beardiebloke

AP on the strike at the technical college:
https://apnews.com/article/kyiv-russia-ukraine-war-vitali-klitschko-86fd573ab5703957663fd40a5ec8d2a6
The strike, using a U.S.-supplied precision weapon that has proven critical in enabling Ukrainian forces to hit key targets, delivered a new setback for Russia which in recent months has reeled from a Ukrainian counteroffensive.
According to the governor of Russia’s Samara region, Dmitry Azarov, an unspecified number of residents of the region were among those killed and wounded by the strike on the town of Makiivka.
Russian military bloggers, whose information has largely been reliable during the war, said ammunition stored close to the facility had exploded in the attack and contributed to the high number of casualties.
Expressing anger at the losses, Daniil Bezsonov, an official with the Russian-appointed administration in Russian-occupied Donetsk, called for the punishment of military officers who ordered a large number of troops to be stationed at the facility.

Don't think I've seen this posted here yet.
One big strike against some kind of conscript barracks in Makiivka ("multiple reports") and a smaller one on something in Pervomaisk east of Bakhmut (that one seems maybe sketchy reporting).
I guess neither is a game changer but reminds me of something posted many pages ago considering the choices available to each side.  Since having a barracks/HQ within missile range of the enemy is obviously a bad idea, I suspect they reason RU do it is not (entirely) "Russia sucks" but that they have no other choice since they need to control unwilling ex-prisoners an mobiks and need to be that close to the front.  Not a good situation to be in if you are forced into mistakes.
 
And happy new year to you all!  Hope this can all end in 2023.

It seems I have lost my bet that the Russian Federation would dissolve by the end of the year. But obviously I meant the Chinese New Year. So Russia has another 3 weeks to fall apart.
Come on, you can do it!

https://t.me/tpkr1775/16866
 
Santa claus invented a new way to deliver gifts to bad boys

As one proponent of western tanks to Ukraine, I'm not wedded to the idea that a M1 or Leopard must be sent, I am wedded to the idea that the West must continue escalation of aid to Ukraine, what form it takes does not matter as long as Ukraine benefits from it.
Bradley and Marders IFVs, fantastic. ATACMS, fantastic. More artillery? Good. Does not matter what is sent, only illustrating to Putin that Western resolve is firm and ironclad and that he should pursue peace and withdrawal now than risk complete collapse later. Clearly Russia does not believe in western resolve, nor in Ukraine's ability to hold, Western tanks are a symbol therefore of the West's commitment to Ukraine that it will do what it takes to ensure Ukrainian victory.
The west is boiling the frog, presumably to prevent Russian panic and escalation. Meanwhile Ukraine suffers, and a slowly boiling frog believes all is well, it must merely wait and the heat will die down. Yet more Ukrainians (and Russians) die.
If another mobilization is begun as predicted by Ukraine, it only indicates Russia is doubling down in the belief that victory or at least short term stalemate is possible and Russia will prevail.
Bradleys and Marders would be a good response.
I think boiling the frog, basically giving Putin escalation dominance is a good strategy, but that must be coupled with Western willingness to escalate. Luckily Bradleys and Patriot systems are a well worthwhile escalation.
 

Thank you for the link. I'll never again be able to hear 'Carol of the Bells' without thinking about its origins as the Ukrainian folk song  Щедрик (Shchedryk). BTW, for anyone interested, there are some beautiful arrangements on YT in its original form.
 
 

We need some actual news, or the new game.....Maybe a tiny bone fragment about the new game?

How the field hospital near Bakhmut operates:


Google subtitles working fine.

-A shell hit is heard.
-Don't worry, it was far away. Like two buidlings from here.
Tradtionally top-notch reporting from Hromadskie. Indeed Bakhmut seem like hell- always had immense respect for military medical stuff patching up all horrific things modern warfare can cause to human body. In this case those medics weren't rotated for 4 months, which means several months of more or less intensive bombardment. Note also this soldier's description of how Wagnerites changed their tactics, from head-on attacks into infiltration at night (dressed in black?) suported by violent artillery barrages.

I hope they don't waste their time and resources going for the Russian power grid.
More useful to try and smuggle a mortar team or some drones to Saratov...

Just had a quick look at this video about defensive trenches in Kherson on one of the roads to Crimea.  I don't see how an AT trench looks any different to an infantry trench but I guess the commentary is based on where one expects these to be.
Not much to add except to say that this looks like a video introduction to a CM campaign with a series of tactical maps...
 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CCcph9srHSw&t=4333s

There is an interesting interview with Polish volunteer sergeant fighting in Ukraine. It is one and a half month old and unfortunatelly no ENG subtitles are available, but there are interesting tactical and organizational details from the ground that are nevertheless relevant and worth to share here. Some are already known, but since he is unusually vocal (within Opsec) plus has a lot of practice it may be worth to bring them on this board:
1.The guy serves as platoon commander (practically down to 12 men + 5 absent) from April. His men are in Separate Special Battalion serving as "Battle Detachment" (re: all kind of missions including SF ones) subordinated to one of the regular brigades, probably mainly at Kharkiv front (undisclosed).

2. Those multinational experienced guys (US, Frenchmen, Poles, Ukrainians and several others) have clearly very different tasks than most common infantry fighting in the trenches- they serve as "fire brigade" in case Russians attacks will brake through. They see periods of very intense fighting, much more than most common soldiers. Interestingly, he claims it is common practice to form such ad hoc local QRF at the brigade and sometimes battalion level. After some time such units are treated as "specialists", taken out of regular order of battle and if having good reputation may be "borrowed" to other brigades for special tasks. Thus they are almost constantly in fight, experiencing problems with fatigue and lack of sleep.

3. Their equipment reflects that- he started with AK 74, but know uses Grot rifle and M14 for sniper tasks, good quality vests and uniforms. He claims many soldiers he served with, including Americans, will prefer those weapons to M4's that are also in use but have reputation of being too fragile in frontline conditions, difficult to keep clean and prone to jamming. He says US M67 granades are also used, but have 5-sec. delay that is way too long in battlefield conditions (mind- probably assaults), so most soldiers in line prefer old F1. It is interesting that he participated in some "water-environment" sabotage missions deep behind enemy lines (planting explosives) armed chiefly with his 9mm pistol.
Entire platoon also have two sets of NVG's for entire unit, which they found very lucky to have- common soldiers rarely have such items.

4. Battlefield effectiveness of AT weapons is also widely different from theoretical. AT-4's serve at max. 150 m but usually closer, NLAW's 6-800 m (platoon get a lot of NLAW's but they had no spare batteries, which shocked soldiers who considered it a sabotage on behalf of "unmentioned" provider state; it almost get them killed). Team's sole Javelin set is effective up to 1500m in practice, but only if line of vision is unobstructed, and similarly they have great problem possessing only pair of batteries- thus they need to allow armour get closer than theoretical range. Infantry is rather vulnarable to RU tanks, since they improved tactics to "shoot and scoot" from 2kms afar, behind practical range of a Javelin: "Unlike at early campaigns, they rarely go into open and creatively use cover and concealment now, preferring their famous carrousel tactics."

5. His and other platoons often do infiltration tactics; it is also visibly different between regular Ukrainians units and Territorial Defence that former prefer aggresive forms of defences- active patrolling, inflitrations, ambushes etc. while latter stick to their trenches, which they nonetheless hold valiantly. His platoon would penetrate several kms deep inside enemy lines on fairly regular basis. They usually move by pickups and technicals- after engagement they instantly mount them and drive at very high speeds, which is dangerous by itself [I also heard from several other accounts that number of common driving accidents due to enforced speed is very high in this war, especially directly behind the front]. Also despite many people demanding Ukrainians getting on the offensive (material was recorded before it) he says this small tactic is exteremely costly for Russians, so we should not expect in this war "massess of armour that will break the front, which will lead to nothing, them being sorrounded and suffering extra casualties". Instead they kill Russians at very high rate every day, devastate their logistics and only later will be able to penetrate the front [Nice practical translation of @TheCaptain theories about "attrition to manouvre" and internal fractures that lead to RU collapse].

6. As a rule they were often outnumbered and almost always outgunned; it stand out that front is often very thinly manned and soldiers dispersed, like a weak team solely holding even large village. Russians also visibly improved their tactic over time- they tried night infiltration, learned how to sneak over the minefields and tried to lure his team in the open. Still, his opinion on them as soldiers is low. There are very detailed desciptions of small unit actions, for example when his platoon defended a village against Russian assault for two sleepless nights, resulting only in 29 eliminated Russians and BMP.

7. Very high regard for Ukrainian determination- especially in June, he says army was basically holding only on its morale and sheer middle finger energy. Even "QRF" elite units in his sector lacked any heavy weapons except several rusty RPG's, they were constantly observed by several drones at once and subjected to constant artillery barrage. Still, they usually defeated muscovite assaults. In one such actions they were aided on flank with 7-man Ukrainian recon team from HQ, armed only with small weapons that successfully stand against armoured assault. Visible recogntition of morale as deciding factor here; for example cases of wounded soldiers leaving hospitals to join collegues at the front are common.

8.Very often they participated in "emergency" missions to plug the whole or counterattack; in one of such they have 17 men to stop expected massive assault of entire BTG and were suddenly joined by colonel, who took rifle and manned the trench with them (attack didn't came in the end). High opinion of Ukrainian officers, who usually share the same burden as common soldiers, in contrast to Russian practices. Also international troops who get this far are only crack volunteers with right psyche determined to stay in the fight- despite witnessing fires no NATO soldier ever ecnountered they get used to this situation and learned how to behave. He notes that other volunteers, not less professional, brave or skilled in direct combat, simply did not have nerves to be in this kind of war and left [another common thrope- even long wartime service in NATO armies did not provide them with adequate experience against heavy fires].

9. This soldier, just as many other volunteers and Ukrainians, is visibly shocked by bestiality of Russian way of war- it is beyond just Bucha and Irpien, but in every village and town atrocities are common, there are also often civilians lying dead in countryside or murdered on roads. He descibes a situation when Russians purposfully shoot passing cars but initially targeting only backseats. Drivers speed up to escape, they take the turn and meet a hidden defence point when they are frontally gunned down in group. This way many cars created a barricade from vehicles and dead civilians that blocked the road in case of Ukrainian advance. Such behaviour of course only stiffened Ukrainian morale.

Ok, sorry for long post. There is another interview with sgt. Krzysztof X that came out several days ago when he give details of offensive in Kharkiv, if you will be interested I may sum up his experiences.

Interviews with some soldiers of I gather the 93rd brigade. They were near Izyum for months but were replaced very shortly before it was retaken, then relocated to near Bakhmut. They really seem to have got the short end of the stick and seem tired but resigned to their lot. The English captions work pretty well.
 

AAA in the ground support role
 

Ok team, what is your take on this. 
 
I was listening to the "The Daily" podcast of today, under the headline "A Bridge, a Bomb and Putin's revenge" from the New York Times. Normally I only listen to them for US internal political issues, but I made an exception. When the 10th of October retaliatory attacks were discussed, there was some gnashing of teeth and doomsday talk about the potential impact on the Ukrainian moral. Not overly much, but well in line with many of the ill-informed and nervous ”maybe we should try for peace instead crowd”. That made me think… What actually did happen on the 10th, and how bad was it really?
 
Sure Lives were lost, people were most probably crippled and definitely traumatized for life – Horrible injury incurred.
But was it a majestic reaction from the war gods of the east, taking their toll for the Ukrainian insolence of bombing the Crimean bridge?
 
I made a rough calculation:
  
83 missiles (Kh 101, Kh 555, Kalibr, Iskander, S-300 and Torndo S) were supposedly used, as well as 17 Shahid UAV. 
The average warhead size of these weapons is 324 kg, for a total mass of 32 400 kg.
Out of these, 43 were reportedly shot down, reducing the mass delivered by 13 932 kg
For a total of 18 468 kg
As I understand it, that is the equivalent of the bomb load of three (3) A-10 warthogs – if you consider that bombs probably weigh more than missile warheads.
3 single seat attack aircraft worth of ordnance… Is that a massive response to a strategic attack on the jugular of the southern front? 
3 single seat attack aircraft worth of ordnance… Will even the sustained attack of such a force do anything to dent the moral/cohesion/effectiveness/capacity of the Ukrainian nation?
On both account, I think not. Especially since the best of russian missile technology seem to be less accurate than even dumb bombs dropped by an A-10.

Furthermore, I saw somewhere that the total shelf cost for the 10 October attack was 350 million $. Is that money well spent? 

All things considered, Putin certainly managed to catch the headlines… Putting the perceived russian military might back on the agenda. But almost completely unjustified, it seems to me…
 
So, what are your thoughts, have I misunderstood this? Should Putin's gestures have anyone really shaking in their boots?

Latest Russian airborne recruits:
 

@Probuswas asking about "HE Anti-personnel HIMARS" and I found this:

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/9/30/2126197/-Ukraine-update-Russia-prepares-for-advance-on-Svatove-as-U-S-provides-powerful-new-rockets
@danfrodois the "LIBERAL SITE, ENTER AT OWN PERIL" warning mandatory?

Their source seems to be this tweet: 
I guess they're not particularly controversial so I don't see why this couldn't be true.
These look deeply unpleasant from the RU infantry's point of view.  Not sure when they would be used if UKR has precision artillery shells, perhaps if they get intel on a big, soft-ish target in RU's rear.

@Probuswas asking about "HE Anti-personnel HIMARS" and I found this:

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/9/30/2126197/-Ukraine-update-Russia-prepares-for-advance-on-Svatove-as-U-S-provides-powerful-new-rockets
@danfrodois the "LIBERAL SITE, ENTER AT OWN PERIL" warning mandatory?

Their source seems to be this tweet: 
I guess they're not particularly controversial so I don't see why this couldn't be true.
These look deeply unpleasant from the RU infantry's point of view.  Not sure when they would be used if UKR has precision artillery shells, perhaps if they get intel on a big, soft-ish target in RU's rear.

All of his stuff is great, but there is real insight in this one.

Entrance to Lyman...
 
How long did it take for RU to take it???

Entrance to Lyman...
 
How long did it take for RU to take it???

Entrance to Lyman...
 
How long did it take for RU to take it???

Before attack soldier (maybe chapelan) reads Psalm 90
 

I could watch Zelenskyy handing out medals without getting emotionally involved. When you've lived in communities where the Commanding Officer is tracked from every single kitchen window as he walks through the estate waiting to see which door he'll knock on, you end up a bit inured.
This though got me.
 

Nice 360 drone shot from the Lyman only escape road: https://goo.gl/maps/6ZhFtVfGascHJurz8

 
drone shot location on the map: