G.I. Joe

I keep getting the distinct impression that the systemic weaknesses in the Russian military are hitting the Air Force particularly hard (unsurprisingly, given the expense of maintaining a good air force).
There has been some commentary off and on about how many of the Russian pilots captured or KIA have been majors and up. Of course it's perfectly normal for senior officers to be flying in combat, but here it seems as if they're doing the bulk of the flying. That makes me think they either have to ration a limited number of flying hours and only the senior guys are getting enough time to stay current, they have issues in their recruitment and training pipeline, or both. Add to that the number of retired pilots they have flying as mercenaries now, and it looks like there are issues.
I also remember reading somewhere (pretty sure it was here, and I think they had a cited source) that the Russian Air Force never flew in anything larger than two-ship formations in Syria. Not being able to coordinate even four-ship flights (in NATO, that would be the basic building block for air tactics as I understand it) looks like a massive red flag regarding their readiness and training.
Also, has anyone else found the apparent lack of any attempt to use the Su-57... interesting?

I keep getting the distinct impression that the systemic weaknesses in the Russian military are hitting the Air Force particularly hard (unsurprisingly, given the expense of maintaining a good air force).
There has been some commentary off and on about how many of the Russian pilots captured or KIA have been majors and up. Of course it's perfectly normal for senior officers to be flying in combat, but here it seems as if they're doing the bulk of the flying. That makes me think they either have to ration a limited number of flying hours and only the senior guys are getting enough time to stay current, they have issues in their recruitment and training pipeline, or both. Add to that the number of retired pilots they have flying as mercenaries now, and it looks like there are issues.
I also remember reading somewhere (pretty sure it was here, and I think they had a cited source) that the Russian Air Force never flew in anything larger than two-ship formations in Syria. Not being able to coordinate even four-ship flights (in NATO, that would be the basic building block for air tactics as I understand it) looks like a massive red flag regarding their readiness and training.
Also, has anyone else found the apparent lack of any attempt to use the Su-57... interesting?

I keep getting the distinct impression that the systemic weaknesses in the Russian military are hitting the Air Force particularly hard (unsurprisingly, given the expense of maintaining a good air force).
There has been some commentary off and on about how many of the Russian pilots captured or KIA have been majors and up. Of course it's perfectly normal for senior officers to be flying in combat, but here it seems as if they're doing the bulk of the flying. That makes me think they either have to ration a limited number of flying hours and only the senior guys are getting enough time to stay current, they have issues in their recruitment and training pipeline, or both. Add to that the number of retired pilots they have flying as mercenaries now, and it looks like there are issues.
I also remember reading somewhere (pretty sure it was here, and I think they had a cited source) that the Russian Air Force never flew in anything larger than two-ship formations in Syria. Not being able to coordinate even four-ship flights (in NATO, that would be the basic building block for air tactics as I understand it) looks like a massive red flag regarding their readiness and training.
Also, has anyone else found the apparent lack of any attempt to use the Su-57... interesting?

- the most combat-ready troops were saved for the battle in the Donbas (although everyone knows that the airborne units, as well as the Taman and Kantemirov divisions) were defeated near Kyiv and Kharkov. - Russia is steadily moving towards its goals, although these goals are unknown to anyone, including Russia itself (Recipe for borscht? Conquests of Peter the Great? denazification?) - Russian aviation is not trying to destroy Ukrainian aviation, and it doesn’t need it (what a trifle, some kind of aviation, who is interested in it in the 21st century) interesting interpretation of Russian propaganda narratives, thanks

So for the record, calling Jomini a "little conservative" is akin to calling Billy Graham "a little religious" - the man tried to create a deterministic theory of warfare based on geometry, and Clausewitz called him on it...and frankly I think Uncle Carl was extremely conservative by modern standards.
That said, I am not sure what the story is around Severodonetsk to be honest.  I completely disagree with J of the West assessment that Severodonetsk is a "strategic decisive point for the RAF" and by taking it they gain "a pivot for operations" and a "pivot for manoeuvre".  If we look at wiki for the latest situation:

And then a G-Earth shot (I will try and do an MFSF flight later):

None of what J of W is stating as "importance" makes sense.  If this was a break out battle over the river and to take Lysynchansk, maybe.  But his argument that the "undefendable terrain of the western Donetsk Oblast" on the other side of this river, also make no sense as we know the RA advances out of Popasna have stalled.  As have the attempts coming down from the North out of Izyum...this is all the same type of rolling terrain spotty with water features.  The idea that if the RAF somehow takes the far bank town of Severodonetsk it is set up for a rolling breakout manoeuvre battle is sensationalism at best, and applying metrics from the Gulf War to this one at worst.  If the RA takes Severodonetsk, they still have a major water obstacle dominated by a very long ridge line to try and assault, then more urban area, and then rolling terrain which the UA has stopped them on along other axis.  So seriously, WTF "Jomini of the West"?
This battle is likely more along the lines of Verdun albeit what I suspect are for different reasons (I am not sure of the historical angle but Haiduk did mention this was a big fight in WW2).  This is a "I want that" and "you can't have it...jerk" type fight.  The UA is there because it is a spot they can make the RA's life miserable an pull in forces. The RA wants it...well why does the RA want anything?  Likely because Putin has been briefed and figures it is also "really important" for reasons.
This battle is interesting in 1) it is definitely attritional, and 2) it looks like it may be the one spot where the Russians have managed to create information parity (but I have a major caveat to this).  The noise about guns and UA casualties is just that "noise".  The UA is not stupid, that is one thing they have proven in this war.  They would not be holding onto a far bank defence - one they really do not need - unless there was some serious advantage attached to it.  My bet is that it comes down to two things: the concentration of arty and EW.
Lets leverage Jomini for a second and lay it out (in some ways he was not wrong):

