absolutmauser

Combat Mission: Pacific
...
I'll get my coat. 

Other than the artillery issues which will hopefully be improved by the forthcoming patches, the biggest casualty producer in the game, to me, is the time limits and the overall aggressiveness of troops. It's really easy to get your troops killed by failing to scout and by making contact with too large a group of your men. If you use scout teams and move methodically, you will avoid running whole squads into kill zones. Your troops will happily barge forward into the kill zones if you order them to. The challenge then becomes dealing with the clock. If you've only got two hours to take an objective, you may have to press forward faster than historically would have been the case most of the time, and the result will be higher casualties. 
I don't think these are necessarily flaws (the game is already pretty sedately paced even with these design decisions), but it helps to keep in mind when you're comparing to historical casualty figures that CMx2 makes it a challenge to really take your time with many of the scenario timers, and the willingness of basically all troops to charge aggressively forward (until they start taking hits) will let you get them killed pretty easily!

I think the game "compiles" LOS data when you load the scenario in the game. Basically checking every square's LOS against all the other squares. The editor doesn't do that when loading/saving map data (advantage being that loading/saving in the editor is extremely quick). Checking LOS should be a task that hugely benefits from multiple cores, because there's a finite workload that can be split up independently between threads.
You won't get 4x loading speed from 4x cores though, as the loading process also does other things that happen in sequence and depend on data load speeds.

Use Shadowplay to upload a gameplay video to Youtube and lets see how bad it is. Your PC should play the game fine.

Get em, Luke. 😃 

People have gotten used to the Steam process where games are kept up to date automagically and you don't have to go download stuff from someplace. They don't remember the times of yore when you had "read" or "make a tiny effort" to update software. 😃 Or if you didn't have good internet, you might have to wait for your favorite game magazine to put the patches you need on a CD (or, gasp, a floppy disk!) that you could buy at the supermarket. BFC may not be as slick as Steam, but it's still much better than the old days. 😃

People have gotten used to the Steam process where games are kept up to date automagically and you don't have to go download stuff from someplace. They don't remember the times of yore when you had "read" or "make a tiny effort" to update software. 😃 Or if you didn't have good internet, you might have to wait for your favorite game magazine to put the patches you need on a CD (or, gasp, a floppy disk!) that you could buy at the supermarket. BFC may not be as slick as Steam, but it's still much better than the old days. 😃

I am not sure the doctrine would come anywhere close to CM play.  Due to some specific issues in game play particularly for the AI small arms isn't generally capable of friendly fire.  There are things we can get away with that in RL wouldn't likely even be considered,

Hehe. Because they want to spend the holiday with their friends and family eating pie and watching football instead of 1) crunching to final release code and 2) handling all the support requests that accompany a release! =D

It takes a while to high five everyone after you destroy the first tank, so maybe they were still working through their touchdown celebration dance routines when the second one showed up? 

I think you originally replied to add "nuance" to sburke's "simple and practical" answer. I just wanted to add that COIN is not a new term, nor is counterinsurgency theory a "post 9/11" theory. FM3-24, which is the Army's documentation and statement of this post-9/11 COIN doctrine, is a revival of the doctrines developed in the 1950s and 1960s with updates to adapt to new technology and the differences between the current Jihadist insurgencies compared with Communist and other prior insurgencies. Gen. Patreaus and Gen. Mattis, the listed authors of FM3-24, specifically discuss how they are applying these earlier doctrines that have been neglected for 20 years, and placing them in the context of the current insurgencies. 
I see your point, though: Soldiers fighting in counterinsurgencies prior to the modern world of post 9/11 had to deal with such primitive situations as:
---Being assaulted by AK47 and RPG-equipped guerillas who blend in with the civilian population
---Dealing with restrictive ROE that prevent the use of firepower in various situations
---Being transported in helicopters on air assault missions and relying on helicopters for casualty evacuation
---Being blown up by improvised explosive devices and other booby traps (maybe there will be an initialism for this sort of thing in the modern era!)
---Setting up combat outposts and firebases and conducting ambush patrols outside of observation posts and outposts to detect and disrupt guerilla attacks on those outposts
---Relying on fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft to deliver close air support including dedicated COIN aircraft like the AC130 gunship
---Being armed only with a mix of assault rifles, precision rifles, automatic rifles, grenade launchers, hand grenades, rocket launchers, light wheeled vehicles, light armored vehicles, APCs, tanks, artillery, mortars, and radio communications
---Using elite special forces to conduct raiding, interdiction, intelligence gathering, and training indigenous personnel
My god, it was practically the bronze age. I'm surprised they didn't pay the troops with salt. 

