In Desperate Battle: Normandy 1944

[Erwin]

One can only wish Noob was around in Hitler's time so he could use these arguments to convince Herr Hitler to conquer the world's knitting championships and kill his spare time instead lol.

However, I recall some of Noob's philosophy was common when I was fifteen as well. So, I guess we need to cut the boy some slack.

[Paper Tiger]

Almost, but would appeasing Hitler and not having gone to war have stopped civilian casualties? Do the concentration camps not count?

No to the first and yes to the second. Sometimes you have to go to war. You have no choice in the matter. But that doesn't mean that you have to like it. It also means that you're going to get dirty and that you might have to do terrible things in order to survive.

Civilians can suffer in many ways with a military action never having occurred.

Good grief. Of course bad stuff happens to people without war. I'm not a simpleton, man. There are FOUR Horsemen of the Apocalypse, not one.

[sburke]

This is all getting just a might bit too personal. While I might disagree with noob that the position while sounding admirable is hoplessly impossible to apply and not have someone else pay the price for it, I don't disagree with his overall sentiment. I'd prefer to not do something I know is wrong rather than trying to justify it later.

And noob, painting everyone else in the broadbrush of being the same as the axis powers isn't really all that helpful either. You want to know why you are arguing with 5 other people who feel just as strongly as you, it is simply they also recognize there is a cost to your position which they feel is immoral to ask others to pay.

We are all not going to agree here which frankly is probably a very good thing. Moral dilemmas should not be easily answered.

[sburke]

No to the first and yes to the second. Sometimes you have to go to war. You have no choice in the matter. But that doesn't mean that you have to like it. It also means that you're going to get dirty and that you might have to do terrible things in order to survive.

Yeah I would say that is a pretty succinct sum up.

Good grief. Of course bad stuff happens to people without war. I'm not a simpleton, man. There are FOUR Horsemen of the Apocalypse, not one.

LOl wasn't trying to say you were sir although I like your response better.

[Sixxkiller]

You know, the TV show MASH had a great line. "In order to be able to shoot at someone you should sit down and get to know them first."

[JonS]

There are FOUR Horsemen of the Apocalypso, not one.

An excellent time to segue to this.

(and the antecendent)

[Mord]

To know me is to shoot me.

Mord.

[Mord]

An excellent time to segue to this.

I tried reading that and woke up face down in a puddle of drool...I still have the keyboard marks in my face. I had to edit my post 'cause it looked like this;

asJjdbhfdb fhbf frnkbfib fhb fjrgl;jrgnbgjgjgg;jngjgjg;ngkreopereoeoeieop[rpwrjrjirjgigjtogn

Mord.

[sburke]

An excellent time to segue to this.

(and the antecendent)

LOL friggin hysterical. To think this place was even nuttier at some point in the past.

[Tarquelne]

So, is Bomber Harris supposed to be someone who deserves praise?

Looked through a few pages... seems the thread has gotten off the topic of the documentary.

In case the comment quoted above was intended to be on-topic:

Short version: No. That was all stuff about McKenna's psychology, not Harris' guilt.

Long version: No. The point is that the documentary maker viewed all WWII vets as being violent due to their experiences in the war. But since of blaming all those heroic vets is something of a non-starter - you have to be a militant hippy for that - the doco-guy shifted the blame to figures like Harris... and figures not like Harris, except that they were also in positions of leadership.

In this view the doco maker AND the most vets are all victims of the perfidy and incompetence of the leaders. And not for something excessive civilian casualties, but for the beatings the doco-maker received in school.

Note, btw, that McKenna does seem to be taking as a given that someone should be "blamed".

[Kanonier Reichmann]

The main aim of WW2 strategic bombing was not to kill German civilians, but to destroy German industry. Unfortunately, with the technology available at the time, you could not do one without the other.

I suppose Dresden was a classic example of attempting to destroy industry as the primary target.

The British switched to night bombing because they could not afford the losses. They wanted to bomb military targets, but at first, they had trouble just hitting cities, which is why "breaking morale" became a primary objective.

An objective in which they failed miserably to achieve despite the massive loss of civilian life.

Why does this topic always generate such heat? German U-Boats also deliberately targeted civilians, but they get a pass.

Not just German U-Boats but Allied submarines as well I think is what you failed to mention. If you continue with that line of argument then you're saying that it would have been wrong for Allied warships to blockade and sink merchant shipping, if necessary, that's heading into Nazi Germany? The fact is, the shipping is often carrying weapons of war so it's accepted that they're valid targets in wartime. Enemy population centres with little or no industry... not so much.

Regards

KR

[Erwin]

We seem to miss the point that any entity that starts a nasty war with the quasi-religious goal of to eliminating other "subhuman" races needs to be eliminated by any means possible.

