Russian army under equipped?

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Peter Cairns said:

In a system where the truth is only ever what you want it to be and facts can be changed at will a culture developed that means even those in charge trying to from above to manipulate events have a distorted picture. In one respect  you can see how those further up would want to hush up an embarrassing story but it is equally possible that those below feed them rubbish.

Entirely possible, though I credit Putin with more intelligence than this.  In other words, if the FSB said the same things to him that they said to the public I would expect Putin to say "do I look like an idiot to you?".  The story completely falls apart simply on the premise alone.  And again, if Putin believed this load of feces he would have launched a war against Ukraine within hours of hearing the news.

No, in this case clearly Putin is fully informed about what is/isn't happening.  Which I expect since he is a KGB/FSB man himself and he has a very carefully controlled clique in the security services.  I don't think Putin would tolerate being lied to on something of this scale.

Quote

One of the mistakes I think we made with Milosevic in Bosnia was to see him as being in full control, able to let lose the dogs of war at his command, when in reality I saw him more like an old man being dragged by his dogs. It wasn't so much when we attacked he let them off the leash and told them to kill, as when we hit him they broke free and went on the rampage. As with Yugoslavia under Tito or Iraq with Saddam and indeed Libya and Syria when a dictator who has ruled by fear weakens or falls the products of a culture of fear are all that is left to pick up the pieces and as we have seen there is all to often fragmentation around clusters of groups every bit as brutal is their former master.

Ironically, this is something Putin has claimed.  When Minsk 1 and 2 were under discussion he kept saying that what is going on in Donbas is not within his direct control.  His message back to the West was "I'll see what I can do".  Which is, of course, utter BS.  Without Russia's direct daily support the DPR/LPR would collapse.  Since there is zero indication that the military, security, and other portions of the Russian government have gone rouge, the only conclusion one can have is that Putin is directly controlling what goes on in Donbas.

However, this does not mean Putin controls every little detail.  The entire operation against the people of Donbas was started by sanctioned actions by ultra nationalist organizations with, of course, direct support from FSB and other government agencies.  This was for both plausible deniability but it was also because it would have politically difficult to send in large numbers of uniformed Russian personnel in Spring and early Summer of 2014.  This meant that a lot of the goons that went over the border were not necessarily acting in Russia's best interests, for a period of time there were indeed rogue elements not within Putin's direct control.  However, those were more-or-less operational problems and not strategic ones.  A year and a half of Russian government operations against the least loyal of these groups, in particular the Cossacks, has largely quieted things down.  That required prolonged threaten, ejecting, arresting, and even kill quite a few to get things to a place where he has more-or-less total strategic control over what happens.

Quote

In Russia thank goodness it's not the terror and arbitrary violence of the Stalin years , but it is a culture where you say what needs to be said, do what needs to be done and evidence is what it needs to be to serve a purpose, as earlier the Ends Justify the Means and the Facts are what you require them to be.

it's the replacement of due diligence with simple expediency. Whats in the Tin isn't reliably whats on the label

This creates culture where at all levels no one can be sure what is fact or fiction and all sources of information become suspect. Putin might be pulling the strings but they are coated in treacle and he is doing it in the dark. 

While true at the tactical and sometimes even operational level, it's so far not ever been true at the strategic level.  For example, Buk was almost for sure sent in with Putin's approval, but the shooting down of HM-17 was likely a tactical error he would not have approved of beforehand.  Strategic control, not tactical control in this situation.

Quote

In the same way I wouldn't rule out that some hapless right wing Ukrainian nut was trying to make some mischief in Crimea, but that is more akin to an ISIS lone wolf than a Kiev run operations. In the same way I actually think that despite their best efforts Putin and those around them probably have a blurred view of what is going on and less control that they and indeed we think over events.

Sure, I wouldn't rule that out either. Except if that is what it was then the FSB would have stuck closer to the truth.  The fact that they lied so largely about the events indicates that there's probably no truth to it worth mentioning.

Quote

Going back to an earlier point it's also why figuring out what the Russian army is capable of is so difficult and why I still think they might be less capable than you think, if not by much.

