Hapless

Bayonet lug.

More seriously, the bit in the middle looks like a muzzle reference device. On tanks, it collects data about the gun barrel (like, how much it's bending due to heat expansion on the sunward side) to feed back to the fire control system to maintain accuracy, I'd imagine it's the same sort of thing.

Bayonet lug.

More seriously, the bit in the middle looks like a muzzle reference device. On tanks, it collects data about the gun barrel (like, how much it's bending due to heat expansion on the sunward side) to feed back to the fire control system to maintain accuracy, I'd imagine it's the same sort of thing.

Best to treat enemy held buildings like landmines:

If you can go round it, go round it.
If you can't go round it... blow it up before you go near it.
If you can't blow it up... shoot the crap out of it in the hope that you'll hit something important that stops it going off.

Clearing the building is the equivalent of stepping on the landmine- don't do it unless you literally have no other choice.

Zooming down from 30k feet to about ten feet: apparently CCTV footage of the attack on the Transnistrian Ministry of State Security building (or whatever it's called).

https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/uddy8q/the_footage_of_the_shelling_of_the_building_of/

Doesn't exactly look professional: maybe it's not supposed to, maybe whoever it is is just crap.

I for one can't help but hear Benny Hill music when I watch the first guy trying to dodge the other two backblasts... and failing.
 

Zooming down from 30k feet to about ten feet: apparently CCTV footage of the attack on the Transnistrian Ministry of State Security building (or whatever it's called).

https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/uddy8q/the_footage_of_the_shelling_of_the_building_of/

Doesn't exactly look professional: maybe it's not supposed to, maybe whoever it is is just crap.

I for one can't help but hear Benny Hill music when I watch the first guy trying to dodge the other two backblasts... and failing.
 

Well, that is now that they are in wartime. In an hypotethical negotiated peace the Russians will have to eventually allow free movement for the merchants, otherwise they would be enacting a blockade, so an act of war. If those territories are controlled by Rusia when the dust settles then Ukraine would lose a long term economic asset, which they hope would bring (rather force) Ukraine closer to Russia (or atleast cripple it for when Round 2 cames along), without having to mantain such blockade. Also, it will allow them to start meddling into Moldava.
Nevertheless, I still think that the plan is to take Ukraine in its entirety eventually, and from there keep on putting pressure into eastern europe (remember all those ultimatums against NATO back in January). This declarations are most likely just meant as internal propaganda, as Odessa is considered by Russians as theirs, and supposedly one of the main cities that had to be liberated. Like I said early, wether they go now against Ukraine or they decide to bite the bullet and wait for another time will most likely be known as Russia mobilizes this May or doesnt. I would be surprised if they intend to keep the war going for longer, but they atleast dont partially mobilize.

Depends on how you view the Russian enclave in Moldova. If your goal is to unite all German Russian speaking peoples on your borders, Moldova could be an important goal for Putin. A direct land bridge would set Russia up for a replay of this crisis in the few years in Moldova. Plus it turns Ukraine into a totally landlocked country, strangling it economically (hopefully). 

So this is a very common misconception.  A ground force is like a ship, simply having in the field erodes it over time, simple interaction with the environment causes wear and tear.  Troops get sick and hurt.  Morale wanes over time as living in a hole like an animal sucks.  Equipment also needs constant maintenance and spare parts, it also gets damaged in accidents etc. 
So yes, simply taking an unit out into the wild and parking it will begin a process of slow attrition over time.  Attrition that will need resupply, refit and rotation.  Add in actual combat and that process speeds up dramatically.
So basically any army in the field is like a bag of water with a hole in it.  How big that hole is depends on all sorts of factors, including combat.  At the top of the bag is how quickly one can pour resources back into the bag. [aside: for those paying attention, yes, all military forces are living examples of the Theseus paradox].
So the question of "how long" is actually a combination of the front end and back end.  Right now that hole is pretty big and the water coming in is not matching, I am not sure if Russia can get a matching back-end to be honest as these are not simple things to replace.  However, this is also tied up with complicated concepts of power I outlined in that other post. 

