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PzKpfw 1

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  1. The Soviets in the Berlin fighting reported recieving Panzerfaust fire from 2nd story rooms, balconies, roofs, basement windows etc. In the house to house fighting in Berlin, German troops were fireing PF down stairwells into to doorways, Basements, hallways, & into rooms Soviet troops entered, PF were fired in the extensive, & bloody battles in the sewers under Berlin etc. Lets just say the Soviet troops must have been very happy when the Panzerfaust stocks finlay ran dry in Berlin. Regards, John Waters
  2. in live test fireing vs Panther tanks conducted @ insigny, & Balleroy in 1944 the US/UK determined that 76mm T4 HVAP & 17lb APCBC were the 2 best rounds vs the PzKpfw V ie,: 17lb APDS was ruled out because it was to innacurate ie,: Lorrin Birds research on 17lb APDS provided the following.: Regards, John Waters
  3. 90% armor quality on the T-34-85 seems rather optimistic IMHO. ie, reports on T-34-85 examples in 44/45 found poor or incomplete welding, with visible gaps throught the joints of some of the models exhaimed. This was attributed to poor QC or an effeort to increase production. Post war US examination of T-34-85s found in Berlin, showed the 45mm plate greately varied in impact resistance from 4 to 14ft/lbs Charpy notch impact resistance. Also anylss of T-34-85 armor showed it contained no nickel, Vanadium, or Molybdenium, & about 50% less Chrome then german plate. Compared to a German report dated June 1942 on the T-34-76 that showed armor composition as: C, .22 to .25 Mn, 1.30-1.50 Si, 1.35-1.45 Cr, .80-.90 Mo, .15-.25 V, 0.0 Ni, 1.30-1.50 Basicly it apperars Soviet armor production was suffering from the same problems as late war German production. I'd say an 85% quality rateing would apply to Soviet armor as well. An report on the* Panther glacis, reported that the inferior toughness was attributed to" a combination of incomplete transformation to martensite upon quenching and temper embrittlement". The plate was quenched incompletely, or too slowly, which would leave the center of the plate not sufficiently quenched (transformed to martensite), although the outer sections would be completely quenched to martensite. & that the armor may have been tempered in the temperature zone which leads to embrittlement (400-1000degF). This would degrade the quality of the steel in both "good" and "bad" sections, leading to overall poor quality due to brittleness. The Panther glacis was of adequate hardness, but inadequate toughness, throughout the cross-section. A zone at the center of the section was even more brittle than the outer zones. Basicly from the report one could say the entire plate was flawed, with an seriously flawed layer at the center. *Data from Robert Livingston. Also i'd add that a Soviet report on the Tiger B armor, stated the Panthers armor they had analyzed at the same time, had superior ballistic protection to the Tiger B they examined. Regards, John Waters
  4. Vanir, sorry about the late reply, my post should have said M61 APCBC, NOT M62. M61 performed better vs face hardened armor & sloped armor then M72 AP. The M72 conversion was to M61 APCBC. Regards, John Waters
  5. Oops that should read 1,750 tanks prior to Zitadelle excludeing PzKpfw V/VI totals. Regards, John Waters
  6. As of 01.07.43 the Germans had 1,397 tanks deployed prior to Zitadelle broken down as*: PzKpfw III 5.cm L/60 - 538 PzKpfw III 5.cm L/42 - 117 PzKpfw III 7.5cm L/24 - 170 PzKpfw IV 7.5cm L/43/48 - 859 PzKpfw IV 7.5cm L/24 - 54 PzKpfw 38t - 12 Total: 1,750 tanks. 1,397 lang 5.cm. 7.5cm & 341 Kurtz 5cm 7.5cm *See Jentz Thomas L. Panzer Truppen vol.2 pp. 78 - 82. Regards, John Waters
  7. Oh c'mon Jason, you stated their were no German heavies, until 43, the plain fact is the Germans had Tigers operateing from Sept 42 on. and it makes no difrence at all to your statement, if their were 12 or 100, or if they showed up the last day of the calendar for 1942. Please show me where i said any of the above. Ahh doesn't this just bring back memories of the good ol evil 'Tiger lobby' conspiracy days, Jason to bad Jeff, Claus, or Lorrin arn't here we could have a meeting. Regards, John Waters