 

Putin's power structure is a house of cards.  He is in charge, but he won't be if he certain power blocks think he should be replaced.  There's evidence that there was already at least one major confrontation with him last year, though we don't know the details or the outcome (other than Putin is still very much in charge).  In the event of a disastrous war with Ukraine one or more power blocks would almost for sure try to change their leadership.  I'm sure Putin knows this very well.

Steve

 

[HerrTom]

There has been a lot of talk about Crimea's referendum, and it's worth pointing out that it has been supported by independent polling.

From the Pew Research Centre:

Which is somewhat at odds with the slightly different question about allowing regions to secede:

 

This is all from Despite Concerns about Governance, Ukrainians Want to Remain One Country

Sorry if I'm too off topic, I haven't had too much time to read the discussion in detail today.

[John Kettler]

Further grist for Russia only equipment in Ukraine! Please see especially links in Description and the comments of Orange_Tomato below the main image.

http://www.moddb.com/groups/tanks/images/t72-models-in-ukraine4

Regards,

John Kettler

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, HerrTom said:

There has been a lot of talk about Crimea's referendum, and it's worth pointing out that it has been supported by independent polling.

Putting aside the traditional (and somewhat reasonable) fear of saying the wrong thing on a potentially tapped phone line, the result is consistent with pre-war polling results.  However, to that we have to keep in mind that Russia's propaganda efforts to woo Russians in Crimea started long before Maidan, but kicked into overdrive after Maidan started.  Since then it's certainly not got any better.

Having said that, this is what really shows Russia as a "bully".  With deft political maneuvering they could have forced the Kiev government into allowing a REAL referendum that was monitored and signed off by the international community.  The result would have likely been a true voluntary vote to become part of Russia legally and without violence.  But this is not the route Russia took, instead invading within hours of the change of government and forcing the world into dealing with the resulting mess.

The reason Russia didn't pursue legal channels that would, most likely, have resulted in Crimea being a part of Russia is because that is only a part of what Russia wanted.  The primary thing it wanted was a destabilized and utterly ruined Ukraine.  Not to mention that Russia does not have the self confidence or strength of character to risk Crimea legitimately saying "no" to union with Russia.  Therefore, war was the only option Russia explored.

3 hours ago, John Kettler said:

Further grist for Russia only equipment in Ukraine! Please see especially links in Description and the comments of Orange_Tomato below the main image.

http://www.moddb.com/groups/tanks/images/t72-models-in-ukraine4

Regards,

John Kettler

No further "grist" because this is old information that even Vladimir isn't refuting (any more).  Now the argument has shifted from "we're not there" to "not important that we are there".

Steve

[Peter Cairns]

13 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I don't think Putin would tolerate being lied to on something of this scale.

"Send three and four pence we're going to a dance".

I doubt anyone would be stupid or brave enough to lie to Putin, that's not how it works. what happens is that systematically at all levels information gets corrupted so that in effect it's GiGo' garbage garbage out. T's like Chinese whispers, what you hear at the end isn't the original message;

"Send Reinforcements we're going to Advance"

13 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

The fact that they lied so largely about the events indicates that there's probably no truth to it worth mentioning.

I'd disagree with that, from a diplomatic point of view, we sanctions hurting and world opinion firmly agreed that Russia is the aggressor ad another round of talks due, any excuse to portray Kiev as being as guilty as Moscow would be useful. In addition domestically tales of enemy agents and saboteurs fits in well with Putins enemies all around tactics and would be useful as sanctions bite and people begin to get weary of the war. Never let a crisis go to waste and having people fearfully checking under their beds and glad that the great leader is ever vigilant is straight from the Putin play book. doesn't mean it's what happened but it wouldn't be unusual.

 

13 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Putin's power structure is a house of cards.

As long as those around him still run the show and their wealth ( Largely in foreign banks and property) is safe so is Putin. What makes it more than a house of cards is that that wealth and power is so intrenched that it is hard to see just how Putin could go wrong in Ukraine. As we are more or less a greed that firstly, only a disastrous major invasion would be enough to bring him down and secondly that right now Russia can't effectively mount a major invasion, then he's incapable of pulling off the blunder that would bring him down.

In the End i see to routes out of this from a western point of view.

Passive;

We wait him out letting him keep Crimea, Lunhans'k and Donest'k but wait until his greater Russia shrinks to be less of a threat regressing to be a global supplier of cheap raw materials and less and less of a global player letting them go backwards until they are less relevant. Putin and his cronies stay in power and rich but they and Russia are a diminished threat over time. we can live with that and so can they.

