General Liederkranz

I'd taken zero casualties at that time. I definitely don't think it's tied to that, in fact it seems you make erroneous connections often in front of coincidences.

This probably refers to the M4A1 mortar carrier, a predecessor to the M21, not to the M4A1 medium tank. As I recall mortar carriers weren't coded yet when CMFI and GL came out.
http://americangimuseum.org/collections/restored-vehicles/m4a1-mortar-carrier-halftrack-1943/

This probably refers to the M4A1 mortar carrier, a predecessor to the M21, not to the M4A1 medium tank. As I recall mortar carriers weren't coded yet when CMFI and GL came out.
http://americangimuseum.org/collections/restored-vehicles/m4a1-mortar-carrier-halftrack-1943/

thanks Piat, your file (actually both files) is included on the ticket along with a few others and your note.

REPRODUCIBLE BUG - file attached  for @BFCElvis and other interested parties
So I replaced part of Elvis's test file low hedgerow with tall hedgerow.
8 out of 8 replays later, there were dead Germans in front of the hedgerows, having charged through the tall hedgerow gaps by the end of the first turn.
I hope others will see what I am seeing!
Foliage Runners Flat Map_PIATpunk.btt

As @Howler said this still sounds bugged to me. I did some tests with this scenario and noted that in v3.12 and v4, not only do the troops not flee forwards, they usually flee back, which makes far more sense. In 4.01 and 4.02 whenever they flee, it's always forward. So even if the issue here is that the pixeltruppen are seeing the elevation change in front of them as "better cover," that is itself new behavior in 4.01 and 4.02. The old behavior--seeking safer cover by moving back from the hedgerow--seems far more realistic to me.
 
 

As @Howler said this still sounds bugged to me. I did some tests with this scenario and noted that in v3.12 and v4, not only do the troops not flee forwards, they usually flee back, which makes far more sense. In 4.01 and 4.02 whenever they flee, it's always forward. So even if the issue here is that the pixeltruppen are seeing the elevation change in front of them as "better cover," that is itself new behavior in 4.01 and 4.02. The old behavior--seeking safer cover by moving back from the hedgerow--seems far more realistic to me.
 
 

No unit should EVER rush forward and towards known contacts when a simple movement back,  away, and down slope from their position (hedges) is but 5 feet away. How is choosing to leave cover to run 20m forward fully exposed to a small rise in the open - EVER a good decision?
Speaking for myself only - I still have no idea what factors are evaluated to produce an evasion way point. Until that changes - I can't show a failure. Ergo, there's no fault to correct.
Perhaps your response to my question will help me better understand what to look for other than nearby HE, small rises in elevation, and small arms fire...

@StefanKollers Kind of depends on the situation.  In urban terrain I would almost always split them.  In more open terrain maybe not.  From my notes:
Soviet squads don't often have Assistant leaders, so splitting will pretty much always drop one teams Leadership rating, as well as imposing the "rule-based" penalty for operating counter to doctrine.
Engine manual 4.0 page 61: Syrian, Soviet & Italian Armies will suffer a morale penalty if split teams are out of close visual and voice C2 of the Platoon HQ.

perhaps im delusional, i would think heavy buildings should offer better protection when hiding prone.

Canadian Riflemen storm a house under the cover of friendly armour and smoke, Op CHARNWOOD.

Bloody Buron.
Ta for the patches Battlefront, better late than never. Singleplayer is alive and well again for me as a result. An AAR of my re-visiting this classic scenario can be read here. Enjoy. More to follow; making text AARs is less time consuming than videos at present. 

Thanks @IanL! It's good to know this is being looked at.

I just checked - this bug has been logged. I agree with @Swant that if an FO has called a few missions and those missions are still on going they should be able to adjust any one and have that adjustment only apply to the parameters of that one mission and leave the other ongoing missions alone.

The FO's can't call in simultanous missions, but when the mission are fire for effect he can call in another. If he have a howitzer FFE at one place, and adjust a completely diffrent asset like a mortar at another place, then why wouldn't the howitzer mission just keep going? It makes no sence that the howitzer, have to adjust to the mortar. 

On a vaguely similar note, here's the web archive for the defunct 'Bayonet Strength' site: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160425143250/http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/General/site_map.htm

Scenarios are as complex or as simple, as quick or as time consuming as you make them. If you treat a scenario as a doctoral dissertation on a real world battle its going to be a lot of hard work.
Its ironic that most of my labor involves creating AI movement orders for the side that players are least likely to play against. The hardest AI to plan is for the attacker; the side the player is most likely to play himself is the attacker. So they'll likely to never see my labored-over AI orders in action.

On the flip side, the large teams allow the MG to stay in action longer. With US teams that are split, you will sometimes end up with the three-man team all wounded or dead and no way for the ammo bearers to take over the MG.

I think the OP is observing that 150 rounds don't go very far and doesn't add much to the MG. While, I'm assuming their rate of fire falls in line with the general behavior of a lower rate of fire when engaged beyond effective range - it would be nice to somehow be able to explicitly control fire of the bearers.
At the moment - it hurts to see them add their fire to the MG and results in their expending all rounds while the MG still has several hundred left.
I believe the OP understands that it is what it is and doesn't expect a fix (it's not a bug - more a limitation of the engine).

The R2V (Rome to Victory) info site is active and has additional screenshots.
https://www.battlefront.com/fortress-italy/cmfi-rome-to-victory-module/?tab=screens

Didnt know the M4A1 carbine was being trialed on the Italian front in ww2 
 
The more you know 😏

I could not get this to happen in the Roadblock scenario no matter what combinations I tried, in multiple attempts. However in the Scottish Corridor first scenario, it's pretty consistent, in two places. I related this in the beta forum with a idea of what is happening and how to reproduce so that someone besides just me can check. Also, I'm on a Mac. Occasionally Mac vs. PC makes a difference. In this case I would bet it doesn't. It's a logic thing, not graphics.
Posting this here so that people know that when something like this gets posted, it does get looked at right away, reproduced, and acted on (acted on for right now would be posting a bug report to the database).  It appears to be some specific sets of circumstances to me. But that's why others need to verify it. I could also be wrong 🙂
Saved game files REALLY help, if it's something reproducible so that you can get a save. That way we can compare the save to us running it fresh.  In this case it was much easier to see what was happening by running it myself at Basic Training level, because I could see all the Germans and what was happening to them.

It may be that trenches don't provide enough protection (especially since we can't get overhead cover), but I think there are two other things going on here too. First, artillery is too flexible in the WW2 games and (as others have suggested on the forum) it would be more realistic not to allow Point or Linear missions, instead requiring Area with a minimum of 50m or so. I've started doing this in single-player games and the results feel much more realistic to me. Artillery will suppress and cause casualties but it rarely annihilates. Second, in my experience it makes a huge difference if infantry in trenches Hide. The problem of course is that the AI will never do this.

Players who believe they have uncovered a bug need only save the game file (must zip it)  and post a comment on the forum dedicated to the game the bug was found.  You should be able attach it to the forum post.  I have attached a save file that was sent to me when working on the 2.2 patch here to demonstrate. Note that it is the 3rd turn of a Campaign. Or the player can send an email to specific beta testers who are responding to the bug report.  When I think I can be of help I often ask the player to send a save file directly to me.
Now to answer the question "Why do the testers need a save game file?".... Not only is it the best evidence,  but also the fastest way to see what the player sees.
The Scottish Corridor 003.zip

(For anti-infantry) there's currently no real reason to use any gun bigger than 75mm in this game. I believe it's because infantry fortifications are undermodelled, and big HE is undermodelled. If you can hit them with 75mm, they're done very fast.

bits of stuff from the US, based on intel on german artillery. (infantry gun related info on employment in bold text). Some appear direct translations from captured german documents or field regulations, which are in my possession as well. :)
 
Notes on German Divisional Artillery
Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 6, August 27, 1942.
The organization of the German divisional artillery, like that of our own, includes three
battalions of 105-mm. howitzers, which ordinarily operate in direct support of the three
infantry regiments, and one medium battalion. The medium battalion is composed of 2
batteries of 150-mm. howitzers and 1 battery of 100-mm. guns, and operates in general
support of the division. There is also an infantry cannon company composed of six 75-
mm. howitzers and two 150-mm. howitzers. In addition, in each armored and motorized
division as well as certain assault infantry divisions, there is one armored assault artillery
battalion composed of three 4-gun companies armed with self-propelled 75-mm. or 105-
mm. howitzers.

In addition to this artillery there is in every division an artillery observation battalion
which is composed of a sound-ranging battery and a flash-ranging battery (each separable
into 2 independent platoons), a survey battery, a reproduction platoon, a signal platoon,
and a meteorological section. This battalion works directly under the division artillery
commander.

In general, the tactics and technique of German artillery are very similar to our own, but
a recent report on cooperation between German artillery and other arms brings out several
interesting divergences as well as some slight differences in emphasis.

All artillery orders are given orally at first; later those of the regiment and the division,
particularly the latter, are confirmed and expanded in writing. The divisional artillery
commander’s order is not issued as an annex to the division order, but as a separate
artillery order. Great stress is placed on the use of fragmentary and warning orders, and the
Germans also emphasize that wherever possible orders should be given on terrain
affording suitable observation rather than by reference to a map.

Counterbattery missions of the divisional medium artillery are heavily stressed. While
counterbattery is primarily the task of the medium battalion, the other three battalions may
often take over this function. The presence of the observation battalion is one of the
reasons for emphasis on counterbattery as a divisional artillery function.

Great emphasis is also placed on the battalion as the fire-control unit, and the separation
of the battalion into independent batteries to be used as attached artillery is never
recommended except in extremely large sectors, or under very difficult terrain conditions
such as thick woods.

In the preparation and conduct of fire, simplicity of technique is the goal. Generally a
standard method is prescribed and followed, and variations are discouraged. This is typical
of all German technique in that they deliberately adopt a simple method which will fit the
large majority of cases, and consider that the gain in simplicity is more important than the
loss of several highly refined techniques, each suitable for only a few complex situations.
Reciprocal laying with the aiming circle is apparently the method most frequently used. It
should be noted that this standardization of technique is in contrast to the general tactical
doctrine of the Germans, which insists upon the uniqueness of each problem and the
necessity for working out a complete and independent solution rather than applying a rigid
prearranged formula.

Communications are normally by wire, and the use of radio is limited to periods of
displacement. The one exception to this is the radio communication between observation
posts and gun positions.

In preparation fires each battery normally covers one or more targets, each about 110 to
165 yards in width. At all times emphasis is placed on flexibility of fire plan and
procedure, particularly by using irregular surprise fires on infantry and artillery, and on
enemy command posts, as well as on the point of intended penetration.

The following table shows the maximum rates of fire consistent with efficient
maintenance of materiel:
(graphic left out)

Except in unusual circumstances the artillery “reserve” consists of a large supply of
ammunition rather than uncommitted units.

In order to secure greater effect against personnel in the open, ricochet fire is
deliberately sought by use of delayed fuse. With light howitzers ricochet is believed to be
always obtainable up to an angle of impact of 270 mils, and usually obtainable up to
360 mils. The adjustment is secured with quick fuse, and fire for effect is conducted with
delayed fuse. If for any reason the ricochet fire does not prove effective, fire for effect is
continued with quick fuse.

The Germans believe in a “lone gun”, placed at a sufficient distance from the rest of the
battery so as to appear to be an entirely different position. This gun is used for harassing
fire, fire against high targets, determination of weather corrections, and finally to deceive
the hostile observation as to the true position of the battery.

It is essential that supported infantry commanders be generally familiar with the
characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of artillery in order to secure most effective
cooperation. They must understand: that the effectiveness of artillery depends to a great
extent on the neutralization of enemy artillery, and that consequently some of the fire must
be employed on counterbattery missions; that the ammunition supply is limited, and the
laying of heavy concentrations on important areas means a loss of fire on less important
ones; that the artillery should engage only those targets which justify its heavy fire; and
finally that unnecessary or too hasty requests divert artillery from its principal missions
and destroy mutual confidence.

One factor which insures that infantry commanders will be familiar with artillery
capabilities and limitations is the presence of the infantry cannon company in the infantry
regiment. This cannon company’s presence also has several other effects. First of all, it
settles the problem of the accompanying gun. Second, artillery is relieved of many small
but difficult direct-support missions and is released for its larger missions. Third, and most
important, it lessens the artillery-infantry gap which liaison officers are intended to bridge,
since it means that the liaison is not between two distinct and separate units of artillery
and infantry, but rather between the regular artillery of the supporting battalion and an
infantry unit which already has organic artillery weapons. There is coordination of fire
plans as well as mutual observation by the cannon company and the artillery. Also the
divisional observation battalion lends its assistance the infantry cannon company.

It is essential that the infantry regimental and battalion commanders assist their
cooperating artillery commander by continually informing him of the infantry plan of
action, the infantry’s progress, and its need for artillery support.

Infantry company, battalion, and regimental commanders are made “artillery minded” by
being constantly trained to rely on artillery support to the utmost.

A very important function of the infantry is to seize and hold the forward locations
necessary for artillery observation, thereby facilitating the artillery support. Likewise, the
infantry should be informed of the positions of the artillery forward observers, observation
posts, and command posts.

Finally, the closest support between the two arms is secured by having forward artillery
observers operate with the advance infantry units. Forward observers with pack radio sets
are believed to be the only effective means of obtaining satisfactory observation. Sets are
used both by individual batteries and by battalions, and quite often the battery commander
himself will act as forward observer, particularly at the beginning of an engagement when
he is not familiar with the terrain. Alternate positions for all observation posts are stressed,
and, as one of our observers reports “It is impossible to exaggerate the emphasis German
doctrine puts on movement of observation posts and improvement of observation.”

COMMENT: In summation the above article points out the following noteworthy
features of German divisional artillery:
1. Early counterbattery fire by divisional artillery.
2. Use of battalion as a unit.
3. No set pattern for fire plan in preparations.
4. Ricochet fire.
5. Use of roving gun for registration, harassing fire, and deception.
6. Education of commanders of supported units as to value of—
a. Neutralizing enemy artillery.
b. Conservation of ammunition for important missions.
c. Necessity for observation.
7. Close support through forward observers with advanced infantry, rather than through
liaison detachments with supported unit commander.