Centurian52

We should have gone with a US naming convention and called it the M1.
Informally known as "Bloody Large Ordnance to Shoot at Targets Using Firecontrol of Unimaginable Precision", aka BLO-STUF-UP

If they get through the Russian AD, I'd say catastrophic. These are guided by a IR camera during the final approach and can easily hit exactly where you want them to hit. Say a support column, pylon, or main cable that the bridge span hangs from. The warhead weighs 500 kg and is two-staged: first is a shaped charge that blows hole in the targeted structure, through which the secondary charge enters and explodes. It's much more effective than a brute force HE charge.

So not to pile on and beat up.  I get the position, video after video of Russian saps getting blown up may seem excessive and masturbatory, and for some it is. However, every video gives off information. Some is just noise, or repetitive.  While others are gold and constitute key indicators which when confirmed by other observations can point to trends.  Trends lead to broader deductions and assessments - this is not a single “keyhole” it is thousands of them.  In most keyholes the milk maid is bathing, but then you start to notice the copy of Karl Marx next to the tub.
ISW and other OS intelligence analysts are doing exactly what professional military are doing.  Looking at all the “war porn” and pulling out trends and indicators that tell a larger story.  Oryx is not counting blow up vehicles because people get their jollies seeing blown up Russian tanks.  They are doing it because individual losses sum up to larger attrition trend which chart the course of a conflict.
This is micro-analysis and has pretty much set this group apart - or did, other groups have caught up.  Example: back in the early days of the war the majority of open source assessment (and frankly military as well) were expecting this war to take a predictable course.  A rapid overwhelming Russian invasion, shock and collapse of the UA, and a drawn out insurgency against a puppet Ukrainian political regime.  It was places like this forum where micro-observation first challenged a lot of macro assumptions.  We saw war porn, but it added up to something going very wrong for the RA.  In fact it pointed to something even more fundamental shifting in warfare itself.
This was not a one-shot deal.  Micro-analysis backed up be expertise has kept us well ahead of the pack in all phases of this war.  Phase II did not become a protracted set of urban sieges - the RA logistical losses and Ukrainian resistance demonstrated that.  Phase III did not see an RA “cauldron” despite their use of WW1 levels of massed fires.  Phase IV the UA counter offensive did shock us at its scope but one could see that this was indeed a collapse of the RA operationally on two fronts (one slow, one fast).  Phase V - Op Russian Leg Humping: was going nowhere - one need only follow the famous “battle of the T” to see why.  And we will use it for Phase VI to try and understand how the UA offensive is unfolding.
So while some may only see Russian sods getting blown up.   I see: poor basic field craft in poorly constructed trench lines which suggest basic training shortfalls.  No effective C-UAS counter measures on the RA side.    The evolution of drone warfare throughout.  The big fact that Russia has still not been able to create information denial (let alone control) in the battle space. HVT losses within the Russian operational system - C2 nodes, A2AD platforms, engineering and logistics.  Failures in RA C4ISR…the list goes on.  I do not see this through a single war porn keyhole, I see them through thousands of them.
Are these view’s skewed?  Definitely.  But the fact that we do not see thousand of videos of Russian UAS blowing off UA heads is telling in itself (does anyone think the Russian info sphere would show any restraint in this?).  Open source is “open”.  In the end it is about filtering noise and trying to hear signal - and again, this is exactly what ISW or any other public analysis platform is doing, along with professional military.  We are just doing it in house - this is how the sausage is made.  What bakes my noodle is that in my lifetime a large virtual collective is able to conduct this sort of work, and demonstrate accurate assessments (more than just a lucky once or twice) is game changing.  
In twenty years we will all be old, senile or dead. However an another group of young(ish) folks will do this for another war but they will likely have AI support (we have already seen it here in its infancy).  They will have access to even more raw information but will have a better ability to use it - they may very well be directly involved in the prosecution of the war and not just sitting in chairs on the sideline.  We are at the beginning of an age of Open Source Warfare - all those keyholes are “pixels” in reality.

Finally!
 
 

There have been some pretty terrible videos linked here. By terrible I mean things like splicing together entirely unrelated - in time, space, or even war - pieces from various places to ... tell a narrative? Of something? I guess?
It's happened often enough that, by and large, I don't bother with any of them. IMO, at least some of the folks posting links here are - at best - entirely undiscriminating in what they chose to watch and link. Either that or they're addicted to giggling.
This thread might be the single best piece of crowd-sourced OS analysis of the war available, but that doesn't mean that everyone posting here is contributing to that value.

Storm Shadow wouldn't need to be operational by the start of the offensive. It would be helpful if it was. But it being ready shortly after the offensive reaches its objectives on the Azov sea would be enough. A system that could fire out to 250-300km would put Mariupol in range of the Kerch bridge. And it would be arriving just in time to do some shaping operations for the follow up offensive.

that was a rant?  It wasn't even a diatribe, or a sternly worded talking-to. 
So what are you suggesting will happen for May, and then June?
I think May is lots of shaping, misdirection, probing, and relatively small exploitation when opportunity arises, like 5-10km advance here & there.  Putin's head will be spinning and hopefully he'll overreact in one place leading to setback in another.  Then later June/early July UKR hits somewhere really, really hard.  Prolly in the south as you suggest.

Looks great!

In fact I would be willing to bet that a significant portion of Russia's nukes don't work anymore. I wouldn't be willing to bet that none of Russia's nukes work though.

Of course a Javelin would lock on. A T-34 still produces heat. It's not like the Javelin only locks on to some super specialized signature that only modern tanks produce. And it's been a while since I heard anyone describe how the NLAW works, so I don't remember the details, but IIRC it doesn't actually "lock on" to anything.