GB was desperate and used whatever methods it could devise merely to survive during the years it stood alone.

Equally, with the Jap fanatics who wanted to die to the last man, woman and child, why should the Allies lose a million more men AND kill many more Jap civilians in the process of invading the home islands, when a couple of atom bombs forced a surrender with comparably LESS loss of civilian life. How many posters here would even exist if we'd lost another generation of men in the Pacific?

Seems to me that deterrence is knowing that if you start a war, you can expect a very nasty retribution. So don't.

Am really tired of predators trying to "explain the morality" of their actions to their prey by attempts to rewrite history.

[TrailApe]

As for the prosecution of war I follow Mr Rimmer's stance:

Rimmer: What are you waiting for? Gloop him.

Lister: I can't. He's not armed.

Rimmer: Lister, this is not a scout meeting. We are not trying to win Best Behaved Troop Flag. Gloop him.

Lister: What? In the back?

Rimmer: Of course in the back. It's only a pity he's awake.

Lister: You mean you can happily kill him if he was asleep?

Rimmer: I can happily kill him if he was on the job.

Go Rimmsy!

[Splinty]

We seem to miss the point that any entity that starts a nasty war with the quasi-religious goal of to eliminating other "subhuman" races needs to be eliminated by any means possible.

GB was desperate and used whatever methods it could devise merely to survive during the years it stood alone.

Equally, with the Jap fanatics who wanted to die to the last man, woman and child, why should the Allies lose a million more men AND kill many more Jap civilians in the process of invading the home islands, when a couple of atom bombs forced a surrender with comparably LESS loss of civilian life. How many posters here would even exist if we'd lost another generation of men in the Pacific?

Seems to me that deterrence is knowing that if you start a war, you can expect a very nasty retribution. So don't.

Am really tired of predators trying to "explain the morality" of their actions to their prey by attempts to rewrite history.

Right on the money.

[Sgt Joch]

I suppose Dresden was a classic example of attempting to destroy industry as the primary target.

Ah yes, Dresden. Everyone always thinks that "Dresden" somehow answers everything. Dresden was one raid in an air war which lasted over 5 years. What about Peenemunde, Schweinfurth, Ploesti?

The strategic bombing of Germany was one of the more successful campaign of the war. It disrupted German weapon production and oil production and tied down significant German resources. By 44-45, over a million personnel were manning Flak guns in Germany. By 43, the Germans were pulling their best fighter squadrons from France and the Russian front to defend Germany. In the air campaign over the winter of 43-44, German fighter squadrons were decimated and many veterans were lost, thereby finishing the Luftwaffe as an effective force for the rest of the war. It shortened the war and saved the lives of Allied soldiers,( i.e. my grandfathers and great-uncles).

More importantly, every participant in the war including Germany, Italy and Japan used the same tactics, which is why I find the ex post facto attempts to somehow create a moral equivalancy between Allied Strategic Bombing and the Nazi murder of 6 million jews so funny.

An objective in which they failed miserably to achieve despite the massive loss of civilian life.

HuH? Mussolini was overthrown after the Allies bombed Rome. Japan surrendered after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were nuked. Postwar studies show that German morale was affected, absenteeism and defeatism was high which affected production. If Germany had a normal government, they would have surrendered, but the Fuhrer had other ideas...

[mjkerner]

Ah yes, Dresden. Everyone always thinks that "Dresden" somehow answers everything. Dresden was one raid in an air war which lasted over 5 years. What about Peenemunde, Schweinfurth, Ploesti?

The strategic bombing of Germany was one of the more successful campaign of the war. It disrupted German weapon production and oil production and tied down significant German resources. By 44-45, over a million personnel were manning Flak guns in Germany. By 43, the Germans were pulling their best fighter squadrons from France and the Russian front to defend Germany. In the air campaign over the winter of 43-44, German fighter squadrons were decimated and many veterans were lost, thereby finishing the Luftwaffe as an effective force for the rest of the war. It shortened the war and saved the lives of Allied soldiers,( i.e. my grandfathers and great-uncles).

More importantly, every participant in the war including Germany, Italy and Japan used the same tactics, which is why I find the ex post facto attempts to somehow create a moral equivalancy between Allied Strategic Bombing and the Nazi murder of 6 million jews so funny.

I love Kurt Vonnegut and "Slaughterhouse Five", but Dresden was a communications and transport hub within about a 100 miles of the Russians, and a "valid" target as those things go. War is hell, total war is total hell.

[Peregrine]

HuH? Mussolini was overthrown after the Allies bombed Rome. Japan surrendered after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were nuked. Postwar studies show that German morale was affected, absenteeism and defeatism was high which affected production. If Germany had a normal government, they would have surrendered, but the Fuhrer had other ideas...

You can't attribute these things to the success of the air war as the allies were bombing everywhere as often as possible for years before these things happened.

[Peregrine]

The main aim of WW2 strategic bombing was not to kill German civilians, but to destroy German industry. Unfortunately, with the technology available at the time, you could not do one without the other. The 1991 bombing campaign against Baghdad shows what can be done with precise weapons and only about 10% of the bombs dropped were smart bombs; its up to 100% now.

Let us not forget that for a long time, bombing Germany was the only way the Allies could help Russia. From June 41 to june 44, Russia was doing the bulk of the fighting (NA/Sicily/Italy were sideshows). In 41/42, Stalin kept dropping hints he might sign a separate peace. Bombing Germany was the only way to keep up the pressure.

The British switched to night bombing because they could not afford the losses. They wanted to bomb military targets, but at first, they had trouble just hitting cities, which is why "breaking morale" became a primary objective.

The U.S. bombed in the daylight, in part to minimise civilian casualties, and suffered high losses because of it. Do they get any credit for being so considerate?

I think the problem with the British actions of the bombing campaign is that they well understood that they were just essentially killing civilians (and not really that effectively considering how much they stuff they dropped) and there was no way that this was going to turn out to be a winning strategy. The German army had to be defeated on the ground with land forces.

The USAAF bombed during the day because they had better aircraft and actually tried much harder to hit something that would more decisively impact the war.

The great irony is the British leadership knew explicitly from their own experiences that a focused campaign on military assets can have a dramatic impact where randomly dropping bombs on cities kills people but doesn't yield significant military results.

[JonS]

I think the problem with the British actions of the bombing campaign is that they well understood that they were just essentially killing civilians (and not really that effectively considering how much they stuff they dropped)

You know, the RAF and USAAF didn't just wake up one day in 1942 and think to themselves "Hey, how's about we go kill some babies today! No rhyme, no reason, I just wanna kill some babies!" As blunt as the CBO was, it was all directed towards specific achieving military objectives, and not one of those objectives was "kill babies".

Also, the CBO from early 1944 through to the end of the war was very effective. It was arguably effective much earlier. The RAF clearly won the Battle of the Ruhr in 1943, and Op GOMORRAH - also in 1943 - scared the pants off Speer and others.

and there was no way that this was going to turn out to be a winning strategy. The German army had to be defeated on the ground with land forces.

So? Defeating the Vichy French in North-West Africa wasn't a 'winning strategy' either - does that mean they shouldn't have bothered with it?

The CBO contributed decisively to the Allied victory in Europe, and the equivalent in the pacific contributed decisively to the defeat of Japan. No, on it's own it wasn't sufficient, but then there was no single strategy that fit that description - it's an impossible standard. Yes; a number of RAF Marshalls (and USAAF Generals) professed belief in it as a single-point panacea (heh). They were wrong.

The USAAF bombed during the day because they had better aircraft and actually tried much harder to hit something that would more decisively impact the war.

Well, 'better' is a matter of opinion. I happen to believe that the Lancaster and Mosquito were unsurpassed in their roles in Europe.

Also, the USAAF didn't try all that hard to achieve much in the way of accuracy. Pattern bombing on command, for a start, rather than having each bomber individually target it's own bombload. They never really had anything to match 100 Gp, or 8 Group, or the LNSF. As a result the RAF was demonstrably more accurate and precise than the USAAF from around mid-1944 onwards, by day or by night.

[Michael Emrys]

Civilians have always been targets in wars too. It's just that in the 20th Century, technological advances made them more vulnerable and effectively put them on the front line.

I hear tell that the 30 Years War was pretty rough on the civilians in the lands being fought over too.

Michael

[JonS]

You can't attribute these things to the success of the air war as the allies were bombing everywhere as often as possible for years before these things happened.

Not solely, but yes you can. Strategic bombing was a very new 'thing' in 1940, one that had never been tried. The tools, tactics, and techniques took a while to develop. By 1943 those were - mostly - in place, and as a result the imposed effects took off.

It's true that the early years of the bombing campaign were largely ineffectual, but they were crucial in learning the lessons required later on.

You also need to look at the cumulative bomb rate. The quantity of bombs dropped up on Germany during the 'learning phase' up to the end of 1942 really was trivial, comprising just 5% of the eventual total. By comparrison, the single year of 1944 - when the tools, tactics, and techniques were all in place - saw 57% of the eventual total dropped.

(yes; gross tonnage on its own is a crude measure of effectiveness)

[Peregrine]

You know, the RAF and USAAF didn't just wake up one day in 1942 and think to themselves "Hey, how's about we go kill some babies today! No rhyme, no reason, I just wanna kill some babies!" As blunt as the CBO was, it was all directed towards specific achieving military objectives, and not one of those objectives was "kill babies".

