In Desperate Battle: Normandy 1944

[LukeFF]

Goering was.

[Peregrine]

Are you sure that Goering was specifically due to the bombing or at all. I thought a lot of argument re the top Nazis was simply focused on the final solution policies.

The allied bombings cannot really be compared to the genocides.

[JonS]

Göring was the third-highest-ranking Nazi official tried at Nuremberg, ... . The prosecution levelled an indictment of four charges, including a charge of conspiracy; waging a war of aggression; war crimes, including the plundering and removal to Germany of works of art and other property; and crimes against humanity, including the disappearance of political and other opponents under the Nacht und Nebel (Night and Fog) decree; the torture and ill-treatment of prisoners of war; and the murder and enslavement of civilians, including what was at the time estimated to be 5,700,000 Jews.

Nothing there about his activities as head of GAF.

[Kanonier Reichmann]

Also -- and I have no idea of the answer -- were any Luftwaffe personnel or commanders actually tried as war criminals by the West for aerial bombing of cities? (the Soviets locked up Erich Hartmann for 10+ years, I know, but they had their own definition of "war crimes").

I wouldn't have thought so. To do so would have smacked of sheer hypocrisy. I believe it was considered to charge Nazi high ranking naval personnel with war crimes for the unrestricted U-Boat campaign until it was pointed out that the Allies did exactly that and far more effectively, against the Japanese in the Pacific.

Regards

KR

[PzKpfw 1]

Germany was defeated in 1943 after Zitadelle, their was no hope of regaining the initiative on the Eastren front. Germany's options at that point were conduct a prolonged defensive battle on the Eastren front & hope the USSR turned on their westren allies. or surrender, Germany chose to fight, costing millions of more lives.

After the Allied breakout of Normandy Germany was in the same position as after Zitadelle except this time they had alot less ground to trade for time. Germany had the same choices, again they chose as in the east. Germans from generals down to the lowest private knew the war was lost. Hitler refused to accept unconditional surrender, and dragged Germany down with him. The whole time praying the Allies would fracture In the end he blamed the German ppl for loseing the war, and had he had his way they all would have died as they were not worthy etc.

No one is to blame for what happened other then Nazi Germany and the Axis powers. Germany could have chosen to surrender at any time, we all know what choice was made and it just cost more deaths.

Regards, John Waters

[LongLeftFlank]

Agree with the conclusion, but again, everything you say only became clear to the Allies in hindsight, some time after the war.

The Allied powers (except perhaps the US & Canada, although in a nuclear age, maybe even them) were fighting for survival against a sinister and highly capable foe who had provided ample evidence of its intent to enslave and likely destroy their civilizations.

Who really knew what technological nightmares German ingenuity was going to spring upon its enemies to, if not win, at least raise the price of victory. Rail-garrison V1/V2s tipped with nerve gas or anthrax and dropped on London, heedless of retaliation? ATGW? Some kind of weird hybrid atomic weapon? (it's not like you could drop Einstein or Oppenheimer a quick email and have them reassure you that this wasn't likely). Anything seemed possible; nothing could be altogether discounted.

It was only with the industrial heartland of the Reich under Allied control and the Nazi war machine at last showing signs of loss of will to fight that policymakers could entertain notions of easing off on humanitarian grounds. And guess what, that's about March 1945.

[Peregrine]

It was only with the industrial heartland of the Reich under Allied control and the Nazi war machine at last showing signs of loss of will to fight that policymakers could entertain notions of easing off on humanitarian grounds. And guess what, that's about March 1945.

There was concern about Dresden. A lot of people blanched at what happened. Political leaders that were instrumental in the policy distanced themselves from what occurred and had been repeatedly attempting for years and policy changed.

[Sgt Joch]

No German officer was prosecuted for the conduct of the war per se, unless they deliberately killed prisoners or civilians.

Field Marshal Milch (Luftwaffe), in charge of aircraft production for a big chunk of the war, was sent to jail for his role in the slave labor program.

General Lohr (Luftwaffe), was executed for his role in the mass murder of civilians during anti-partisan operations in Yugoslavia.

Lt. Eck, commander of U-852, was executed for ordering the killing of survivors of the Peleus.

Donitz was not prosecuted for his role in the Battle of the Atlantic, mostly because all the American and British admirals who fought against him were of the opinion that he fought a tough but clean war. Some were even willing to testify on his behalf.

