domfluff

I've long felt that training missions were a good idea - something above a simple "how to play the game" tutorial, but below a full scenario.
Ideal would be something that wasn't necessarily all that challenging, but still allows you to lose - essentially a "if you can't do this, you don't understand it" check.
Once you have this ideal situation locked down, the scenarios and campaigns proper can then give you the "real" version, on less than ideal terrain or with additional complexities.
That kind of thing would answer an awful lot of criticisms of various platforms and systems. At various times people have expressed frustration with Stryker, ifvs in general, the Italians, the British 2 inch mortar, halftracks, combat in urban and wooded terrain, etc. etc. 
The soviet tutorials in cold war do a good job of expressing some of the core tenets, and the second develops on the first. The halftrack tutorials in the bp do a similar job - I got more use out of the mortar halftracks as a combination of mobile direct and indirect fire than I've ever done before, and tutorial 3 might be my favorite scenario in the battlepack, for all of the above reasons.

Hi all
I've created this post to make available some resources that may be of use to players.
I've attached the Five Days One Summer campaign flowchart - so you can see where you are going, if you wish. If you'd rather not see into the future then best not read it.
I've attached the Tigers at Ogledow campaign flowchart - again possible spoilers here so if you'd rather not know, don't look!
Also I've attached a SPW Training Missions Tactics and Lessons document. This document provides a deeper overview of the doctrine and tactics taught (and used) by German armored panzer grenadier units equipped with the Sdkfz 251 halftrack and its variants (referred to as a Schützenpanzerwagon or SPW) in the later part of the war, around 1944. Its main intent is to provide additional background to the series of scenarios and missions in the battle pack for Red Thunder, in particular the series of three SPW ‘Lesson’ series scenarios. My thanks to @domfluff who reviewed this and provided tactical insight, oh and it was his idea originally.
Five Days One Summer Wiking panzer grenadier mods - I've added a wee package of mods I used for the grenadiers in the Five Days One Summer. I basically assembled others excellent mods to create a look which is in the Wiking Mods GMc Mix . Main changes are grenadiers are in light battle rattle - no extraneous kit, crusher caps are M43s and senior officer has a 'Wiking' cuff band and a M43. My thanks to the talent and good will of Aris, @EZ (WSS Senior Officer and WSS camo uniforms), @Frenchy56 (Crusher and side caps to M43) @kohlenklau (No-gear mod - the campaign is mod tagged 'no gear') @Lucky_Strike (Senior officer peaked caps to M43s). I used Aris' Soviet tank mods, his Soviet faces and VM's summer Soviet uniforms.
Five Days Campaign Overview_v1.pdf SPW Training Missions Tactics and Lessons_FINAL.pdf
1831305623_FiveDaysOneSummerMods.rar
Tigers at Ogledow Campaign Overview_v1.pdf

The Assault command can genuinely be useful, but it's always optional.
You typically really want to use it in a less than optimal situation, where you have to move your squad under fire, and need to supply your own fire support - i.e., when your situation is that you're pressed for time, out of position, and you need to accept risk to turn the situation around. Things have *gone wrong*, and you need to fix this before this scenario becomes permanent.
It's worth experimenting with it to understand how to use it.
If you plot Assault command moves, with target lines from each waypoint, then as soon as the moving element stops, they will open fire. This way, the squad keeps up a continuous volume of fire at the target, rather than hoping that the stationary element can spot things in time.
For this, you generally want to use it over short distances, and perhaps with multiple waypoints. It can be extremely useful, especially for things like Soviet dismounts, who should have their IFV also providing area fire at the same time - this way the squad is only ever moving a single team, whilst the other team and the ifv are mag-dumping into the targeted building or the like.
This will be extremely wasteful for ammunition, but that's sort-of the point - if you're doing this with a soviet section, they're performing their duty correctly. The ifv will have enough rounds to give them a single full reload, so you can do this twice a battle, but it's clearly an effective and useful way of doing things, and works well even with poor quality troops.
This is the kind of thing you really can't do manually, but it's a narrow use-case, and isn't the most efficient thing in the world.
If I was using infantry in a more precise mode, I wouldn't touch assault, and instead just spilt squads myself. This will be a lot slower, and the volume of fire will be less exuberant, but you won't end up spaffing thousands of rounds against an empty farmhouse.