Active;

As with Reagan, we tighten the economic noose, We let US and EU firms sell the Chinese better jet engines and we get India to go for something other than the PAKFA, a partnership with Turkey or Korea for a fifth generation fighter and it's next tank. Without exports to those countries Russia's ability to produce a next generation of high tech weapons would be dented. We need somehow to get turkey on board which is tricky given the Turkish president is mending fences with Moscow.

Economically we would need to do more to freeze Russian banks out of the international banking system and probably stop all Russians buying property in western Countries and have much tighter visa controls on all Russians. If we hit their personnel wealth by hitting the economy and stop them getting it out of the country then it will start to hurt the people that matter.

Both are long term projects both would have limited success because those at the top are so entrenched and rich they are difficult to hurt and both strategies would make the lives of millions of innocent Russian people a lot harder for a lot longer, something they don't deserve. whatever sanctions we take or route we take the people at the bottom we want to help will be hurt more than the ones at the top who are to blame.

Much as a oppose what Russia has done and is doing, I am for long term passive containment as the least worst option.

Sorry if this is a bit to political and way off topic but given recent mistakes over foreign policy I think above all trying to understand your opponent is one of the most important things you can do. Back to GiGo, if who incorrectly assess their motives or intent you'll make the wrong response.

Peter.

 

[Sgt Joch]

16 hours ago, HerrTom said:

There has been a lot of talk about Crimea's referendum, and it's worth pointing out that it has been supported by independent polling.

Other polls are consistent with that. Again, as some have pointed out, there may be the question of whether all poll respondents are lying because they are afraid the secret police will send them to Siberia. However, follow up questions in at least one Ukrainian poll suggest most Crimeans would rather be part of Russia than part of Ukraine:

"Yet answers to other, more neutral questions show Crimeans are not interested in going back to Ukraine.

Fifty-one percent reported their well-being had improved in the past year. That especially concerns retirees, who started receiving much higher Russian pensions. Being part of a wealthier state -- and, despite its recent economic woes, Russia is still far wealthier than Ukraine -- is a powerful lure, despite a drop-off in tourism revenues, the peninsula's major source of income. Berezovets' group estimates they dropped to $2.9 billion in 2014 from $5.1 billion the year before -- but that is being compensated by transfers from Moscow. In 2015, the peninsula will receive 47 billion rubles ($705 million), or 75 percent of its budget, from Russia, not counting the increased pensions. Ukraine never financed the peninsula at that level: in 2014, it planned to transfer 3.03 billion hryvnias ($378 million at the time) to Crimea.

Crimeans' year of upheaval has made them sophisticated news consumers: They have learned to reject the propaganda flying at them from all sides. Eighty percent say Ukrainian coverage of their region is all or mostly lies. While 84 percent watch Russian television from time to time, only 10 percent say they trust it. Social networks have become the most trusted source of information: 29 percent say they rely on them.

The armed conflict in eastern Ukraine was the biggest worry for 42 percent of respondents. It's more important to them than inflation, which 40 percent of the respondents named, or the peninsula's de facto transport blockade by Ukraine, which worries 22 percent of those asked. 

Taken together, these answers suggest that a majority of Crimeans see Ukraine as a poor and unstable country where the media are hostile toward them. That's largely an accurate assessment that has nothing to do with fear or brainwashing from Moscow. All things considered, Ukraine is not at this point a welcoming alternative to Russia. As Berezovets pointed out, the Kiev government has not even passed a single legislative act to help the Ukrainian patriots who fled the peninsula after the annexation. It's true they are a smaller group, by two orders of magnitude, than those displaced by the fighting in the east -- the government puts their number at 19,941 people -- but they are still a sizable community of pro-Kiev people who were left to fend for themselves after leaving their houses and other property in what is now Russian territory."

https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-02-06/one-year-later-crimeans-prefer-russia

Edited August 15, 2016 by Sgt Joch

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, Peter Cairns said:

"Send three and four pence we're going to a dance".

I doubt anyone would be stupid or brave enough to lie to Putin, that's not how it works. what happens is that systematically at all levels information gets corrupted so that in effect it's GiGo' garbage garbage out. T's like Chinese whispers, what you hear at the end isn't the original message;

For sure that's how it works.  However, Putin is not going to get out in front of the cameras like that about something he hasn't verified.  The FSB, as an institution, is most likely trustworthy internally.  This is generally the case in very strong police states, especially when the leader is from the same organization (and Putin is KGB/FSB to his very core).  If someone came to Putin and said "Ukraine just bombarded us" Putin's most likely reaction would be to send someone he trusted to verify, would have quickly figured out it wasn't true, discovered what really happened, then made the decision to leverage what really happened to his advantage.

Think about it this way.  Did Russian state media put some absolutely ridiculously and fabulously faked "reports" during the early days of the change of power in Kiev?  Absolutely.  Do they make Russia look ridiculously inept and over-the-top liars?  Absolutely.  Was Putin involved in any of those detailed decisions about what to publish or not?  No.  He simply said "here's the story we want to tell, make it happen".  After the series of embarrassingly amateurish lies he might have said "c'mon guys, don't oversell it" because the absolutely hysterically funny stuff kinda petered out.  Again, I doubt he micro managed the process from there.

But this is different.  Putin put his own ass on the line for this one.  He also had to consider what he would do in response.  If he wasn't aware it was fabricated he would have acted as if it were real.  That would have meant a military response to Ukraine directly and immediately.  The fact that 3 days elapsed before he said anything clearly shows that he was in on it and approved the operation.

5 hours ago, Peter Cairns said:

I'd disagree with that, from a diplomatic point of view, we sanctions hurting and world opinion firmly agreed that Russia is the aggressor ad another round of talks due, any excuse to portray Kiev as being as guilty as Moscow would be useful. In addition domestically tales of enemy agents and saboteurs fits in well with Putins enemies all around tactics and would be useful as sanctions bite and people begin to get weary of the war. Never let a crisis go to waste and having people fearfully checking under their beds and glad that the great leader is ever vigilant is straight from the Putin play book. doesn't mean it's what happened but it wouldn't be unusual.

Of course.  That's the whole point of this nonsense.  What I said is that because it's so obviously a lie there's probably no real truth to the story at all.  If there was some truth to it, such as non-state acting Ukrainians taking their own initiative, I think the cover story would have been more solid than it is.

5 hours ago, Peter Cairns said:

As long as those around him still run the show and their wealth ( Largely in foreign banks and property) is safe so is Putin. What makes it more than a house of cards is that that wealth and power is so intrenched that it is hard to see just how Putin could go wrong in Ukraine. As we are more or less a greed that firstly, only a disastrous major invasion would be enough to bring him down and secondly that right now Russia can't effectively mount a major invasion, then he's incapable of pulling off the blunder that would bring him down.

It's still a house of cards.  Everybody is out for themselves and there's no rule of law.  But it's not just the war that's hurting Russia, it's the inept management of the economy.  Even if not a single Putin insider wants to fix a single thing, he doesn't want to be the one taking the hit.  This causes internal friction and friction is something that can lead to fire.  These individuals tend to band together to create factions (power blocs) within the the regime. 

From what I've seen Putin already had one showdown with at least one major faction sometime last year.  He's also recently purged a number of high profile figures from his inner circle and, in some cases, deprived them of their freedoms.  Including some figures that were very surprising to people who know the details (which I do not, BTW).  "Circling the wagons" is generally a defensive move, and defensive moves means there is at least a perceived threat.

5 hours ago, Peter Cairns said:

In the End i see to routes out of this from a western point of view.

Passive;

We wait him out letting him keep Crimea, Lunhans'k and Donest'k but wait until his greater Russia shrinks to be less of a threat regressing to be a global supplier of cheap raw materials and less and less of a global player letting them go backwards until they are less relevant. Putin and his cronies stay in power and rich but they and Russia are a diminished threat over time. we can live with that and so can they.

This isn't the way the West is playing it now, nor is it likely to do so. 

5 hours ago, Peter Cairns said:

Active;

As with Reagan, we tighten the economic noose, We let US and EU firms sell the Chinese better jet engines and we get India to go for something other than the PAKFA, a partnership with Turkey or Korea for a fifth generation fighter and it's next tank. Without exports to those countries Russia's ability to produce a next generation of high tech weapons would be dented. We need somehow to get turkey on board which is tricky given the Turkish president is mending fences with Moscow.

Economically we would need to do more to freeze Russian banks out of the international banking system and probably stop all Russians buying property in western Countries and have much tighter visa controls on all Russians. If we hit their personnel wealth by hitting the economy and stop them getting it out of the country then it will start to hurt the people that matter.

Unlikely.  First, because I don't think it will take that long for something significant to happen, therefore thinking that far ahead isn't necessarily valuable.  Second, I don't think there's enough consensus for action among Western leaders to make something like this happen. At least not yet.

The likely course of action is similar to the one already being pursued, which is a hybrid of what you stated.  On the one hand the West will continue to isolate Russia economically, politically, and militarily short of provoking a direct military confrontation.  Whenever Russia wants something that requires the West in some way, Russia will be rebuffed or at least driven to make more concessions than it wants.  Syria is an excellent example of this.  Such efforts are not passive because they take a great deal of energy and will to maintain.  On the other hand I don't see the West doing things like trying to create "color revolutions" in Russia or Russian allied states any more than it has in the past.  If something pops up, the West might take advantage of it.  But there's not going to be a concerted operation to create opposition movements where they don't exist or even support the ones that do exist with anything more than political encouragement.

Soooooo... bringing this around full circle to the military side of things.

Putin has once again shown that he continues to be disinterested in overt military action in Ukraine.  If he was interested in it, then this announcement would have been followed by a ground offensive of some sort.  Instead we had a fabricated story that is clearly intended to influence a political settlement.  There might come a time when Putin throws down the gauntlet and attacks, but that time is clearly not this campaign season.

The problem Putin faces is that the trajectory of internal politics and external opportunities continues to aim downward.  Since he is unwilling and even unable to fix Russia's systemic economic problems or raw materials prices which have masked them for so many years, things are going to get worse each passing day.  He most likely knows this.  What we don't know is at what point will Putin determine that a change of course is needed AND will that be throwing away Donbas or trying to knock Ukraine to its knees militarily.  So far Putin seems to be headed down the path of throwing away Donbas in exchange for concessions (in particular recognition of Crimea), however that is largely up to Ukraine and Ukraine has proven so far to be a fordable adversary.

Steve

 

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Sgt Joch said:

Other polls are consistent with that. Again, as some have pointed out, there may be the question of whether all poll respondents are lying because they are afraid the secret police will send them to Siberia. However, follow up questions in at least one Ukrainian poll suggest most Crimeans would rather be part of Russia than part of Ukraine:

 

An interesting poll and it confirms pretty much the debate taking place back during the initial Russian occupation.  The threshold for Russia to sweep Crimeans off their feet was exceptionally low.  Years of animosity between Kiev and Crimea, deliberately made worse by Moscow, meant that Crimeans had in many ways burned their bridges with Kiev and vice versa before the conflict started.  Since Ukraine was a far more inept and far less affluent Kelptocracy than Russia, Kiev couldn't offer a better deal to Crimeans even if it wanted to (which it didn't).  All Russia had to do was increase payments to pensioners and bump up state salaries to seal the deal with the bulk of Crimeans.  The overt theft of private holdings, increased political repression, and the targeting of Tatars and Ukrainian loyalists are being overlooked.

The thing that I said back in 2014 and I'll say now is that Crimeans might have "buyer's remorse" at some point.  While Russia is currently much stronger and seemingly better organized than Ukraine, things are in motion.  Russia is becoming less affluent, more repressive, and less respected in the world as a whole.  Ukraine, on the other hand, has shown signs that it is stabilizing, becoming less repressive, and more respected in the world compared to where it was in 2014.  Whether each country continues to go in their respective directions, to what degree, and how quickly is unknown.  However, there is a very realistic chance that in 10 years Crimeans might view the grass as greener on the Ukrainian side than that which is under their feet.

Steve

[HUSKER2142]

Military international games: The best moments

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

Fun vid!  Who had the lime green camo vehicles?  Venezuela?  Whomever it is, I like the paint job

Steve

[VladimirTarasov]

8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Fun vid!  Who had the lime green camo vehicles?  Venezuela?  Whomever it is, I like the paint job

Steve

I believe that was Iran.

[Battlefront.com]

I could only see one second of frame with a flag on the side of a BMP, and Venezuela was what it appeared to be.  Looked more like Lithuania, but we know that's not right

Steve

[Peter Cairns]

Found this interesting and it might add to the discussion and give pointers to why people in Crimea had problems with Kiev and why Western Ukraine looks to the EU, it's GDP per region for the Ukraine.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Ukrainian_subdivisions_by_GDP_per_capita#/media/File:Ukraine_GRP_per_capita_2008_US_dollars_(nominal).png

[ikalugin]

(I just came from SPA in Evian to view the sights in ROK)

Did I miss anything non political? (to be quite honest, I didn't read this thread on my extended holiday b/c TLDR)

To add some military content:

As a reminder, in the Center 2015 we have practiced moving large force (division+) over long distance (over 3000km) in a short time frame.

Now we are conducting the large exercise in the south-western axis. The premise of the exercise is the same:

- alerting multiple units and formations.

- moving them across significant (Ukraine relevant) distances quickly.

- conducting local exercises in unfammiliar area.

 

 

 

 

 

Declaimer - "alert" footage is done separately from the actual movement of units out of their basing areas and after that happens.

Edited August 28, 2016 by ikalugin

[ikalugin]

This is coupled with the rail road troops exercise.

The rail road troops:

- created 3 bridges over Volga.

- as well as the troops load on/load off points and relevant tracks.

- all of this was done in a short time frame.

Armoured train is there as a rear security measure.

Edited August 28, 2016 by ikalugin

[ikalugin]

For that matter, did anyone see any good western materials about the (most recent) exercises? I can post russian articles on that topic.

[ikalugin]

The force Russia has availiable for an operation in Ukraine in CMBS relevant time frame.

- Crimean grouping.

- VDV and other centrally managed highly mobile assets.

- 3 TDs, 3 MRDs, 1 Tnk BDE, 14 MR BDEs of Ground Forces. Those troops are availiable while retaining coverage of other critical strategic axis (Arctic, Baltics, Caucasus, Central Asia, Far East).

- other supporting units of Ground Forces which have to be accounted for in the calculus, but we would drop them for now.

While the VDV (and other centrally managed highly mobile) and Crimean forces are fairly well known here, the Ground Forces grouping is interesting. The grouping has:

- 14 MR BDEs and 12 MR regiments.
- 1 Tnk BDE and 12 Tnk regiments.

In terms of composition this gives us (assuming known standard OOBs and TO&Es):

- 6*10k+15*5k=135k manpower in the combat units of Ground Forces alone (ie not accounting for other units or services).

- 14+12=26 "large" tank battalions (40 tanks each) and 3+36=39 "small" tank battalions (31 tanks each) (for a total of ~2250 tanks in those battalions).

- 78+13=91 motorised battalions of all types (on IFVs and APCs) (ballpark figure would be ~3700 APCs and IFVs in classical roles, more if we account for specialist roles).

- no less than (this assumes 1 battalion per BDE) 39+18=57 artillery battalions (divizions) (ballpark figure would be no less than 1000 artillery pieces).

Then there are dedicated artillery, combat engeniers, chemical (those guys handle flame throwers) troops.

p.s. recent exercises (Center-2015, snap drills in 2015, snap drills in 2016 including the currently ongoing one I have mentioned above) imply that this entire force would be availiable 48-96 hours from the political decision being made by the CINC with 24 hours of covert preparation (transmission of orders, initiation of movement), 24-72 hours of overt preparations (movement of units out of their basing areas into the attack).

Edited August 28, 2016 by ikalugin

[Krater]

4 minutes ago, ikalugin said:

The force Russia has availiable for an operation in Ukraine in CMBS relevant time frame.

- Crimean grouping.

- VDV and other centrally managed highly mobile assets.

- 3 TDs, 3 MRDs, 1 Tnk BDE, 14 MR BDEs of Ground Forces. Those troops are availiable while retaining coverage of other critical strategic axis (Arctic, Baltics, Caucasus, Central Asia, Far East).

- other supporting units of Ground Forces which have to be accounted for in the calculus, but we would drop them for now.