In fact, in the immediate postwar period, no one saw unrestricted submarine warfare or strategic bombing of cities as a war crime, unless someone stepped over the line like Eck.

ps - BTW, what is happening at Wikipedia? Every entry dealing with German WW2 war crimes is slanted to minimise German actions and maximise potential Allied crimes, almost like right wing fanatics are using Wikipedia for political purposes...

ps2 - "Real" history books show that: Lohr was not convicted for the Bombing of Belgrade; Eck's order to "shoot survivors" was clear; Mush Morton's actions caused a malaise throughout the U.S. submarine service, but fortunately he died thereby solving the problem; etc.

[ASL Veteran]

ps - BTW, what is happening at Wikipedia? Every entry dealing with German WW2 war crimes is slanted to minimise German actions and maximise potential Allied crimes, almost like right wing fanatics are using Wikipedia for political purposes...

The National Socialist Workers Party was a 'left wing' organization not a 'right wing' organization. Don't let Stalin's post war posturing fool you (Stalin, chomping a cigar 'wow, wouldn't want to be associated with those guys - better call them right wingers so nothing sticks to me. Oh, don't look at all those Ukrainians - nothing to see there). No, the Nazi Party was not communist but Fascism holds many 'community' and 'collective' based foundations. The collective being the state as opposed to the proletariat.

[ArgusEye]

Left wing and right wing are crippled concepts, and have been since the late 19th century.

National socialism isn't socialism with a nationalistic side dish. Socialism of those days was still the original Marxist concept (not the weird watered down socialist/social democrat hybrid debited today) of the lower classes [proletariat] standing up to and destroying the upper classes [bourgeoisie]. National socialism was about the same mechanism, but unlike in regular socialism, it wasn't class against class, but ethnicity against ethnicity. Thence *national* socialism.

As for extreme right and extreme left, they are closer in their ideas to each other than to the center.

[sburke]

The National Socialist Workers Party was a 'left wing' organization not a 'right wing' organization. Don't let Stalin's post war posturing fool you (Stalin, chomping a cigar 'wow, wouldn't want to be associated with those guys - better call them right wingers so nothing sticks to me. Oh, don't look at all those Ukrainians - nothing to see there). No, the Nazi Party was not communist but Fascism holds many 'community' and 'collective' based foundations. The collective being the state as opposed to the proletariat.

Huh? No, whatever else one might say about the Nazi's, they were most assuredly not left wing.

[LongLeftFlank]

Hee hee. You know, when people go far enough to the Left, they come out on the far right again (i.e. worshipping the Chairman or the Dear Leader as messianic god king).

It doesn't work the other way though; once people move past the point of messianic worship (God / Nation / Race) on the right, they then seem to give up in despair and withdraw from society altogether, becoming misanthropic hermits (e.g. Solzhenitsyn, the Unabomber, Bin Laden). Or Colonel Jack D Ripper.

[Michael Emrys]

Hee hee. You know, when people go far enough to the Left, they come out on the far right again (i.e. worshipping the Chairman or the Dear Leader as messianic god king).

It doesn't work the other way though; once people move past the point of messianic worship (God / Nation / Race) on the right, they then seem to give up in despair and withdraw from society altogether, becoming misanthropic hermits (e.g. Solzhenitsyn, the Unabomber, Bin Laden). Or Colonel Jack D Ripper.

Perhaps you may already know that in chaos theory (now more commonly called complexity theory) there is a set of phenomena called Strange Attractors. Not exactly sure what that has to do with your post, but somehow it called them to mind.

Michael

[sburke]

Perhaps you may already know that in chaos theory (now more commonly called complexity theory) there is a set of phenomena called Strange Attractors. Not exactly sure what that has to do with your post, but somehow it called them to mind.

Michael

I think you meant to post this in the MBT.

[PzKpfw 1]

So, is Bomber Harris supposed to be someone who deserves praise? Seeing as he was the one who deliberately targeted millions of civilians with his bombing campaign against German population centres which resulted in hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths is that a praiseworthy achievement? It appeared that his main motivation was revenge on the German peoples for having bombed English civilian centres (also an unforgiveable strategy). Of course, Germany claimed that they were simply responding to the (ineffectual) bombing raid that had been orchestrated by Bomber Command against Berlin in the early days of the Battle of Britain.

I guess he simply wanted to prove once and for all that 2 wrongs do in fact make a right.

Regards

KR

Harris did NOT choose to target civilians etc. He is often blamed for this, the truth is civilians chose to attack civilians. Harris had no pwer to dictate national policy. The strategy of area bombing was decided on months before Harris was apointed as head of BC by the goverment.