The Assault command can genuinely be useful, but it's always optional.
You typically really want to use it in a less than optimal situation, where you have to move your squad under fire, and need to supply your own fire support - i.e., when your situation is that you're pressed for time, out of position, and you need to accept risk to turn the situation around. Things have *gone wrong*, and you need to fix this before this scenario becomes permanent.
It's worth experimenting with it to understand how to use it.
If you plot Assault command moves, with target lines from each waypoint, then as soon as the moving element stops, they will open fire. This way, the squad keeps up a continuous volume of fire at the target, rather than hoping that the stationary element can spot things in time.
For this, you generally want to use it over short distances, and perhaps with multiple waypoints. It can be extremely useful, especially for things like Soviet dismounts, who should have their IFV also providing area fire at the same time - this way the squad is only ever moving a single team, whilst the other team and the ifv are mag-dumping into the targeted building or the like.
This will be extremely wasteful for ammunition, but that's sort-of the point - if you're doing this with a soviet section, they're performing their duty correctly. The ifv will have enough rounds to give them a single full reload, so you can do this twice a battle, but it's clearly an effective and useful way of doing things, and works well even with poor quality troops.
This is the kind of thing you really can't do manually, but it's a narrow use-case, and isn't the most efficient thing in the world.
If I was using infantry in a more precise mode, I wouldn't touch assault, and instead just spilt squads myself. This will be a lot slower, and the volume of fire will be less exuberant, but you won't end up spaffing thousands of rounds against an empty farmhouse.

The Assault command can genuinely be useful, but it's always optional.
You typically really want to use it in a less than optimal situation, where you have to move your squad under fire, and need to supply your own fire support - i.e., when your situation is that you're pressed for time, out of position, and you need to accept risk to turn the situation around. Things have *gone wrong*, and you need to fix this before this scenario becomes permanent.
It's worth experimenting with it to understand how to use it.
If you plot Assault command moves, with target lines from each waypoint, then as soon as the moving element stops, they will open fire. This way, the squad keeps up a continuous volume of fire at the target, rather than hoping that the stationary element can spot things in time.
For this, you generally want to use it over short distances, and perhaps with multiple waypoints. It can be extremely useful, especially for things like Soviet dismounts, who should have their IFV also providing area fire at the same time - this way the squad is only ever moving a single team, whilst the other team and the ifv are mag-dumping into the targeted building or the like.
This will be extremely wasteful for ammunition, but that's sort-of the point - if you're doing this with a soviet section, they're performing their duty correctly. The ifv will have enough rounds to give them a single full reload, so you can do this twice a battle, but it's clearly an effective and useful way of doing things, and works well even with poor quality troops.
This is the kind of thing you really can't do manually, but it's a narrow use-case, and isn't the most efficient thing in the world.
If I was using infantry in a more precise mode, I wouldn't touch assault, and instead just spilt squads myself. This will be a lot slower, and the volume of fire will be less exuberant, but you won't end up spaffing thousands of rounds against an empty farmhouse.

I do think that CMCW is not a good first CM title. It's excellent, but it's aimed a little higher than some of the others, and things like the NTC reflect that.

The real-world NTC is an environment where you're supposed to fail, essentially - it's a very powerful training tool, but it's brutal and intended to be.

The CMCW NTC campaign is very, very good at showing you what you're up against - the BMP-1 in CMSF is a joke, and in CMCW it's a serious threat. You can't park US tanks on a ridgeline and destroy everything like you can in CMSF or to a lesser extent CMBS. You have to read the terrain and pick your battles, lean on combined arms and use every aspect of your force.

It's a serious challenge, and in particular it'll punish bad habits learnt in the other CM titles. The M1A2 is such a large advantage in CMSF and CMBS that you can get away without using your armour correctly - it offers a *large* safety net, and will cover a lot of your shortcomings. This is objectively not true for the M60A1, and that's one of the major lessons which the NTC is trying to teach.



 

Assault is automated fire and manoeuvre between teams.... each element that moves is one of the elements you get from "Split squads", i.e., one of each of the two-three defined teams.

Now, should teams be able to subdivide? Maybe, but CM's scale has the team as the lowest element.

My scenario is up ... details on the dedicated thread here:
 

I do think that CMCW is not a good first CM title. It's excellent, but it's aimed a little higher than some of the others, and things like the NTC reflect that.

The real-world NTC is an environment where you're supposed to fail, essentially - it's a very powerful training tool, but it's brutal and intended to be.

The CMCW NTC campaign is very, very good at showing you what you're up against - the BMP-1 in CMSF is a joke, and in CMCW it's a serious threat. You can't park US tanks on a ridgeline and destroy everything like you can in CMSF or to a lesser extent CMBS. You have to read the terrain and pick your battles, lean on combined arms and use every aspect of your force.

It's a serious challenge, and in particular it'll punish bad habits learnt in the other CM titles. The M1A2 is such a large advantage in CMSF and CMBS that you can get away without using your armour correctly - it offers a *large* safety net, and will cover a lot of your shortcomings. This is objectively not true for the M60A1, and that's one of the major lessons which the NTC is trying to teach.



 

Ah gotcha, so not the M113 then. Yeah, I don't think that was caught or reported.

...and that's how one starts to arrive at Soviet doctrine.
 
One of the core tenants of the Soviet way of way is a mathematical adherence to firepower-above-all. You can indeed create situations where firepower alone is sufficient to get the job done, but it's a narrow and single-minded point of view. It can certainly be powerful, but it's successful if and only if you can remain in control of the broader variables, and can successfully shape the engagement to your liking.
As soon as you run into situations where things aren't going your way, you'll start running the risk of such an approach being badly exposed. In those situations, you're often better having some more depth to your thinking, and giving yourself more outs.

There's an analogy I like about this kind of thing, about mountain climbing - one school of thought gives the climber a bunch of different backup ropes, so that they can lose half a dozen of them, and it doesn't matter. This is wasteful of resources, sure, but this kind of redundancy can severely reduce the risk you're willing to accept. The other gives the climber just a single rope, but focuses on making it a really good rope. In this situation, you're following the straight line path to the goal, and if you're not hitting anything outside of the parameters you expect, you're doing it with maximum efficiency and economy of effort.
So yes, it's a viable approach, but it's not necessarily uncovering some deeper truth - rather it's one possible way of thinking, which will sometimes be the best (or least-worst) course of action, but not always, or in every situation.

...and that's how one starts to arrive at Soviet doctrine.
 
One of the core tenants of the Soviet way of way is a mathematical adherence to firepower-above-all. You can indeed create situations where firepower alone is sufficient to get the job done, but it's a narrow and single-minded point of view. It can certainly be powerful, but it's successful if and only if you can remain in control of the broader variables, and can successfully shape the engagement to your liking.
As soon as you run into situations where things aren't going your way, you'll start running the risk of such an approach being badly exposed. In those situations, you're often better having some more depth to your thinking, and giving yourself more outs.

There's an analogy I like about this kind of thing, about mountain climbing - one school of thought gives the climber a bunch of different backup ropes, so that they can lose half a dozen of them, and it doesn't matter. This is wasteful of resources, sure, but this kind of redundancy can severely reduce the risk you're willing to accept. The other gives the climber just a single rope, but focuses on making it a really good rope. In this situation, you're following the straight line path to the goal, and if you're not hitting anything outside of the parameters you expect, you're doing it with maximum efficiency and economy of effort.
So yes, it's a viable approach, but it's not necessarily uncovering some deeper truth - rather it's one possible way of thinking, which will sometimes be the best (or least-worst) course of action, but not always, or in every situation.

So this is an opinion entirely unmatched by the totality of military history, historic doctrine and current practice.
I'm honestly a bit curious where it's pulled from.

So this is an opinion entirely unmatched by the totality of military history, historic doctrine and current practice.
I'm honestly a bit curious where it's pulled from.

Welcome to the concept of Shaping.

Crew served weapons are primarily about suppression (in fact, most weapons are primarily about suppression), so the challenge is how you create conditions such that you can deploy them effectively.

In this particular case, you're advancing across mostly open ground against a dug-in enemy, including trenches and bunkers. This is pretty much a worst-case scenario, and as such there's an expectation of casualties. It also means that this isn't the most interesting or representative of scenarios, and not a great example of this kind of concept, but shrug.

You need to identify your win-states - imagining what an advantaged position might look like, and then work out what conditions are required to construct that. This is neither easy to define or do, and there's an art to this.

In the specific case of that CMBN mission, you might identify that the bunkers are the enemy centre of gravity. You might decide that you can effectively suppress these bunkers if you're able to get sufficient MG and mortar fires onto them, but you have the issue of how you can get your crew-served weapons set up to get that suppression in place.

That means that you're looking for what conditions you can change to shape the battlespace, and give you the freedom of operation you desire. In this case, if the bunkers are the problem, then a smoke mission to blind them should allow you a window of time to get your crew served weapons set up.

This pre-supposes a couple of things:

1) You have determined that the bunkers are the enemy centre of gravity
2) That your solution to the bunkers is setting up crew served weapons
3) You need a solution to give you the time to set these up.

That may or may not be a valid course of action, and that's something which you can debate, or seek out alternatives.


In a more general sense, and to answer the original question, "How to create fire superiority", you're looking to create unfair situations on a local level. To use the terrain and your forces to construct situations where you can bring your strength against a minority of the enemy. If you have a platoon, and the enemy has a platoon, but you manage to attack their platoon one section at a time, with the full weight of your platoon, you're going to have overwhelming fire superiority, three times in a row. 

"But what if they move", yes, so the important thing is to consider the situation from the enemies perspective, and to control your battle-space such that you can deal with this reaction. You might have a section of your platoon dedicated to suppressing the enemy, another section moving for the assault, and a third section providing security, guarding the main line of reinforcement, and isolating the enemy you're focusing on. The entire purpose is to control the space, to give yourself maximum freedom of movement and available options, whilst denying those to your opponent. That's far, far more important than the set-up time of an MG or whatever the kill counter says - if you can shape the battlefield correctly, then you can get yourself in a situation where you've won long before the first shot is fired. 

Welcome to the concept of Shaping.

Crew served weapons are primarily about suppression (in fact, most weapons are primarily about suppression), so the challenge is how you create conditions such that you can deploy them effectively.

In this particular case, you're advancing across mostly open ground against a dug-in enemy, including trenches and bunkers. This is pretty much a worst-case scenario, and as such there's an expectation of casualties. It also means that this isn't the most interesting or representative of scenarios, and not a great example of this kind of concept, but shrug.

You need to identify your win-states - imagining what an advantaged position might look like, and then work out what conditions are required to construct that. This is neither easy to define or do, and there's an art to this.

In the specific case of that CMBN mission, you might identify that the bunkers are the enemy centre of gravity. You might decide that you can effectively suppress these bunkers if you're able to get sufficient MG and mortar fires onto them, but you have the issue of how you can get your crew-served weapons set up to get that suppression in place.

That means that you're looking for what conditions you can change to shape the battlespace, and give you the freedom of operation you desire. In this case, if the bunkers are the problem, then a smoke mission to blind them should allow you a window of time to get your crew served weapons set up.

This pre-supposes a couple of things:

1) You have determined that the bunkers are the enemy centre of gravity
2) That your solution to the bunkers is setting up crew served weapons
3) You need a solution to give you the time to set these up.

That may or may not be a valid course of action, and that's something which you can debate, or seek out alternatives.


In a more general sense, and to answer the original question, "How to create fire superiority", you're looking to create unfair situations on a local level. To use the terrain and your forces to construct situations where you can bring your strength against a minority of the enemy. If you have a platoon, and the enemy has a platoon, but you manage to attack their platoon one section at a time, with the full weight of your platoon, you're going to have overwhelming fire superiority, three times in a row. 

"But what if they move", yes, so the important thing is to consider the situation from the enemies perspective, and to control your battle-space such that you can deal with this reaction. You might have a section of your platoon dedicated to suppressing the enemy, another section moving for the assault, and a third section providing security, guarding the main line of reinforcement, and isolating the enemy you're focusing on. The entire purpose is to control the space, to give yourself maximum freedom of movement and available options, whilst denying those to your opponent. That's far, far more important than the set-up time of an MG or whatever the kill counter says - if you can shape the battlefield correctly, then you can get yourself in a situation where you've won long before the first shot is fired. 

It's important to distinguish US Cavalry from that of other nations. Where the typical roles of Cavalry are screening, reconnaissance and exploitation, US Cavalry have a fourth role, that of economy of force missions (i.e., using them as a more conventional force, when the need arises). That's almost unique to the US, so it's not a "normal" capability in broader terms.

Some of the typical Cavalry roles are indeed above CM scale, and will therefore play a role in scenario design. Many of the missions in CMCW use Cavalry units, because they're likely to be first to the fight in a Fulda Gap scenario.

Nevertheless, *all* of the cavalry roles are also important on the scale of a CM battlefield, and that would be true regardless of equipment or time period.

To understand reconnaissance units in general, it's important to understand what they're for. Most reconnaissance units are equipped with fast vehicles and good optics - whether that's just a jeep, a pair of binoculars and a radio, the large open windows of the BRDM giving excellent vision whilst under cover of armour, or sophisticated suites of thermal optics and satellite communications.

Any armament they have is often secondary, but it's typically designed to deal with the threats they are likely to encounter - that of other reconnaissance units.

The British Scimitar is a great example of a reconnaissance vehicle. A company-sized force might have a pair of them in the Cold War, and this pair would roam ahead of the formation, possibly dismounting to spot when appropriate.

The job of this pair would be to screen - get advanced warning of the incoming enemy, and to do so in positions which do not give away their position to the enemy. They would do this by screening forward of the friendly positions, using their speed to get well forward.

Then, the first enemy they would be likely to see in this context would be a Soviet recon platoon - perhaps three BMPs. In this situation, the 30mm Rarden is in it's element, and two Scimitars fighting from successive hull down positions are a serious overmatch for three BMPs. 

So consider this scenario from the perspective of the Soviet player. They've sent forward their recon platoon, with the hope of finding the enemy position. Instead, a pair of Scimitars has engaged them from a position entirely unrelated to their defensive lines, and further has destroyed their recon platoon without giving anything more away.

That means that the only option for the Soviet player would be to turn their CRP from a force that's creating the conditions for the main body to operate - perhaps seizing key terrain or starting to shape the battlefield with artillery - and instead has been relegated to a probing force, slowing inching their way forwards without the information that the recon platoon should have provided.

This tiny screening asset has just had an outsized impact on the way this entire battle will unfold.

The "how" of Recon is better described by Bil than me (https://battledrill.blogspot.com/2014/01/reconnaissance.html), but there are two fundamentally different approaches to how you employ intelligence to shape your course of action. One is that you're relying on recon assets to form the plan - the entire early portion of the battle will be led by those assets, and you're intending to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy before you make decisions. This is the safer, more flexible option, but it's also very slow. It also represents the typical approach that a NATO force might employ in most situations. The latter method is that you lean heavily on your terrain and enemy analysis, and use recon elements in a much simpler role - to firm up that picture. Typically these would roam ahead of your force as per the Soviet example above, with the much simpler goal of working out where the enemy are. This is a lot more dangerous, but it's significantly faster, and it's therefore the approach that the Soviet armies should be using in CMCW.

Neither is "recon by death", although both obviously involve accepting some risk. Sometimes knowing where the enemy aren't is more important than knowing where the enemy are, and making sure that a route or a terrain feature is clear from enemy can be equally or more important than actually seeing them.

In what possible context did you think this was about Quick Battle points?

All points-buy systems are bad, and CM's is no different - typically they're a least-worst option for design. If you're going to shift the goalposts to discussing the formations in QB efficiency terms then sure, only a minority of possible units and formations and unit are actually going to be worth taking, this is why they're bad. 
Quick battle points have no influence or meaning on the CM model, campaigns, scenarios or any PBEM which are outside of the context of Quick Battles. That might be the only thing that matters to you, but it's a minority of what CM actually is.

In what possible context did you think this was about Quick Battle points?

All points-buy systems are bad, and CM's is no different - typically they're a least-worst option for design. If you're going to shift the goalposts to discussing the formations in QB efficiency terms then sure, only a minority of possible units and formations and unit are actually going to be worth taking, this is why they're bad. 
Quick battle points have no influence or meaning on the CM model, campaigns, scenarios or any PBEM which are outside of the context of Quick Battles. That might be the only thing that matters to you, but it's a minority of what CM actually is.

In what possible context did you think this was about Quick Battle points?

All points-buy systems are bad, and CM's is no different - typically they're a least-worst option for design. If you're going to shift the goalposts to discussing the formations in QB efficiency terms then sure, only a minority of possible units and formations and unit are actually going to be worth taking, this is why they're bad. 
Quick battle points have no influence or meaning on the CM model, campaigns, scenarios or any PBEM which are outside of the context of Quick Battles. That might be the only thing that matters to you, but it's a minority of what CM actually is.

It's important to distinguish US Cavalry from that of other nations. Where the typical roles of Cavalry are screening, reconnaissance and exploitation, US Cavalry have a fourth role, that of economy of force missions (i.e., using them as a more conventional force, when the need arises). That's almost unique to the US, so it's not a "normal" capability in broader terms.

Some of the typical Cavalry roles are indeed above CM scale, and will therefore play a role in scenario design. Many of the missions in CMCW use Cavalry units, because they're likely to be first to the fight in a Fulda Gap scenario.

Nevertheless, *all* of the cavalry roles are also important on the scale of a CM battlefield, and that would be true regardless of equipment or time period.

To understand reconnaissance units in general, it's important to understand what they're for. Most reconnaissance units are equipped with fast vehicles and good optics - whether that's just a jeep, a pair of binoculars and a radio, the large open windows of the BRDM giving excellent vision whilst under cover of armour, or sophisticated suites of thermal optics and satellite communications.

Any armament they have is often secondary, but it's typically designed to deal with the threats they are likely to encounter - that of other reconnaissance units.

The British Scimitar is a great example of a reconnaissance vehicle. A company-sized force might have a pair of them in the Cold War, and this pair would roam ahead of the formation, possibly dismounting to spot when appropriate.

The job of this pair would be to screen - get advanced warning of the incoming enemy, and to do so in positions which do not give away their position to the enemy. They would do this by screening forward of the friendly positions, using their speed to get well forward.

Then, the first enemy they would be likely to see in this context would be a Soviet recon platoon - perhaps three BMPs. In this situation, the 30mm Rarden is in it's element, and two Scimitars fighting from successive hull down positions are a serious overmatch for three BMPs. 

So consider this scenario from the perspective of the Soviet player. They've sent forward their recon platoon, with the hope of finding the enemy position. Instead, a pair of Scimitars has engaged them from a position entirely unrelated to their defensive lines, and further has destroyed their recon platoon without giving anything more away.

That means that the only option for the Soviet player would be to turn their CRP from a force that's creating the conditions for the main body to operate - perhaps seizing key terrain or starting to shape the battlefield with artillery - and instead has been relegated to a probing force, slowing inching their way forwards without the information that the recon platoon should have provided.

This tiny screening asset has just had an outsized impact on the way this entire battle will unfold.

The "how" of Recon is better described by Bil than me (https://battledrill.blogspot.com/2014/01/reconnaissance.html), but there are two fundamentally different approaches to how you employ intelligence to shape your course of action. One is that you're relying on recon assets to form the plan - the entire early portion of the battle will be led by those assets, and you're intending to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy before you make decisions. This is the safer, more flexible option, but it's also very slow. It also represents the typical approach that a NATO force might employ in most situations. The latter method is that you lean heavily on your terrain and enemy analysis, and use recon elements in a much simpler role - to firm up that picture. Typically these would roam ahead of your force as per the Soviet example above, with the much simpler goal of working out where the enemy are. This is a lot more dangerous, but it's significantly faster, and it's therefore the approach that the Soviet armies should be using in CMCW.

Neither is "recon by death", although both obviously involve accepting some risk. Sometimes knowing where the enemy aren't is more important than knowing where the enemy are, and making sure that a route or a terrain feature is clear from enemy can be equally or more important than actually seeing them.

In what possible context did you think this was about Quick Battle points?

All points-buy systems are bad, and CM's is no different - typically they're a least-worst option for design. If you're going to shift the goalposts to discussing the formations in QB efficiency terms then sure, only a minority of possible units and formations and unit are actually going to be worth taking, this is why they're bad. 
Quick battle points have no influence or meaning on the CM model, campaigns, scenarios or any PBEM which are outside of the context of Quick Battles. That might be the only thing that matters to you, but it's a minority of what CM actually is.

In what possible context did you think this was about Quick Battle points?

All points-buy systems are bad, and CM's is no different - typically they're a least-worst option for design. If you're going to shift the goalposts to discussing the formations in QB efficiency terms then sure, only a minority of possible units and formations and unit are actually going to be worth taking, this is why they're bad. 
Quick battle points have no influence or meaning on the CM model, campaigns, scenarios or any PBEM which are outside of the context of Quick Battles. That might be the only thing that matters to you, but it's a minority of what CM actually is.

So obviously the response was a more generic one than for any specific formation, there will always be exceptions.

Stryker Cavalry is firmly not one of them. They absolutely have disproportionate firepower for it's size - as Cavalry they'll typically have far more CAS and artillery support per-man than that of the rifle formations, but even on the level of an individual platoon, you're looking at three five man squads with two M240Bs, and one javelin per squad. 

That's 16 men, two GPMGs and three ATGMS, not counting the Strykers themselves. Compare that to the Stryker infantry with 37 men and the same number of weapons, and the cavalry unit is disproportionately powerful for it's size - it has twice as many weapons per man as a Stryker platoon.

The Bradley platoon comparison becomes even more stark, since the Cavalry Bradley squads are four men, with the remaining space being taken up by extra TOW missiles.

So obviously the response was a more generic one than for any specific formation, there will always be exceptions.

Stryker Cavalry is firmly not one of them. They absolutely have disproportionate firepower for it's size - as Cavalry they'll typically have far more CAS and artillery support per-man than that of the rifle formations, but even on the level of an individual platoon, you're looking at three five man squads with two M240Bs, and one javelin per squad. 

That's 16 men, two GPMGs and three ATGMS, not counting the Strykers themselves. Compare that to the Stryker infantry with 37 men and the same number of weapons, and the cavalry unit is disproportionately powerful for it's size - it has twice as many weapons per man as a Stryker platoon.

The Bradley platoon comparison becomes even more stark, since the Cavalry Bradley squads are four men, with the remaining space being taken up by extra TOW missiles.