Vanir Ausf B

Continuation - discussion of current RU way of advance.

Extract from an article (paywalled unfortunately) in the Spectator, based on operational data from the Ukrainian military. The whole article is here:
Article - Why didn't Ukraine fall.
..."However, the operational data reveals that 90 per cent of Ukrainian UAVs flown before July were lost, mainly to electronic warfare. The average life expectancy of a quadcopter was three flights. The average life expectancy of a fixed wing UAV was six flights. Surviving a flight does not mean a successful mission; electronic warfare can disrupt command links, navigation and sensors, which can cause the UAV to fail to fix a target. Contrary to the narrative, Russian EW has been successful on the battlefield. Instead, what has proved decisive is the sheer number of drones that Ukraine has been able to deploy. The most useful UAVs, according to the data, are cheap fixed wing models. This is not because they are difficult to defeat but because they are inefficient to target, flying too high for short-range air defences while being too inexpensive to engage with medium or long-range systems."

Something something morale etc
 
 

I do not make maps for Kherson for a time being because there are no much progress and/or info. As soon as there is clear progress, I will make new ones. So far it is grinding match will little progress here and there.
But few things I would like to comment
Unfortunately, Oleksandrivka is not liberated. We know it becasue RU published a video from there recently. Here is geolocation from UKR.
 
 
Here he says this week UKR overran several position toward Soldatske (for example Pravdine) but Soldatske was captured some time ago and Pravdine was attacked today with Rybar claimed UKR attack was sort of defeated. So, we are waiting for tomorrow to see what's going on there. 
 
Here he says RU forces retreated for Kisilevka but around 14-15 of September RU were still there with no sign of retreat. 
 
Here Bridgehead is too shallow - UKR are pushing to Chkalove and beyond (bottom of the map). But Bruskinse is neither captured nor contested. So far it seems RU controls it. 
So, I see too many questionable statements that are not aligned with what I see myself. Sorry.
 

I have imagination, that Russia hasn't real oligarchs. All real oligarchs already either escaped from Russia like Abramovich, or dead like Berezovskiy, or jailed like Khodorkovskiy. All other "oligarchs" either appointed "wallets" of Putin/FSB close to Putin like Prigozhyn, Roldugin, Rottenberg, Chaika, Miller etc, or large businessman, which "brought full loyality oath" to Putin with FSB part in their business and of course compromissing evidence and threat of window flight.
So, no any "private armies" or "oligarch armies". Prigozhyn is just "Sauron's voice", empowered by Putin. Wagner, Liga etc - all they band of merceneries, hired for state funds, which turned out in pockets of such "oligarchs".  
No-no! ) Russian (Moskovite) feudalism like in 14-17 centuries is nothing like Europe. This is Golden Horde type super-centralized power, where all nobles either 100 % loyal to Tsar or dead/expelled. Indeed this is Ukraine has hystorical tradition of private armies. Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth nobles (under Lithuanian also means local Ruthenian (Ukrainan) nobles), ruling in the Ukrainian landsб had own armies and contested with Polish central power for own old rights if seen attempts of kings to strenght own power. Later turmoils among Cossacks in the second part of 17th century caused that sometimes several hetmans (cossack warlords, having some state administrative power in Ukraine, when in Poland and Lithuania hetmans were just temporary warlords) could exist with own armies, and this bored known proverb in Ukraine "where are two Ukrainains there are three hetmans". So, such tradition of nobles "court hosts" and self-organized Cossack bands (when they only appeared) with frontier mentality borned in 2014 huge number of volunteer units (many of which really were micro-PMC). Even Azov was "favorite toy" of former Internal affairs minister Arsen Avakov (middle-hand oligarch).
Unlike in Russia UKR oligarchs have a parellel with 15-17 centuries nobles, opposing to central power or suporting it for some benefits, so this is one of reasons, why in Ukraine dictatorship is almost impossible.
About Akmmetov - this is not good example. Workers cooperated with DPR fighters for "joint patroling" but not for withstanding to them. Better example with Akhmetov - he as largest maphiozi had own criminal army, which was known under name "Lux". Soon he legalized this thugs as "security company Lux". He had own chiefs of local police, local SBU (Khodakovskyi was commander of Donetsk "Alfa" SBU Spetsnaz and became commander of Vostok DPR unit), Procecution Office... He could just said a word and his bandits could eliminate all pro-Russian insurgents... But... Akmetov, who had a plans to dictate own demands to Kyiv's power and made own game, at last outplayed himself.

When I was in the 82d, one mission we practiced over and over and over was the 2 gun raid, a fast quick hitting mission for a 105mm battery. I was the Fire Direction Officer for our battery as one of my assignments in the Army. Best job in Field Artillery (I may be biased). 