 

I think you originally replied to add "nuance" to sburke's "simple and practical" answer. I just wanted to add that COIN is not a new term, nor is counterinsurgency theory a "post 9/11" theory. FM3-24, which is the Army's documentation and statement of this post-9/11 COIN doctrine, is a revival of the doctrines developed in the 1950s and 1960s with updates to adapt to new technology and the differences between the current Jihadist insurgencies compared with Communist and other prior insurgencies. Gen. Patreaus and Gen. Mattis, the listed authors of FM3-24, specifically discuss how they are applying these earlier doctrines that have been neglected for 20 years, and placing them in the context of the current insurgencies. 
I see your point, though: Soldiers fighting in counterinsurgencies prior to the modern world of post 9/11 had to deal with such primitive situations as:
---Being assaulted by AK47 and RPG-equipped guerillas who blend in with the civilian population
---Dealing with restrictive ROE that prevent the use of firepower in various situations
---Being transported in helicopters on air assault missions and relying on helicopters for casualty evacuation
---Being blown up by improvised explosive devices and other booby traps (maybe there will be an initialism for this sort of thing in the modern era!)
---Setting up combat outposts and firebases and conducting ambush patrols outside of observation posts and outposts to detect and disrupt guerilla attacks on those outposts
---Relying on fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft to deliver close air support including dedicated COIN aircraft like the AC130 gunship
---Being armed only with a mix of assault rifles, precision rifles, automatic rifles, grenade launchers, hand grenades, rocket launchers, light wheeled vehicles, light armored vehicles, APCs, tanks, artillery, mortars, and radio communications
---Using elite special forces to conduct raiding, interdiction, intelligence gathering, and training indigenous personnel
My god, it was practically the bronze age. I'm surprised they didn't pay the troops with salt. 

 

I think you originally replied to add "nuance" to sburke's "simple and practical" answer. I just wanted to add that COIN is not a new term, nor is counterinsurgency theory a "post 9/11" theory. FM3-24, which is the Army's documentation and statement of this post-9/11 COIN doctrine, is a revival of the doctrines developed in the 1950s and 1960s with updates to adapt to new technology and the differences between the current Jihadist insurgencies compared with Communist and other prior insurgencies. Gen. Patreaus and Gen. Mattis, the listed authors of FM3-24, specifically discuss how they are applying these earlier doctrines that have been neglected for 20 years, and placing them in the context of the current insurgencies. 
I see your point, though: Soldiers fighting in counterinsurgencies prior to the modern world of post 9/11 had to deal with such primitive situations as:
---Being assaulted by AK47 and RPG-equipped guerillas who blend in with the civilian population
---Dealing with restrictive ROE that prevent the use of firepower in various situations
---Being transported in helicopters on air assault missions and relying on helicopters for casualty evacuation
---Being blown up by improvised explosive devices and other booby traps (maybe there will be an initialism for this sort of thing in the modern era!)
---Setting up combat outposts and firebases and conducting ambush patrols outside of observation posts and outposts to detect and disrupt guerilla attacks on those outposts
---Relying on fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft to deliver close air support including dedicated COIN aircraft like the AC130 gunship
---Being armed only with a mix of assault rifles, precision rifles, automatic rifles, grenade launchers, hand grenades, rocket launchers, light wheeled vehicles, light armored vehicles, APCs, tanks, artillery, mortars, and radio communications
---Using elite special forces to conduct raiding, interdiction, intelligence gathering, and training indigenous personnel
My god, it was practically the bronze age. I'm surprised they didn't pay the troops with salt. 

