What if: Germany would have been able to achieve ceasefire in the West?

[Aragorn2002]

Now we are counting the days until we go back to our beloved Eastern front I would like to ask this forum what would have happened if the Germans had managed to arrange a ceasefire in the West in the summer/autumn of 1944 and would have been able to concentrate their forces in the East. I'm not suggesting the Germans could have stopped the Red Army and I know a ceasefire in the west would have been extremely unlikely, even after a succesfull 20th of July. I'm also not interested in the political aspects of such a situation, merely in the military consequences and possible/likely operations in the Baltic, Poland and Rumania.

All I would like to know is how the fighting would have developed. Would the Germans have been able to transport enough reinforcements to the Eastern front to delay or stop the Russians, would Stalin have stepped up the pace etc. I'm studying this hypothesis now for a year or so and find it hard to draw conclusions, perhaps you can help me to draw a picture of how the end of Germany would have looked like. Personally I think defeat would have been inevitable, but no doubt it would have cost the Russians even more casualties and a couple of months more fighting.

Conditions for this scenario are roughly: Hitler is dead, Rommel has taken over and sweeps away Himmler and the like, Germans will withdraw from Western Europe asap, Western allies agree to an immediate ceasefire, both Germans and Russians are exhausted after heavy fighting and huge losses following operation Bagration, so the front is stabilizing more or less like it did in the autumn of 1944, German weapon production is at it's peak, Finland decides to stay in the war for another while after significant German deliveries of antitankweapons and assault guns and Rommel throws everything he can find to the east.

What would probably have happened and how?

[JasonC]

Um, the front didn't stabilize in the autumn of 1944. The front *in Poland* did. The main theater of action moved south - with all German reserves needed to patch together the hole left by Bagration and stop the Russians up north in Poland, the south collapsed, the Russians broke into Romania, which switched sides. They took all of Romania including the oil fields, penetrated Bulgaria, took the eastern half of Hungary, and went to Belgrade in eastern Yugoslavia - all before the end of 1944, between mid August and December.

On the other flank they were also taking Estonia and most of Latvia and leaving German forces pocketed against the Baltic in the Courland pocket, as the Germans called it, but even that part was a sideshow to the main event in the south, in the last third of 1944.

As for what would have happened, the Germans could have launched a failed Ardennes offensive somewhere on the east front instead of the west, thrown away their last bunch of armor in another useless death ride, and then been ground to powder afterward much as they actually were. The Germans never had a sound defensive doctrine; they never used their armor properly as an operational reserve to stop enemy offensives when they could instead throw it away offensively, because their armor doctrine was all offense all of the time, clear to the end of the war. (See Hungary lakes offensive in 1945 e.g.).

[ChappyCanuck]

From everything I have ever read, neither Churchill or Roosevelt would accept anything other than absolute unconditional surrender for Germany, whether or not Hitler was alive or dead. Kinda makes it a moot point

[Aragorn2002]

Um, the front didn't stabilize in the autumn of 1944. The front *in Poland* did. The main theater of action moved south - with all German reserves needed to patch together the hole left by Bagration and stop the Russians up north in Poland, the south collapsed, the Russians broke into Romania, which switched sides. They took all of Romania including the oil fields, penetrated Bulgaria, took the eastern half of Hungary, and went to Belgrade in eastern Yugoslavia - all before the end of 1944, between mid August and December.

On the other flank they were also taking Estonia and most of Latvia and leaving German forces pocketed against the Baltic in the Courland pocket, as the Germans called it, but even that part was a sideshow to the main event in the south, in the last third of 1944.

As for what would have happened, the Germans could have launched a failed Ardennes offensive somewhere on the east front instead of the west, thrown away their last bunch of armor in another useless death ride, and then been ground to powder afterward much as they actually were. The Germans never had a sound defensive doctrine; they never used their armor properly as an operational reserve to stop enemy offensives when they could instead throw it away offensively, because their armor doctrine was all offense all of the time, clear to the end of the war. (See Hungary lakes offensive in 1945 e.g.).

I agree with all of this. But what if the Germans could have controlled their blind belief in offensive actions and would have chosen a sound defensive doctrine, as you mention, with deep defensive networks and carefully chosen counterattacks with armoured units? At Lauban and Bautzen they proved to be still able at that. It can't be denied that the Germans made it a lot easier for the Russians to reach Berlin, by time and again sending their best units to other sectors of the eastern front and other stupid decisions, like Courland for instance. Would it have made much of an impact if they had used their last resources differently? I'm not talking about a German victory, or even a standstill, but about prolongation of the war. Although Russia's armed forces where in much better condition than those of the Germans, they were also running out of manpower (although they probably would have found a way to solve that by more thorough mobilisation). Could a fanatical German defence and even higher losses have brought Stalin to the conference table? Is that even imaginable?

ChappyCanuck, no, it doesn't. Many books have been written about historical events with other outcomes. A French victory at Waterloo for instance. It is fascinating for those who study history. I agree of course with what you say about Churchill and Roosevelt. Of course I realize that I'm sticking my neck out with a hypothesis like this, but it really interests me.

[JasonC]

Since you are inventing impossibles by sheer will, of course the moon could be made of green cheese if the moon were made of green cheese. There is no point in stopping the hypotheticals at complete change in opponents, command, and doctrine then drawing the line at how the opposing politicians choose to react to those changes. Could they have used their military assets much more efficiently, sure. Could they have used them efficiently enough to stop the Russians in the last year of the war? No, not even remotely, unless you invent new imaginaries like the Russians shoot their left foot and cut off their right arm and decide to surrender or what have you.

The Red Army, alone, could readily defeat the German army, entire, from the position in mid August 1944, regardless of the direction of the German army, as long as the Russian army is handled with reasonable intelligence, as it had been over the whole second half of the war to that point.

The Germans need the whole western force just to hold the southern end of the front; they get a reserve if they evacuate Courland but that also frees Russian forces. The Germans can make an armor reserve behind the central front in Poland of Kursk scale. But the Russians just don't have to land the next blow there, it can come in Hungary or western Yugoslavia, while simultaneously building up a hammer behind the Polish front. The Germans either react to the southern threat or they do not. If they do, then they can stop it, but the hammer in Poland goes to Berlin. If they don't, they may hold longer, but they still lose the war via collapse of their southeastern flank.

[Soldat-Hans]

That would never happen, since the Germans were another force in the World and not allied! So they were an enemy even before WW2. The Allies even liked it, when the germans pushed back russia (because Russia wasnt allied)! When the Battle of Stalingrad was lost, the Americans Decided to Attack germany first, because they were afraid that Russia could take whole Europe! So no, there is no way, there could be a cease fire with the Allies! This is how the world works even today! Be with the Allies and they like you (or use you and throw you away) or be not Allied and automatically their enemy and they fight you with sanctions, Agents, and today with terrorists, who were shown as freedomfighters in TV! Normal going! (Good have a nuclear Bomb and they may leave you alone). Goal is the Power over the ****ing world!

[Sequoia]

The Soviet Union became an Ally to Britain the day Germany attacked in June '41. Britain was not at all happy at the initial successes of the Wehrmacht that Summer and Fall. After the US entry the Western Allies decided on a Germany first strategy well before Stalingrad. But I don't need to go on and you probably shouldn't either with Jason watching this thread.

[H1nd]

I dont agree with JasonC at all. In my opinion we can always speculate. By speculating you can look at the history on different agles and while the speculation can draw you away from the facts and lead you astray it can also help you to understand history the way it happened. The why behind the facts ain't always so clear unless you look at all the other options.

Now the speculation:

Sure the Russian army was terribly powerfull by the late 44 but the single most biggest reason why Germany was defeated by 1945 was Hitler. Ofc the German high command was utterly incompetent in opposing his disastrous orders but I think it is well worth the speculation what would have happened had Hitler not been able to give those foolish orders of his. In fact Hitlers persistence on standing ground at all cost is mentioned in almost every page in any history book of ww2. I dont remember the details but one of the main reason why Romania and rest of the south fell so easily was that the German sixth army was once again encircled and annihilated instead of having the German and Romanian troops fall back to defend the naturaly defendable positions along the Romanian border.

As for the cease fire.. I really dont see any way it could have happened. I think the Allies even considered the scenario that Hitler would have been ousted from power but came to the conclusion that it is actually better for allies to have him in power till the end and not support any assasination attempts etc. I'm also rather certain that the way Allies were ready to sacrifice manpower and materiel tells that they were very well motivated and ready to go to the end in any case whether there was a coup or not.

[Michael Emrys]

...I would like to ask this forum what would have happened if the Germans had managed to arrange a ceasefire in the West in the summer/autumn of 1944 and would have been able to concentrate their forces in the East.

Too late. What you describe was only a little better for Germany in 1941-'42-'43 and they failed all three times. They blew it at Kursk and were then unable to resist the Soviet counter-offensive.

I think defeat would have been inevitable, but no doubt it would have cost the Russians even more casualties and a couple of months more fighting.

I think that is about the best the Germans could hope for, and that essentially is nothing to hope for. From the middle of 1943 onwards it was clear to anyone who wasn't some kind of lunatic that the Third Reich was going down and it was going to be ugly. About the only thing they could do was to try to postpone the inevitable as long as possible. But the result of that strategy was to prolong the agony as long as possible. With benefit of hindsight, it is not hard to see that the best move for Germany at that point was to make peace all around, unconditional surrender and all. Naturally, Germany's leaders were not comfortable with that option as it was fraught with uncertainties. But we can now say that however horrible that would have been, fewer people would have died and they Allies might have been less inclined to be vengeful afterward. Small comfort and not at all apparent at the time, but there it is.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

After the US entry the Western Allies decided on a Germany first strategy well before Stalingrad.

Actually, that had been discussed and tentatively agreed to well before the US's entry into the war even though nothing had been declared or formally constituted. What happened was that after Guadalcanal, the US commitment to the Pacific gradually drew off a larger and larger proportion of resources.

It has always tickled my curiosity to speculate how the war might have gone differently if some of the resources committed to invading the Marianas had gone to Europe instead. Overlord might have begun in May instead of June and Anvil might have happened at the same time or at least soon after instead of August. Could VE Day have occurred before the end of 1944? Who knows? Probably not, but likely before May '45 anyway. Recapture of the Marianas might have been delayed six months, but with the A Bomb coming up in the wings, the final defeat of Japan would not have been much postponed.

Michael

[Vanir Ausf B]

Now we are counting the days until we go back to our beloved Eastern front I would like to ask this forum what would have happened if the Germans had managed to arrange a ceasefire in the West in the summer/autumn of 1944 and would have been able to concentrate their forces in the East.

The key factor your hypothetical does not mention is if Lend-Lease continues to the Soviet Union. If it does then German defeat is only delayed a few months. If LL is ended then I could see the Soviet machine running low on steam in '45 and Stalin accepting a peace that leaves him everything except Germany itself.

[Michael Emrys]

The key factor your hypothetical does not mention is if Lend-Lease continues to the Soviet Union. If it does then German defeat is only delayed a few months. If LL is ended then I could see the Soviet machine running low on steam in '45 and Stalin accepting a peace that leaves him everything except Germany itself.

While Lend-Lease was definitely a plus for the Soviets, I don't think you can show that it was decisive, especially in the time frame we are discussing here. A vast amount of stuff had already been shipped and was in the Soviet arsenal, but keep in mind that they manufactured the bulk of their most important equipment. As I said, things like boots, rations, and certain strategic materials like copper were important in that they freed up Soviet manpower and manufacturing to make other things like tanks and artillery, but having those cut off in the last months of 1944 would not have made a huge impression.

Michael

[Vanir Ausf B]

Going from memory, about 1/3 of the Red Army's food supply was via Lend-Lease, as was most of their aviation fuel and truck fleet. Whether or not having that cut off would be "decisive" is questionable, but that it would have had a large impact on Soviet logistics and Stalin's calculations is not.

[Ithikial_AU]

Not likely and if some kind of army coup were led it wouldn't have Rommel in charge. He did have quite detractors in the upper German brass and there were plenty of officers above him in rank.

If there was a military coup someone higher would have been in charge to sue for peace. Whether it was accepted or not, doubtful. Maybe if there was a gentleman's agreement on the Western Front but as others have said it would sort of go against Roosevelt's unconditional surrender wish. Out of Roosevelt and Churchill, the US President was the bigger player and would likely get the final say by this stage. Eastern front, with his forces having the clear advantage by now, I doubt very much Stalin would accept anything until Berlin was taken. Too much bad blood had built up to that point and Stalin was already thinking of Post War Europe and wanted as much territory as he could get his hands on.

[Freyberg]

It was vanishingly unlikely that the western allies would have made peace with any German government merely with the replacement of Hitler, but if the West had moved on Berlin instead of cutting Germany in half, the German government minus Hitler had retreated to the 'southern redoubt', and the USSR and the West had confronted each other around Berlin; and if the Germans had held out for some time while the Soviets and the allies had faced of against each other for an extended period, then it's not inconceivable - though still rather unlikely - that the West would have softened their stance towards Germany.

Much would have depended upon the actions of Stalin - what if, in the above scenario, he had decided he had more to gain from westward aggression than from the immediate liquidation of the remnant of a still defiant German state?

Having said that, Hitler was the evil psychic force that drove German military power. I don't believe it was possible for any other leader to motivate the German army to continue fighting.

[JasonC]

Vanir - LL was only 7% of Russian war output by value. No it was not required to defeat Germany from the position already achieved in August of 1944.

As for the silly Signal magazine fantasy that "When the Battle of Stalingrad was lost, the Americans Decided to Attack germany first, because they were afraid that Russia could take whole Europe", it is utter nonsense. The US discussed the Germany first plan with Great Britain right after the fall of France, with the US still neutral and Russia still an ally of Germany; it was not based on the threat posed by Russia but on the threat posed by Germany. The Germany first grand strategy was already formally agreed by the joint US and UK staffs and national leaders at the time of the Atlantic Charter in the summer of 1941, after the invasion of Russia but before war between the US and Japan broke out.

The delusion that the US and UK thought of Germany minus Nazi rule as an ally against Russia was a fantasy of the Prussian militarists (imagining that the west would view them as honorable and gentlemen and Christians and all that), but never had the slightest basis in reality. The US and UK thought of them instead as militarists, blood soaked jackbooted thugs, and mass murderers, and considered their eradication as important a war aim as removing the Nazi regime. The aspects of German militarism that were common to both world wars they saw as the prime reason they had to fight and win the second one after the first, and they were entirely resolved to finish the job and not have to fight a third against the same blockheaded warmongers.

German propagandists never ever grokked this, and apparently some of their apologists still don't. But sorry Charlie, it was Germany first to smash all that, even before Russia was on our side, or the US was formally a belligerent.

[Vergeltungswaffe]

Regardless of the total percentage of Russian war output, without lend lease US made trucks (used in the hundreds of thousands), the Russians get to Berlin many months, maybe even a couple years, later.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Yeah, that 7% figure is highly misleading. Just looking at that you may be forgiven for thinking the Western allies could have never sent anything and the Soviets would have barely noticed the difference. But the reality is much different. Trucks are worth less than tanks but deep penetrations don't work if you can't keep your spearheads supplied. A ton of aviation fuel is worth less than a bomber but a bomber without fuel isn't worth much. Foodstuffs are relatively cheap compared to most other war materials but are critical for a country that can't feed itself. What is the value of a pair of boots to a soldier? The US shipped 15 million pairs.

Note that I'm not saying it would have been impossible for the Soviets to finish them off alone, but it would have at least been much more costly, enough so that a deal that gave Stalin most of what he wanted in '44 would have looked attractive, and after having been abandoned by his allies few would have faulted him for taking it.

[costard]

... enough so that a deal that gave Stalin most of what he wanted in '44 would have looked attractive, and after having been abandoned by his allies few would have faulted him for taking it.

More likely, being Stalin and in charge of a world beating military, he'd have ended up in the Med, all over the Middle East and in control of the Suez (not to mention half of Europe under his control), whereby the US and UK would have had to fight him. This would be why a treaty with Germany (with or without Hitler) was a non-starter for the West.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Stalin was in charge of a world beating military in May of '45 too but didn't do any of that.

[costard]

Um, yeah, but in the meantime the US had developed the nuke, they had a standing army of a million plus just across the border and they had Stalin's eastern flank with the unsinkable aircraft carrier that is Japan. Plus, and this is important, there is no betrayal to avenge in the popular politics of leading masses.

[Aragorn2002]

I'm not interested in what Roosevelt and his pro-Soviet ambiance thought or how Uncle Sam singlehandedly won the war or how many US trucks were delivered to the Red Army. I'm interested in the military options the Germans still had left in the autumn of 1944 in a tactical sense. It wonders me how difficult it is to raise an interesting question here at this forum, without it being smothered in sarcasm and vague accusations of apologism or revisionism. I'm sick and tired of that.

[costard]

wot? ..........

[Aragorn2002]

wot? ..........

Not aimed at you.

[costard]

Given that by Fall 1944 the rational individuals still extant in Germany knew it was fighting for it's very existence and losing, I'd say there were precisely two options left, (tactically, strategically, whatever): fight and lose, or surrender. They chose both.