Sarjen

Like what?  Say China quietly backs another side in a US led western intervention, how exactly are they going to be in trouble?  Russia already did this with bounties in Afghanistan and all we did was make quacking noises.  If China decides to supply and support their freedom fighters, our options beyond starting WW3 are limited.  Our options against Russia are non-existent. 
Supplying the other side is a long held tradition in "short of war" space.  Russians did it in Vietnam, we did it in Afghanistan (Round 1).  
That would be the plan, but regional containment has now raised the bill significantly.  Imagine Iraq in '03 as a proxy war.  We now have to make Jordan, Turkey, Iran, Syria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia airtight to prevent flow of outside support to the other team.  The intervention bill before casualties just went up by an order of magnitude.
Not many countries can field next-gen ATGMs and MANPADs, however primary competitors all can, and in Chinas case we already know they have been working very hard at knock offs. 
We would definitely try and establish operational pre-conditions first; however, I am not sure what that looks like.  We lost air dominance below 2000 feet in Iraq against ISIL and they were basically using commercial off the shelf stuff. Information warfare is even more tricky, hell we can't even agree as to what a legitimate military target is or is not in the information space...and that kind of thing can cripple a coalition.
In the opening phase of this war, based on what we have seen and heard, yes, very much.  In the first month of this war the UA did not have enough artillery to cover a 1000km+ frontage, so ATGMs were likely doing a lot of the heavy lifting.  We are definitely in an arty-duel phase now.  Regardless, next gen man portable ATGMs with ridiculous ranges and kill ratios have arrived there is enough video evidence of this in this war to prove it.
In Iraq in '05, the insurgents brought logistical resupply along the main MSR for the US to a grinding halt.  They cut the secondary routes and then IED'd US logistics until it damned near broke - it actually had to pause for a week to re-tool, which is nuts.  This war points to a whole other level of projection of friction onto an operational system.
This has been brought up before.  What we are seeing in Ukraine is consistent with trends we saw back in the Donbas in 2014, in Iraq against ISIL, and in the Nagorno-Karbakh.  I am sure some phenomenon are unique to this war and we will be spending some time trying to figure that one out.  However, there has been a weird noise coming out of conventional warfare for some time now and this war has just underlined in bold some of that.  
This week I got some capstone doctrine to review and provide feedback, and right up front "we are a manoeuvre warfare, mission command based military"...and I am think..."are we now?"  "Should we be?"

Stop lying - NATO has no military strength to occupy and pacify Russia. Full stop.
NATO has no interest in fighting, occupying and pacifying Russia. Full stop.
If Russians are paranoid about NATO they should attend psychology sessions.
Bingo. You just admitted that NATO cannot win conventional war with Russia because Russia will escalate it to all out Nuclear war. NATO threat is just Russian paranoid imagination.
Grabbing somebody else land while killing people living there to create buffer state is a Hitler style war crime.  
Size of Russian land and size of forces required to occupy and pacify it will not change. 
Let me remind you that USSR was founded on idea of total western destruction. FYI that what Russians still want to do.

Still not a valid argument, because relative military capacity isn't relevant in the final analysis. NATO doesn't have, and never has had, enough military power to subjugate Russia, because Russia is freckin' Hyooge. It no more has the power to conquer Russia militarily than Russia has the power to conquer Ukraine. Strewth, "we" couldn't even manage Afghanistan or Iraq; how are we going to fare better in The Rodina? Russian fear of NATO aggression has always been a paranoid fever dream or "demonisation of the other" for propaganda purposes, to divert the proles' attention from the failings of the ruling classes.
 

Exactly. If NATO is this enduring threat that Ukraine, whom was nowhere at all close to being allowed in NATO was attacked in a full scale war upon the justification of safeguarding Russian security, than Finland, with it's borders near Russia's major cities and Northern Fleet bases, should garner some sort of escalation, even if ultimately posturing and not real force buildup for a defense/offense of the region.
That Russia's reply is a muted "shrug" or the Russian public whom Ukraine's invasion was justified as partly avoiding NATO encirclement gives no regard to Finland joining NATO as a credible threat just tells everyone worried about Russian escalation that their reasoning was a lie.
If the Russian public, supposedly very worried about NATO expanding and invading, gives no regard to Finland joining, yes Russians may be annoyed at NATO encroaching, pissed, but this betrays that Russia actually does not fear NATO and speaks instead to Russia's fear of NATO limiting Russian interference in their backyard.

If Putin's plan for this war is to wait till West loses interest in the war, this is the opposite of what they should be doing - this is the way to get Ukraine some Eurofighters.
Edit:
So this user claims that by appealing the verdict, UK would de facto recognize DLPR as a legal entity. IMO the counter to that is for UK to add them to terrorist organization lists, and recognize Russia as a terrorist supporter and rogue state. Bleep around and find out...
 

Ah, pro-Russian-troll o'clock again.  Yay.
"NATO filter bubble", you clearly know nothing about NATO.

So far Business Insider appears to be the only source. I found a few reports in other media but everyone was quoting Business Insider. I can't say too much about credibility but given how generally uninformed German mass media is w.r.t. the finer details of this war, I doubt there is much real fact checking going on.
On a personal note: Could we please reduce the general Germany-bashing a bit? As I have said here severals times, I am not much of a Scholz-fan myself and Scholz is not Germany. Moreover, as (I think) Napoleon once said, never assume ill will when you can explain something with incompetence instead... Third point: While I often share the irritation caused by German politics, we should still keep in mind (and here I have to kind of defend Scholz): Germany's democratically elected chancellor is still called Scholz, not Selenskyj or Duda or Biden. So, while it is legitimate to ask or even demand something of a country it is also legitimate for said country not to grant everything. Not meant inflammatory and, as I said, I don't like much of what Scholz & Co decided (or rather did not decide) in the past.

Wagner PMC spetsnaz-for-hire also operating up here.
https://mobile.twitter.com/AggregateOsint/status/1534771959220797441 Interestingly, all through human history, mercenaries tend *not* to be usable in high intensity / high casualty infantry combat situations like MOUT or forest combat, for the very reason that you can't spend your money if you're dead.
...If you enlist in a foreign legion type unit, a la Gurkhas or Étranger, that's different, you're a foreign enlistee in a regular armed unit, usually under local officers.
And when mercs do accept high risk taskings, these are usually one-offs requiring specialised skills (sappers, frogman, mountaineering, etc.).  And special operators tend to plan such ops so that it's other folks who do the bulk of the dying.  As my SEAL buddy once said, if you're still in active contact after the second clip, you've just become a Marine.
 

Thanks ) Just became some more of work, my wife turned back and often occupies PC because her work, also it's hard to live three months 24/7 as war news translator, so I took small vacations 

Russian TG tells the lack of infantry forced Russians to use personnel of recon companies and battalions to participate in actions like usual infantry. This causes additional losses of specialiized troops, so Russian units soon can be limited in the tactical recon. Russian command puts an ultimatum for recon units commanders - either their soldiers go to the battle like usual infantry or this commander have to retire. As the author told on this screen, his familiar recon battalion commander chose to retire. 
Members of LostArmour discussion boards also told about lack of capable infantry both in Russian troops and LDPR. All last success maintained mostly by PMC, remained motivated VDV and Spetsnaz, which more and more plays a role of VDV. Most part of "line infantry" day by day is losing own motivation.  

This is that first famous large column of Rosgvardia, destroyed in first or second day of war. All this did 6th company of 92nd mech.brigade near Kutuzivka village NE from Kharkiv. The company in Day 1 turned out itself in the rear of Russians, because they advanced forward too fast, trying to enter in Kharkiv. In first contacts the company lost 3 BTR-4E, but despite this company commander decided to break through back to Kharkiv. The company, heading toward the city, encountered with large columnn of Rosgvardia/OMON, which drove in the same direction. Commander immadiately ordered to attack them - as result almost whole column was destroyed, but from full elimination Russians were saved because two their tanks appeared on the road and engaged UKR company. Two more BTR-4E were knokced out by tanks, so rest of company broke contakt and on full speed reached Kharkiv.

Eh, I blame the programme manager - he's the one responsible for making SURE discrete elements of the project interact properly. Mind you, no self respecting engineer would be using non-metric in the first place, so theres that.

Dobrev says they are already considering classifying information about Russian forex reserves, always a good sign.
 
 

Just signed into the forum to say thanks to everyone contributing to this thread.  Found the thread a few weeks ago and have been soaking up every comment.  Absolutely fantastic and informative content.  Bluntly, my domain expertise in this arena is fairly insignificant to most in this thread so I'll be fairly quiet.  But absolutely appreciate the content.
 

Interesting view on the domestic car market in Russia. 
 
 

HAHA! I was waiting for this. I just set 1 story buildings with destroyed walls and low roofs.. that does the trick well!

I don't think Scholz is doing much wrong. Germany supports countries who send their Russian made material to Ukraine, but also sends German weapon systems like the powerful PzH 2000 and the Gepard Flakpanzer, not to mention the many Panzerfaust ATGM' s.  I don't see any justification to call that BS. There's a strange Germany bashing atmosphere in this thread, but I think Germany is doing all it can in a very difficult and complicated situation. 
Apart from that I'm not in favor of sending all available weapons to Ukraine because we don't have much left to start with. Rearmament will take years and years and Ukraine is getting enough weapons to stand their ground. In the meantime NATO has to rebuild it's strength and prepare for the time when the US will turn it's back on Europe.

Truth....speaking as a smoothie drinking leftist ( :P) in the US it's really the extreme left and right that are vocally outspoken against the US support.  The right wing types are just trying to score points against the president.  The extreme leftys are just as stupid...as always.  It is one of the few things that me and most of my Navy buddies agree about in American politics.  We are all in favor of more weapons to defeat Russian.  

Your definitions are categorically wrong.  A dictator with actual 95% support isn't a dictator but a phenomenally popular leader.  An autocrat maybe.   A Dictator in reality relies on brute force power to stay on top.  Pinochet, Kim Jong un, Robert Mugabe etc. State control of the media and education systems, full control of the state police and military institutions, judiciary etc ensures control.  
And what the heck is that "smoothie sipping leftist" comment?  I don't think you are finding in the US that the "smoothie sipping leftists" are Putin's main apologists.  Granted the left can have some annoying as hell pontificators, they however haven't been the ones most vocally decrying the US gov't support for Ukraine.  Who within the French political scene has been arguing against supporting Ukraine?  Same in most other western states.  Gimme a smoothie and arm the hell out of Ukraine. (actually,  i prefer coffee and wine).

Several times in my career (well, two different careers), it was brought home to me how much can be determined with a few pieces of information from varied sources, when presented to subject matter experts. And we have some of that here as well - a number of people who have real life experience at certain aspects, in which I include a comprehensive knowledge of history, military or otherwise.
In the Army we routinely and on "special occasions" got intelligence briefings on things. Sometimes it was political/military situations in general because being in the 82d always meant you were on call to be sent to the next hot spot, like, this afternoon if necessary, so we were briefed a lot on what was going on in the world. Some general, some classified. Then there were briefings on new equipment. One time in particular we got a picture of a new Russian tank in a factory. Someone mentioned seeing the exact same picture in Newsweek. But what the Newsweek pic didn't show was the factory. The tank was on a white background. Including the factory would have given a clue (maybe pointed right at) WHO took that picture. Sources. We got to see the assembly line. Newsweek readers saw the tank.
At Electric Boat (US nuclear submarine shipyard for those not familiar) I had occasions to participate in some studies for the Office of Naval Intelligence. I can't say a lot about these but let's just say we were trying to reverse engineer new Russian sub designs from bits and pieces of data the ONI would feed us. We could ask questions too, and sometimes in a week or two we might get an answer, sometimes they'd say not available, use your judgement. What was impressive was that when you put 20 experienced submarine design experts from various fields together, and with just a scattering of facts provided how scary close you can get to the answer. And we know how close because several years later we could compare our "guess" to what we could see of the real thing from open sources. My part was determining the reactor shield design, which is a significant weight account. Had to do this using what we knew from Russian naval reactor designs, and some assumptions on what Russia allows for radiation exposure (more than the US/UK and I assume France). But I designed reactor shielding for a living. Physics doesn't change and there are limited materials that are useful.
That in particular emphasizes how easy it is to have something compromised by just feeding a few bits of good info to real experts and having them analyze and collate.  And many times individual facts are not classified, because they don't show the whole picture. But given enough individual facts you can find the big picture, which makes you think that more facts should be classified 🙂 .
Bottom line is that even data from open sources, put in the right hands or group of hands, can come remarkably close to classified secrets.

