New Book: "Battlegroup!: The Lessons of the Unfought Battles of the Cold War" (Jim Storr)

[Jim Storr]

On 1/7/2022 at 11:58 AM, BeondTheGrave said:

This is something I am a bit interested in for the later Cold War era, the relationship between German Generals, Nazis, and the US Army has always been....... weird. After all we forced many of them to write us histories while they were in prison camps, histories which were pretty influential in how the civilian community has gone on to remember WWII and especially the Eastern Front. From what I've read of both documents and of writing on the subject, the US Army was pretty uncritical when it came to the Nazis. There is even an infamous Military Review article which is very flattering to Joachim Piper and has, as I recall, one line in it about all the bad stuff he did. The interviews with Hermann Balck I linked in that other thread are also interesting, I've always gotten the vibe from reading the interview transcripts that what theyre really saying is that the Russians are incapable of being good soldiers, Germans are inherently good soldiers, etc. Balck also definitely takes the line in his memoir that Berlin and the rear area troops were responsible for the brutality not the troops on the line. Thats not really true (see the work of Omar Bartov who takes down that specific myth). Yet the US Army took those lessons seemingly uncritical and really adopted the German lessons from fighting the Soviets without any comment on all the nasty parts of WWII on the Eastern front. Also no comment on the fact that the Germans lost(!!!) and why that may have been the case. Its interesting stuff.

Back on schedule @marais the Amazon page suggests he has some SHOCKING revelation about the Bundeswehr. Is that just selling fluff or does he seem to have something to say there? Is it just 'the Germans were really good?' Also for those who have read it, where do you think this falls on the memoir to scholarship spectrum? Sometimes you get these guys who do this annoying thing where they want to contribute to bigger questions about a subject, but are too lazy to do more research so they just take their own direct experience and apply it writ large to the whole Army or the whole system. Or just ignore everything they didn't directly engage with. It makes me wary of these kinds of books sometimes. Do you think he does a good job of striking a balance? 

If his big revelation re: the Germans is that 'they had learned lessons from WWII and that made their doctrine good' I hate to break it too him, but the US also did that, both AD & AirLand Battle were directly based off WWII experiences generally, German experiences specifically, and were written in combination with German doctrine. The 1980s HDV 100/100 and FM 100-5 were very similar, and DePuy was PROUD that he had gotten the Germans to rewrite the 1970s version of HDV 100/100 to make it like Active Defense. I wonder how much of 'German doctrine is good!' stems from biases developed during WWII and the 1950s, applied to the 1970s & 80s. My own work looks to conclusively show that German and American doctrine werent all that different in theory, and were written jointly together at multiple levels. So why would someone like Storr rate the US and Germany differently, as often happens? (I dont want this to sound rotely nationalistic, but rather why the Germans get elevated so highly) Is it that their WWII experiences look good and carried their reputation through the Cold War? Or that they were still doing something nobody else was? If there were I havn't figured it out. 

This issue is explored a considerable length in 'Battlegroup!'  I find it strange that nobody so far in this blog has mentioned the relevance of the Middledorf books, both in terms of their content and the impact they had on the Bundeswehr.  

So, Am I 'too lazy to do more research'?  Well, I translated both of the Middeldorf books into English (which has never been done before).  That's well over 600 pages of technical, military German.  

As for 'hating to break it to me':  If the commentator had read the book he would find that I was well aware of the German influence on DePuy and Starry.  But the impact of the Wehrmacht on the Bundeswehr, via Middeldorf and his colleagues, predates that by two decades.  

Yours sincerely,  

Jim Storr 

[BeondTheGrave]

15 minutes ago, Jim Storr said:

This issue is explored a considerable length in 'Battlegroup!'  I find it strange that nobody so far in this blog has mentioned the relevance of the Middledorf books, both in terms of their content and the impact they had on the Bundeswehr.  

So, Am I 'too lazy to do more research'?  Well, I translated both of the Middeldorf books into English (which has never been done before).  That's well over 600 pages of technical, military German.  

As for 'hating to break it to me':  If the commentator had read the book he would find that I was well aware of the German influence on DePuy and Starry.  But the impact of the Wehrmacht on the Bundeswehr, via Middeldorf and his colleagues, predates that by two decades.  