I am going to be extremely generous here and say the RA has its guns positioned within 30km of Severodonetsk based on ranges (D-20s do about 18 and the Pions can reach out at about 37, so for arguments sake).  That is a slice of a pizza that is 188 km around.  The Russians can realistically put their guns in about 1/3 of that circle - so about a 63 km arc, which translates into about 942 sq kms.  At "900 guns" that is a density of a gun per sq km.  That is a pretty high density of gun positions - not WWI - but likely the highest of this war.  Further you have all the logistics to support all them guns.  
Finally, the RA has concentrated a lot of EW to try and make this op box go dark for the UA: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-technology-90d760f01105b9aaf1886427dbfba917  All these emitters are pumping out an ungodly amount of EM and easily visible.
So what?  Well there is a lot of talk of Ukrainian losses in this fight, and I believe them.  But war is negotiation and sacrifice.  Those lives are not being spent for the far bank town the UA really does not need.  They are likely being spent to pull in the concentration of arty and EM...so the UA can hit them - attrition, like tracers, cuts both ways.  What is missing from all this is the RA losses on key arty, EM and logistics because  they are concentrating them around and on top of this operationally near-worthless town, that when successfully taken will bring all the joy of a colicky baby because you still have to take that brutal set of ridges...on the other side of a freakin river.
We have no idea how bad the Russians are taking it right now, because "dark box"...but you know who does...the UA.   The one thing all that EW cannot turn off are the space-based ISR assets that the West (primarily the US) are beaming directly to the UA.  All those RA assets are very visible to multi-spectral space-based ISR and I have every faith are being hit regularly in this fight; it is the only thing that makes any sense - the UA are trading infantry for RA arty, EW and logistics right now.  If they wanted to trade infantry-for-infantry they would be doing it from all those ridges, which is the the obvious fallback position.
The Russians on the other hand are trading their own critical resources so that Putin can declare a "great victory" of very little military value - just like they have done throughout this war.

This portion of his latest post is worth a read:
 

One useful thing I find comes out of this sort of intra-European bickering is that it completely dispels the notion that NATO is some kind of sinister agent of US hegemony with a singular goal of crushing that country's enemies. This is what people who see the whole world through the lens of authoritarianism don't understand. In the "free" world, people are not only allowed to disagree on policy, but they openly and continuously debate it. Unfortunately that means we sometimes don't take as decisive action as would be ideal, but what's important is that when the action is taken we can be sure that the process was relatively transparent and the motivations are well-understood, even if not everyone was persuaded. In my opinion it is the freedom to have these conversations that is a big part of what structures like NATO are supposed to be protecting.

Im not convinced that specific bits of NATO stock will change the larger-scale realities facing the UA.
Himars et al seem very important, and certainly very useful, but delivery is slow and low powered. Ukraine needs to hit behind the Russian lines, at their logistics and supply. It needs to hit their artillery with something other than their own artillery. This tube war stuff is not where UA should be putting its weight; its playing Russia's gme, rather than not dodging  Russians s while gut stabbing them.
UA needs to break out of this death spiral asap.:
 
 

Biggest mistake western analyst make regarding Ru artillery is counting number of Russians tubes thinking they produce the same firepower per tube as western ones. It is not the tubes you need to count but round expenditure per gun. Soviet/Russian arty love to exaggerate the firepower by inflating number of tubes while decreasing available rounds per gun for engagement.
They love to say we have ****load of tubes per km of front or we just engaged enemy target with ****load of tubes, go, there is nobody alive there (RU infantry goes, UKR infantry climb out of dugouts and shoots RU infantry to pieces - rinse and repeat until some parts of RU artillery finally zeroes on actual UKR firing points then UKR infantry retreats to the next defensive line). But if you look at actual expenditure per gun the picture is different.
For example, during Goose Green battle UK 3 tubes expended 900 rounds. That is 300 rounds per gun per engagement. Battle was bloody but it was won.
On other hand during the battle for hill 776 the VDV 10 SPGs expended 800-1200 round (depending on the period you take). That is 120 rounds per gun per engagement. The result - two pieces got broken, at least 40% of own troops got hit by friendly arty fire, defense collapsed, and company was overrun and destroyed. 
On paper 3 UK tubes vs 10 RU tubes in support look bad. In reality though...
According to reports small drones like quadcopters are not that useful against artillery - range, time and wind issues. What is needed is a bigger one (akin to airplane not copter) comparable to Orlan. 

Excellent analogy, very well put as usual. The similarities between the position of NATO and Ukraine's other allies and the period of U.S. "neutrality" in World War II are pretty striking. Phillips P. O'Brien has a good turn of phrase for it in How the War Was Won when he describes the United States as a "non-combatant ally" of the United Kingdom, especially after Roosevelt won his third term.
Of course, every situation is unique. The sanctions can almost be thought of as a (mostly) bloodless "strategic bomber offensive" of sorts: if Uralvagon can't build another T-90 for lack of foreign components, the net effect in strategic terms is the same as if the plant had been levelled... 

I don't know the outcome but this has got to be better than no visit.  Hopefully seeing the destruction will help this to sink in and spur more aid.  Putin is a serial mass murderer and is an ongoing threat to all of europe.  Defeating his military in Ukraine is not just the right thing to do for the future of freedom and humanity, it is good for Europe. 
If Putin had won in Ukraine his next stop would've been Georgia, then Baltics, Finland, or maybe even Poland.  He would've used some make-believe border terrritorial dispute to make small military incursion or fake insurrection which would not be enough to start a wider war, like in the Donbas & Crimea.  Then he'd wait for the status quo to stabilize and do it again, over & over and over again.

I will take the ring to Mordor!
 
 
 

They don't have anything to offer or withdraw to pressure UA into that - all already pledged to support it in obtaining EU candidacy status. Zelensky would probably made any funny business public and humiliate them thoroughly. 
I'd rather think that they finally understood where the political capital is to be made ( and what coincidentally is a right thing to do, and good for everyone in EU too). It's probably going to be afer FR parliamentary elections, so Macron should have his hands untied finally. I don't expect anything huge, but some robust economic support package and loud declaration of support of UA cause would be great.
And some Eurofighters
Edit: on a more serious note, I really think is that the best way to both increase EU unity and highlight independence from US, is to try to outmatch it in support given to UA. It is a one in a decade chance. I thought EU leaders blew it, but maybe there's still time... 

I've just passed to this page and read THIS. Guys, I though this was just a joke, but now my heart is melted down and I can't reject this gift. Though, I feel myself awkward... and also huge gratitude to all of you and Kinophile personally for idea     

Thanks for organizing this! Hope all goes well. Definitely a fitting thank you for Haiduk's unique contributions to the Fellowship of the Thread...

Thanks for organizing this! Hope all goes well. Definitely a fitting thank you for Haiduk's unique contributions to the Fellowship of the Thread...

So Kosovo and Libya have been brought up a couple times now as examples of “NATO aggression” and some weird theories on the US somehow “using NATO” to do its bidding.  This is not how things worked, nor how things work.  Both Kosovo and Libya were conducted under UNSC resolutions as Chapter VII missions, not by an edict from the White House. In fact every NATO intervention over the last 30 years has had the backing of the UN Security Council, of which both Russia and China are permanent members.  (the only exception may be immediately after 9/11 when the US invoked article 5).  
In fact NATO as an alliance is not supporting the Ukraine (technically) it’s member states are bilaterally.
NATO is a massive military alliance, trying to make it to do anything is very hard and the idea that the US can “order NATO” is laughable.  NATO having a history of unilaterally invading nations and so Russia is somehow justifiably pushing back is nonsense.  As to NATO expansion, it has been 1) bureaucratic and 2) driven by Russian aggressiveness to its neighbours.  Narratives to the contrary are misinformed at best.

+1
Exactly. A comment like that is really hard to take any other way than "we know we're the bad guys, and we're happy to lean into it."

That's a take. I doubt if you asked the Irish if they enjoyed the famines, the answer would be positive. India, I'm sure their famines and deindustrialization aren't taken as a positive. I could go on, but that's some silly stuff, imperial conquest is good, jeez.

Love that humour:
 
 

Incredible.
Haiduk's in for a hell of a surprise when he gets back on his pc...
FUNDED!

$1500 to get him a new laptop. Amazing. Thank you, everyone who donated.
 

This is actually quite a hard problem to solve atm:
They are too small to hit with unguided fire
They don't have a big enough IR signature for a stinger type missile
If you tune your radar to be able to spot them you will be overwhelmed by false positives from birds and ground clutter
It looks like missiles like starstreak are designed with drones in mind, which is why they have a complicated semi-manual aiming system, and AAA or even "mad minute" small arms fire can just about manage, but they are far from reliable and it's easy enough to just send another drone.
I can see a lot more light AAA and starstreak type missiles in the near future as a counter, or even anti-drone drones!
Edit: and lasers - everyone is going for lasers like crazy to shoot down drones (among other things) but they aren't quite there yet

GoFundMe link to get Haiduk a new laptop is now live!
Any questions please PM me directly.
@BFCElvis I wont be cluttering this thread with this.

Europe and the US are brothers in arms, no matter what we sometimes think of that. We share basically the same values and interests. We can't afford not to be allies.

About Turkey in NATO. Erdogen's Turkey is not quite the same country as the Turkey of president Bayar in 1952 when they first joined. You can't blame 1952 NATO for not 'Minority Reporting' the government of Turkey 70 years in the future.