Ie,* one week before Harris took command BC was formaly directed to concentrate all its efforts 'on the morale of the enemy civil population'. So as we see Harris inhereted the area bombing strategy, he did not concieve it etc. Harris's veiw on the subject was Germany's material ability to wage war was what counted, and this could be undermined only by heavy and persistant bombing of industrial centers, factories, transport facilities, supporting services, and workers houseing.

*See: Overy Richard. Why The Allies Won. p.113

Rgards, John Waters

[Sublime]

Waters Im not saying you.re wrong, but what about the strategy declaration that the German civilians were the target because they were the factory workers etc?

You mean that this was a War Office decision and it wasnt up to Harris? If it wasnt up to Harris Im just interested to know how far political leadership went in dictating Strategic Bomber Offensive policy (targetting, times of attack, number of aircraft, etc etc etc)

[PzKpfw 1]

Waters Im not saying you.re wrong, but what about the strategy declaration that the German civilians were the target because they were the factory workers etc?

You mean that this was a War Office decision and it wasnt up to Harris? If it wasnt up to Harris Im just interested to know how far political leadership went in dictating Strategic Bomber Offensive policy (targetting, times of attack, number of aircraft, etc etc etc)

The decision to attack civilians, was made by the civilian goverment. It was instittuted before Harris was appointed head of bomber command. Harris was in charge of carrying out his goverments orders by all means neccessary.

Regards, John Waters

[Sublime]

Interesting. I had been under the impression that the decision to attack civilians had come about as part of an evolutionary process that began with daylight bomber operations over France in '40 that to raids after the BoB at night that progressively grew more refined and large as time went on. After massed bombing at night seemed to not do as well against factories, and early reports came back with horrible statistics with bombs on targets shook up the high command, a strategy shift to attack civilians occured. I had also thought Harris was in command then, but again Im not disputing what you say at all. Just as I thought the development of firestorm bombing was in a way an accident, an unforseen side effect of massed incediary bombings on cities...?

[Kanonier Reichmann]

How much influence did Harris have in providing assistance to the civilian government in coming to that decision on the directive to target factory workers? I can't believe he had no hand in the ultimate policy direction, especially seeing he is appointed as head of Bomber Command within a week of the directive being issued.

Sounds to me like a case of ensuring the right person for the job is in place to carry out an unpalatable directive. The sort of person who will prosecute such a directive with great zeal and determination despite contrary views. Seems like the person in the form of Harris was well chosen for such an unconscionable strategy.

Arthur Harris and Curtis LeMay would have made fine bedfellows and had much in common to discuss if they ever crossed paths in their wartime service. To give you an idea of the mindset of leMay, this quote was attributed to him... Killing Japanese didn't bother me very much at that time... I suppose if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal... in the context of being questioned over the use of firebombing on cities like Tokyo.

Regards

KR

[JonS]

and early reports came back with horrible statistics with bombs on targets shook up the high command

The Butt Report, August 1941.

I had also thought Harris was in command then

Harris took over Bomber Command in Feb 1942.

Also relevant: The Area Bombing Directive

The Area Bombing Directive was a directive from the wartime British Government's Air Ministry to the Royal Air Force which ordered RAF bombers to attack the German industrial workforce and the morale of the German populace through bombing German cities and their civilian inhabitants.

This was issued 8 days before Harris took over BC.

Ironically, on 20 May 1942 Mr. Justice Singleton, a High Court Judge, in a report to Cabinet looking at competing bombing points-of-view concluded that

If Russia can hold Germany on land I doubt whether Germany will stand 12 or 18 months' continuous, intensified and increased bombing, affecting, as it must, her war production, her power of resistance, her industries and her will to resist (by which I mean morale).

He was quite right. Bombing only really got under way at the start of 1944, and 18 months later the war was over, in substantial part because "her war production, her power of resistance, her industries and her will to resist (by which I mean morale)" had been affected by "continuous, intensified and increased bombing".

I thought the development of firestorm bombing was in a way an accident, an unforseen side effect of massed incediary bombings on cities...?

That it was. The Hamburg firestorm was very much a happy accident, due to freak weather conditions interacting with the particular schedule of bombing laid on against the city. A different schedule of bombing, or the same schedule delivered a week earlier or later, would not have created the same firestorm. There were few other firestorms created during the war, because the necessary conditions were particular and so poorly understood.