The "raid" was to move 2 guns forward by UH-60 to a position close to the front lines to fire at a lucrative target in the enemy rear. Since a 105mm is relatively short ranged compared to a 155mm, we needed to move up close, get dropped off, lay the two guns, fire the mission, pack up, call our rides and get out of dodge. In a hurry. But it was a quick strike at an important target of opportunity. These guys are firing at a leisurely pace. In a pinch, a 105mm can be fired almost as fast as a mortar. Almost. The gunner in the video is checking his sight on the aiming stakes to make sure the gun hasn't shifted with each round. We'd have a crew of 6 or so too, so the new rounds would come fast. It's cased ammo so loading is very quick, as you can see. Much more effective once we got UH-60s to replace the UH-1H choppers. 2 UH-60s could sling a gun under each with ammo strapped onto its trails, the gun crew, and me and my assistant one of us each in one of the choppers, and the "Smoke" (Chief of the Firing Battery - a SFC, the senior NCO in the battery next to the 1SG). 
As the FDO, I also had to act as XO on the spot and survey the guns while my "Computer"  (E-5 SGT who normally calculates elevation and time), set us up a temporary FDC to calculate from  - just me and him - and then after surveying in the guns run over and finish the calcs and safety check them.  The XO stayed back with the battery of 4 remaining guns, and my FDC team sergeant (a SSG), stayed there to run the full FDC back in battery. A lot of action in a real hurry, we'd be in and out in about 20 minutes after slinging 10-20 rounds per gun out. 
I don't know what these guys are doing but a M102 and this comparable UK howitzer are highly mobile and versatile. The shells don't pack the punch (about 1/3 the weight) but this is what they shine at. 
Note: No one checked the barrel between rounds. Bad form, and potentially extremely dangerous, although a little less so with cased ammo than separate. Need to check there's no obstruction in the tube.
Dave

I  must confess to not knowing a thing about who @gummibear737 is but whoever they are, this is about as clear eyed a thread as it gets on how ruthlessly the US is going to benefit from the war in Ukraine. 

Olga Simonova, Who Quit Russia To Fight for Ukraine, Killed on Front: Report (msn.com)

Ukraine is asking for more tanks, specifically from Germany. Predictably, the answer so far is "nein".
WaPo (probably paywalled)
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/13/ukraine-tanks-russia-germany-offensive/

What is our timeline? 
I will happily predict the current Russian state will not fall apart in any substantial way for the next 10 years.

Interesting bit, on Ukraine acquiring anti drone systems via Poland
https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-defense-firm-selling-anti-drone-systems-to-ukraine-by-way-of-poland/
Maybe Poland may want to buy other stuff as well from Israel.
 
 
 

Scholz and his party get A LOT of flak from everyone (including the other two parties in the coalition) for it. I'm not sure how long he can keep that up. Especially since his dearest excuse ('no-one else delivers tanks/IFVs' 'we only do it together with NATO') has been defused quite nicely by the US ambassador who basically gave a carte blanche for weapons delivery on Twitter.
I guess his reasoning comes from the part of the population who are absolutely horrified of war in general and see a cease fire as the first and utmost thing that has to happen. I'm not sharing that idea, but it is what some people think.

wrong thread

Some other weapon slang (usually common for UKR and RUS): 
- Dashka (was heard in this video) - hypocrism form of female name Darya - DShK HMG
- Kalashmat - combined "Kalashnikov"+"avtomat" (SMG), but also similar to the Russian word "koloshmatit' " - jargon, which means "to inflict many punches, to beat up" - AK-rifle 
- bekha - jargon name of BMW car -  BMP 
- Kabanchyk ("little boar") - 120 mm or 122 mm shell
- mishka - hypocrism from Russian "medved' "(bear) - tank. I don't know why
- motolyha  - combined from "motor" and consonant jargon word "kolymaha" (eng."rattletrap") - MTLB
- Grach ("rook") - Su-25 
- Sushka - any Su-aircraft
- Krokodil - Mi-24
- Sapog  ("hight boot") - SPG-9  

You are right in general but in specific details it is not as clear cut as you stated.
RU lost. RU lost even before the war started Despite this fact the war in Ukraine is still going on and it might turn to the worst As i said - we (me included) consistently underestimate RU Nat capability to prolong and male bloody any conflict they are involved in  Let me give you an example of how you underestimated RU ISR capabilities
What if I tell you RU Nats saw it weeks before it started?
Here is an example from 31-Aug 8 AM
This is from 30-Aug. Note Balaklya. 
But actually, they noticed UKR preparations in Kharkiv direction at least one month before the offensive started: 
22-Jul
7-Aug
Balaklya and Sukhi Yar are on the roads from Chuhuev to Izum. He basically described UKR offensive intent. 
You are telling me how bad RU ISR is while I was looking for a weeks at RU Nat writing - UKR are concentrating forces at Kharkiv direction for offensive most likely aimed at Izum. 
What if tomorrow RU Nats blow up Nuclear station. What if tomorrow you will have to fight them? What your estimations will be? That their ISR is crap? And what if it is not? What if they have a lot of civilian eyes looking at your every move? What's if they have Telegram based network of volunteer agents all over Ukraine? What if it is incompetence of RU MOD that mask their true HUMINT capabilities? 
Do not underestimate RU Nat ability to take lives of our boys if RU crap hits EU fan.  I cannot be there with boys but at least I try to warn you and others here not to dismiss RU Nat volunteers. It is their turf as well. They can and will surprise you.  

Just my usual reminder not to underestimate RU Nat Volunteers. They are learning and improving. And not just their volunteer units but RU regular units as well. 
 

Ukrainians using a captured modernized BMP-3 against former owners:
 

Yeah, I suspect there is a significant amount of variability in warfare that is distinct from changes over time. Just as, in WW2, the fighting in North Africa was very different from fighting on the Eastern Front, and both were different from the fighting in the Pacific, I suspect that if another high intensity war between two different peer or near peer armies broke out in another part of the world it would look very different from this one in a lot of ways. It's not that this war has its peculiarities, so much as every war has peculiarities. Differences in objectives, scale, level of commitment, doctrine, force structure, and terrain may create a massive amount of variability even in wars fought in the same time period. Time period/technology obviously does make a big difference. If you reran WW2 with modern technology, but all other factors kept identical, it would still be a very different war. But I think it is far too simplistic to think of time period/technology as being the only thing that makes wars different.
For an obvious example, there is probably a comparable amount of difference between a modern land war in eastern Europe and a modern air/naval/amphibious war in the Pacific as there is between a modern land war in eastern Europe and a 1940s land war in eastern Europe, or between a modern air/naval/amphibious war in the Pacific and a 1940s air/naval/amphibious war in the Pacific.
So I don't think we should be talking about how modern war is different from war of decades past, as if modern war and war of decades past are homogeneous things, but about how specific types of war are different from their older counterparts. How is modern European ground war different from European ground war of decades past. How is modern counter-insurgency in desert/jungle/etc... different from counter-insurgency in desert/jungle/etc.. in decades past. How is modern air/naval/amphibious war around scattered island chains different from air/naval/amphibious war around scattered island chains of decades past. How is modern peer vs peer desert combat different from peer vs peer desert combat from decades past.

I can't escape the feeling that some of the "lessons" we are seeing are artifacts of this war's peculiarities and may not be transferable to other conflicts, even near-peer. Is it that mass doesn't work or is it that you can't mass without denuding vast swaths of frontage, as the Russians are discovering to their chagrin.
One can hope 😇

Good! Though they need to evolve their tactics.
RU uses forward spotters to report movement of drones. Drone flying not high enough (like on video) is easily audible and its direction is easy to track even at night. RU notice this drone swarm from a distance and will easily guess its direction. Next, RU will move anti-drone defenses to the path of the drones. This drone swarm looks impressive, but it allows RU to concentrate anti-drone defenses in one place. Next, they will turn on EW at least to block the control channel (I do not think they have microwave guns yet) making sure it is AI who controls the drones. AI does not do evasive maneuvers and at this altitude drones are well withing effective range of even small arms. So, even without advanced anti-drone weapons Ivan will light up the skies and eventually attrite the swarm. And if Ivan gets air-burst munition it is game over for this swarm.
To nail RU US needs to go either higher and more dispersed. Or to fly lower and more compact - like bomber streams to drive them along shallow terrain features. Once inside drones can be fanned out to specific objectives.   

Newest from War on the Rocks and Kofman

https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/ukraines-kharkhiv-operation-and-the-russian-militarys-black-week/

I can't escape the feeling that some of the "lessons" we are seeing are artifacts of this war's peculiarities and may not be transferable to other conflicts, even near-peer. Is it that mass doesn't work or is it that you can't mass without denuding vast swaths of frontage, as the Russians are discovering to their chagrin.
One can hope 😇

Detachment (battalion) of Spetsnaz is not equal to motor-rifle battalion. I don't know about current Russian Spetsnaz structure, but in late USSR time typical Spetsnaz brigade had three detacments in 164 men each. Among detachment there were three company in 42 men each (some had 58) and special radio equipment company in 32 men + 6 men HQ. Currently Russian SpN detachments got some suport units, but probably "combat core" remained with the same personnel number  

I keep thinking about the video posted yesterday of the Humvee leading an assault on a village, .50 cal blazing and AT4s popping off. This is exactly what tanks were designed for. Have the Ukrainians discovered that light vehicles are just as good or are they making do with what they have because tanks can't be everywhere?
 

500,000 seems improbable to me. Unless the Russian "stealth mobilization" has been far more successful than we thought.

RE: Tanks
Ukraine has about 5 armored brigades to cover a frontage of somewhere around 1800-2000 km. I think this is why we see tanks penny-packeted in company-size units and also why we are seeing wheeled vehicles used in assaults. It's not so much a deliberate decision to avoid mass as it is a condition imposed by this war. At least that's my guess 😉