Didn't say that didn't think that. I have no idea what the Germans did with their kids but I would be surprised if it was any different than sending the kids to safer areas in the countryside like the British did.

But that said the British Commander of Bomber Command did think that bombing cities would lead to such chaos and civil unrest that it would force the Germans to the negotiating table. He started thinking that during/after his experiences in WWI.

Bombing simply wasn't remotely accurate so any attacks were bound to destroy large swathes of the Germans cities and this was accepted and became the norm.

I don't think you can classify that as a successful strategy though. As you said above, the bombing got going in 1942 and the war continued into 1945. Even after ultra intelligence identified the acute shortages in oil production (and this was something the bombing contributed too that Albert Speer would have been concerned about) Bomber Command still didn't either due to different ideas in prosecuting the war or couldn't due to bombing inaccuracy cripple their war effort. The bombing of the factory workers also didn't force a change of government.

[JonS]

But that said the British Commander of Bomber Command did think that bombing cities would lead to such chaos and civil unrest that it would force the Germans to the negotiating table. He started thinking that during/after his experiences in WWI.

Yeah, and he was wrong in that specific regard. So? Being wrong in that specific doesn't mean the whole thing was a waste of time.

Bombing simply wasn't remotely accurate so any attacks were bound to destroy large swathes of the Germans cities and this was accepted and became the norm.

Initially, that's true. Area bombing was a pragmatic response to the realisation that the RAF simple didn't have the tools, tactics, and techniques needed to attack point targets. But eventually they did gain a high degree of accuracy - see, for example, the raid on the Ameins prison, the Penemunde (sp?) raid, tactical support in Normandy, the pre-OVERLORD transportation plan, the destruction of the PzGroupWest HQ, and the bombing of Le Havre for examples.

But it's also due to a realisation that attacking production targets by default means attacking areas, not points. Individual factorys are spread out. Individual factories also depend on a network of systems - transport links, feeder factories, and, yes, workers and their housing, all of which are spread over vast areas. Why attack a single factory making aircraft, when it's feasible to attack all factories making all sorts of things, and their feeder systems, at the same time?

I don't think you can classify that as a successful strategy though. As you said above, the bombing got going in 1942 and the war continued into 1945.

The Russian Campaign only got going in 1941 and continued clear through to the end of the war - that's even longer! By your standard the Russians shouldn't have bothered?

The 'Battle' of the Atlantic got going in 1939 and continued clear through to the end of the war - that's even longer still! By your standard the British shouldn't have bothered with that one either?

Incidentally:

Even after ultra intelligence identified the acute shortages in oil production (and this was something the bombing contributed too that Albert Speer would have been concerned about) Bomber Command still didn't either due to different ideas in prosecuting the war or couldn't due to bombing inaccuracy cripple their war effort.

Bomber Command dropped more bombs on 'oil' targets than the USAAF.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-RAF-III/img/RAF-3-17-1.jpg

[Michael Emrys]

Particularly before the war, but also during it, everyone who had anything to do with strategic bombing greatly exaggerated its efficacy. Although it did have an impact on civilian morale, there was never the kind of mass panic that had been predicted. Rather, the effects were more subtle than that. Apathy and disaffection were more likely than panic. But also there could be a hardening of the determination to prosecute the war, a determination to make the enemy pay for what one was currently having to endure.

Michael

[Peregrine]

The Russian Campaign only got going in 1941 and continued clear through to the end of the war - that's even longer! By your standard the Russians shouldn't have bothered.

The 'Battle' of the Atlantic got going in 1939 and continued clear through to the end of the war - that's even longer still! By your standard the British shouldn't have bothered with that one either.

Incidentally:

Bomber Command dropped more bombs on 'oil' targets than the USAAF.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-RAF-III/img/RAF-3-17-1.jpg

That is a totally unfair comparison and not comparable in scale to the question of the Bomber Command. The Russians were clearly successfully as they the were on the winning side of the war and were responsible for the vast majority of the German army casualties. But they still had their share of disasters and a big list of things they could have done better.

The battle of the Atlantic could be an example of where the air campaign was a bit wrong.

Not sure if this was Bomber Command hanging on to aircraft or Fighter Command or maybe technological development in aircraft range but in a nutshell Coastal Command got more aircraft that had a longer range which when coupled with radar advances finally finished the U-boat threat. <--- from a single source read a long time ago so I might be wrong. It was probably a book critical of Bomber Command though.

A quick read of the internet indicates that getting B-24 Liberators released from Bomber Command to assist was the problem I was half remembering. Not verified.

Dropping more or more accurately on oil targets is something that definitely would have turned the Bombing campaign into a success rather than something that is so much harder to quantify.

I never said they shouldn't have bothered.