Yours sincerely,  

Jim Storr 

As I havn't read the book I cant comment on what youre really saying in it, and as I said in my own comment perhaps youre making a more nuanced argument to which I am currently unaware. So if nothing else, the recommendation of another user sold you a copy. Thats more than I've ever sold! Congrats. The influence of the German army on the rest of NATO and the US is something I am keenly interested in, as are the connections between the Wehrmacht and NATO as its laundered through the Bundeswehr. Middeldorf isn't a name that has come up much in what I have read, but its well known that Wehrmacht generals like Adolf Heusinger helped form the Bundeswehr and former Wehrmacht soldiers filled its ranks. If your book contributes to this conversation then I look forward to reading it. Though it was my understanding your book focused on the 1970s and 1980s. Are you trying to establish in your book a direct connection to the late-Cold War Bundeswehr, and thus the rest of NATO, as well? 

We live in an exciting time. At least in the US, millions of pages of documents are becoming available for the first time that will let us settle important questions about the construction and planning for the late-Cold War Army. A similar process is happening in Germany, and if I had to guess most of the rest of NATO as well.  In ten years the field probably wont look anything like it does today.

[The_Capt]

On 1/10/2022 at 4:17 AM, Jim Storr said:

I'm delighted to see that Battlegroup! is being discussed on this forum.  

I would ask that people actually take the time to read the book before commenting. It took me over a year to write.  Is it too much to ask that people take a couple of days to read and consider it before rushing on line with a critique?  

It is astonishing to see books criticized largely on the bibliography.  Regarding (for example) Soviet military art and theory.  I was taught it extensively through four levels of professional military education.  A glance at my bookshelves shows 7 related books that aren't in the bibliography.  Is this really a justified criticism?  Would you want me to list every book that I've ever read?   

Similarly for the suggestion that I haven't written many books (and that therefore 'Battlegroup!' may not be very good).  Is that mistaking quantity for quality? 

There are some really substantive and novel issues in 'Battlegroup!'.  I am saddened to see that they have not yet been addressed here.  But exactly the same happened for 'The Hall of Mirrors', and even 'King Arthur's Wars'.  

Yours sincerely 

Jim Storr

Hey Jim,

  Welcome, and you have my sympathies, trust me.  These are a good bunch for the most part but like any bar there is always a few "guys" who just gotta be.  So have you tried CMCW by any chance?  

[Sgt.Squarehead]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So have you tried CMCW by any chance?  

That's the burning question really. 

[Jim Storr]

18 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Hey Jim,

  Welcome, and you have my sympathies, trust me.  These are a good bunch for the most part but like any bar there is always a few "guys" who just gotta be.  So have you tried CMCW by any chance?  

Thank you for the welcome. No, I haven't tried CMCW.  

Best wishes 

Jim Storr

[Jim Storr]

13 hours ago, Sgt.Squarehead said:

That's the burning question really. 

Interesting.  May I ask why?  

Best wishes 

Jim Storr

[Jim Storr]

19 hours ago, BeondTheGrave said:

As I havn't read the book I cant comment on what youre really saying in it, and as I said in my own comment perhaps youre making a more nuanced argument to which I am currently unaware. So if nothing else, the recommendation of another user sold you a copy. Thats more than I've ever sold! Congrats. The influence of the German army on the rest of NATO and the US is something I am keenly interested in, as are the connections between the Wehrmacht and NATO as its laundered through the Bundeswehr. Middeldorf isn't a name that has come up much in what I have read, but its well known that Wehrmacht generals like Adolf Heusinger helped form the Bundeswehr and former Wehrmacht soldiers filled its ranks. If your book contributes to this conversation then I look forward to reading it. Though it was my understanding your book focused on the 1970s and 1980s. Are you trying to establish in your book a direct connection to the late-Cold War Bundeswehr, and thus the rest of NATO, as well? 

We live in an exciting time. At least in the US, millions of pages of documents are becoming available for the first time that will let us settle important questions about the construction and planning for the late-Cold War Army. A similar process is happening in Germany, and if I had to guess most of the rest of NATO as well.  In ten years the field probably wont look anything like it does today.

Thank you for the observation.  In brief, Lt Col Eike Middeldorf was responsible for 'lessons learnt' in the German Army High Command (OKH) in 1944-5.  Heusinger commissioned him to assemble a panel (of six others) who wrote the definitive work on what the Wehrmacht learnt fighting the Red Army.  It was published as 'Taktik im Russlandfeldzug' ('Tactics in the Russian Campaign') in German in January 1956, with a foreword by Heusinger.  A very slightly revised second edition was published in July 1957.  I think it was translated into Russian.  I am fairly sure it was translated into Swedish.  I am fairly sure it was never translated and published into English.  