  8. To provide more examples on my previous posts, concerning mixed Tank Tank Brigada, for the failed Soviet offensive at Kharkov in 1942 the main strike force was Pushkin's Tank Group, with 4 Tank Korps, consisting of 4th TC, 13th TC, 23rd TC, & 24th TC. Pushkin's forces had a total of 568 tanks in 12 Brigada broken down by type: T-34-76 - 127 KV - 82 T-60 - 206 T-70 -14 MK III(Valantine) - 30 Stuart, M3 - 76 Grant, M3 - 33 As we see above 40% of the tanks were Lt tanks, the Soviets were forced to use Lt tanks in place of mediums & heavies in the formations as they could not produce enough T-34 & KV to outfit their TC to Shtat levels. Pushkin's Group was encircled and destroyed at Izyum in May 1942. This example highlights Rotmistrovs remarks i used earlier. A Soviet study after Kharkov on problems with mixed brigades described the problem as being that T-34s left the KV-1 & Lt tanks to far behind during operations for them to contribute to the inital breakthru phase & splintering the force. Ie, T-34s entered German anti tank gun defence ranges before the KV-1 could move ahead to breakthru the German defenseive positions. KV's also caused problems in that they often broke thru bridges, which delayed follow up forces from advanceing, it didnt help that Soviet bridgeing material was only rated for 30 tons, so special bridgeing had to be made for the KV that wasnt usualy available in operations till later. Same with the Lt tanks they to were left behind & could not contribute in time to the initial phase. Also poor coordination & tactics were cited as well as lack of radios. Ie, the solution was to let the KV advance, breakthru the German inital German defensive line then send in the T-34 & Lt tanks to exploit it. These experiences led to the formation of the Soviet Independant Heavy Tank Regiments. Another problem encountered increaseingly in 1942 was the appearence in greater numbers of the PAK 50, with PzGr.40 APCR ammunition or 'arrowhead' as it could penetrate the KV-1 armor. As well as the introduction of the PAK 40. Prior to this the KV had earned the nick name 'white mammoth' with its crews, when single KVs were able to sit outside German defensive positions with impunity & fire away on those positions, after the appearence of the PAK 40/50 this was no longer practicle. Regards, John Waters
  9. Jason, Tiger were operateing on the Eastren front in 1942 ie, s.H.Pz.Abt.502(511), their first loss of a Tiger in combat was 25.11.42 To state their were no heavies on the Eastren front till 1943, is rather misleading. Regards, John Waters
  10. 3/s.H.Pz.Pz.Abt 506 reported the loss of 1, Tiger II on 24.09.44 to an "PIAT", operateing with Kg. Spindler SE of Osterbeek. regards, John Waters
  11. Jason i'm not saying it does per sey, what i am getting at with workhorse is the T-34 did not achieve what the Soviets refered to as "strategic mobility" prior to late 1943. Ie, a point Rotmistrov makes concerning this subject about mixed Tank Brigades, the KV-, T-60/70 could not keep up with T-34-76 in operations, so T-34s left their componet light tank elements in the dust, which made the attacks less cordinated & with less firepower etc. & their was no fix for this until such time as T-34s were available in sufficent numbers, to outfit all TB'S With T-34 & remove the light tank componets. Until then the mixed brigades hindered Soviet mobile operations, to an extent, yes they were successful despite of this, but not soley because of the T-34. And to comment on your earlier post, their were not 8,000 T-34 in inventory on 31.12.42 their was only 7,600 T-34, M3 Grant in inventory faceing the Germans as of January 1943. at the most 5,953 T-34s survived 1942. Agreed,but i'm not sure for the same reasons, the Soviets continued to use Light tanks out of neccessity they had no