[Kanonier Reichmann]

Ironically, on 20 May 1942 Mr. Justice Singleton, a High Court Judge, in a report to Cabinet looking at competing bombing points-of-view concluded that

He was quite right. Bombing only really got under way at the start of 1944, and 18 months later the war was over, in substantial part because "her war production, her power of resistance, her industries and her will to resist (by which I mean morale)" had been affected by "continuous, intensified and increased bombing".

To be able to mount a 1,000 bomber raid in the form of Operation Gomorrah on Hamburg in July 1943 hardly backs up the view that bombing only really became serious from 1944 onwards. That's a lmost 2 years before the Nazi regime finally capitulated and from what I understand, the peoples will to resist was still very high, judging by the fierce fighting in and around Berlin. On the count of breaking the populations will, it appeared to have failed miserably.

Regards

KR

[JonS]

Look at the stats I posted earlier. Gomorrah and the battle of the Ruhr were impressive, but they really didn,t get going till ,44. Also, the 12-18month estimate was in the context of a force of 4,000 bombers, which #never# happened.

[PzKpfw 1]

How much influence did Harris have in providing assistance to the civilian government in coming to that decision on the directive to target factory workers? I can't believe he had no hand in the ultimate policy direction, especially seeing he is appointed as head of Bomber Command within a week of the directive being issued.

The decisions roots go all the way back to May 19, 1940 & Lord Trenchards, memorandum on "The Present War Situation" to Churchhill. Basicly it stated how to conduct the air war, & that morale mattered most in that the Germans were prone to 'hysteria & panic'. This memo was read by the Service cheifs & in July 1941 BC was ordered to attack 'German transportaion morale'. Then in Feb 1942 BC was directed to concentrate all its efforts on the 'morale of the enemy civil population'. Harris had no say in these events he was the person selected to head BC & and carry out the directives. JonS also makes a good point on the Butt, & Singleton reports & bomber accuracy or the lack of etc, & the reports effects on the decision process on area bombing.

Sounds to me like a case of ensuring the right person for the job is in place to carry out an unpalatable directive. The sort of person who will prosecute such a directive with great zeal and determination despite contrary views. Seems like the person in the form of Harris was well chosen for such an unconscionable strategy.

The only contrary veiws at the time were the military wanted to use the bombers against German military targets.

Arthur Harris and Curtis LeMay would have made fine bedfellows and had much in common to discuss if they ever crossed paths in their wartime service. To give you an idea of the mindset of leMay, this quote was attributed to him... Killing Japanese didn't bother me very much at that time... I suppose if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal... in the context of being questioned over the use of firebombing on cities like Tokyo.

Regards

KR

Well one has to also remember it was a difrent world at the time, few ppl in the war years would have objected to, the bombing as the liberal conscience of today.

Regards, John Waters

[LongLeftFlank]

Reluctant to wade back into this, but in the 1939-42 period Hitler and the Nazi leadership had been making extravagant public promises to the German populace that the war would not significantly affect the civilian economy, bombing included -- "You can call me Meier!" etc. Considering their willingness to murder any and all political opponents, real or imagined, the Nazis were strangely sensitive to popular opinion, and this did not go unnoticed in Britain.

Also, Hamburg is the closest major German city to England; it was a comparatively easy target for a large raid, and easy to find on a river at night -- you didn't need Pathfinders, OBOE, etc. That said, I think there were also "thousand bomber raids" in 1943 on Cologne and Berlin IIRC, maybe others too.

[PzKpfw 1]

To be able to mount a 1,000 bomber raid in the form of Operation Gomorrah on Hamburg in July 1943 hardly backs up the view that bombing only really became serious from 1944 onwards. That's a lmost 2 years before the Nazi regime finally capitulated and from what I understand, the peoples will to resist was still very high, judging by the fierce fighting in and around Berlin. On the count of breaking the populations will, it appeared to have failed miserably.

Regards

KR

Concerning Gomorrah Albert Speer stated that it put the 'fear of god into him'. As well as he told Hitler, that the destruction of another 6 cities on the same scale, would bring armaments production to a total halt. Jeschonnek remarked that 'Stalingrad was trifling'.

The policy was not only Englands at Casablanca in january 1943 the Combined Cheifs of Staff directive ordered the 'progessive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened'.

Another aspect in the questioning of morality in bombing of civilian population centrers during the war is the bombers were not attacking defenceless civilians, in that the combat was not between the bombers & civilians, it was between the bombers & German defensive forces, Ie, German fighters & AA guns. This is something rarely brought up in these discussions.

Regards, John Waters