Middeldorf then went on to write 'Handbuch der Taktik' ('Handbook of Tactics'), published in July 1957.  It is clearly based on 'Taktik im Russlandfeldzug'.  Some of the passages are identical; some are very similar.  Colleagues tell me that it was used as the standard text by the Bundeswehr until it could write and publish its own pamphlets.  Bundeswehr officers trained in the 1970s recognized parts of it as being similar, if not identical, to what they were taught  (that is, 20 years later).  

Understandably, 'Battlegroup' relies heavily on the Middeldorf books.  

I hope that helps.  Yours sincerely, 

Jim Storr

[dbsapp]

It would be interesting to read.

16 minutes ago, Jim Storr said:

Heusinger

[Aragorn2002]

22 minutes ago, dbsapp said:

It would be interesting to read.

Both Heusinger and Speidel probably worked for the western Allies, hence their reward after the war.

[domfluff]

1 hour ago, Jim Storr said:

Interesting.  May I ask why?  

Best wishes 

Jim Storr

The_Capt is one of the project leads on Combat Mission Cold War, which is clearly directly relevant to your book.

[Jim Storr]

39 minutes ago, domfluff said:

The_Capt is one of the project leads on Combat Mission Cold War, which is clearly directly relevant to your book.

Thank you.  

Jim Storr

[domfluff]

Oh, and on the subject of tabletop wargaming being "just two guys with some dice".

I haven't read the book yet, but I understand that the rules being discussed were the WRG modern rules (1950-1985, presumably).

Since that underlying ruleset was the basis for the US Dunn Kempf ruleset, and the Canadian "Contact!" rules of the period, both used for professional training and experimentation, I don't think it's reasonable to dismiss them out of hand.

http://www.wargaming.co/professional/details/contact.htm
http://www.wargaming.co/professional/details/dunnkempf.htm

Is wargaming a tool that needs to be handled carefully when making assumptions or conducting analysis? Sure, but it's clearly a useful and relevant tool.

[sawomi]

57 minutes ago, domfluff said:

Is wargaming a tool ...? Sure...

-> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kriegsspiel

[chuckdyke]

These NATO Generals Had Unusual Backgrounds: They Served in the Third Reich (historynet.com)

 

 

[dbsapp]

35 minutes ago, sawomi said:

-> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kriegsspiel

That's intresting, I've always wondered how those wargames looked like. 

Sounds like D&D! (though I never played it)

[domfluff]

2 minutes ago, dbsapp said:

That's intresting, I've always wondered how those wargames looked like. 

Sounds like D&D! (though I never played it)

Interestingly, there's been two schools of thought on Kriegspiel since pretty much the beginning. One is a more regimented, rules-based approach, with tables and measurement, and the other a more freeform, adjudicated version - rules-light, but using an arbiter to allow for much greater freedom of action.

Free Kriegspiel is in many ways the progenitor of roleplaying games, and certainly of the Engel Matrix games used for professional modelling.

[Jim Storr]

1 hour ago, domfluff said:

Oh, and on the subject of tabletop wargaming being "just two guys with some dice".

I haven't read the book yet, but I understand that the rules being discussed were the WRG modern rules (1950-1985, presumably).

Since that underlying ruleset was the basis for the US Dunn Kempf ruleset, and the Canadian "Contact!" rules of the period, both used for professional training and experimentation, I don't think it's reasonable to dismiss them out of hand.

http://www.wargaming.co/professional/details/contact.htm
http://www.wargaming.co/professional/details/dunnkempf.htm

Is wargaming a tool that needs to be handled carefully when making assumptions or conducting analysis? Sure, but it's clearly a useful and relevant tool.

Thank you.  Pages 69-71 and 286 of 'Battlegroup!' refer.  

In the context of the book, wargaming can be seen as just one of many tools of military operations research.  As a soldier I worked in that field for several years.  

Yours sincerely

Jim Storr

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, domfluff said:

Is wargaming a tool that needs to be handled carefully when making assumptions or conducting analysis? Sure, but it's clearly a useful and relevant tool.

So wargaming and the military have a long and weird relationship.  It has been employed as a training tool, operational research and simulation tool, staff operational planning tool and a predictive analytical tool (to a lesser extent so far).

I say weird because in just about every one of these roles wargaming has had it proponents and its detractors.  The proponents tend to be in the objectivist school where warfare can be broken down into its core components and scientific theory can be applied to give hi resolution results.  The other camp is the subjectivist school where warfare is a human artistic venture that can never be distilled down to a core ruleset and as such wargaming is a useful tool at best and distraction at worst (this crowd also tend to be in charge and very often ignore wargame results when it counters their own instincts - the history of war is littered with cautionary tales here).