choice, their were not enough T-34 available to soley equip all tank brigades till late 43. & here is where the full production finaly kicks in as 61% of all T-34 on hand, & produced were lost in 1943. & here is where we disagree, in opinion to me i see the transition occur in Bagration & after this to me was the T-34s strategic mobility realised. I dont agree that the Soviets had superior quality in November 42, the T-34 was not the dominant tank, their were more T-60/T-70 in the Tank Corps tank Brigades then T-34. T-34s worked with light tanks used as medium tanks a role they were forced into by neccessity. & one can not dismiss the contribution of the light tanks to Soviet successes. Nor can one atribute operational succecess soley to tanks their was a combined arms componet as well. Also one cannot dissmiss STAVKA planning & logistics effects on operations. Ie, Uranus was carefully planned & executed & unlike previous Soviet operation to date it worked because they struck the weakest link in the German defences, the satalite forces, and the Germans had no mobile reserves to use to halt it. Also to use November 1942 as an example of superiority one cannot dismiss the defeat that occured in Zhukovs oft forgotten Operation Mars, which was as important as Uranus,& more in some ways, where unlike Uranus, the Germans had mobile reserves that smashed Zhukovs forces, despite the initial commitment of 668,000 men, & 2000 tanks to the main assault. Mars losses were 100,000 KIA/MIA with 235,000 WIA, as well as the loss of 1,600 tanks. Mars stands as one of the worst Soviet operational defeats of the war in terms of cost in men & material, at a time of suposed Soviet force superiority. And one cant pretend or wish MARs away as the Soviets tried to do. Regards, John Waters
  12. From January 1, 1942 - December 31, 1942, the Soviets lost 15,000 tanks broken down as, 1,200 Heavy tanks, 6,600 T-34, 7,200 Lt. tanks 42.13% of the tanks on hand & produced in this time period are lost. You continue to ignore actual Tank Corps & Brigade composition & returns show their were more light tanks then either T-34 or KV in front line combat formations. Im not disputeing that the T-34 or KV or they wern't superior to German tanks etc, you threw that in for some reason. I'm also not discussing strategic initiative, nor the merits of the increase in the medium or heavy tank % etc. Nor am i being rude or sarcastic. And please point me to where i claimed they "had only light tanks'. This comment alone begs the question, have you even read any of my posts?. My point is/was that was apperently lost on you, that the T-34 did not become the workhorse it did till late 1943 Ie, the dominant tank numericly & to the point all TC Tank Brigades were outfitted entirely with T-34s, or the fleets ppl refer to. The Soviets despite production increase could not in 1942 outfit their entire force with T-34 nor could they until late 1943 due to losses, Ie, the German drive to Stalingrad left a wake of destroyed Tank Corps that for the most part had to retreat on foot & be rebuilt completely which ate production as well. The lt tanks were used in great numbers to make up for the lack of T-34s in the Tank Corps. After Dec 43 the Lt tanks begin to dissapear from the Tank & Mech Corps replaced by the T-34 & relegated to training establishments as of 01.01.45 their were still 5700 lt tanks in inventory in the training regts. This is why if you look at Stalingrad you see a Tank Corps during Uranus ie, 1st Tank corps had 96 T-34, 63 T-70 4th TC had 21-23 KV, 60 T-34, 30 MK II, & 60 T-60. 7th TC had 20 KV, 46 T-34, 30 T-70, 69 T-60 & these were TC specialy built up to relive Stalingrad. Yes some Tank Corps did achive the July 1942 Shtat levels Ie, the 17th Tank Corps, 3 Tank Brigades had their allotted 32 T-34, & 21 T-70 per brigade. But this was an exception compared to other TC tank type & numbers. Either i'm not being clear enough here, for you to understand, the pupose of my posts, or you just dont want to, or you want to arue for arguements sake, either way i'm here all week . Regards, John Waters