More likely, the risk of a T-14 breaking down on the Red Square again was too much for Putin to bear

So they may just be completely missing a core capability for fighting a nuclear war. Yet another reason not to buy their nuclear saber rattling. Why am I not surprised?

I can't throw far. In fact I actually failed the grenade course my first time through (thank god we were using dummy grenades (and thank god we had a concrete wall for the live grenades)). I just couldn't throw for s**t (couldn't throw far or accurately). Probably because I never played sports as a kid (gamer for life). I was a crack shot though (tied for 2nd best shot in my company (38/40)). The rest of my platoon just couldn't wrap their heads around how I could be such a good shot, yet such a terrible thrower. Considering how important grenades are in trench warfare, it's probably just as well I didn't join the International Legion when this thing broke out.

9 fresh brigades, if the reporting is to be believed. At 4,000 soldiers per brigade that's 36,000 soldiers. Presumably these will be focused on a relatively narrow portion of the front. And they'll be fully mechanized.

There seems to be a historical pattern of dictators being reluctant to put any more money into a war than they can get away with. Dictatorships go to war more casually than democracies, but are hesitant to part with the cash needed to win the war. Democracies go to war far more rarely, but go all-in when they do.

I can't throw far. In fact I actually failed the grenade course my first time through (thank god we were using dummy grenades (and thank god we had a concrete wall for the live grenades)). I just couldn't throw for s**t (couldn't throw far or accurately). Probably because I never played sports as a kid (gamer for life). I was a crack shot though (tied for 2nd best shot in my company (38/40)). The rest of my platoon just couldn't wrap their heads around how I could be such a good shot, yet such a terrible thrower. Considering how important grenades are in trench warfare, it's probably just as well I didn't join the International Legion when this thing broke out.

One thing we need to take into account is these Russian machinations are often being done in an alcohol fog. We're hearing threats and demands, abrupt dismissals and promotions, grandiose statements and absurd threats. They don't often make sense to us because these guys are drunkards.

The power structure:
1. Kadyrov is a warlord with a defined territory he controls as a palatinate of the Russian Federation. He has intense local ties, a populace and geography that is quite difficult if not now impossible for the Russian army to subdue and an army that is loyal, personally, to him. His power is interleaved with Putin's but negotiated and inalienable by the Kremlin. 
2. Prigozhin is a functionary without any defined territorial control and thus no independent logistics, manpower sources or arms. He is, in essence, the appointed head of a quasi-state enterprise without a stronghold in any institution, region or ethnic group. He can be subdued by the simple expedient of cutting him off, trumping up a tax charge against him and tossing him back into the Russian penal system. His power derives from favor only, is alienable and only negotiated with difficulty.
What you are witnessing is the interplay between (in order of importance) the large institutional powers (FSB, MoD), the regional warlord (Kadyrov), the disposable functionary (Prigozhin) and the system created by Putin in which all must vie for his favor in whatever way they can. The  FSB/MoD are in daily contact and have the greatest access to Putin. They don't need to shout to be heard. Kadyrov mostly boasts but more importantly he withholds his forces in order to gain concessions and preserve his own strength for the aftermath. Prigozhin is much more marginal and so he must go public and make dramatic gestures for Putin to hear him. That's what you saw last week. 
The larger point of course is that Russia is run as a semi-mafia state primarily concerned with safeguarding Putin's power. Putin is the arbiter of the factions who must appeal to him in order to protect themselves and receive decisions and resources while their competition keeps them from uniting against him. And that creates inherent weaknesses...like divided command, conflicts between military needs and domestic power struggles, etc. 

I doubt it. China's economic fate in the 21st century was sealed decades ago by the one child policy. One glance at a demographic chart of China shows that they are in for some hard times ahead (lots of old people, relatively few young people, with the graph leaning uncomfortably far to the left (male) side). I doubt they could stop their impending economic decline even if they managed to take full control of Taiwan's semiconductor industry intact, without suffering further damage to their trade, budget, or industry in the process.
Personally I think the 2020s are the now or never moment for China to take Taiwan. My guess is that they will stop gaining on the US sometime this decade, and probably be in decline by the 2030s. I think they will either take Taiwan by 2030, or be forced to accept that they will never be strong enough to take it by force again (I'm hoping for the latter, much as I'd like to have Combat Mission Taiwan Strait).

I can't throw far. In fact I actually failed the grenade course my first time through (thank god we were using dummy grenades (and thank god we had a concrete wall for the live grenades)). I just couldn't throw for s**t (couldn't throw far or accurately). Probably because I never played sports as a kid (gamer for life). I was a crack shot though (tied for 2nd best shot in my company (38/40)). The rest of my platoon just couldn't wrap their heads around how I could be such a good shot, yet such a terrible thrower. Considering how important grenades are in trench warfare, it's probably just as well I didn't join the International Legion when this thing broke out.

Rampant corruption is reported to have rendered Russia's ballistic missile early warning system virtually useless. Scams by contractors are said to have led to unsuitable foreign-made components being used on a wide scale.
The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel reports that a scandal is about to break over a component substitution scam that it says has crippled Russia's early warning radars. Such scams have been widespread in Russian military procurement, often with the collusion of corrupt officials.
 

There is nothing that any army in the world has that could prevent the Russians from digging trenches on ground they still hold. If your argument is that Russia shouldn't still be holding any ground, because we should have provided Ukraine with enough material support to have kicked them off of all of it by now, then I'm with you on that. But at that point we're really not talking about trenches anymore.

There is nothing that any army in the world has that could prevent the Russians from digging trenches on ground they still hold. If your argument is that Russia shouldn't still be holding any ground, because we should have provided Ukraine with enough material support to have kicked them off of all of it by now, then I'm with you on that. But at that point we're really not talking about trenches anymore.