So what? Well most western militaries have accepted an uneasy truce with simulation/gaming.  They are willing to invest in training as the cost savings and accuracy of what it can do here has been well proven (someone ask @Bil Hardenberger).  They are willing to accept operational research...to a point as whenever one is talking about military capability and it value OR will only go so far.  Militaries are closed cultures with sacred norms (seriously, get in a discussion about the future of tanks with and army guy) so OR will always be taken with a grain of salt. 

On operations we have the crux of the matter.  The Operational Planning Process has a wargame stage embedded within it but it is more of a staff check to acid wash COAs and pull out key deductions as opposed to predictive analytics. One day, it is likely that predictive analytics will be employed on operations as they are happening but first they will need to be of much higher resolution than what we see now and then they will have to actually demonstrate competitive advantage.  Once that happens we are at the edge of Enders Game, thing is most contemporary professional military thinkers have a sense that it will happen, the major question is "when?".  

[Sgt.Squarehead]

7 hours ago, Jim Storr said:

Interesting.  May I ask why?

Errrr.....Because this is a CM forum, maybe? 

[Jim Storr]

2 hours ago, Sgt.Squarehead said:

Errrr.....Because this is a CM forum, maybe? 

Well, you're right; of course it is.  But it's also an online forum where some people choose to criticize books they haven't read.  And, as this thread now seems to show, reading 'Battlegroup!' might be useful for CMCW gamers.  

Sincerely,  

Jim Storr

[Sgt.Squarehead]

6 minutes ago, Jim Storr said:

And, as this thread now seems to show, reading 'Battlegroup!' might be useful for CMCW gamers.

I'll let you know, once I've read it. 

[Jim Storr]

18 hours ago, Sgt.Squarehead said:

I'll let you know, once I've read it. 

Thanks.  I shall look forward to it.  You might be interested in the following  review from The Wavell Room (#WavellReviews 'Battlegroup!' by Jim Storr » Wavell Room) .  there is also a shorter piece by 'JWH' at Battlegroup!: The Lessons of the Unfought Battles of the Cold War: Amazon.co.uk: Storr, Jim: 9781914059964: Books.  

 

Best wishes 

Jim Storr

Review of ‘Battlegroup’ on The Wavell Room.

Jim Storr is back.  Battlegroup! examines the tactical level of the Cold War and asks what we can learn from the unfought battles of Eastern Europe.  If you’ve read any of Storr’s work before, you’ll know what to expect.  For those of you who haven’t, Storr has a relentless focus on evidence and ‘warfare’; how battles are fought.  In the book’s forward, General Sir James Everard comments on Storrs ‘meticulous detail’ and this rings true throughout his analysis.  Battlegroup! isn’t a generalist look at ‘war’.  It is an analysis of fighting.  

Battlegroup! is split into four major sections which contain interlocking arguments.  Section one looks at the strategic and operational setting of the 1980s Cold War.  Storr details the armies and how they were shaped.  Section two examines the components of land forces, how they are organised, and how they wanted to fight.  Section three looks at battlegroup tactics and draws conclusions about what might have happened.  The last section draws the themes together to look at what lessons might be drawn.  

The bottom line up front of this review is that any serious land professional must read Battlegroup!  Storr forces a reader to think about the mechanics of warfare differently, to consider evidence, what doctrine really means, and why things are the way they are.  As Storr says in his introduction, whilst lots has been written about the Cold War, very little has been written about how a battle would have been fought.  Battlegroup! fills this gap offering tactical insights.  It’s a brilliant book.

Sources and methodology

Storr’s range of doctrine, primary sources, and experience adds credibility to Battlegroup!  He leans heavily on German Second World War writing.  The two most commonly cited books are Tactics of the Russian Campaign and Handbook of Tactics with Lieutenant Colonel Eike Middeldorf as the lead writer.  These two texts focus on German tactics against the Soviet Union.  Storr identifies that the Wehemact had, and the Bundesweht inherited, a ‘far deeper and more perceptive understanding of tactics than the Western Allies’.   By this, he really means that the Germans actually study tactics.  That deduction alone should send alarm bells across modern doctrine writers. 

It would be easy (lazy, perhaps) to critique Storr for being too dependent on these Second World War insights, but he doesn’t shy away from updating or disagreeing with different doctrinal ideas.  Reading these views takes an English speaking reader away from their traditional comfort zones offering different insights. 