  13. Where did you get the Germans started Barbarossa with 3,300 tanks?. As of June 22 1941 the Germans had 5,264* tanks faceing east: PzKpfw Bef. - 330 PzKpfw 1 - 877 PzKpfw II - 1,074 PzKpfw III 1,440: 350 3,7cm, 1,090 5cm PzKpfw IV - 517 PzKpfw 35t - 187 PzKpfw 38t - 754 Flammpanzer - 85 if we exclude the 877 PzKpfw 1, & PzKpfw 35t not assigned to combat units, that still leaves 4,200 German tanks & 377 AG's vs 15,000** Soviet tanks in the Westren Military Districts. *See: Jentz Thomas L. Panzer Truppen. vol 1. p.186. **See: Dunn Walter S. Hitler's Nemesis. p.117. Regards, John Waters
  14. Correction on T-34 tank losses 1942 total T-34 irreversible losses was 6,600 T-34-76 Regards, John Waters
  15. The Soviets produced 12,520 T-34-76 in 1942, of this total over 6,000 were irreversible losses. As of 31.12.42 the Soviets had less then 6,000 T-34-76 in inventory. In 1943 their were still more light tanks in frontline combat formations then T-34. Once again as of Jan 1943 the Soviets had the following tank strength delpoyed vs the Germans: 7,600 - T-34, M3 Grant 2.000 - KV-1, KV-1S, KV-8 8,500 - Light tanks - T-60, T-70, MK II/III In 1942 the Soviets had 6,300 light tanks in inventory. 1942 production of light tanks was 10,612 light tanks, & the Soviets recieved another 2,553 light tanks via Lend Lease. Out of a total of over 18,000 Lt.tanks the Soviets lost 7,200(40%) fom Jan 1 - Dec 31 1942. Late 1943 into early 1944, is the first time in the war, that T-34s outnumber Lt. tanks in frontline combat formations, & where the T-34 finaly becomes the 'workhorse of the eastren front'. 61% of T-34 in inventory & produced in 1943 were lost from Jan 1, - Dec 31 1943. A good example of this was 29th Tank Corps, which operated with 5th Guards Tank Army. As of 01.07.43 the 29th had: 25th Tank Brigade - T-34/T-70 31st Tank Brigade - T-34/T-70 32nd Tank Brigade - T-34 A typical Tank Brigade composition in 1943 was 20, T-34 & 40/45 T-60/T-70 with a few exceptions. on 12.07.43 the 29th lost 60% of its tanks. The 29th was refitted after Zitadelle & was involved in heavy fighting from August - Dec 1943 where it suffered very heavy losses. The 29ths 3 Tank Brigades were finaly refitted in late Dec 43 with all T-34 (65 per Brigade) & was one of the 1st to do so. The truth of the matter was the Germans were faceing alot more light tanks then T-34s, until late 43 early 44 with the exception a few Corps given special priority refit of T-34s for Kursk. Regards, John Waters
  16. Soviet Tank & SU Production numbers June 22 1941 -10 May 1945: T-40: 1941 - 14 1942 - 181 Total T-40 production = 195. T-50: 1941 - 48 1942 - 15 Total T-50 production = 63. T-60: 1941 - 1,548 1942 - 4,474 Total T-60 production = 6,022. T-70: 1942 - 4,883 1943 - 3,343 Total T-70 production = 8,226. T-80: 1943 - 120 Total T-80 production = 120. T-34-76: 1941 - 1,886 1942 - 12,553 1943 - 15,712 1944 - 3,723 Total T-34-76 production = 33,874. T-34-85: 1943 - 100 1944 - 11,000 1945 - 8,330 Total T-34-85 production = 19,430. Total combined T-34 production = 53,304. T-44: 1945 - 200 Total T-44 production = 200. KV-1: 1941 - 812 1942 - 1,753 Total KV-1 production = 2,565. KV-1S: 1942 - 780 1943 - 452 Total KV-1S production = 1,232. KV-85: 1943 - 130 Total KV-85 Production = 130. IS-2: 1943 - 102 1944 - 2,252 1945 - 1.500 Total IS-2 production = 3,854. SU-76: 1942 - 26 1943 - 1,928 1944 - 7,127 1945 - 3,562 Total SU-76 production = 12,643. SU-122: 1942 - 25 1943 - 635 Total SU-122 production = 660. SU-85: 1943 - 750 1944 - 1,900 Total SU-85 production = 2,650. SU-100: 1944 - 500 1945 - 800 Total SU-100 production = 1,300. SU-152: 1943 - 670 Total SU-152 production = 670. ISU-122: 1944 - 1,600 1945 - 800 Total SU-122 production = 2,400 ISU-152: 1943 - 35 1944 - 900 1945 - 400 Total ISU-152 production = 1,335. Regards, John Waters
  17. Yes they had T-34-76 & KV-1, but only in small numbers ie, as of 01.06.41 The Soviets had the below authorised strength numbers in ()'s: T-34-76 - 1,085 (12,810) KV-1 - 263 (3,843) KV-II - 70 The Soviets were in the midst of of forming 61 Tank Divisions. The production plan initiated on 15.03.41 authorised production of 290 T-34-76, & 110 KV per month. To get enough material to even begin produceing these levels, the Soviets had to scrap 2 battleships, 2 battlecruisers, & several Lt cruisers. The plan called for 61 Tank Divs by September 1944. Out of 23,106 tanks in inventory on 22.06.41 only 2,611 were 'new tanks'(BT-7M, T-40) of the 20,495 remaining over 11,000 were T-26, & the rest were a mix of T-28, BT-2, BT-5, T-35 Light tank & tankettes. Of which Allied tanks of the time were on par or superior in areas. While the Soviets followed the same path they first added towed 85mm AA guns to the Tank Corps & formed seprate Anti tank Bns in 1943 directly in response to the Tiger tank because their standard AT guns 45mm, 57mm, & 76mm could not reliably penetrate the Tigers armor except at close ranges on rear shots. This was a stop gap until the KV-85, T-34-85 could be introduced. The SU-85 was also introduced to replace the towed 85mm guns, but some tank corps & SABs retained their towed 85s much longer. The SU-85 could only defeat the Tiger & Panther at short ranges, so the Soviets began replaceing the SU-85 in the Medium SU Regts in October 1944 with the SU-100. The Heavy SU Regts were originly formed in 1943 with the SU-122 then replaced due to poor AT performance with the SU-85. until the SU-152 could be deployed. The first 25 were rushed to Kursk dureing Zitadelle, where they earned the nickname 'Zvierboi' (Big game hunter). 670 SU-152 were produced in 1943. Production was stopped & the ISU-152, & ISU-122 entered production in 1944. The ISU-122 was cosidered the ultimate Zvierboi as it could penetrate the Panther turret front out to 2000m & it outranged the 8.8cm L/56. BY 1945 the smallest gun in the Tank corps was the 76mm on the SU-76. All of this was a response to the Tiger & Panther. The US followed a similar convulted route hampered by Macnair & ordinace finaly culminateing in the 90mm on the Pershing, & Jackson which was superior to the Soviet 122mm in penetration. I dont have Jackson numbers on hand vs the 2400 ISU-122 produced in 1944/45. Concerning the match up with the T-34-85 the M4A3E8 was superior in some areas to the T-34-85 all & all crew skill would have been a factor in all cases. I dont see any signifigant technichal advanteges concerning the Soviet or Allied AFVs other than minor armor thickness and docturnial levels, 76mm APCBC & APCR-T could defeat the SU-100/122 frontaly, just as the SU-100/122 could defeat the Sherman/M-10 frontaly. Despite impressive drives into Germany the Soviets never matched the Allies operationaly. Either way the doctrines were difrent, and the Allies were much better equipped & supplied then the German forces the Soviets faced in 44/45. All & all this just leads to the big what if clash between the Allies & Soviets in 1945 8). Regards, John Waters
  18. One thing to add the gyro stabalizer was only installed in 75mm Shermans. It was not installed on the 76mm models. Also as noted before 75mm M62 APCBC was more then capable of dealing with the PzKpfw IV H etc. Infact M62 was the round most fired in the ETO, the US converted thousands of M72 rounds to M62 after the Insigny live fire tests. Although its interesting the Soviets had no problems with the M72 rounds vs German armor. Regards, John Waters
