play such games.

Which I why I think a U.S. heavy brigade or two, and every missile and fighter bomber in NATO should adjust the Russians definition of costly.

[db_zero]

10 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Which I why I think a U.S. heavy brigade or two, and every missile and fighter bomber in NATO should adjust the Russians definition of costly.

This approach sends a message to any potential despot that the way to avert NATO/US direct intervention is to possess a nuke.

The days of the post Soviet collapse where the West could go in and use its conventional military might to shape events is gone.

We’re now back in the days Putin is more familiar with. The Cold War days where proxy wars were tightly managed so as to not lead to nuclear annihilation, only this time around the nuclear club has grown.

Win or lose Putin has just re-arranged the game.

 

Edited April 10, 2022 by db_zero

[dan/california]

The Russians are still trying to level Kharkiv, trying fairly hard.