Dave

A good start point.  I also have been mulling over a lot of these issues; however, I come to different conclusions.  My primary induction is that we are looking at this too narrowly; quality vs quantity is a one dimensional set of competitive metrics and we are clearly moving past it in this war.  To start these are somewhat vague as what do we mean by "quality"?  Is that training and equipment?  The amount of money invested prior to war?  Quantity, is that mass on the battlefield or broader strategic capacity?  Is it both?  These definitions muddle more than they really explain.
I think there are at least three more dimensions that need to be explored (and I say "at least" deliberately): "smartness" and "distribution", and "capacity". 
Smartness could just as easily be described as intelligence in the broader sense but the term is already in use.  By this I define smartness as: the ability of a force to competitively create usable knowledge in the prosecution of war.  This is effectively competitive theory building at all levels of warfare (i.e. the warfare enterprise) - [aside: I did have graphics but the "eeewww PowerPoint crowd" might get ruffled again].  So one can have a very well trained and equipped force but is it competitively smart?  Further, can you have a smart low-quality but high quantitative force?  Theorists say yes, they call it a swarm.  Smartness could easily be called C4ISR; however, I personally think that term gets boxed up as "HQ stuff" which does a disservice to the idea of the overall cognitive ability of a force as a sentient system in itself.   
In the opening phase of this war the Russian attacked on 5 main axis where they concentrated over 190k troops well armed and just coming off moths of exercises (how effective those were are in doubt), they had the local mass advantage as Ukrainian defence was 1) still mobilizing, 2)  in a state of shock at the first punch and 3) was spread out across a very long frontage as no one knew if Belarus was going to jump in or there were more axis the Russians were going to open up. So in the opening phase of this war we have seen a very smart Ukrainian force meet what I call a "dim" mass-based Russian one, and it appears the meeting was decisive in the opening phase of this war.
Distribution and capacity speak to mass but how one employs it.  Distribution is how we spread that mass around and capacity is how much depth we invest into it.  In this war, again in the opening phase, we saw the Ukrainian defence as very highly distributed mass, yet also highly connected and very intelligent.  It met a very high density mass, yet also "dim" of the Russian forces...and we saw what happened.  The Ukrainian defence created friction and attrition along the entirely of the Russian operational system leading to the collapse of that system on at least 2 operational axis, one of them the main effort of the whole war.   So now we can have high quality - smart - distributed/lower capacity mass meeting low quality - dim - concentrated/higher capacity mass, and we all saw what happened.  Western militaries will wring their hands over this one for at least a decade because we tend to put out high quality - smart - concentrated/low capacity mass and no matter what the military visionaries, revisionist or conservatives may say, we have no idea what happens when these types of forces all meet - Steve, has nearly shouted himself raw pointing out how wrong the pre-war modeling was, and still can be.  Particularly when we have seen what low quality - smart - distributed/high capacity (nearing endless) mass can do to our forces over time, in insurgencies over the last 20 years .
This brings me to my last point, which no one really seems to be talking much about either: speed of victory/loss matters.  Hypothetically Russia could win this thing if it manages to drag out this war for a century - I am talking Taliban style of constant low level cuts and bites across the spectrum that it somehow manages to sustain.  However, by then it may no longer matter.  Putin will be dead, the political landscape will have changed to the point that what ever mattered in this war, in this moment has become a complete sideshow.  Further, Russia may "win" but the victory completely breaks the nation, to the point that the victor is not even Russia anymore.  We know this because this is what happened in Afghanistan.  In Oct of '01 it was "a critical blow to terrorism", in Aug of '20 - "*sigh* let's just get this over with".  The USA of '01 is gone and the one in '20 was built upon it but did not have anywhere near the same level of investment as fundamental conditions had changed.  
Back to my main point, western militaries are built for either a quick victory or long loss.  We do not know what to do with a quick loss or long victory.  Further, the public that send us are not wired for the latter either.  Problem is that these could be the wars offered to us and this is a major strategic blind spot.  I think this was one of the authors main points, that is particularly insightful as it relates directly to what sorts of forces we have been building.
And finally, as if all that was not enough, I am still on the fence as to what is happening between defence and offence.  Is this conditions based or are we looking at something more fundamental?  Offence in the form the Russians are offering is clearly in trouble.  It has become incredibly difficult and costly with the type of force they have employing to prosecute it.  We have all been getting "scope eye" on a 2500 sq km postage stamp of terrain - in a country of roughly 604k sq kms - down in the south; however, the rest of the country is also pretty static.  The UA has made a couple successful offensives around Kharkiv and now north of Kherson, but these have been modest.  This could be, as the author suggests, due to the Ukrainian force and how it is being employed (not western enough?).  Or has technology driven us into a different warfare paradigm?  Frankly, I do not know and I am sure people have plenty opinions but let me be the first to break it, you don't know either...no one does.  We likely won't know until something breaks and one side in this war figures it out.  Or maybe they won't and it will take the next war for a side to come up with the answer. The only thing I can say definitively is that the question is in the air right now and the real experts are all watching and waiting.

Quote - (I am also the kind of wargamer that feels bad when he losses pixel troops unnecessarily, they are my responsibility to use wisely).
Amen, brother.
When I play any of the CM games, I am really anal about keeping my casualties as low as possible.  To the point of obsession.  I play real time and I micro manage my forces to a point that most people would wonder if I am actually having fun ( I am).
Screen shot of my best accomplishment.  The point of pride is not in the kill count on the right.  For me, the satisfaction is the left hand column.  That is all that matters to me.

Regarding the UK report on Russia casualties, this is our current list. 
Russia has suffered 'devastating losses' of junior officers, harming its ability to fight, claims UK intel (msn.com)
I found a list from March 20 that included lower-level officers and added
 
MG Andrey Kolesnikov, Russia’s 29th Combined Arms Army commander
Andrei Sukhovetsky, Deputy Commander of the 41st Combined Arms Army
Major General Vitaly Gerasimov, First Deputy Commander Of The 41st Army
Major-general Oleg Mitiayev, commander of 150th motor-rifle division
General-Lieutenant Andrey Mordvichev commander 8th CAA 
Major-General Tushaev (Chechen)
LTG Yakov Rezantsev, Russia’s 49th CAA commander, in Chornobaivka near Kherson.
MG Vladimir Frolov, deputy commander of 8th Guard CAA, Southern military district
Major General Simonov Deputy chief of Electronic Warfare Troops of Armed Forces of Russian Federation
 