  19. The Sherman has been much maligned for its 'inferior' armor/gun & propensity to burn vs the PzKpfw V/VI etc. Yet the T-34-76/85 had exactly the same problems very few Soviet tank crewman survived the penetration of the T-34, in fact the T-34 in all its varients was a coffin for more tank crew, then any other Soviet AFV in the war. It wasnt till the IS-2 that Soviet crews had a 25-30% chance of surviveing their tanks destruction according to Soviet reports. The Sherman & T-34-76's armor were both designed to frontaly defeat the most common AT gun of the time, the 37mm, both tanks armor was desighned to defeat undermatching projectiles. The T-34 side hull armor could & was defeated by 3.7cm AT fire. The T-34 revolutionised tank desighn when it first appeared, it's sloped armor effects on designs can still be seen today. Yet the one problem with the T-34-76/85 that was never rectified was due to it's high hardness(BHN) T-34 armor was very brittle & could not stand up to repeated impacts in the same area, the armor would shatter(the KV-1 did not have this problem due to lower BHN, softer armor). Soviet reports tell of T-34 drivers hatches being blown off on lower glacis hits, as well as whole sections cracking on hits etc. The Shermans armor due to its lower BHN stood up to, & held together vs repeated impacts in the same area. Loza etc, commented on this, and the lack of spall effects on impact in the Sherman vs T-34 as well. T-34 armor was very vulnerable to overmatching projectiles, ie, 7.5cm L/43, L/48, L/70, L/71 etc. In reality the Sherman & T-34 were in the same boat vs Panther & Tiger & the 7.5cm lang PzKpfw IV as well, though both could kill the PzKpfw IV @ standard ranges, both had problems dealing with the PzKpfw V/VI frontaly & both were far more mechanichly reliable then any German tank. Not to say they didnt have problems Ie, the T-34 engine had problems in the 85 especialy, on any long distance travel the prefrered mode was rail as T-34-85s suffered high ammounts of engine failures on extended road marches or deployments. Same with the T-34-76 their is an account of a T-34-76 Brigada that made a 300km road march then got chewed out for not useing rail transport & risking loseing tanks to mechanichal breakdowns & track life wear before they were deployed to battle. Regards, John Waters
  20. Schwere Panzerjäger - Abteilung 519 Activated with three kompanie on 25.08.43 in Wehrkreis III. The Abt moved to the Oldebroek Training Area in September 1943. It received the first Nashorns in October. In January 1944, the Abt was transfered to the Eastern Front (Witebsk), attached to AGC. By July 1944, it had lost all of its Nashorn, the Abt was then rebuilt at Mielau (Wehrkreis I) with one company of 14 Jagdpanther, 2 companies with 14 AG. The Abt HQ had 3 Jagdpanther. On 10.10.44, the battalion was attached to the 1st SS.Pz.Korps & 116th Pz.Div on 11.7.44 (Kg. Bayer, Hurtgen Forest) In December 1944, the Abt was attached to the 246. VolksGren. Div. As of 12.12.44, it had 19 AG & 9 Jagdpanther. On 15.03.45, the Abt was attached to the 1st. Armee. On 10.04.45 all of the Jagdpanther had been lost. Earnst was zug leader within the 1./schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 519, & later commanded (or was acting commander depending on authors translations), of 1/s.PzJ.Abt 512 (Jagdtiger). Kurowski is noted for getting units etc wrong, but he is the only author who actualy personaly interviewed the ppl he wrote about in Panzer Aces, Earnst passed away some time ago, so i guess we have to take the good with the bad 8(, Regards, John Waters
  21. Yes Earnst gained his fame in the Nashorn. Well you got me digging thru my sureviveing files in your reply concerning Kurowski, havent dusted them off in years LOL. I wish i still had the documents i lost when my HD crashed 8( lost alota irreplaceble data i had collected on the eastren front. Its my understanding Earnst was given his own Abt he had to return to Germany in early 44 to put it together where he states (according to Kurowski) that the Abt retuned to the East. What i dont get & this maybe because of Kurowski altering Earnts quotes, or something else, Earnst specificly gives dates(July 1944) & what vehichle his Abt was equipped with, yet as our research shows no Jagdpanthers were delivered to the Ost till 45, then we have Bixs quotes on useing the Jagdpanther with PR 35 in fact he related vgetting 8 kills with it on his first outing IIRC. Anyway i'll keep digging into this maybe with your help we can figure this mess out 8P. Regards, John Waters