Secondly, Storr relies heavily on wargaming.  In describing his approach he lays out arguments both for and against wargaming.  He concludes that it must be done seriously to have any value.  He then describes his personal experience of 202 battle war games played over 30 years and the deductions they generated.  These games were generally up to battlegroup level and underpin Storr’s analysis of wider sources.  A secondary theme throughout Battlegroup! is a reminder of just how powerful wargaming is in generating professional knowledge.  A purest academic might discount wargaming, and Storr’s own military experience, as undermining his assessment of the evidence.  Whilst it’s impossible to verify his gaming, his personal experiences and ability to bring the deductions to life add a ring of credibility when he draws his more cutting deductions.  After all, the battles Storr is analysing never happened.  

Truth grenades 

To give you a feel for how these strands fall together, let’s consider infantry fighting vehicles.  Any British Army soldier will have a view on the utility of turreted and tracked vehicles.  The cancellation of the British Army’s Warrior fighting vehicle in 2021 has made the modern debate somewhat emotional.  Storr’s conclusion, however, is that they ‘are a bad idea’.  They would get infantrymen killed for ‘little or no gain’.  Storr is quick to accept that many find them ‘useful’ but points out that no modern soldier has had to attack even a moderately well prepared defensive position in them.  Looking at infantry fighting vehicles in the defensive, Storr concludes that they are ‘hostage to fortune’.  Whilst cannon and anti tank missiles are effective, they just aren’t when mounted on infantry fighting vehicles.  In this example he draws together wargaming and practical experience to challenge any bias you might have.  

Battlegroup! doesn’t, however, only focus on combat arms.  There is a significant amount of detail on engineering, logistics, medical, and other supporting arms.  A more traditional analysis of Cold War combat looks at headline equipment capabilities.  Storrs dives into the detail about fuel and ammunition consumption.  For example, German Leopard 2 tanks consume 58% less fuel than American Abrams.  What are the battlefield consequences of that for the size of a division?  Have you ever stopped to consider the cost of this in peacetime and how the savings may be better spent?  Storr does.  In another fresh twist, he also considers how delays in providing combat replacement soldiers affects combat and creates inefficiencies in battlegroups.  It’s impressively deep and comprehensive.  

Storr also draws different conclusions about the use of close air support.  A contemporary NATO officer is likely to believe in the utility of close air support and that air mobility operations won’t work against peer opponents.  His combination of German doctrine and wargaming draws him to the conclusion that ‘air attack has often been dramatic but ineffective… it has limited effect on battlegroup operations’.  This is a conclusion that many readers will disagree with; but as mentioned above, Storr’s logic will pull apart your beliefs with no sympathy for them.  Believers in air mobility are likely to be triggered by Storr’s assessments in their utility.   

Another example of Storr turning traditional narratives is his analysis of urban warfare.  Storr critiques a narrative of urban warfare written by attackers and telling of slow and chaotic attacks with high casualties.  But there is little evidence for this, or for our current understanding of urban strong points and the weaponry needed for success.  Quoting the research of David Rowland, Storr notes it was published in the Journal of the Operational Research Society concluding ‘I doubt whether any historian has read it’.  Our existing understanding is ‘simply wrong’.¹  Storr forces a reader to consider evidence in a way that modern military thinking, and professional training does not.  

These themes are tied together in Battlegroup! and evidence his core argument that shock, surprise, and exploitation are key to success in land warfare.  

Why should you read Battlegroup!?

It’s difficult to do justice to the range and depth of Battlegroup!  The book is outstanding.  It ranges from Army structures to platoon tactics, from offensive to defensive, fighting in woods to fighting in towns.  All are convincingly blended to challenge any preconceptions you may have about conventional warfare.  

You’d be right to finish reading it and question why you don’t already understand warfare from this perspective.  It certainly made me look at British doctrine and warfare development differently. 

However, the quality of this book is such that it needs a stronger recommendation.  I agree with General James Everard who writes in the forward “he is a joy to read, and in Battlegroup!  He has again spun a web of rich discovery”.

 

 

[sawomi]

18 minutes ago, Jim Storr said:

...what we can learn from the unfought battles of Eastern Europe...

...Wehemact ...

...Bundesweht...

*cough*

Ok.

[Aragorn2002]

40 minutes ago, sawomi said:

*cough*

Ok.

He probably read the Kindle version.

But seriously, sounds like an interesting book, Jim. Will it actually be available on Kindle?

Edited January 13, 2022 by Aragorn2002

[Combatintman]

38 minutes ago, Aragorn2002 said:

He probably read the Kindle version.

But seriously, sounds like an interesting book, Jim. Will it actually be available on Kindle?

He doesn't know, as stated in his post earlier in this thread.

On 1/10/2022 at 11:13 PM, Jim Storr said:

Thank you.  

The publisher, Helion, has control over what formats get published.  I have no say in that. 

Best wishes 

Jim Storr