While the VDV (and other centrally managed highly mobile) and Crimean forces are fairly well known here, the Ground Forces grouping is interesting. The grouping has:

- 14 MR BDEs and 12 MR regiments.
- 1 Tnk BDE and 12 Tnk regiments.

In terms of composition this gives us (assuming known standard OOBs and TO&Es):

- 6*10k+15*5k=135k manpower in the combat units of Ground Forces alone (ie not accounting for other units or services).

- 14+12=26 "large" tank battalions (40 tanks each) and 3+36=39 "small" tank battalions (31 tanks each) (for a total of ~2250 tanks in those battalions).

- 78+13=91 motorised battalions of all types (on IFVs and APCs) (ballpark figure would be ~3700 APCs and IFVs in classical roles, more if we account for specialist roles).

- no less than (this assumes 1 battalion per BDE) 39+18=57 artillery battalions (divizions) (ballpark figure would be no less than 1000 artillery pieces).

Then there are dedicated artillery, combat engeniers, chemical (those guys handle flame throwers) troops.

How about DNR/LNR OOB?

[ikalugin]

redundant post

Edited August 28, 2016 by ikalugin
reduntant post.

[ikalugin]

59 minutes ago, Krater said:

How about DNR/LNR OOB?

Despite the changes in DNR/LNR Armed Forces status since Debaltsevo local comunity does not take them seriously. Hence it was omited. Otherwise - they have 2 army groupings made out of brigades.

p.s. this round table may be of interest:

(https://youtu.be/cJwFWDvF8VU)
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJwFWDvF8VU)

Especially statements by the retired officers, who had experience in commanding large formations during Soviet times.)

 

 

Note, how Ukrainians in some of their materials view the LNR/DNR forces as elements of regular Russian Armed Forces, for example here:

http://www.cacds.org.ua/en/activities/879

While I do not agree with the statement, in my opinion the LNR/DNR forces are usable within the likely, CMBS relevant, scenarios.

 

Edited August 28, 2016 by ikalugin

[ikalugin]

MoD news items on the check up (note, this is not a regular exercise, so it is fairly representative of what you would get in the "bolt out of the blue" attack scenario):

Exercises begin: http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12093710@egNews

Multiple BDEs of Southern MD participate: http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12094009@egNews http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12094069@egNews

Movement of units for distances of ~2000km by transport and for the distances of ~500km by themselves: http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12094066@egNews  http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12094068@egNews http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12094105@egNews

Movement of units out of Central MD for the distances over of 2500km into the Southern MD: http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12094138@egNews

Deployement of two army commands: http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12094214@egNews

The Central MD stuff is very important, because Central MD forms the 2nd operational echelon for the Ukraine scenarios with it's 2nd CAA and because the deployement time achieved in such a snap readiness check is relevant to Ukraine scenarios.

Edited August 28, 2016 by ikalugin

[ikalugin]

Update

Troops moving into Crimea during the exercises: (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aJXbdr_fkys)
Troops conducting training: (https://youtu.be/--oAWlIcicg)

Mobilisation of other state institutions during the exercise: http://stat.function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12094234@egNews

 

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

On 8/27/2016 at 7:32 PM, ikalugin said:

For that matter, did anyone see any good western materials about the (most recent) exercises? I can post russian articles on that topic.

I think that would assume a certain degree of interest that does not exist in professional circles.  

[Krater]

1 hour ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

I think that would assume a certain degree of interest that does not exist in professional circles.  

Why not?  I would think that analysis of Russian armed forces would be exactly of interest to the personal circles.

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

12 minutes ago, Krater said:

Why not?  I would think that analysis of Russian armed forces would be exactly of interest to the personal circles.

The Russian conventional threat is negligible.  We have their manuals, they do the same basic exercises, over, and over, and over again.  We likely have how many days in advance the "snap" drill units were actually alerted, and there's nice little charts we have showing exactly how long Russians expect to take doing a task simply because we've seen them do it so many times, and often have the actual standards set forth by the Russians themselves.  

I'm sure there's still "something" to be learned, but it certainly isn't in how intrepid the 3032 Train Barge Transport Company executed the script this year.  

The current Russian emphasis on electronic, cyber, and "hybrid" warfare is much more relevant, and a much bigger focus in terms of intelligence gathering because those are the means Russia would actually leverage in a war.  This isn't 1989 after all.