  22. winkelried below is what i have for deliveries to the Eastren & Westren fronts for Jagdpanthers: Westren Front: sPzJgAbt. 654: Apr-44 - 8 Jun-44 - 17 Jul-44 - 9 Aug-44 - 8 Oct-44 - 16 Nov-44 - 6 Dec-44 - 20 Jan-45 - 10 Feb-45 - 6 sPzJgAbt. 559: May-44 - 5 Aug-44 - 8 Sep-44 - 17 Jan-45 - 6 Mar-45 - 5 Apr-45 - 19 sPzJgAbt. 519: Sep-44 - 17 Dec-44 - 4 Jan-45 - 6 sPzJgAbt. 560: Oct-44 - 4 Nov-44 - 5 Dec-44 - 4 Jan-45 - 12 Mar-45 - 11 sPzJgAbt. 655: Nov-44 - 5 Dec-44 - 9 Jan-45 - 10 Apr-45 - 10 2./sPzAbt. 507: Mar-45 - 3 PzAbt. 2106 Apr-45 - 5 II./PzRgt. 130: Feb-45 - 14 Apr-45 - 35 Eastren Front: PzJgAbt. 563: Jan-45 - 10 3./PzJgAbt. 616: Jan-45 - 9 I./PzRgt. 29: Jan-45 - 14 SS PzJgAbt. 10: Feb-45 - 10 SS PzJgAbt. 2 Feb-45 - 10 SS PzJgAbt. 9: Feb-45 - 10 Pz. Abt. F-G: Feb-45 - 10 PzJgAbt. 49: Feb-45 - 8 PzJgAbt. 87: Mar-45 - 4 Wapruef: Nov-43 - 1 Germany Dec-43 - 1 Germany Mielau Mar-44 - 2 Germany Versuch Jan-44 - 5 Germany Unknown Mar-45 - 1 Germany Unknown The above is what troubled me with Kurowskis Earnst quotes as we see 1299th does not exist in Jadgpanther deliveries nor timeframe. Does anyone know what Panzerjager Abt Earnst commanded in July 1944?. Also note Bixs statement of 8 Jagdpanther recieved in PR 35 in Jan 1945. Regards, John Waters
  23. A few things, the mass deployment of the T-34 did not occur until late 1943 early 1944, simply put the Soviets lost so many medium tanks in 41-42, production could not keep up. Ie, from December 1941 - April 1942 the Soviets lost 1,386 tanks in the fighting West & Northwest of Moscow alone. As of 01.01.42 the Soviets had 7,700 tanks of which only 1400 were 'modren' designs, ie, 800 T-34-76, 600 KV, 6,300 light tanks. Of course another factor was the forced re-location of the factories that were just gearing up production or were still in rail transit. Ie, below is production totals for Jan - Dec 1942: Jan - Mar: KV - 764 T-34 - 1, 605 T-60 - 2,353 T-70 - 322 SU-76 - 0 SU-122 - 0 Apr - Jun: KV - 879 T-34 - 2,651 T-60 - 1,017 T-70 - 2,066 SU-76 - 0 SU-122 -0 Jul - Sep: KV - 890 T-34 - 3,946 T-60 - 318 T-70 - 4.020 SU-76 - 0 SU-122 - 0 Oct - Dec: KV - 0 T-34 - 4,376 T-60 - 0 T-70 - 2,376 SU-76 - 25 SU-122 - 25 As 01.01.43 The Soviets had *22,100 tanks deployed vs the Germans, broken down as: 2000 - KV-1, KV-1S, KV-8. 7,600 - T-34-76, M3 Grant. 8,500 - T-60, T-70, Mk.II/III *Totals do not include Far east. The mass deployment of the T-34 in reality did not occur until late 1943, & 1944. Light tanks were still the most numerous Soviet tank well into 1943. The Sherman according to internal Soviet reports had several areas where it was superior to the T-34-76/85: - Optics - Gun power* - Turret traverse - Ammo stowage protection - Mechanichal reliability (Sherman track shoes had a longer life then the T-34-85 engine) *Soviet reports show 75mm M72 AP had superior penetration then 76mm BR-350A/B eg. Soviet crews reported M72 AP defeated the Tiger E side hull armor where the BR-350 failed at the same ranges. 76mm APCBC consistantly out performed 85mm BR-365 BY 10% In Soviet live fire tests vs the Tiger II etc. The Soviets recieved 2,007 M4A2 75mm, & 2,095 M4A2 76mm Sherman via Lend Lease. A clue to how highly the Soviets regarded the Sherman was they equipped 3 elite Guards Mechanized Corps entirely with Shermans to the point 2 GMC's traded in their T-34-85 for Shermans. The only negative comments were on the Shermans inferior cross country performance in harsh terrain ie, snow & mud & in overcomeing elevated terrain in the Manchurian operations where Shermans could not keep up in mountianous terrain compared to T-34s. Regards, John Waters
  24. Winkelreid, the problem is not with Kurowski, per sei, the details on the Jagdpanther deployment, and their role in the attack are from 'Albert Ernst'. Ernst never stated PR.25, nor 6th PzGr. had Jagdpanthers etc. Interstingly 35th PR recieved 8 Jagdpanther in Jan 45 according to Herman Bix. As to the 1299th that bugged me as well, but i put that off as a mistake by Kurowski. Regards, John Waters
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