Guards Colonel Konstantin Zizevsky commander of the 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment 
Colonel Viktor Ivanovich Isaikin (killed Mar 2)
Colonel Konstantin Ogiy, Head of Kemerovo SOBR unit, Rosgvardiya (killed Feb 28)
Colonel Sergey Karasev, Commander, 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade (Ulyanovsk) (Killed Mar 11)
Colonel Andrei Zakharov, Battalion-tactical group Commander, 6th Tank Regiment (Chebarkul) , 90th Tank division (killed Mar 10) (given Order of Courage in 2016)
Colonel Sergey Sukharev, commander of 331st Guards Airborne Regiment (of the 98th VDV Division)
Colonel? Denis Shishov, the commander of the 11th Air Assault Brigade
Colonel Yuryi Agarkov, the commander of 33rd motor-rifle regiment (Kamyshyn, Volgograd oblast) of 20th Guard motor-rifle division
Colonel Alexander Vladimirovich Zakharov, 6th tank regiment commander
Colonel Igor Nikolaev Commander of 252nd Motor Rifle Regiment, the 3rd Motor Rifle Division.
Colonel Alexei Sharov, commander of the 810th Marine Brigade
Colonel Sergey Savvateeyev, Deputy commander of Rosgvardia SOBR
Col. Denis Kurilo commander of the 200th infantry brigade (detachment #08275, Pechenga city)
Colonel Alexander Bespalov, commander of 59th Tank Regiment, 144th Motor Rifle Division Lublin twice Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov Regiment
Colonel Ivan Grishin, the commander of Russia's 49th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (1st Tank Army)
Colonel Mikhail Nagamov, commander of 6th engineer-sapper regiment of 1st Guard tank army of Western military district.
Colonel Sergei Porokhnya commander of the 12th separate guards engineering brigade
Col. Denis Kozlov 12th Guards Engineering Brigade’s (Central Military District) commander This is the second loss of a commander for the Brigade
Colonel Nikolay Ovcharenko  commander of the 45th Engineer-Sapper Regiment a part of the 1st Guards Tank Army
Col. Eduard Pelishenko Acting commander of DNR 1st Army Corps  seriously wounded
Colonel Vladimir Ivanov, unit unknown
Col. Evgeny Gerasimenko,Rosgvardiya spetsnaz. He served in 12th sep.special force detachment "Ural" (Nizhniy Tagil). But he got lost early of 8th of April.
Col. Alexei Smirnov, Chief of Communications for 98th Guards Airborne Division
Col. Vladimir Ivanov was a press officer for the MoD.

Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Agarkov, Commander, 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment. (killed Mar
Lieutenant Colonel Okruzhnov Alexander Nikolaevich, Head of Artillery, 104th VDV Regiment, 76th Airborne Division (killed Mar 7)
Lieutenant Colonel Renat Ravilovich Gaisin
Lieutenant Colonel Denis Glebov, Deputy Commander of the 11th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade (killed Mar 5, given Order of Courage)
Lieutenant Colonel Vitaly Slabtsov The Deputy Commander of the VDV's 83rd Air Assault Brigade
Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry Sofronov, Commander of the 61st Separate Marine Brigade of the Russian Armed Forces, (killed Mar 5)
Lt Colonel Mikhail Orchikov was deputy commander of a motor-rifle brigade 19th motor-rifle division
Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Savvateev, Deputy Commander, SOBR unit (Vladimir), Rosgvardiya
Lt.colonel Ilya Piatkin, 38 years  SOBR
Lt.colonel Roman Ryabov, 50 years  SOBR
Lt.colonel (likely) Mikhail Rodionov, 46 years   SOBR
lt.colonel, Ruslan Gashiyatullin, but only motor-rifle battalion commander. Odd.
According to Russian media, he lived in Dagestan, so probably he is from 136th Guard motor-rifle brigade of 58th CAA.
lt.colonel Igor Zharov a VDV officer and RVVDKU graduate, was killed in Ukraine. He was the chief of staff for a regiment
lt.colonel Alexandr Okruzhnov, artillery chief of 104th Guard air-assault regiment of 76th Guard air-assault divosion
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Kornik, head of the HQ for 40th Engineer-Sapper Regiment (but I can’t find a reference to this unit, so I wonder if it was actually 45th Engineer-Sapper Regiment
Lt.colonel Dmitriy Dormidontov, MLRS battalion commander 20 of March Ukrainian mortar shell directly hit Russian blindage. Three officers were killed
    - battalion commander (probably motor-rifle, so mayor or lt.colonel too)
    - forward air-controller (usually lt. or captain)
Lieutenant Colonel Georgy Petrunin, the military commandant of Samara
Lt.colonel Dinar Khametov, MLRS battalion commander of 200th motor-rifle brigade of 14th Army Corps of Joint Strategical Command "Northern Fleet".
Lt.colonel Dibir Dibirov, 291st motor-rifle regiment of 42nd MRD, 58th CAA
Lt.colonel Viacheslav Savinov, deputy chief of the staff, chief of artillery recon of 49th CAA 
Lt.colonel Miras Bashakov, commander of 133th separate guard tank battalion of 138th separate guard motor-rifle brigade
Lt.colonel Denis Mezuyev, commander of 1st Guard motor-rifle regiment of 2nd Guard "Tamanskaya" MRD.
Lt. Col. Aleksey Kryukov, possibly FSB Special Purpose Center Alfa group FSB 
Lt.colonel Eduard Dmitriev, senior officer of combat training department of 2nd guard CAA, Central military district, killed 24th of April.
Lt.Colonel Grigoriy Tarasenko.
Interesting person. He already participated in the war on Donbas during 2016-2019 probably as a shadow comamnder and even was wounded in 2019. Then participated in Syria operation. 
Lt.colonel Alexandr Blinov, senior officer of combat training of 150th motor-rifle division, Novoherkassk, Rostov oblast, 8th CAA
Lt. Col. Albert Karimov, GRU Spetsnaz
Captain 2nd Rank (Lt. Col. equivalent) Alexander Bobrov, commander 170th Minesweeper Division, 184th Water Area Protection Brigade (Novorossiysk).
"Lt.colonel" (LPR-promoted) Roman Medvedev, artillery chief of 4th motor-rifle brigade of LPR.
Lt.colonel Dmitriy Golosenko, 1st GTR of 2nd GMRD - MIA
Lt. Col. Denis Sukhanov, artillery officer for unknown unit
Lt. Col. Valentin Kuzmin, HQ staff of 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division
Lt. Col. Sergey Nikitin, 74th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade
Lt. Col. Alexander Dosyagaev, commander 2nd Airborne Battalion, 104th Guards Airborne Regiment, 76th Guards Air-Assault Division
Lieutenant Colonel Fezul Bichikaev from Vladikavkaz was the deputy commander of a regiment in Yekaterinburg, possibly the 288th MRR
Major Ruslan Leonov, Spetsnaz company commander (killed Mar 10)
Major Alexei Ilnitsky, deputy battalion commander, VDV 11th Air Assault Brigade (Ulan-Ude) (killed, given Order of Courage)  
Guards Major Andrei Petrovich Burlakov, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Secret Service, Chief of Intelligence of Regiment, Rosgvardia (killed Mar 10)
Major Bezborodov Dmitry Valeryevich, Rosgvardiya battalion commander (killed)
Major Vorsyuchenko Alexey Vasilyevich, VDV Unit #81430 HQ, 76th Airborne SAM Regiment (killed)
Major Dmity Bezborodov Bezzhizninski, Operational Battalion Commander, Rosgvardia (killed)
Major Sergey Vladimirovich Kashansky, GRU/GU 24th SpetsNaz Brigade? (killed)
Major Dmitry Bukatin, 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltiysk, Kaliningrad) (killed)
Major Patskalev Oleg Mikhailovich, Deputy Commander, 2nd Battalion, 331st VDV Guards Airborne Regiment (Kostroma), 98th Guards Airborne Division (killed)
Major Alexander Viktorovich Shchetkin, Deputy Commander for Military-Political Work, 1st Guards Motor Rifle Regiment (Sevastopol), 2nd Guards Tamanians Motor Rifle Division (killed)
Major Ratmir Kudayev (Police) (killed, given Order of Courage)
Major Sergei Krylov, Deputy Commander, 331st VDV Guards Airborne Regiment (Kostroma), 98th Airborne Division (killed Mar 17)
Major Alexey Osokin, the commander of the VDV's 31st Air Assault Brigade's 1st battalion
Major Oleg Patskalev, deputy battalion commander, 331st Guards Airborne Regiment, 98th Guards Airborne Division.
Mayor Denis Yagidarov, commander of airborne battlion of 31st separate air-assault brigade
Major Ruslan Vladimirovich Petrukhin, deputy battalion commander in the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 35th Army, Eastern Military District (killed Mar 11)
Major Dmitry Toptun motorized rifle battalion commander 488th Motor Rifle Regiment, 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division
Major Viktor Maksimchuk possible deputy commander of a motorized rifle regiment or battalion commander
Major Alexandr Lyubanov. VDV.
Marine Major Alexey Sukhanov 177th Naval Infantry Regiment
Major Azamat Alinov, company commander in 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade 
Major Livoskiy Deputy Commander of 35th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade’s rocket artillery battalion
Major Sergei Panov was reportedly the tank battalion commander in the 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade (other sources say 90th GTD)
Major Alexander Sergeevich Fedorov, Chief of Communications and Deputy Chief of Staff of Unit #47130, 103rd Rocket Brigade (Ulan-Ude, Divizionnaya station) (killed Mar 15)met with our SOF...
Major Ruslan Petrukhin, a graduate of the Kazan Higher Military Command School and a deputy battalion commander in the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade, was killed in Ukraine.
Maj. Pavel Suslov, Tyumen is his city. 40th engineer-sapper regiment, Ishym town of Tiumen oblast
Mayor Dmitriy Tiunin, commander (?) of engineer-sapper battalion of 136th guard motor-rifle brigade, 58th guard CAA
Captain Timur Suleymanov acting commander for 228th motor-rifle regiment?
Major Dmitriy Stakheev
Mayor Yegor Sannikov. No other info. Probably artillery officer.
Mayor Alexey Martiushev
Mayor Denis Golovko, deputy commander of 2nd motor-rifle battalion of 71st guard motor-rifle regiment, 42nd guard motor-rifle division, 58th guard CAA
Mayor Sergey Kashanskiy, 19th separate special force detachment "Yermak" (Novosibirsk) of Rosgvardia, Syberian military district of Rosgvardia
Mayor Sergey Reznichenko, chief of the staff of some supply battalion.
Mayor Pavel Gareyev, unit and data of death unknown. Judging by the signs on lapels he served in air defense unit and his rank is AD battalion command/staff duty.
Mayor (?) Pavel Yevgkevskyi. Commander of 4th battalion of 105th rifle regiment of DPR's 1st Army Corps
Major Artyom Lazarenko was the operations officer for the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade
Major Alexey Dineka, 247th Air Assault Regiment, 7th Air Assault Division