 

I think you originally replied to add "nuance" to sburke's "simple and practical" answer. I just wanted to add that COIN is not a new term, nor is counterinsurgency theory a "post 9/11" theory. FM3-24, which is the Army's documentation and statement of this post-9/11 COIN doctrine, is a revival of the doctrines developed in the 1950s and 1960s with updates to adapt to new technology and the differences between the current Jihadist insurgencies compared with Communist and other prior insurgencies. Gen. Patreaus and Gen. Mattis, the listed authors of FM3-24, specifically discuss how they are applying these earlier doctrines that have been neglected for 20 years, and placing them in the context of the current insurgencies. 
I see your point, though: Soldiers fighting in counterinsurgencies prior to the modern world of post 9/11 had to deal with such primitive situations as:
---Being assaulted by AK47 and RPG-equipped guerillas who blend in with the civilian population
---Dealing with restrictive ROE that prevent the use of firepower in various situations
---Being transported in helicopters on air assault missions and relying on helicopters for casualty evacuation
---Being blown up by improvised explosive devices and other booby traps (maybe there will be an initialism for this sort of thing in the modern era!)
---Setting up combat outposts and firebases and conducting ambush patrols outside of observation posts and outposts to detect and disrupt guerilla attacks on those outposts
---Relying on fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft to deliver close air support including dedicated COIN aircraft like the AC130 gunship
---Being armed only with a mix of assault rifles, precision rifles, automatic rifles, grenade launchers, hand grenades, rocket launchers, light wheeled vehicles, light armored vehicles, APCs, tanks, artillery, mortars, and radio communications
---Using elite special forces to conduct raiding, interdiction, intelligence gathering, and training indigenous personnel
My god, it was practically the bronze age. I'm surprised they didn't pay the troops with salt. 

 

I think you originally replied to add "nuance" to sburke's "simple and practical" answer. I just wanted to add that COIN is not a new term, nor is counterinsurgency theory a "post 9/11" theory. FM3-24, which is the Army's documentation and statement of this post-9/11 COIN doctrine, is a revival of the doctrines developed in the 1950s and 1960s with updates to adapt to new technology and the differences between the current Jihadist insurgencies compared with Communist and other prior insurgencies. Gen. Patreaus and Gen. Mattis, the listed authors of FM3-24, specifically discuss how they are applying these earlier doctrines that have been neglected for 20 years, and placing them in the context of the current insurgencies. 
I see your point, though: Soldiers fighting in counterinsurgencies prior to the modern world of post 9/11 had to deal with such primitive situations as:
---Being assaulted by AK47 and RPG-equipped guerillas who blend in with the civilian population
---Dealing with restrictive ROE that prevent the use of firepower in various situations
---Being transported in helicopters on air assault missions and relying on helicopters for casualty evacuation
---Being blown up by improvised explosive devices and other booby traps (maybe there will be an initialism for this sort of thing in the modern era!)
---Setting up combat outposts and firebases and conducting ambush patrols outside of observation posts and outposts to detect and disrupt guerilla attacks on those outposts
---Relying on fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft to deliver close air support including dedicated COIN aircraft like the AC130 gunship
---Being armed only with a mix of assault rifles, precision rifles, automatic rifles, grenade launchers, hand grenades, rocket launchers, light wheeled vehicles, light armored vehicles, APCs, tanks, artillery, mortars, and radio communications
---Using elite special forces to conduct raiding, interdiction, intelligence gathering, and training indigenous personnel
My god, it was practically the bronze age. I'm surprised they didn't pay the troops with salt. 

 

COIN as a term for counter-insurgency has been around far longer than the US doctrines developed after the invasion of Iraq. I don't believe Galula or Trinquier use the term in their seminal works from 1964 and 1961, respectively, but the USAF was discussing dedicated COIN aircraft at least as early as 1963. 

COIN as a term for counter-insurgency has been around far longer than the US doctrines developed after the invasion of Iraq. I don't believe Galula or Trinquier use the term in their seminal works from 1964 and 1961, respectively, but the USAF was discussing dedicated COIN aircraft at least as early as 1963.