The_MonkeyKing

and US aid is back on track for now

and US aid is back on track for now

and US aid is back on track for now

and US aid is back on track for now

and US aid is back on track for now

and US aid is back on track for now

and US aid is back on track for now

Situation developing

 

I think if Ukrainians get to choose what the limited funds are used for, Abrams is not on that list

Situation developing

 

Situation developing

 

Re install...?

First answer to “Did NATO forces plan etc?”  Absolutely, yes.  The 11 ACR (V Corp) owned this ground: had war gamed it, exercised over it and planned for a Soviet attack in this area for decades.  They had PTPTs (peace time prepared targets) already sketched in, in some places only needed to add mines or explosives to obstacles pre-sighted.  In game I was probably too forgiving for levels of US/NATO prep but there was a strategic surprise element built into the backstory.
Soviet doctrine actually had a fair amount manoeuvre built into it, however, it was normally only ever exercised at operational levels.  An MRR or TR was really considered a tactical munition - point at enemy and pull trigger.  One had to go up to divisional level before anything resembling manoeuvre warfare kicked in.  The Soviets were hampered by centralized control however, so we really do not know how things would have really panned out.
Mission 3 is extremely realistic from a Bn or Regt COs point of view.  This is day 3 or 4 of the war so recon would have largely been stripped away in the forward Recon Battles.  So formations and units would be relying on their own recon/FSE’s.  An MRB CO would have been pointed and ordered at a primary objective with limited recon against an opponent how really knew and owned the ground.  A collision of this sort (I.e. rolling straight into a KZ situation) is very realistic for the forces and time of the battle.  Removing the Soviet players ability to shape or pre-position was by-design to reflect this situation.  You are an MRB CO smashing forward.  If you die, there are entire echelons behind you that may bypass but you are stuck with this situation.  We really were aiming to put the player in realistic Soviet shoes, not simply allow them to fight as westerners in Soviet kit.
Is it unfair?  Most definitely.  Is it realistic.  Absolutely.

An interview with Koffman about the risk of Russian nuclear escalation. He makes some good points. He also unintentionally makes an excellent, though unintentional,  case that Poland needs its own nukes.

The sum was 500 million euros...
Finland made the same investment last year to our own plants alone

The sum was 500 million euros...
Finland made the same investment last year to our own plants alone

The sum was 500 million euros...
Finland made the same investment last year to our own plants alone

Yeah, Germany has been doing were well on the ground for the last year or so. Still PR and communication disaster.

https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/30664/ukraine-battlefield-dynamics-manpower-fortifications-and-ammunition/
My notes:
They made another trip to UKR front lines. They are doing these around every 3months. 
Ukraine's Challenges: Ukraine faces a triple threat with manpower, fortifications, and ammunition shortages. Mobilization remains stalled at political level, hindering long-term force generation. This decision also has a long lead time to effects on the battlefield Last year we saw you cannot make brigades in couple of months  Fortifications are being worked on now, but only lately. Ammunition depends on external factors like US aid and Europe commitment drones are going to help to bridge the gap to an extent. These problems are the same as last trip three months ago. Ukraine leadership changes are still an unknown. Generally seems the leadership is on the same page about the main challenges as the front line troops The war is at an intersection. Many things can go either way, US support, UKR mobilization... Depending on these the war can change radically. Even a Harkiv-style collapse for the Ukrainians is not out of the question on the "bad timelines".  Overly extended summer offensive and pointless commitment of reserves to those attacks have depleted Ukraine Especially Ukrainian infantry has been under extreme strain, battalion might be in OK condition but only have a couple of platoons of fully mission-capable infantry.  Unlikely to see any strategic level offensives from the Ukrainians in 2024  Some Russian challenges:   Russian Force Quality: While a concern in 2023, Russia has demonstrated a capacity to sustain casualties and maintain a baseline level of force quality. This has been shown in practice during the summers stubborn defense and the bloody assaults we are now seeing. UKR has reported increased discipline and executions by the RU Manpower: So far Russia has been able to compensate for it casualties with recruitment. This has been surprisingly successful. Several 100k last year and now in the tens of thousands a month. Unkown how long Russia can keep up. If they cannot a new mobilization wave is going to be required. Equipment availability: Main limiting factor for the Russians at this moment. Ukraine's Evolving Tactics: Shortage of Soviet-era AA ammunition is a major concern. and now also western ammunition  UKR is having increasing success with small mobile AA defenses (MANPADS, AAA, HMG) supported by well integrated sensors and coordination. This is against RU cruise missiles and suicide drones. Especially in parts of the front UKR is developing integration of assets, intelligence and troops to a whole new level. Big steps compared to three months ago Drone war moving more towards competition in quality and integration rather than quantity. 
Ukraine Battlefield Dynamics Manpower, Fortifications, and Ammunition.mp3

https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/30664/ukraine-battlefield-dynamics-manpower-fortifications-and-ammunition/
My notes:
They made another trip to UKR front lines. They are doing these around every 3months. 
Ukraine's Challenges: Ukraine faces a triple threat with manpower, fortifications, and ammunition shortages. Mobilization remains stalled at political level, hindering long-term force generation. This decision also has a long lead time to effects on the battlefield Last year we saw you cannot make brigades in couple of months  Fortifications are being worked on now, but only lately. Ammunition depends on external factors like US aid and Europe commitment drones are going to help to bridge the gap to an extent. These problems are the same as last trip three months ago. Ukraine leadership changes are still an unknown. Generally seems the leadership is on the same page about the main challenges as the front line troops The war is at an intersection. Many things can go either way, US support, UKR mobilization... Depending on these the war can change radically. Even a Harkiv-style collapse for the Ukrainians is not out of the question on the "bad timelines".  Overly extended summer offensive and pointless commitment of reserves to those attacks have depleted Ukraine Especially Ukrainian infantry has been under extreme strain, battalion might be in OK condition but only have a couple of platoons of fully mission-capable infantry.  Unlikely to see any strategic level offensives from the Ukrainians in 2024  Some Russian challenges:   Russian Force Quality: While a concern in 2023, Russia has demonstrated a capacity to sustain casualties and maintain a baseline level of force quality. This has been shown in practice during the summers stubborn defense and the bloody assaults we are now seeing. UKR has reported increased discipline and executions by the RU Manpower: So far Russia has been able to compensate for it casualties with recruitment. This has been surprisingly successful. Several 100k last year and now in the tens of thousands a month. Unkown how long Russia can keep up. If they cannot a new mobilization wave is going to be required. Equipment availability: Main limiting factor for the Russians at this moment. Ukraine's Evolving Tactics: Shortage of Soviet-era AA ammunition is a major concern. and now also western ammunition  UKR is having increasing success with small mobile AA defenses (MANPADS, AAA, HMG) supported by well integrated sensors and coordination. This is against RU cruise missiles and suicide drones. Especially in parts of the front UKR is developing integration of assets, intelligence and troops to a whole new level. Big steps compared to three months ago Drone war moving more towards competition in quality and integration rather than quantity. 
Ukraine Battlefield Dynamics Manpower, Fortifications, and Ammunition.mp3

Yeah, Germany has been doing were well on the ground for the last year or so. Still PR and communication disaster.

Yeah, Germany has been doing were well on the ground for the last year or so. Still PR and communication disaster.

So, the Germans have in fact given more % to Ukraine than US and have been hurt the most economically with Nord stream shut down etc. 
Let's keep this in mind in the next round of German bashing. 
 

https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/30664/ukraine-battlefield-dynamics-manpower-fortifications-and-ammunition/
My notes:
They made another trip to UKR front lines. They are doing these around every 3months. 
Ukraine's Challenges: Ukraine faces a triple threat with manpower, fortifications, and ammunition shortages. Mobilization remains stalled at political level, hindering long-term force generation. This decision also has a long lead time to effects on the battlefield Last year we saw you cannot make brigades in couple of months  Fortifications are being worked on now, but only lately. Ammunition depends on external factors like US aid and Europe commitment drones are going to help to bridge the gap to an extent. These problems are the same as last trip three months ago. Ukraine leadership changes are still an unknown. Generally seems the leadership is on the same page about the main challenges as the front line troops The war is at an intersection. Many things can go either way, US support, UKR mobilization... Depending on these the war can change radically. Even a Harkiv-style collapse for the Ukrainians is not out of the question on the "bad timelines".  Overly extended summer offensive and pointless commitment of reserves to those attacks have depleted Ukraine Especially Ukrainian infantry has been under extreme strain, battalion might be in OK condition but only have a couple of platoons of fully mission-capable infantry.  Unlikely to see any strategic level offensives from the Ukrainians in 2024  Some Russian challenges:   Russian Force Quality: While a concern in 2023, Russia has demonstrated a capacity to sustain casualties and maintain a baseline level of force quality. This has been shown in practice during the summers stubborn defense and the bloody assaults we are now seeing. UKR has reported increased discipline and executions by the RU Manpower: So far Russia has been able to compensate for it casualties with recruitment. This has been surprisingly successful. Several 100k last year and now in the tens of thousands a month. Unkown how long Russia can keep up. If they cannot a new mobilization wave is going to be required. Equipment availability: Main limiting factor for the Russians at this moment. Ukraine's Evolving Tactics: Shortage of Soviet-era AA ammunition is a major concern. and now also western ammunition  UKR is having increasing success with small mobile AA defenses (MANPADS, AAA, HMG) supported by well integrated sensors and coordination. This is against RU cruise missiles and suicide drones. Especially in parts of the front UKR is developing integration of assets, intelligence and troops to a whole new level. Big steps compared to three months ago Drone war moving more towards competition in quality and integration rather than quantity. 
Ukraine Battlefield Dynamics Manpower, Fortifications, and Ammunition.mp3

https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/30664/ukraine-battlefield-dynamics-manpower-fortifications-and-ammunition/
My notes:
They made another trip to UKR front lines. They are doing these around every 3months. 
Ukraine's Challenges: Ukraine faces a triple threat with manpower, fortifications, and ammunition shortages. Mobilization remains stalled at political level, hindering long-term force generation. This decision also has a long lead time to effects on the battlefield Last year we saw you cannot make brigades in couple of months  Fortifications are being worked on now, but only lately. Ammunition depends on external factors like US aid and Europe commitment drones are going to help to bridge the gap to an extent. These problems are the same as last trip three months ago. Ukraine leadership changes are still an unknown. Generally seems the leadership is on the same page about the main challenges as the front line troops The war is at an intersection. Many things can go either way, US support, UKR mobilization... Depending on these the war can change radically. Even a Harkiv-style collapse for the Ukrainians is not out of the question on the "bad timelines".  Overly extended summer offensive and pointless commitment of reserves to those attacks have depleted Ukraine Especially Ukrainian infantry has been under extreme strain, battalion might be in OK condition but only have a couple of platoons of fully mission-capable infantry.  Unlikely to see any strategic level offensives from the Ukrainians in 2024  Some Russian challenges:   Russian Force Quality: While a concern in 2023, Russia has demonstrated a capacity to sustain casualties and maintain a baseline level of force quality. This has been shown in practice during the summers stubborn defense and the bloody assaults we are now seeing. UKR has reported increased discipline and executions by the RU Manpower: So far Russia has been able to compensate for it casualties with recruitment. This has been surprisingly successful. Several 100k last year and now in the tens of thousands a month. Unkown how long Russia can keep up. If they cannot a new mobilization wave is going to be required. Equipment availability: Main limiting factor for the Russians at this moment. Ukraine's Evolving Tactics: Shortage of Soviet-era AA ammunition is a major concern. and now also western ammunition  UKR is having increasing success with small mobile AA defenses (MANPADS, AAA, HMG) supported by well integrated sensors and coordination. This is against RU cruise missiles and suicide drones. Especially in parts of the front UKR is developing integration of assets, intelligence and troops to a whole new level. Big steps compared to three months ago Drone war moving more towards competition in quality and integration rather than quantity. 
Ukraine Battlefield Dynamics Manpower, Fortifications, and Ammunition.mp3