Good find man, this is really interesting!

Haven't gotten all the way through yet, but when he starts talking about what they did when they reached Hostomel, it's so fascinating to listen to someone describing the blunt end of a battle drill army.

"We came off the helicopter so we made a horseshoe formation- because that's the drill."
"The commander told us to hold a position, so we dug in- because that's the drill."

Drills are not tactics, but they're easier to teach and judge. To train a platoon attack, go through the checklist from the manual, tick the boxes, training complete, well done, schedule again the next time the qualification comes up.

Free play exercises- where you *use* drills to practice tactics- aren't just harder to pull off effectively, but harder to justify in a budget because you can't be certain of the result. When you've got 3 platoons to qualify and a limited time to do it in, it's difficult to explain how you spent x hours on an exercise where all one of those platoons does is sit there, or where another one gets wiped out and the other is the only one that passed.

I don't think I've ever seen anything from the RU side approaching a free-play kind of exercise. Things like Zapad are most operational/strategic and the filmed chunks are clearly just highly scripted demonstrations. Certainly nothing like the NTC.

I don't mean to imply that drills are useless- everyone learns drills and they *should* learn drills, but when you can't use the building-blocks to make a coherent effort, or your drills fall apart because war is a kaleidoscope of chaos, confusion, uncertainty and stress in a way that exercises aren't then you sit on an airfield for a week getting pulverised by air and artillery.

I'm over-exaggerating a little, but I do think there is a drills vs tactics tension we're seeing play out at the tactical level.

Or, you know,... seeing a battle drill army that has been ticking off that it's been doing it's drills properly for the last 20 years and selling off the ammo allocation for vodka...

Good find man, this is really interesting!

Haven't gotten all the way through yet, but when he starts talking about what they did when they reached Hostomel, it's so fascinating to listen to someone describing the blunt end of a battle drill army.

"We came off the helicopter so we made a horseshoe formation- because that's the drill."
"The commander told us to hold a position, so we dug in- because that's the drill."

Drills are not tactics, but they're easier to teach and judge. To train a platoon attack, go through the checklist from the manual, tick the boxes, training complete, well done, schedule again the next time the qualification comes up.

Free play exercises- where you *use* drills to practice tactics- aren't just harder to pull off effectively, but harder to justify in a budget because you can't be certain of the result. When you've got 3 platoons to qualify and a limited time to do it in, it's difficult to explain how you spent x hours on an exercise where all one of those platoons does is sit there, or where another one gets wiped out and the other is the only one that passed.

I don't think I've ever seen anything from the RU side approaching a free-play kind of exercise. Things like Zapad are most operational/strategic and the filmed chunks are clearly just highly scripted demonstrations. Certainly nothing like the NTC.

I don't mean to imply that drills are useless- everyone learns drills and they *should* learn drills, but when you can't use the building-blocks to make a coherent effort, or your drills fall apart because war is a kaleidoscope of chaos, confusion, uncertainty and stress in a way that exercises aren't then you sit on an airfield for a week getting pulverised by air and artillery.

I'm over-exaggerating a little, but I do think there is a drills vs tactics tension we're seeing play out at the tactical level.

Or, you know,... seeing a battle drill army that has been ticking off that it's been doing it's drills properly for the last 20 years and selling off the ammo allocation for vodka...

We shouldn't go overboard with the Putin health speculations. If one compares the pictures to previous meetings with his cabinet ministers in his office, he simply seems to have a habit of holding on to things with his hands, even many years ago.

One alternative on the political front is that Putin isn't actually in power anymore: that there's been a quiet coup behind the scenes. The new bosses have all the power, but they're keeping him in position to soak up the failure while they try to bring an end to hostilities.

Probably tremendously unlikely, but that video of him talking to Shoigu seems so off. Slouched, unhealthy Putin gripping onto the table for dear life, tapping his foot with his shoulders up by his ears. Shoigu in a suit and not his uniform. The tiny table and the uncomfortable proximity. Looks like the same room that Putin gave his hour long history lesson from just before the war started (the one with the Kremlin screensaver and the array of 70s phones)- but he's not behind the desk in a position of authority here, he's out in front face-to-face with Shoigu.

I mean, I've only seen a short cropped video but it definitely doesn't has the same vibe as the pre-war stuff.

One alternative on the political front is that Putin isn't actually in power anymore: that there's been a quiet coup behind the scenes. The new bosses have all the power, but they're keeping him in position to soak up the failure while they try to bring an end to hostilities.

Probably tremendously unlikely, but that video of him talking to Shoigu seems so off. Slouched, unhealthy Putin gripping onto the table for dear life, tapping his foot with his shoulders up by his ears. Shoigu in a suit and not his uniform. The tiny table and the uncomfortable proximity. Looks like the same room that Putin gave his hour long history lesson from just before the war started (the one with the Kremlin screensaver and the array of 70s phones)- but he's not behind the desk in a position of authority here, he's out in front face-to-face with Shoigu.

I mean, I've only seen a short cropped video but it definitely doesn't has the same vibe as the pre-war stuff.

One alternative on the political front is that Putin isn't actually in power anymore: that there's been a quiet coup behind the scenes. The new bosses have all the power, but they're keeping him in position to soak up the failure while they try to bring an end to hostilities.

Probably tremendously unlikely, but that video of him talking to Shoigu seems so off. Slouched, unhealthy Putin gripping onto the table for dear life, tapping his foot with his shoulders up by his ears. Shoigu in a suit and not his uniform. The tiny table and the uncomfortable proximity. Looks like the same room that Putin gave his hour long history lesson from just before the war started (the one with the Kremlin screensaver and the array of 70s phones)- but he's not behind the desk in a position of authority here, he's out in front face-to-face with Shoigu.

I mean, I've only seen a short cropped video but it definitely doesn't has the same vibe as the pre-war stuff.

Good find man, this is really interesting!

Haven't gotten all the way through yet, but when he starts talking about what they did when they reached Hostomel, it's so fascinating to listen to someone describing the blunt end of a battle drill army.

"We came off the helicopter so we made a horseshoe formation- because that's the drill."
"The commander told us to hold a position, so we dug in- because that's the drill."

Drills are not tactics, but they're easier to teach and judge. To train a platoon attack, go through the checklist from the manual, tick the boxes, training complete, well done, schedule again the next time the qualification comes up.

Free play exercises- where you *use* drills to practice tactics- aren't just harder to pull off effectively, but harder to justify in a budget because you can't be certain of the result. When you've got 3 platoons to qualify and a limited time to do it in, it's difficult to explain how you spent x hours on an exercise where all one of those platoons does is sit there, or where another one gets wiped out and the other is the only one that passed.

I don't think I've ever seen anything from the RU side approaching a free-play kind of exercise. Things like Zapad are most operational/strategic and the filmed chunks are clearly just highly scripted demonstrations. Certainly nothing like the NTC.

I don't mean to imply that drills are useless- everyone learns drills and they *should* learn drills, but when you can't use the building-blocks to make a coherent effort, or your drills fall apart because war is a kaleidoscope of chaos, confusion, uncertainty and stress in a way that exercises aren't then you sit on an airfield for a week getting pulverised by air and artillery.

I'm over-exaggerating a little, but I do think there is a drills vs tactics tension we're seeing play out at the tactical level.

Or, you know,... seeing a battle drill army that has been ticking off that it's been doing it's drills properly for the last 20 years and selling off the ammo allocation for vodka...

Interview with captured Russian airborne soldier.
A video of a captured Russian soldier from 31st Airborne Assault Brigade, who was part of the first wave to attack (presumably) Hostomel, and is the only survivor of his company. He doesn't appear to be coerced and amongst other things (a) says that the individual soldiers weren't briefed about the mission until they were on the helicopters inbound for the attack (b) describes the effects of Ukrainian artillery on his unit (c) describes another company being merged with his own because their combat losses (d) gives his opinion about his units level of training. 
The interview is 25 minutes long, subtitled,and repays watching.
 
 

Not storming Azovstal is an intersting one.

On the one hand... why try and clear it when you can (hopefully) starve the defenders out? Or at least, let their supply problems grind them down until attacking looks like it might result in fewer casualties. What's interesting is the potential that this reflect shifting political/military priorities: raising a Russian flag over Azovstal and thus the entirety of Mariupol is taking a backseat to something else. Like, for example, a need to get more replacements for other, now more important operations.

On the other hand... not clearing Azozstal because you can't, or because you can't afford to seems like a serious admission of failure, will or capability. It doesn't feel like a victory.

Perhaps more interesting is the reporting that it's Putin's decision not to storm the place. So it's his responsibility: he's no longer the benevolent Tsar mislead by his generals, he's getting personally involved. If that comes back to bite- in the same way that it came back to bite Tsar Nicholas II, then... well that would be interesting. Russia moving from a "We know it's terrible, but if only Putin knew how bad it was then he'd be able to fix it" to "Sergei, get the pitchfork we're going to Moscow" is probably unlikely, but historically similar illusions being shattered hasn't ended well.

Not storming Azovstal is an intersting one.

On the one hand... why try and clear it when you can (hopefully) starve the defenders out? Or at least, let their supply problems grind them down until attacking looks like it might result in fewer casualties. What's interesting is the potential that this reflect shifting political/military priorities: raising a Russian flag over Azovstal and thus the entirety of Mariupol is taking a backseat to something else. Like, for example, a need to get more replacements for other, now more important operations.

On the other hand... not clearing Azozstal because you can't, or because you can't afford to seems like a serious admission of failure, will or capability. It doesn't feel like a victory.

Perhaps more interesting is the reporting that it's Putin's decision not to storm the place. So it's his responsibility: he's no longer the benevolent Tsar mislead by his generals, he's getting personally involved. If that comes back to bite- in the same way that it came back to bite Tsar Nicholas II, then... well that would be interesting. Russia moving from a "We know it's terrible, but if only Putin knew how bad it was then he'd be able to fix it" to "Sergei, get the pitchfork we're going to Moscow" is probably unlikely, but historically similar illusions being shattered hasn't ended well.

This is not true. Russians had some plans for arab fighters, but here is a question - how to coordinate their actions? Also these fighters are very unstable force - they can just drop a weapon and run away toward EU borders to get a status of refugee. 
Different Russian PMC groups of course present. Vagner is already "brand", but indeed Vagner PMC already doesn't exists. One of those, who fight in Ukraine call itself "Liga". Our troopers engaged with them around Izium and Popasna and in whole have opinion they are more trained, motivated and experienced than regular Russian units.

Well then it should be hard coded if you're playing Russians.
On easy.
With elite veterans.

Definitely some parallels.
Another thought experiment for any interested.  If you want to see a war were The Capt's definitions and concepts break down read World War Z by Max Brooks:
- No communication, negotiation or concept of sacrifice for zombies.
- No null or negative decision space as zombies cannot be put into dilemma, nor are their decisions meta-stable,
- All mass and attrition, manoeuvre is nearly impossible as zombies have no Center of Gravity beyond the horde itself.
- Technically this is not a war as it is not a social interaction, it is more of a pest infestation.
Well that was fun...back to Ukraine.

Since everyone in this thread seems to be talking about game dev again, when are we going to get a new line in the mission results screen? Killed, wounded, destroyed, $ cost for ordinance? 🤣 

Relink, because it's interesting. My take was more tactical- that they were only likely to get a couple of shots off and were holding out for something juicy, a by-product being the joking that most Russian vehicles didn't justify the expense of the missile.
@Huba You got the right one 👍, this is just the longer version I think.

Is this the one ? 
 

That might be a pretty good analogy for the Russian army actually:

Contemplating a decaying orbit in a malfunctioning spacecraft short-circuited by the free-floating graphite shards of a broken pencil point; trying desperately to solve the problem by sharpening the pencil some more and adding to the cloud of pencil shavings clogging the instruments.

Should have invested in a pen guys! Or, you know... not gone to space.

(Not to say that COTS products and components aren't a good idea, providing they're being used because they work and not because Ivan found it in the bin and it happens to fit.)