holoween

Now the Next interesting topic is how you chose to validate your results namely with the one exception among major armies that doesnt use IFVs Israel.
"The only army to have much experience of APC operations in regular war did not adopt IFVs." p.122
Historically its actually exactly the opposite. The army with the most experience using APCs being the wehrmacht with the SdKfz 251 literally starting ww2 with an APC. And as soon as the Bundeswehr formed they went for getting an IFV with the HS 30 8 years ahead of the BMP1.
Out of all major militaries Israel is actually the exception in not having an IFV.
So lets examine what could have lead to this and what they are using instead.
The area Israel has to fight in has generally quite rough terrain and a fairly high number of highly build up areas. This generally puts a higher emphasis on the dismounts. It also decreases the value of the added speed of advance IFVs can give formations. Israel also had a fairly long history of Insurgency fighting where IFVs also tend to not excel (compare Iraq occupation) though htats straying away from the regular war narative.
Interestingly as much as the Arab Israeli wars were studied by Soviets and Nato alike neither abandoned their IFVs. The biggest influence being the development of BMP2. Curiously with 1 fewer dismounts compared to BMP1 so lack of dismounted infantry wasnt the takeaway.
What seems to be far more influential is that Israel maintains an army of a size it can only afford due to extensive military aid and during the cold war the same was true of its oponents. Its main aid contributor was the US which for the time of Israels major wars simply didnt own IFVs and so couldnt sell them but istead sold APCs. At that point Israel also had very limited AFV production capability so the combination of essentially free APCs and production of IFVs eating into the tank numbers its obviously the better choice to not produce IFVs.
To feed into this the heavy APCs build were primarily captured or outdaatet tank chassis repurposed and only with the Namer did they produce them from the ground up resulting in far lower numbers than they would like. These heavy APCs also face primarily Insurgents not a regular army so are in purpose closer to the modern US MRAP.
IFVs have also been used in several regular wars (2nd and 3rd gulf war, 2008 Georgian war and 2014 in Ukraine). So far they all seem to have accounted quite well for themselves seeing as no unser advocated to stop using them.

Jim Storr ive gotten the book a few weeks ago and have read through it a few times now. Generally i found it easy to read though somewhat heavy on opinions rather than analysis.
You might have found a quite critical audience here as i  as several before me take issue with a certain aspect of the book. In my case ill focus on the chapter Infantry and Antitank Forces specifically your discussion of IFVs.
 
I think wargaming is a valuable source if information but always needs to be cross referenced with rl data.
However the IFV section is entirely at odds with the vast majority of modern armies and from reading it seemed inherently at odds with what was being said. It is also at odds with my personal experience so i was trying to wrap my head around it until i started collecting quotes from it to make a rebuttal ten i realized where the issue comes from.
"Ground-mounted cannon, such as the French and German 20mm, would have beenhighly effectivea gainst enemy APCs." p.116
"Cannon and ATGMs could be very effective [...] Once dismounted in cover, they could be very difficult to locate" p.123
So the Weapons the IFVs carried were effective so why not the IFV itself? Lets see the defense:
"IFVs located in a defensive position [...] tended to be knocked out by artillery fire, or neutralized and then easy prey to the attackers, be it tanks or shoulder-fired antitank weapons." p.124
"If IFVs were sited outside defensive positions [...] being quite large vehicles, they attrackted fire from the attackers Tanks and ATGMs." p.124
This implies that either a dismounted 20mm cannon is more resistant to artillery bombardement or its position wont be spotted and so not bombarded. That is strange in two ways. The IFV should be more resistant to artillery and given its mobility should be sitting outside of view only to move into its firing position when targets are called my the infantry and so actually harder to spot. Or dug in and just have its turret exposed in which case it should be equally difficult to spot but still be more resistant to artillery fire.
Now looking at the offense
"vehicle-mounted cannon and MGs did not help. [...] difficulty in locating the defenders, who were invariably concealed and often dug in." p.123
"Conversely they made the [...] IFVs obvious and high-priority targets for the defender´s fire." p.123
This is strange in two ways. First for supressing defenders and assisting the own infantry exact locations of the defenders need not be known. Simply supressing areas that could be dangerous to the own infantry if occupied by enemy infantry will do the majority of work since 20mm cannons firing he at 1000rpm cyclic into the defenders general area is going to keep their heads down. Even more if there is a full platoon doing this.
Second is that in the game even with their aparently ineffective fire they were still the priority target and not the supporting tanks (and if there werent any why?)
But what about using their ATGMs?
"Where IFVs used  [...] ATGMs [...] they were highly vulnerable to enemy ATGM fire, from either dismounted launchers or specialist antitank vehicles. In both cases the enemy were much harder to locate" p.123
This is again somewhat strange. An IFVs turret is certainly larger than an atgm launcher alone but for the ATGM vehicle that is only the case if it can go hulldown in which case an IFVs turret still wouldnt be much bigger and far more importantly the main way an ATGM will get located is dust and smoke kicked up from the weapons launch which will be the same in either case.
These contradictions between observed results and expected results indicate to me that:
1. There is a spotting mechanic in the ruleset used and IFVs are at a higher disadvantedge as a result
2. Improper defensive doctrine at least for western vehicles who should have several fighting positions and frequently switch. Possibly combined with the ruleset not giving the bonus for a defensive position when employing such a strategy
3. Strange targeting priorities or improper support. A defending unit should prioritize supporting tanks when employing anti tank weapons as they are the biggest threat to the individual unit. In wargaming its easy to always target the unit that will result in the greatest chance of overall success but for the actual troops individual survival is key. A tank will given the choice between an IFV or a tank first shoot the tank because that is the bigger threat. If Tanks simply werent involved the quewstion becomes why not? IFVs are combined arms weapons and suffer when left alone just like any other weapon.