Mayor Alexey Varnavskiy. Data of death and unit unknown. He has signs of signal troops on lapels. His rank corresponds to HQ of divisional level signal unit.
Major Yury Belitchenko, Flight Commander in 55th Separate Helicopter Regiment, SMD
Mayor Nikolay Kolesnikov, unit unknown, signs on the shoulder strips similar to ground forces (except tank trops)
Mayor Vasiliy Tynnyi, deputy of company comamnder of Spetsnaz. unit unknown
Mayor Grigoriy Artemyev, officer of military commandant unit.
Mayor Andrey Kunakov, chief of the staff, 153rd separate SOF detachment of 346th separate SOF brigade, Special Operations Command.
Mayor Azamat Alimov, company commander of 3rd Special forces brigade
Mayor of reserve Valeryi Statilko.
Reserve Maj. Valery Farshatov, volunteer for LNR
Mayor Sergey Kotelnikov, killed 7th of May, unit unknown
Maj. Dmitry Vostrikov, deputy commander of 810th Naval Infantry Brigade’s air-assault battalion
Major Galiev Artyom Radikovich, KIA
Mayor Sergey Borisenko, 106th guard airborne division
Maj. Ivan Zaika, possibly from 41st CAA headquarters or some subordinate unit
Mayor Ramis Zagretdinov, motor-rifle battalion commader of 35th guard motor-rifle brigade, 41st CAA
Mayor Leonid Sharshukov, unit unknown, likely engineer. Died in hospital on 9th of May
Mayor Viacheslav Karenko, due to anchor signs he served in Black Sea Fleet, but in some coastal unit. He had Ukrainian citizenship, served in Ukrainian naval forces and betrayed in 2014.
Retired (?) mayor (?) Ivan Kravchenko. Battalion commander. He has a chevron of GRU, but also has a sign of Donbas Volunteer Union, so currently he was not officer of Russian regular troops. Either DPR battalion commander (regular or conscripts), or Russian volunteers battalion commander. 
mayor Alexandr Shchetkin, 1st GTR of 2nd GMRD
mayor Dmitriy Lytnyev, 423rd GMRR of 4th GTD
mayor Ilgiz Usmanov, 423rd GMRR of 4th GTD
mayor Maxim Khlebko, 7th separate recon battalion of 47th GTD
Major Dmitry Lytnev, 4th Guards Tank Division
Major Gregory Artemiev, head of military commandant’s office in Volsk, Saratov Oblast.
Maj. Roman Sarychev, military commandant
Maj. Anton Morozov, air-assault company commander, 542nd Separate Air-Assault Battalion
Mayor Anatoliy Miagkov, last meantion of his service - 12th separate special force detachment "Ural" of Rosgvardia, Ural district of Rosgvardia
Maj. Sergei Borisenko, 106th Airborne Division
Maj. Valentin Ivanov, unit unknown
Major Yuri Melekhin, commander 1st Spetsnaz Detachment of the 16th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade
Maj. Ivan Budkin, chief of staff of 2nd Airborne Battalion, 234th Airborne Regiment, 76th Air-Assault Division
Maj. Alexander Denisov deputy of battalion commander of 137th guard airborne regiment of 106th guard airborne division
Reserve Maj. Denis Sorokin
Mayor Nikolay Kolomoyets, 61st Naval infantry brigade, 14th Army Corps of Norhern Fleet coastal units
Major Roman Khlynovsky, engineering officer (probably) in the 64th Guards Separate Motor Rifle Brigade
Captain Andrey Paliy
Capt. Fakhretin Gasanov, commander 1st MRB, 394th MRR, 127th MRD
Captain Maklagin Vyacheslav Vyacheslavovich (killed Feb 25, given Order of Courage)
Captain Aleksey Aleksandrovich Chuchmanov, GRU/GU 3rd SpetsNaz Brigade (Tolyatti) (killed Mar 3, 2022)
Captain Yevgeny Ivanov, platoon commander, Russian 247th Guards Assault Caucasian Cossack Regiment (killed)
Captain Sergei Aleksandrovich Visyach (killed)
Captain Alexey Glushchak, GRU/GU 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade (killed, given Order of Courage)
Captain Ilya Kuptsov, VDV 76th Air Assault Division, Intelligence Department (Pskov) (killed)
Captain Alexander Vladimirovich Shokun, Chief of Communications, VDV 11th Guards Air Assault Brigade (Ulan-Ude) (killed)
Captain Nikitin Alexey Nikolaevich, 1141st Guards Artillery Regiment, 7th VDV Guards Mountain Air Assault Division (Novorossiysk) (killed)
Captain Eduard Gilmiyarov Rinatovich, Commander, 5th Airborne Assault Company, 31st VDV Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade (Ulyanovsk) (killed)
Police Captain Opatsky Alexei Mikhailovich, Commander, Zyryanin OMON Special Purpose Mobile Platoon, Rosgvardia Directorate, Komi Republic (killed)
Captain Dmitry Nikolayevich Chumanov, Commander, MLRS Battery (Ulan-Ude) (killed Mar 4)
Senior Lieutenant Alexei Aleshko, Military Intelligence Officer (killed Mar 10)
Senior Lieutenant Andrei Shamko, VDV, GRU/GU 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Pskov) (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Nurmagomed Gadzhimagomedov, company commander, 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment (killed, given Hero of Russia)
Senior Lieutenant Nikolai Shumitsky, Tank Company Commander, 81st Tank Battalion, 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Sergey Dorokhov, Rosgvardia SOBR team member (Vologda) (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Aleksey Aleshko, Platoon Commander, VDV, RVVDKU graduate. (killed Feb 25, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Nikita Ivanovich Perfilov, VKS Russian Aerospace Forces (killed Mar 6)
Senior Lieutenant Lazarenko Alexander Alexandrovich (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Nikolai Symov, 331st VDV Airborne Regiment (Kostroma), 98th Airborne Division (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Sukhovskoy Semyon Mikhailovich, Company Commander, 234th Air Assault Regiment, VDV 76th Guards Air Assault Division (killed Mar 5)
Senior Lieutenant Sergei Zuykov Alekseevich, Rosgvardia (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Sergey Alekseevich Zuykov (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Vokhmyanin Alexander Viktorovich, Chief of Staff, Artillery Battalion (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Maxim Vadimovich Susloparov, Unit #90600, 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Peacekeeping Brigade of Alexandria (Roshchinsky), 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Maxim Kholkin, Air Defense, 4th Military Base (South Ossetia) (killed March 7, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Anton Volkov, Translator, GRU/GU, (killed Feb 27)
Senior Lieutenant Sergei Chudnik, Commander, Tank Platoon (killed March 16, given Hero of DPR)
Senior Lieutenant Dmitry Vyacheslavovich Vdovin, Company Commander (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Ilya Sergeevich Chernyshev, Commander, Armored Battery, 331st Guards Airborne Regiment (Kostroma), 98th VDV Guards Airborne Division (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Nikita Samoilov, Deputy Commander, VDV Reconnaissance Company (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Alexei Ivanov, 5th Separate Guards Tank Brigade (Ulan-Ude) (killed)
Lieutenant Alexander Osipov, VDV (killed)
Lieutenant Georgy Alexandrovich Dudorov, Deputy Commander, Military-Political Affairs, Recon company, 137th Airborne Regiment, 106th VDV Airborne Division (Tula) (killed March 6)
Lieutenant Alexander Lebedev (killed)
Lieutenant Vitaly Olegovich Golub , Platoon Commander, 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Guards Combined Arms Army (Volgograd) (killed, given Order of Courage)
Lieutenant Dmitry Chernyshev, VDV 247th Air Assault Regiment (killed, given Order of Courage)
Lieutenant Daniil Dmitreievich Kurin, Reconnaissance Platoon Commander, 34th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade (killed, March 3)
Lieutenant Georgy Dudorov, Deputy Commander, Reconnaissance Company, 137th VDV Airborne Regiment, 106th Guards Airborne Division (Tula), son of Alexander Durorov, the Deputy Governor of Nenets Autonomous Okrug (killed Mar 6)
Lieutenant Ovchinnikov Lev Aleksandrovich, VDV 331st Airborne Regiment (Kostroma) (killed)
Lieutenant Vsevolod Vasilyevich Yaroslavtsev, Commander, Mortar Platoon, Motorized Rifle Battalion, 126th Gorlovskaya Separate Coastal Defense Brigade (Perevalnoe), 22nd Army Corps. (killed Mar 3)
Lieutenant Stanislav Olegovich Kutelev, VDV, RVVDKU graduate (killed)
Lieutenant Brian Andrei Yurkov, Ground Forces Air Defense Officer (North Ossetia) (killed)

Naval-
Captain of 3rd rank (=mayor) Alexandr Chirva, commander of large landing ship "Tsezar Kunnikov" of 197th landing ship brigade, Black Sea Fleet. Died from wounds 16-17th of April. He was wounded during Uлrainan strike on Russians landing ships in Berdiansk on 24th of March
Captain of 1st rank (=colonel) Andrei Paliy Deputy of Black Sea Fleet commander
Captain of 3rd rank (mayor equivalent) Roman Pasynkov, chief of troops service department of Black Sea HQ 810th Naval Infantry Brigade

Aviation -
Mayor Yevgeniy Osipov, 18th Guard assault aviation regiment "Normandia-Neman" (Su-25SM)
Mayor Artyom Ogoltsov, 332nd Guard helicopter regiment (airfields Pushkin, Pribilovo, Leningrad oblast) of 6th AF and AD Army, Western militrary district. This regiment is armed with Mi-28N, Mi-35 and Mi-8AMTSh. Google search shows, during maneuvers Zapad-2021 he was a pilot of Mi-28N.
Colonel Ruslan Rudnev was a Su-25 attack aircraft pilot based in the Far East. He was killed in Ukraine and buried on March 1
Lieutenant Colonel Alexey Narzullaevich Khasanov, Deputy Commander, 31st Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (pilot, Su-30SM, killed Mar 5)
Lt.colonel Fyodor Solovyov, commander of 872nd SP-howitzer regiment of 127th motor-rifle division, 5th CAA Eastern Military District
Major General (*ret.) Banamat Botashev Russian Air Force 
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Pozynych, Deputy Commander for Military-Political Work, 14th Guards Fighter Regiment (Kursk) (Pilot, Su-30SM, killed)
Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Chervov, Deputy Commander, Aviation Regiment (Voronezh) (Pilot, Su-25, killed Mar 7)
Captain Ivan Sergeevich Afanasyev (Pilot, Ka-52?, killed)
Captain Radzhabov Rabazan Gasainievich (Pilot, killed)
Captain Emelyanchik Sergei Stanislavovich (Pilot, Mi-28n?, killed Mar 4)
Captain Eugene Kislakov, 14th Guards Fighter Regiment (Kursk) (Pilot, Su-30SM, killed)
Separatist Forces -
separatist commander Mikhail Kyshchyk, better known as "Misha Chechen,"
Colonel (DPR-promoted? Or posthumously?) Statsenko Alexey, deputy commander of armament of 1st motor-rifle brigade of DPR. 
"Mayor" (LPR-promoted) Alexzndr Shepel, battalion commander of 2nd motor-rifle brigade LPR. Citizen of Ukraine. Considered as "best battalion comamnder of LPR". Killed 6th of March
"Captain" or even "mayor" (DPR-promoted) Agranovich Sergey, company commander of recon-assault battalion "Sparta" of DPR.
"Colonel" (DPR promoted) Vladimir Kovalenko, chief of "non-departamental security of Internal affairs ministry of DPR" (prisoners guarding service). Citizen of Ukraine. Former officer of Ukrainian 20th separate convoy service battalion of Internal troops (later National Guard), dislocated in Donetsk. After his unit was seized in 2014 by DPR he defected to separs side.
Reserve Lt. Col. Alexander Kalnitsky, presumably with a Cossack volunteer unit from Krasnodar Krai
LNR Police Lt. Col. Denis Babich
Vladimir Zhoga, warlord, Sparta Battalion (Lt Col equivalent?) (killed Mar 5)
Separatist Taras "Clooney" Gordienko, Commander, B-2 Anti-tank group (killed Mar 14)

WIA
Major General Serhiy Nirkov was seriously wounded; Chief of Staff - Deputy Commander of the 35th Combined Arns Army
Major General Andriy Serytsky Chief of Staff - Deputy Commander of the 36th Combined Arms Army was seriously wounded;
First Rank Captain Anton Kuprin, 44, lead Russian warship was fatally hit by Ukrainian Neptune missiles
Col. Yan Sukhanov, acting commander 810th Guards Separate Naval Infantry Brigade - heavily wounded (commander Col. Aleksey Sharov was killed in Mariupol on Mar. 22nd)clancy
Lt. Col. Aleksey Teremkov, commander 542nd Separate Air-Assault Battalion - heavily wounded
Maj. Leonid Smirnoff, acting commander 382nd Separate Naval Infantry Battalion - heavily wounded
Captured
Lieutenant Colonel Krishtop Maxim Sergeevich Deputy Commander of the 47th Aviation Regiment 
   I have two listings which may both be Krishtop.
   Lieutenant Colonel Krishtop Maxim Sergeevich, (Pilot , Su-30, captured)
   Lieutenant Colonel, 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment 47th Bomber Aviation Regiment, 105th    Guards Mixed Aviation Division (Pilot, Su-34, captured)
Lt. Colonel Astrakhov Dmitry Mikhailovich:from SOBR
Lt.colonel Alexandr Koshel Claimed he is the chief of PsyOps counteraction group of 58th CAA His documents says he is mayor, serving in m/u 21250 - 212th Training center of tank troops (Siberian Military district). He can be promoted to lt.colonel and appointed lately on the duty of PsyOps in 58th CAA and hadn't time to change own military ID.  
lt.colonel Sergei Kosik, 14th Fighter aviation regiment 
Lieutenant Colonel Anikin head of artillery of the 59th regiment
Captain Denisov the head of communications of the 59th regiment
Major Sergey Yermalov, 159th Fighter Aviation Regiment, Besovets airfield, Karelia, 105th Mixed Aviation Division, 6th AF and AD Army, Western Military District
lt.colonel Yevgeniy Starodubov, 1st GTR of 2nd GMRD
mayor Ilshat Gazimov, 27th GMRB
mayor Yuriy Grechko, 96th separate recon brigade
Major Schetkin Leonid Petrovich, Commander and chief of staff, 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 41st Combined Arms Army (captured Feb 26)
Major Rashki Shishkanov Dmitry Alexandrovich, Battalion Deputy Commander, 126th Gorlovskaya Separate Coastal Defense Brigade (Perevalnoe), Unit #12676, 22nd Army Corps, Black Sea Fleet (captured)

Sacked
General Roman Gavrilov of Rosgvardia
General Vladislav Ershov, commander of 6th Army
Lieutenant General Sergei Kissel, commander 1st Guards Tank Army
Anatoly Bolyukh Deputy to FSB head Col Gen Sergei Beseda  
150 FSB agents purged
Lt. Gen. Arkadiy Marzoev as a commander of the 22nd Army Corps
Arrested
Admiral Igor Osipov commander of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Armed Forces arrested
Col Gen Sergei Beseda, head of the foreign intelligence branch of the FSB, the Fifth Service   Beseda has been sent to Lefortovo prison in Moscow
Fragging incidents - okay maybe just a rumor but a fun one!
37th Guards Separate Motor Rifle Brigade commander Col. Yuri Medvedev hospitalized in Belarus after being intentionally run over by one of his own soldiers
Suicide
commander of the 13th Tank Regiment of the 4th Tank Division 
Others
Col Vladimir Kryvolapov replacement commander of the 810th Marine Brigade only a Sgt?

Oligarchs
These two and there was another one in Surrey, England, age 58, who supposedly hanged himself 2 weeks ago in his $18 million custom mansion. Mikhail Watford was worth tens of billions and told his neighbor last year that he was on Putin's list.
Spanish news website El Punt Avui reported the bodies of Sergey Protosenya, 55, his wife and his daughter were found at around 4 p.m. on Tuesday, April 19 at their home in the seaside resort of Lloret de Mar in Spain's Catalonia region.
Former Kremlin official and Gazprombank vice-president Vladislav Avayev, 51, was found dead in his luxury Moscow apartment by his 26-year-old daughter on Monday, police said. The bodies of his wife Yelena, 47, and younger daughter Maria, 13, were also discovered. All had suffered gunshot wounds.
Alexander Subbotin has reportedly died after an anti-hangover treatment that involved toad poison

I doubt 700 000 meant as "in the army", more likely this is all force structures - Armed Forces (Ground Forces, Air Forces, Naval Forces, Territorial Defense Command, Air-assault command), SOF + their volunteers, SBU special forces + their volunteers, National Guard, State Border Guard Service. Also very likely special police units like KORD. Or maybe even whole police. I have no clue where to place 700K in current army structure even with Reserve Corps deployed. 
Pre-war picture in artillery was much worse. Because of losses of 2014-2015 and exhausting of barrels life in 2016-2021, the number of artillery was significantly reduced. Mech. or tank brigade had 18 2S1 (3 batteries x 6 barrels), 12 2S3 (3 batteries x 4 barrels) and 12 Grad (3 batteries x 4 launchers). Maybe, when the war started, all "shortened" battalions got additional guns/launchers for 36/18 number, but I don't know.
Number in 17 brigades also not correct. We had 13 "heavy" brigades (tank, mech. and mountain-assault) +1 training center, which can consider as brigade or at least "large BTG". For this 13 brigades we should have 234 122 mm SP-howitzers and per 156 152 mm SP-howitzers and 122 mm MLRS launchers. OK, I will add per 18/12/12 for training center too. 
Next we had 4 "light" motorized infantry brigades, which should have the same brigade artillery group, but 152 mm towed D-20 howitzers insted 2S3. And probably because D-20 was enough quantity, they could have 18 howitzers in battalion. So +72/72/48
One yager infantry brigade. There is few info about it, but it 100 % had battalion of 2S1. +18 122 mm
Next, 4 Air-assault/airborne brigades: 2 battalions of 122 mm howitzers in each (D-30 and 2S1) + MLRS battalion (12 Grad), also one BTG in 80th brigade has own arty battalion (18 D-30), also separate artillery battalion of Air-Assault Command level (12 2S3), So +162/12/48
Next, 2 Marines brigades - each had 18 2S1 and 12 Grad-1. Also at least two separate battalions of theese brigades had own 2S1 batteies. So +48/0/24
National Guard. Among all units there are 5 x 122 mm battalions and one 122 mm battery = 96 x 122 mm (2S1, D-30)
So pre-war ground forces brigade level required 648 x 122 mm, 252 x 152 mm, 288 x 122 mm MLRS
Artillery brigades 5 in Ground Forces and one in Naval Forces. I assume they had reduced 4-barrel batteries too, so we should have 18 x 152 mm battalions (2S19, 2S5, 2A65, 2A36) with 212 barrels and 4 x 203 mm battalions (2S7) with 48 barrels.
MLRS brigades - 3 in Ground Forces and 1 in Naval Forces. Total 6 battalions of 220 mm Uragan per 8 in each = 48 launchers, and 11 battalions of 300 mm Smerch/Vil'kha per 4 in each = 44 launchers
Missile brigade:  4 battalions of Tochka-U = 12...16 launchers
Since the war began, Reserve Corps was depolyed 3 tank, 3 mech., 3 infantry/yager, 2 air-assault and 2 artillery brigades. This is potentially +234 x 122 mm howitzers, at least 108 x 152 mm howitzeres, 120 x 122 mm MLRS and 72 x 152 mm long-range howitzers (2A65)
Territorial defense brigades don't have artillery (except MT-12), looks like some of them received D-20, but this more exception, so I will not count them. 
So, totally we should have:
882 x 122 mm howitzers (147 batteries). I think, they still in service, because a lot of ammunition remained. But Air-assault and marines units probably will be betetr to re-arm on 105 mm caliber (35 batteries). Or to made one battalion on M777 and the second on L118. M777 is light and mobile howitzer, it should be in mobile units, I think, but because of its range, theese howitzers now first of all go to artillery brigades. 
360 x 152 mm howitzers (69 batteries). Or to reach all full-strenght batteries in 6 barrels we should have 486 x 152 mm howitzers. I see M109 or Krab, replacing 2S3/D-20
212 x 152 mm long-range guns/howitzers (53 battreies). Or 318 barrels for full-strength. Caesar, Pz2000 or our perspective Bohdana is our future in this class.
420 x 122 mm Grad-class MLRS (35 batteries). Or 630 launchers for full-strength battalions. I think, Grads can be taken from former Warsaw pact/Aisa/Africa stores. In future we are capable to close this class with own developments.
48 x 220 mm Uragan (6 batteries). This is dead end Soviet MLRS branch. After the war we should say goodbye to it. But Uragans can be substituted with M270 MLRS. 
44 x 300 mm Smerch (11 batteries). M270 ATACMS or HIMARS critically needs to this class! Or at least future modifications of our Vil'kha
16 x ballistic missile launchers. HIMARS ATACMS. Or our Hrim-2 in future.  
Of course for reserve and losses substitution we should have +20-30% more of each class. 
 
 

I didn't serve, but this is an example of low morale, right? 🤣
 
Also, +8 L52 155mm SPGs from Slovakia. I wonder to what degree training on Danas is applicable to these new guns: