The_MonkeyKing

I would guess it is not worth it to hit those helicopters with the current munitions available. 
Those helicopter bases must be anti-air hardpoints and the helos are dispersed(in the satellites) 100m apart so it would be 1 storm shadow = one destroyed helo + what it takes to penetrate AA.
The target lists must have lots of higher priority targets for these low-availability high-demand deep strike assets.
Now GLSDB that would be nice. But still, the copter will just move 50km further back when these arrive to the theater. 

On this episode of the Russia Contingency, Mike is joined by Rob Lee, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Eurasia program, and Franz Stefan-Gady, founder and chief executive officer of Gady Consulting.
https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/28970/ukraines-offensive-first-impressions/
my summary notes:
Careful optimism but lots of unknowns Ukrainians seem to be managing well with green formations in an environment where even Western professionals would likely struggle progress within the realm of expectations nobody in the analyst community was expecting this to look like Harkiv The question is not "have the Ukrainians reached a certain point" but where they were planning to be at this point in time Mike guesses it is unlikely Ukrainians are where they hoped to be at this point but also that actually doesn't tell us much. how are the relative attrition and commitment of forces? How much Ukraine has ammo available and for how long time? Ukraine could choose to reinforce one of the current attacks or open a new one western axis is having difficulties but the eastern axis is advancing well and on a wide front the main effort is still to show itself. "we know it when we see it" Ukraine seems to be trying to get Russia to commit reserves This is still unclear We are in the attritional phase of this operation Transition to maneuver phase is often sudden Ukraine approaching the Russian mainline expectedly everything takes time when advancing on fortified positions.  Russia likely aiming to make this approach attritional as possible but not to stop Ukrainians Russia likely trying to make the attack culminate at the mainline or shortly after it Early Russian hard counterattacks are surprisingly hard (and unsuccessful) Experienced Ukrainian units are making gains at this moment. New formations are still mostly not committed Ukraine is also mixing the new formations with its more experienced forces Ukrainian Positive indicators Ukraine seems to be capable of hitting the depth of the Russian rear effectively can they isolate the battlefield? Ukraine seems to be winning the counter-battery war Ukraine seems to be learning and adapting already Night fighting capacity paying off Ukrainian Challenges Some Russian units fight stubbornly even when these same formations have disintegrated in the past 42nd mot.rifle div. and the two Spetsnaz brigades seem to have held on the western axis Doing combined arms breaches without air superiority and NATO level of enablers and without total fires dominance. Russian rotatory aviation  Mines A possible shortage of short-range air defense on the Ukraine side although rotatory aviation operations would be expected in any case

So this is Moscow stating it is ok for Ukrainian planes to operate out of NATO airfields?
Even Moscow is trying to get the West to realize it has absolute escalation dominance 

Unfortunately, since “most” U.S. school systems no longer have the Civics classes that were required during my education in the 1950s and 1960s, most people don’t realize that an H. Res or an S. Res mean absolutely nothing. A Resolution (Res) is nothing more than that body, House or Senate expressing an “opinion.” E.g. “We hereby resolve that the sun AND the moon rise in the east!”
Only an HR or SR have the capability to become a “Bill,” that when signed by the President becomes an ”Act,” which is a “Law.”

Never happened. Only the House passed it, or tried to. Never came up in the Senate. So, no money, and no further action on it.

So this is Moscow stating it is ok for Ukrainian planes to operate out of NATO airfields?
Even Moscow is trying to get the West to realize it has absolute escalation dominance 

On this episode of the Russia Contingency, Mike is joined by Rob Lee, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Eurasia program, and Franz Stefan-Gady, founder and chief executive officer of Gady Consulting.
https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/28970/ukraines-offensive-first-impressions/
my summary notes:
Careful optimism but lots of unknowns Ukrainians seem to be managing well with green formations in an environment where even Western professionals would likely struggle progress within the realm of expectations nobody in the analyst community was expecting this to look like Harkiv The question is not "have the Ukrainians reached a certain point" but where they were planning to be at this point in time Mike guesses it is unlikely Ukrainians are where they hoped to be at this point but also that actually doesn't tell us much. how are the relative attrition and commitment of forces? How much Ukraine has ammo available and for how long time? Ukraine could choose to reinforce one of the current attacks or open a new one western axis is having difficulties but the eastern axis is advancing well and on a wide front the main effort is still to show itself. "we know it when we see it" Ukraine seems to be trying to get Russia to commit reserves This is still unclear We are in the attritional phase of this operation Transition to maneuver phase is often sudden Ukraine approaching the Russian mainline expectedly everything takes time when advancing on fortified positions.  Russia likely aiming to make this approach attritional as possible but not to stop Ukrainians Russia likely trying to make the attack culminate at the mainline or shortly after it Early Russian hard counterattacks are surprisingly hard (and unsuccessful) Experienced Ukrainian units are making gains at this moment. New formations are still mostly not committed Ukraine is also mixing the new formations with its more experienced forces Ukrainian Positive indicators Ukraine seems to be capable of hitting the depth of the Russian rear effectively can they isolate the battlefield? Ukraine seems to be winning the counter-battery war Ukraine seems to be learning and adapting already Night fighting capacity paying off Ukrainian Challenges Some Russian units fight stubbornly even when these same formations have disintegrated in the past 42nd mot.rifle div. and the two Spetsnaz brigades seem to have held on the western axis Doing combined arms breaches without air superiority and NATO level of enablers and without total fires dominance. Russian rotatory aviation  Mines A possible shortage of short-range air defense on the Ukraine side although rotatory aviation operations would be expected in any case

more gems:
 

So this is Moscow stating it is ok for Ukrainian planes to operate out of NATO airfields?
Even Moscow is trying to get the West to realize it has absolute escalation dominance 

more gems:
 

Bleep me, they just INVITED NATO's air force to join the war. How can such an invitation be refused? Three thousand sorties days will wrap thus thing up by the fourth of July

Sounds like it.
Moscow has backed down on every single "red line" that it has drawn when NATO has pushed the issue.  The only strategy they have left that is even slightly plausible is to de-escalate, drag things out for as long as possible, and hope that NATO countries get tired of supporting Ukraine (obviously coupled with stirring up the western tankie contingent to go on about Russia being willing to talk about peace,  and Ukraine being belligerent).

So this is Moscow stating it is ok for Ukrainian planes to operate out of NATO airfields?
Even Moscow is trying to get the West to realize it has absolute escalation dominance 

So this is Moscow stating it is ok for Ukrainian planes to operate out of NATO airfields?
Even Moscow is trying to get the West to realize it has absolute escalation dominance 

So this is Moscow stating it is ok for Ukrainian planes to operate out of NATO airfields?
Even Moscow is trying to get the West to realize it has absolute escalation dominance 

So this is Moscow stating it is ok for Ukrainian planes to operate out of NATO airfields?
Even Moscow is trying to get the West to realize it has absolute escalation dominance 

On this episode of the Russia Contingency, Mike is joined by Rob Lee, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Eurasia program, and Franz Stefan-Gady, founder and chief executive officer of Gady Consulting.
https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/28970/ukraines-offensive-first-impressions/
my summary notes:
Careful optimism but lots of unknowns Ukrainians seem to be managing well with green formations in an environment where even Western professionals would likely struggle progress within the realm of expectations nobody in the analyst community was expecting this to look like Harkiv The question is not "have the Ukrainians reached a certain point" but where they were planning to be at this point in time Mike guesses it is unlikely Ukrainians are where they hoped to be at this point but also that actually doesn't tell us much. how are the relative attrition and commitment of forces? How much Ukraine has ammo available and for how long time? Ukraine could choose to reinforce one of the current attacks or open a new one western axis is having difficulties but the eastern axis is advancing well and on a wide front the main effort is still to show itself. "we know it when we see it" Ukraine seems to be trying to get Russia to commit reserves This is still unclear We are in the attritional phase of this operation Transition to maneuver phase is often sudden Ukraine approaching the Russian mainline expectedly everything takes time when advancing on fortified positions.  Russia likely aiming to make this approach attritional as possible but not to stop Ukrainians Russia likely trying to make the attack culminate at the mainline or shortly after it Early Russian hard counterattacks are surprisingly hard (and unsuccessful) Experienced Ukrainian units are making gains at this moment. New formations are still mostly not committed Ukraine is also mixing the new formations with its more experienced forces Ukrainian Positive indicators Ukraine seems to be capable of hitting the depth of the Russian rear effectively can they isolate the battlefield? Ukraine seems to be winning the counter-battery war Ukraine seems to be learning and adapting already Night fighting capacity paying off Ukrainian Challenges Some Russian units fight stubbornly even when these same formations have disintegrated in the past 42nd mot.rifle div. and the two Spetsnaz brigades seem to have held on the western axis Doing combined arms breaches without air superiority and NATO level of enablers and without total fires dominance. Russian rotatory aviation  Mines A possible shortage of short-range air defense on the Ukraine side although rotatory aviation operations would be expected in any case

On this episode of the Russia Contingency, Mike is joined by Rob Lee, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Eurasia program, and Franz Stefan-Gady, founder and chief executive officer of Gady Consulting.
https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/28970/ukraines-offensive-first-impressions/
my summary notes:
Careful optimism but lots of unknowns Ukrainians seem to be managing well with green formations in an environment where even Western professionals would likely struggle progress within the realm of expectations nobody in the analyst community was expecting this to look like Harkiv The question is not "have the Ukrainians reached a certain point" but where they were planning to be at this point in time Mike guesses it is unlikely Ukrainians are where they hoped to be at this point but also that actually doesn't tell us much. how are the relative attrition and commitment of forces? How much Ukraine has ammo available and for how long time? Ukraine could choose to reinforce one of the current attacks or open a new one western axis is having difficulties but the eastern axis is advancing well and on a wide front the main effort is still to show itself. "we know it when we see it" Ukraine seems to be trying to get Russia to commit reserves This is still unclear We are in the attritional phase of this operation Transition to maneuver phase is often sudden Ukraine approaching the Russian mainline expectedly everything takes time when advancing on fortified positions.  Russia likely aiming to make this approach attritional as possible but not to stop Ukrainians Russia likely trying to make the attack culminate at the mainline or shortly after it Early Russian hard counterattacks are surprisingly hard (and unsuccessful) Experienced Ukrainian units are making gains at this moment. New formations are still mostly not committed Ukraine is also mixing the new formations with its more experienced forces Ukrainian Positive indicators Ukraine seems to be capable of hitting the depth of the Russian rear effectively can they isolate the battlefield? Ukraine seems to be winning the counter-battery war Ukraine seems to be learning and adapting already Night fighting capacity paying off Ukrainian Challenges Some Russian units fight stubbornly even when these same formations have disintegrated in the past 42nd mot.rifle div. and the two Spetsnaz brigades seem to have held on the western axis Doing combined arms breaches without air superiority and NATO level of enablers and without total fires dominance. Russian rotatory aviation  Mines A possible shortage of short-range air defense on the Ukraine side although rotatory aviation operations would be expected in any case

On this episode of the Russia Contingency, Mike is joined by Rob Lee, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Eurasia program, and Franz Stefan-Gady, founder and chief executive officer of Gady Consulting.
https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/28970/ukraines-offensive-first-impressions/
my summary notes:
Careful optimism but lots of unknowns Ukrainians seem to be managing well with green formations in an environment where even Western professionals would likely struggle progress within the realm of expectations nobody in the analyst community was expecting this to look like Harkiv The question is not "have the Ukrainians reached a certain point" but where they were planning to be at this point in time Mike guesses it is unlikely Ukrainians are where they hoped to be at this point but also that actually doesn't tell us much. how are the relative attrition and commitment of forces? How much Ukraine has ammo available and for how long time? Ukraine could choose to reinforce one of the current attacks or open a new one western axis is having difficulties but the eastern axis is advancing well and on a wide front the main effort is still to show itself. "we know it when we see it" Ukraine seems to be trying to get Russia to commit reserves This is still unclear We are in the attritional phase of this operation Transition to maneuver phase is often sudden Ukraine approaching the Russian mainline expectedly everything takes time when advancing on fortified positions.  Russia likely aiming to make this approach attritional as possible but not to stop Ukrainians Russia likely trying to make the attack culminate at the mainline or shortly after it Early Russian hard counterattacks are surprisingly hard (and unsuccessful) Experienced Ukrainian units are making gains at this moment. New formations are still mostly not committed Ukraine is also mixing the new formations with its more experienced forces Ukrainian Positive indicators Ukraine seems to be capable of hitting the depth of the Russian rear effectively can they isolate the battlefield? Ukraine seems to be winning the counter-battery war Ukraine seems to be learning and adapting already Night fighting capacity paying off Ukrainian Challenges Some Russian units fight stubbornly even when these same formations have disintegrated in the past 42nd mot.rifle div. and the two Spetsnaz brigades seem to have held on the western axis Doing combined arms breaches without air superiority and NATO level of enablers and without total fires dominance. Russian rotatory aviation  Mines A possible shortage of short-range air defense on the Ukraine side although rotatory aviation operations would be expected in any case

The Tokmak axis is expanding according to the Ukrainians:

Now the infamous Bradley pile is on the Ukrainian side of the line. We have not seen Russians releasing photos where they destroy the abandoned equipment (only a couple singles). I presume most of the equipment is now on the Ukrainian side of the line and being recovered.

Some pointers from Millie:
combined 60 000 Ukrainians trained in the west so far 6 000 Ukrainians in training in the West at this moment The USA has trained a combined 60 000 Ukrainians in maneuver combined arms operations This includes 12 maneuver combined arms "Battalion tactical groups" including their entire staff at this moment three battalions are in training by the USA

This appears to be the 100 KIA/100 WIA strike we talked about yesterday.
 
 

Some pointers from Millie:
combined 60 000 Ukrainians trained in the west so far 6 000 Ukrainians in training in the West at this moment The USA has trained a combined 60 000 Ukrainians in maneuver combined arms operations This includes 12 maneuver combined arms "Battalion tactical groups" including their entire staff at this moment three battalions are in training by the USA

Some pointers from Millie:
combined 60 000 Ukrainians trained in the west so far 6 000 Ukrainians in training in the West at this moment The USA has trained a combined 60 000 Ukrainians in maneuver combined arms operations This includes 12 maneuver combined arms "Battalion tactical groups" including their entire staff at this moment three battalions are in training by the USA

https://warontherocks.com/2023/06/ukraines-multiple-axes-of-attack/
UKRAINE’S MULTIPLE AXES OF ATTACK
NICK DANFORTH AND MICHAEL KOFMANJUNE 14, 2023
PODCASTS - PODCASTS - WAR ON THE ROCKS
my summary: 
very incomplete and delayed image with competing claims. the offensive has been going on for a week two main axes of advance, Tokmak and Velyka Novosilka another shoe might very well drop as a new axis Luhansk is likely to see some action Separate axis in Bakmut, incremental gains secondary priority grinding fight So far operation is closer to Kherson than Harkiv. Still doesn't mean it won't transform into something else. Ukraine has not committed its main forces and has not reached the main defensive lines Defensives are clearly a significant factor and mechanized mobile warfare against them has proven challenging in this war Success/failure too early to tell Traditionally starting days are decisive but this is not always the case. Seems not in this case here The key question is where Ukrainians are now in relation to where they were planning to be at this point and how is are force commitments going on both sides. It is clear that the rosiest predictions of this operation were incorrect. These people might believe they are helping by inflating expectations but they are not At this point, it is clear that the main advantage of Western equipment is survivability and night operation capacity. No wunderwaffe In the big picture, Mike thinks the technical tactical level capabilities are just one piece of a big puzzle. Names this is his biased opinion.  It comes down to force employment  We have only seen only a couple of the new brigades in operations in limited scope so the capacity of the new formations is still largely unknown. Ukraine seems to have enough ammo and probably has an advantage in artillery in the south. No longer "she'll hunger" of the beginning of the year. Ukraine military Ukraine's military has one foot in the Soviet past and one foot in "NATO". Wide variety between units in culture, skill, and experience  The prewar military was nothing like many in the West described it as NATO trained ext. No widespread Western training, no NCO core... The prewar UKR military does not exist anymore Mobilization and coming of old Soviet reserve officers  It is remarkable how much Ukraine's military has done given its challenges What happens after a Ukrainian breakthrough? logistics? Enablers? sustaining momentum? how much of the Ukrainian force is left at the moment of breakthrough? How will Russia be able to react? Russian ability to recover? challenges Ukraine has Limited amounts of engineering equipment. Breaching equipment is also often lost at first Ukraine has a challenge with a lack of short-range AA with the formations minefields challenges with enablers  challenges with force employment units are green Ukraine is attaching more experienced units to these green units Russia has significant force density and reserves in the south not easy the do offensive operations when you have always been a defensive force