Now the Next interesting topic is how you chose to validate your results namely with the one exception among major armies that doesnt use IFVs Israel.
"The only army to have much experience of APC operations in regular war did not adopt IFVs." p.122
Historically its actually exactly the opposite. The army with the most experience using APCs being the wehrmacht with the SdKfz 251 literally starting ww2 with an APC. And as soon as the Bundeswehr formed they went for getting an IFV with the HS 30 8 years ahead of the BMP1.
Out of all major militaries Israel is actually the exception in not having an IFV.
So lets examine what could have lead to this and what they are using instead.
The area Israel has to fight in has generally quite rough terrain and a fairly high number of highly build up areas. This generally puts a higher emphasis on the dismounts. It also decreases the value of the added speed of advance IFVs can give formations. Israel also had a fairly long history of Insurgency fighting where IFVs also tend to not excel (compare Iraq occupation) though htats straying away from the regular war narative.
Interestingly as much as the Arab Israeli wars were studied by Soviets and Nato alike neither abandoned their IFVs. The biggest influence being the development of BMP2. Curiously with 1 fewer dismounts compared to BMP1 so lack of dismounted infantry wasnt the takeaway.
What seems to be far more influential is that Israel maintains an army of a size it can only afford due to extensive military aid and during the cold war the same was true of its oponents. Its main aid contributor was the US which for the time of Israels major wars simply didnt own IFVs and so couldnt sell them but istead sold APCs. At that point Israel also had very limited AFV production capability so the combination of essentially free APCs and production of IFVs eating into the tank numbers its obviously the better choice to not produce IFVs.
To feed into this the heavy APCs build were primarily captured or outdaatet tank chassis repurposed and only with the Namer did they produce them from the ground up resulting in far lower numbers than they would like. These heavy APCs also face primarily Insurgents not a regular army so are in purpose closer to the modern US MRAP.
IFVs have also been used in several regular wars (2nd and 3rd gulf war, 2008 Georgian war and 2014 in Ukraine). So far they all seem to have accounted quite well for themselves seeing as no unser advocated to stop using them.

Now the Next interesting topic is how you chose to validate your results namely with the one exception among major armies that doesnt use IFVs Israel.
"The only army to have much experience of APC operations in regular war did not adopt IFVs." p.122
Historically its actually exactly the opposite. The army with the most experience using APCs being the wehrmacht with the SdKfz 251 literally starting ww2 with an APC. And as soon as the Bundeswehr formed they went for getting an IFV with the HS 30 8 years ahead of the BMP1.
Out of all major militaries Israel is actually the exception in not having an IFV.
So lets examine what could have lead to this and what they are using instead.
The area Israel has to fight in has generally quite rough terrain and a fairly high number of highly build up areas. This generally puts a higher emphasis on the dismounts. It also decreases the value of the added speed of advance IFVs can give formations. Israel also had a fairly long history of Insurgency fighting where IFVs also tend to not excel (compare Iraq occupation) though htats straying away from the regular war narative.
Interestingly as much as the Arab Israeli wars were studied by Soviets and Nato alike neither abandoned their IFVs. The biggest influence being the development of BMP2. Curiously with 1 fewer dismounts compared to BMP1 so lack of dismounted infantry wasnt the takeaway.
What seems to be far more influential is that Israel maintains an army of a size it can only afford due to extensive military aid and during the cold war the same was true of its oponents. Its main aid contributor was the US which for the time of Israels major wars simply didnt own IFVs and so couldnt sell them but istead sold APCs. At that point Israel also had very limited AFV production capability so the combination of essentially free APCs and production of IFVs eating into the tank numbers its obviously the better choice to not produce IFVs.
To feed into this the heavy APCs build were primarily captured or outdaatet tank chassis repurposed and only with the Namer did they produce them from the ground up resulting in far lower numbers than they would like. These heavy APCs also face primarily Insurgents not a regular army so are in purpose closer to the modern US MRAP.
IFVs have also been used in several regular wars (2nd and 3rd gulf war, 2008 Georgian war and 2014 in Ukraine). So far they all seem to have accounted quite well for themselves seeing as no unser advocated to stop using them.

Jim Storr ive gotten the book a few weeks ago and have read through it a few times now. Generally i found it easy to read though somewhat heavy on opinions rather than analysis.
You might have found a quite critical audience here as i  as several before me take issue with a certain aspect of the book. In my case ill focus on the chapter Infantry and Antitank Forces specifically your discussion of IFVs.
 
I think wargaming is a valuable source if information but always needs to be cross referenced with rl data.
However the IFV section is entirely at odds with the vast majority of modern armies and from reading it seemed inherently at odds with what was being said. It is also at odds with my personal experience so i was trying to wrap my head around it until i started collecting quotes from it to make a rebuttal ten i realized where the issue comes from.
"Ground-mounted cannon, such as the French and German 20mm, would have beenhighly effectivea gainst enemy APCs." p.116
"Cannon and ATGMs could be very effective [...] Once dismounted in cover, they could be very difficult to locate" p.123
So the Weapons the IFVs carried were effective so why not the IFV itself? Lets see the defense:
"IFVs located in a defensive position [...] tended to be knocked out by artillery fire, or neutralized and then easy prey to the attackers, be it tanks or shoulder-fired antitank weapons." p.124
"If IFVs were sited outside defensive positions [...] being quite large vehicles, they attrackted fire from the attackers Tanks and ATGMs." p.124
This implies that either a dismounted 20mm cannon is more resistant to artillery bombardement or its position wont be spotted and so not bombarded. That is strange in two ways. The IFV should be more resistant to artillery and given its mobility should be sitting outside of view only to move into its firing position when targets are called my the infantry and so actually harder to spot. Or dug in and just have its turret exposed in which case it should be equally difficult to spot but still be more resistant to artillery fire.
Now looking at the offense
"vehicle-mounted cannon and MGs did not help. [...] difficulty in locating the defenders, who were invariably concealed and often dug in." p.123
"Conversely they made the [...] IFVs obvious and high-priority targets for the defender´s fire." p.123
This is strange in two ways. First for supressing defenders and assisting the own infantry exact locations of the defenders need not be known. Simply supressing areas that could be dangerous to the own infantry if occupied by enemy infantry will do the majority of work since 20mm cannons firing he at 1000rpm cyclic into the defenders general area is going to keep their heads down. Even more if there is a full platoon doing this.
Second is that in the game even with their aparently ineffective fire they were still the priority target and not the supporting tanks (and if there werent any why?)
But what about using their ATGMs?
"Where IFVs used  [...] ATGMs [...] they were highly vulnerable to enemy ATGM fire, from either dismounted launchers or specialist antitank vehicles. In both cases the enemy were much harder to locate" p.123
This is again somewhat strange. An IFVs turret is certainly larger than an atgm launcher alone but for the ATGM vehicle that is only the case if it can go hulldown in which case an IFVs turret still wouldnt be much bigger and far more importantly the main way an ATGM will get located is dust and smoke kicked up from the weapons launch which will be the same in either case.
These contradictions between observed results and expected results indicate to me that:
1. There is a spotting mechanic in the ruleset used and IFVs are at a higher disadvantedge as a result
2. Improper defensive doctrine at least for western vehicles who should have several fighting positions and frequently switch. Possibly combined with the ruleset not giving the bonus for a defensive position when employing such a strategy
3. Strange targeting priorities or improper support. A defending unit should prioritize supporting tanks when employing anti tank weapons as they are the biggest threat to the individual unit. In wargaming its easy to always target the unit that will result in the greatest chance of overall success but for the actual troops individual survival is key. A tank will given the choice between an IFV or a tank first shoot the tank because that is the bigger threat. If Tanks simply werent involved the quewstion becomes why not? IFVs are combined arms weapons and suffer when left alone just like any other weapon.

Jim Storr ive gotten the book a few weeks ago and have read through it a few times now. Generally i found it easy to read though somewhat heavy on opinions rather than analysis.
You might have found a quite critical audience here as i  as several before me take issue with a certain aspect of the book. In my case ill focus on the chapter Infantry and Antitank Forces specifically your discussion of IFVs.
 
I think wargaming is a valuable source if information but always needs to be cross referenced with rl data.
However the IFV section is entirely at odds with the vast majority of modern armies and from reading it seemed inherently at odds with what was being said. It is also at odds with my personal experience so i was trying to wrap my head around it until i started collecting quotes from it to make a rebuttal ten i realized where the issue comes from.
"Ground-mounted cannon, such as the French and German 20mm, would have beenhighly effectivea gainst enemy APCs." p.116
"Cannon and ATGMs could be very effective [...] Once dismounted in cover, they could be very difficult to locate" p.123
So the Weapons the IFVs carried were effective so why not the IFV itself? Lets see the defense:
"IFVs located in a defensive position [...] tended to be knocked out by artillery fire, or neutralized and then easy prey to the attackers, be it tanks or shoulder-fired antitank weapons." p.124
"If IFVs were sited outside defensive positions [...] being quite large vehicles, they attrackted fire from the attackers Tanks and ATGMs." p.124
This implies that either a dismounted 20mm cannon is more resistant to artillery bombardement or its position wont be spotted and so not bombarded. That is strange in two ways. The IFV should be more resistant to artillery and given its mobility should be sitting outside of view only to move into its firing position when targets are called my the infantry and so actually harder to spot. Or dug in and just have its turret exposed in which case it should be equally difficult to spot but still be more resistant to artillery fire.
Now looking at the offense
"vehicle-mounted cannon and MGs did not help. [...] difficulty in locating the defenders, who were invariably concealed and often dug in." p.123
"Conversely they made the [...] IFVs obvious and high-priority targets for the defender´s fire." p.123
This is strange in two ways. First for supressing defenders and assisting the own infantry exact locations of the defenders need not be known. Simply supressing areas that could be dangerous to the own infantry if occupied by enemy infantry will do the majority of work since 20mm cannons firing he at 1000rpm cyclic into the defenders general area is going to keep their heads down. Even more if there is a full platoon doing this.
Second is that in the game even with their aparently ineffective fire they were still the priority target and not the supporting tanks (and if there werent any why?)
But what about using their ATGMs?
"Where IFVs used  [...] ATGMs [...] they were highly vulnerable to enemy ATGM fire, from either dismounted launchers or specialist antitank vehicles. In both cases the enemy were much harder to locate" p.123
This is again somewhat strange. An IFVs turret is certainly larger than an atgm launcher alone but for the ATGM vehicle that is only the case if it can go hulldown in which case an IFVs turret still wouldnt be much bigger and far more importantly the main way an ATGM will get located is dust and smoke kicked up from the weapons launch which will be the same in either case.
These contradictions between observed results and expected results indicate to me that:
1. There is a spotting mechanic in the ruleset used and IFVs are at a higher disadvantedge as a result
2. Improper defensive doctrine at least for western vehicles who should have several fighting positions and frequently switch. Possibly combined with the ruleset not giving the bonus for a defensive position when employing such a strategy
3. Strange targeting priorities or improper support. A defending unit should prioritize supporting tanks when employing anti tank weapons as they are the biggest threat to the individual unit. In wargaming its easy to always target the unit that will result in the greatest chance of overall success but for the actual troops individual survival is key. A tank will given the choice between an IFV or a tank first shoot the tank because that is the bigger threat. If Tanks simply werent involved the quewstion becomes why not? IFVs are combined arms weapons and suffer when left alone just like any other weapon.

Jim Storr ive gotten the book a few weeks ago and have read through it a few times now. Generally i found it easy to read though somewhat heavy on opinions rather than analysis.
You might have found a quite critical audience here as i  as several before me take issue with a certain aspect of the book. In my case ill focus on the chapter Infantry and Antitank Forces specifically your discussion of IFVs.
 
I think wargaming is a valuable source if information but always needs to be cross referenced with rl data.
However the IFV section is entirely at odds with the vast majority of modern armies and from reading it seemed inherently at odds with what was being said. It is also at odds with my personal experience so i was trying to wrap my head around it until i started collecting quotes from it to make a rebuttal ten i realized where the issue comes from.
"Ground-mounted cannon, such as the French and German 20mm, would have beenhighly effectivea gainst enemy APCs." p.116
"Cannon and ATGMs could be very effective [...] Once dismounted in cover, they could be very difficult to locate" p.123
So the Weapons the IFVs carried were effective so why not the IFV itself? Lets see the defense:
"IFVs located in a defensive position [...] tended to be knocked out by artillery fire, or neutralized and then easy prey to the attackers, be it tanks or shoulder-fired antitank weapons." p.124
"If IFVs were sited outside defensive positions [...] being quite large vehicles, they attrackted fire from the attackers Tanks and ATGMs." p.124
This implies that either a dismounted 20mm cannon is more resistant to artillery bombardement or its position wont be spotted and so not bombarded. That is strange in two ways. The IFV should be more resistant to artillery and given its mobility should be sitting outside of view only to move into its firing position when targets are called my the infantry and so actually harder to spot. Or dug in and just have its turret exposed in which case it should be equally difficult to spot but still be more resistant to artillery fire.
Now looking at the offense
"vehicle-mounted cannon and MGs did not help. [...] difficulty in locating the defenders, who were invariably concealed and often dug in." p.123
"Conversely they made the [...] IFVs obvious and high-priority targets for the defender´s fire." p.123
This is strange in two ways. First for supressing defenders and assisting the own infantry exact locations of the defenders need not be known. Simply supressing areas that could be dangerous to the own infantry if occupied by enemy infantry will do the majority of work since 20mm cannons firing he at 1000rpm cyclic into the defenders general area is going to keep their heads down. Even more if there is a full platoon doing this.
Second is that in the game even with their aparently ineffective fire they were still the priority target and not the supporting tanks (and if there werent any why?)
But what about using their ATGMs?
"Where IFVs used  [...] ATGMs [...] they were highly vulnerable to enemy ATGM fire, from either dismounted launchers or specialist antitank vehicles. In both cases the enemy were much harder to locate" p.123
This is again somewhat strange. An IFVs turret is certainly larger than an atgm launcher alone but for the ATGM vehicle that is only the case if it can go hulldown in which case an IFVs turret still wouldnt be much bigger and far more importantly the main way an ATGM will get located is dust and smoke kicked up from the weapons launch which will be the same in either case.
These contradictions between observed results and expected results indicate to me that:
1. There is a spotting mechanic in the ruleset used and IFVs are at a higher disadvantedge as a result
2. Improper defensive doctrine at least for western vehicles who should have several fighting positions and frequently switch. Possibly combined with the ruleset not giving the bonus for a defensive position when employing such a strategy
3. Strange targeting priorities or improper support. A defending unit should prioritize supporting tanks when employing anti tank weapons as they are the biggest threat to the individual unit. In wargaming its easy to always target the unit that will result in the greatest chance of overall success but for the actual troops individual survival is key. A tank will given the choice between an IFV or a tank first shoot the tank because that is the bigger threat. If Tanks simply werent involved the quewstion becomes why not? IFVs are combined arms weapons and suffer when left alone just like any other weapon.

Jim Storr ive gotten the book a few weeks ago and have read through it a few times now. Generally i found it easy to read though somewhat heavy on opinions rather than analysis.
You might have found a quite critical audience here as i  as several before me take issue with a certain aspect of the book. In my case ill focus on the chapter Infantry and Antitank Forces specifically your discussion of IFVs.
 
I think wargaming is a valuable source if information but always needs to be cross referenced with rl data.
However the IFV section is entirely at odds with the vast majority of modern armies and from reading it seemed inherently at odds with what was being said. It is also at odds with my personal experience so i was trying to wrap my head around it until i started collecting quotes from it to make a rebuttal ten i realized where the issue comes from.
"Ground-mounted cannon, such as the French and German 20mm, would have beenhighly effectivea gainst enemy APCs." p.116
"Cannon and ATGMs could be very effective [...] Once dismounted in cover, they could be very difficult to locate" p.123
So the Weapons the IFVs carried were effective so why not the IFV itself? Lets see the defense:
"IFVs located in a defensive position [...] tended to be knocked out by artillery fire, or neutralized and then easy prey to the attackers, be it tanks or shoulder-fired antitank weapons." p.124
"If IFVs were sited outside defensive positions [...] being quite large vehicles, they attrackted fire from the attackers Tanks and ATGMs." p.124
This implies that either a dismounted 20mm cannon is more resistant to artillery bombardement or its position wont be spotted and so not bombarded. That is strange in two ways. The IFV should be more resistant to artillery and given its mobility should be sitting outside of view only to move into its firing position when targets are called my the infantry and so actually harder to spot. Or dug in and just have its turret exposed in which case it should be equally difficult to spot but still be more resistant to artillery fire.
Now looking at the offense
"vehicle-mounted cannon and MGs did not help. [...] difficulty in locating the defenders, who were invariably concealed and often dug in." p.123
"Conversely they made the [...] IFVs obvious and high-priority targets for the defender´s fire." p.123
This is strange in two ways. First for supressing defenders and assisting the own infantry exact locations of the defenders need not be known. Simply supressing areas that could be dangerous to the own infantry if occupied by enemy infantry will do the majority of work since 20mm cannons firing he at 1000rpm cyclic into the defenders general area is going to keep their heads down. Even more if there is a full platoon doing this.
Second is that in the game even with their aparently ineffective fire they were still the priority target and not the supporting tanks (and if there werent any why?)
But what about using their ATGMs?
"Where IFVs used  [...] ATGMs [...] they were highly vulnerable to enemy ATGM fire, from either dismounted launchers or specialist antitank vehicles. In both cases the enemy were much harder to locate" p.123
This is again somewhat strange. An IFVs turret is certainly larger than an atgm launcher alone but for the ATGM vehicle that is only the case if it can go hulldown in which case an IFVs turret still wouldnt be much bigger and far more importantly the main way an ATGM will get located is dust and smoke kicked up from the weapons launch which will be the same in either case.
These contradictions between observed results and expected results indicate to me that:
1. There is a spotting mechanic in the ruleset used and IFVs are at a higher disadvantedge as a result
2. Improper defensive doctrine at least for western vehicles who should have several fighting positions and frequently switch. Possibly combined with the ruleset not giving the bonus for a defensive position when employing such a strategy
3. Strange targeting priorities or improper support. A defending unit should prioritize supporting tanks when employing anti tank weapons as they are the biggest threat to the individual unit. In wargaming its easy to always target the unit that will result in the greatest chance of overall success but for the actual troops individual survival is key. A tank will given the choice between an IFV or a tank first shoot the tank because that is the bigger threat. If Tanks simply werent involved the quewstion becomes why not? IFVs are combined arms weapons and suffer when left alone just like any other weapon.

Jim Storr ive gotten the book a few weeks ago and have read through it a few times now. Generally i found it easy to read though somewhat heavy on opinions rather than analysis.
You might have found a quite critical audience here as i  as several before me take issue with a certain aspect of the book. In my case ill focus on the chapter Infantry and Antitank Forces specifically your discussion of IFVs.
 
I think wargaming is a valuable source if information but always needs to be cross referenced with rl data.
However the IFV section is entirely at odds with the vast majority of modern armies and from reading it seemed inherently at odds with what was being said. It is also at odds with my personal experience so i was trying to wrap my head around it until i started collecting quotes from it to make a rebuttal ten i realized where the issue comes from.
"Ground-mounted cannon, such as the French and German 20mm, would have beenhighly effectivea gainst enemy APCs." p.116
"Cannon and ATGMs could be very effective [...] Once dismounted in cover, they could be very difficult to locate" p.123
So the Weapons the IFVs carried were effective so why not the IFV itself? Lets see the defense:
"IFVs located in a defensive position [...] tended to be knocked out by artillery fire, or neutralized and then easy prey to the attackers, be it tanks or shoulder-fired antitank weapons." p.124
"If IFVs were sited outside defensive positions [...] being quite large vehicles, they attrackted fire from the attackers Tanks and ATGMs." p.124
This implies that either a dismounted 20mm cannon is more resistant to artillery bombardement or its position wont be spotted and so not bombarded. That is strange in two ways. The IFV should be more resistant to artillery and given its mobility should be sitting outside of view only to move into its firing position when targets are called my the infantry and so actually harder to spot. Or dug in and just have its turret exposed in which case it should be equally difficult to spot but still be more resistant to artillery fire.
Now looking at the offense
"vehicle-mounted cannon and MGs did not help. [...] difficulty in locating the defenders, who were invariably concealed and often dug in." p.123
"Conversely they made the [...] IFVs obvious and high-priority targets for the defender´s fire." p.123
This is strange in two ways. First for supressing defenders and assisting the own infantry exact locations of the defenders need not be known. Simply supressing areas that could be dangerous to the own infantry if occupied by enemy infantry will do the majority of work since 20mm cannons firing he at 1000rpm cyclic into the defenders general area is going to keep their heads down. Even more if there is a full platoon doing this.
Second is that in the game even with their aparently ineffective fire they were still the priority target and not the supporting tanks (and if there werent any why?)
But what about using their ATGMs?
"Where IFVs used  [...] ATGMs [...] they were highly vulnerable to enemy ATGM fire, from either dismounted launchers or specialist antitank vehicles. In both cases the enemy were much harder to locate" p.123
This is again somewhat strange. An IFVs turret is certainly larger than an atgm launcher alone but for the ATGM vehicle that is only the case if it can go hulldown in which case an IFVs turret still wouldnt be much bigger and far more importantly the main way an ATGM will get located is dust and smoke kicked up from the weapons launch which will be the same in either case.
These contradictions between observed results and expected results indicate to me that:
1. There is a spotting mechanic in the ruleset used and IFVs are at a higher disadvantedge as a result
2. Improper defensive doctrine at least for western vehicles who should have several fighting positions and frequently switch. Possibly combined with the ruleset not giving the bonus for a defensive position when employing such a strategy
3. Strange targeting priorities or improper support. A defending unit should prioritize supporting tanks when employing anti tank weapons as they are the biggest threat to the individual unit. In wargaming its easy to always target the unit that will result in the greatest chance of overall success but for the actual troops individual survival is key. A tank will given the choice between an IFV or a tank first shoot the tank because that is the bigger threat. If Tanks simply werent involved the quewstion becomes why not? IFVs are combined arms weapons and suffer when left alone just like any other weapon.

Would be nice if they just allowed each unit to plot up to 5 area fire orders at the same time, instead of having to fight the game interface more than the opponent.
The unit would then automatically distribute fire between those 5 spots.

Yes and the point were making is that whatever way theyre currently doing it leads to the stug being too expensive.
That isnt exclusive to the sherman. Every tank works best when given spotting information be it from the platoon or supporting units and afvs always work best when massed.
If i have to be better than the oponent to have equal chances my kit is worse and should therefore cost less.
I havent been able to observe an accuracy difference between pz4 and stug.

None of this is stug specific but simple afv tactics. So basing pricing on the german side simply always outplaying the oponents is strange.
So There youre admitting to a stugs disadvvantedge over other (turreted) afvs.
Until it got the long 75mm.
Yes afvs combined with inf works better nothing in favour of the stug specifically.
Do you have anything to back that up?
Anything that gets a slight modification to fit inside a tank gets the designatiok kwk even if the actual gun barrel and the rounds fired are identical.
How is any of that relevant to the discussion?
 
This petition comes from members of a forum playing hvh with capable commanders on both sides. So basic tricks are usually used by everyone. What has come out of it is that noone ever picks stugs if they want to win. They are far more expensive than their combat performance warrants.

So you dont want to accept a simple duel between them which is reasonable.
But you also dont want to accept looking at the vehicles individual stats that they derive their cost from to compare them
Can you please lay out how you would want a comparison because to me it looks like you just dont want to compare because the conclusion is too obvious.
Ive yet to see you put forward a coherent argument why the price should be at the point where it is.
The player experience im referring to coms from players consistently playing HvH QBs and Turnaments. I have yet to hear anyone consider the Stug to be deserving of the price it has no matter how you try to compare.

su 76 is better compared to the wespe.

When their formula spits out prices that are at odds with all player experience then it might be worth finding out what is causing that discrepancy.
Sure
Only in pure penetration. HE is at best equal, it has far less ammo and is limited by not having a turret.
Until the sherman goes hulldown and then the sherman is smaller.
Sure but even then the only time the stug comes out on top is if you compare short, long range tank duels.
Its not exactly loaded when all you could come up with to countere have been the points you mentioned above. Those even if taken at face value dont make the stug 50% more valuable.

This is a petition from players over at thefewgoodmen CM playing community. It regards Quickbattle pricing of common tanks that we think should be adjusted.
In our opinion a basic 75mm Sherman, a basic PzIV long and a basic StuG long should roughly be priced the same.
As for changing the pricing model we feel that:
the turret on the tanks is worth quite a bit, so the StuG should be discounted for the lack of it. CMx2 is good enough to really make a turret count same for the additional MG and ammo loadout on the real tanks - right now secondary weapons seem not to influence prices much at all. Again, current CMx2's engine mechanisms provide good utility from these MGs although the PzIV has a better gun than the 75mm Sherman the 50mm front turret puts it right back into the same price class. And the Sherman has better HE Currently the prices are (in CMBN):
basic Sherman M4M1 (mid) 190 points Pz IVJ (early) 241 points StuG III (mid) 299 points We feel that the current pricing is getting in the way of both historically accurate force mixes (not enough StuGs) and also of general fairness between the sides. Pricing these three the same would improve both and lead to more even, realistic forces. Our community makes a lot of use of QB-purchased vehicles (we are probably the experts on it) and we feel the combat capabilities are fundamentally equivalent between these three.

Id argue that that in itself is quite a significant failing though probably not easy to fix( if its even possible).
 

I can neither confirm nor deny the presence of spotted cats on the CMCW battlefield.  I am pretty sure we mentioned a time line of "2022" for delivery, with all the usual caveats you have come to love.

I am a tanker.
In general id say tanks are spotted far too easily in hulldown positions and when los is broken up like shooting through trees etc.
They are also far too hard to spot in the open or when moving across the field of view.

Once you notice it it becomes very obvious and in the modern titles id say it matter more.
Just ran a test with a german tank btl and information about a hostile tank was at the btls hq before it was at the platoonmates tank which is simply impossible irl given how the radios are set up. It still got there in a minute but it should have only taken a few seconds.

Once you notice it it becomes very obvious and in the modern titles id say it matter more.
Just ran a test with a german tank btl and information about a hostile tank was at the btls hq before it was at the platoonmates tank which is simply impossible irl given how the radios are set up. It still got there in a minute but it should have only taken a few seconds.

The backup sight from Leo2 is comparable to the main sight of T72. Seems reasonable to me. It is a backup sight so no point massively overbuilding it.
Plot the results on a graph and youll see a pattern. So far with with 60 tests under 3 different conditions i can certainle see a trend emerging.
It isnt broken. For the most part it works great.
Run 4 tanks without command links and see if they have worse results. The time between no contact to any contact at all should be exactly the same between 4 tanks in and out of C2. Only if there is a noticable differece is there a chance platoons working together is modeled.

I am a tanker.
In general id say tanks are spotted far too easily in hulldown positions and when los is broken up like shooting through trees etc.
They are also far too hard to spot in the open or when moving across the field of view.

Currently in place so Leopard2.
Though the measure im applying is the one for Emergency use so no electric turet drive and only an 8x magnified backup sight.
Targets are nicely illustrated here: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235040314_Canadian_Army_Trophy_Analysis
 
It does make a difference though. If units spot others in the open and in broken terrain similarly the distinction starts to matter less than it probably should.
At least from the technical specifications i cant see any reason why they should perform worse. And since crew performance is a seperate stat that should have by far the largest impact.
For the technical comparison i can send you some documents.
I havent sat inside a T72 yet so i cant say it exactly but for a Leopard2 even just using the backup sight it should be far lower if its in an open field.

So i just used your scenario to get some data:
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18Ma_-1Wl273jK9zck8gmlmqj1FPw2uQGNvbe90ZwuVI/edit#gid=0
I gave the m60 a short firing arc because the test isnt about comparing t72 to m60 yet. At this point its a simple test to see how long the t72 takes to spot. Ill replace the t72 with an m60 and a t64 later to get the comparison between them. Also a 1000m experiment.
 
Things that i noticed:
- Some of the crews are legally blind. A third of them took over two minutes to get a contact. Who let those guys into tanks?
- Only two would qualify as per german tank gunnery standards and then only when applying emergency mode times. (normal ones are 15s from target presentation to target hit and emergency with the backup sight and controlls its 30s)
Id assume 60° for such a caslulation (basically gunner from 11 to 1) but thats variable. Working as a platoon generally each tank would have even less space to cover.
CM doesnt see to differentiate between cluttered and clean environment. A tank sitting somewuere between the buildings of a village should be much harder to spot than one sitting in the open but this doesnt appear to be the case.
Id love to see which ones. None of its technical data suggests it should be worse than any contemporories.
I wouldt take the gulf wars results as an indicator that t72 had bad visibility. Thats more a case for how much thermals outperform non thermals in bad visibility conditions.
 
In broken up terrain or bad weather id agree but the test was in clear weather and open and flat ground. And even then the times are quite long for a fully exposed tank.