Vanir Ausf B

"The office of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, our country’s president, is in charge of the ultimate decision regarding the dates and directions [of the counter-offensive]. When people start talking, even people from respectable Western institutions, trust me: there are no people who know the full extent of our plans. Because the final plans have not yet been approved.
We have several options [for the counteroffensive]. They are all being considered. Decisions will be made depending on the circumstances that prevail at any given moment. There’s no need to expect, or not expect, anything.
We have already proven that we are an invincible nation, and we will definitely [win]. In no small part, thanks to the help of our partners.
-- Oleksii Danilov
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/secretary-national-security-council-zelenskyy-171659645.html

I presume from others sectors of the front not under attack. At least in theory. That's how these things work. Russia can't defend everywhere at once. But at the same time Ukraine can't attack everywhere at once.

Hey Skeptical,
I would ask him but I don't have a twitter account. I suspect most of these fortifications are unmanned or lightly manned. Many of the experts, or "experts" as the case may be, say it will come down to ISR and logistics, which is why some of them are predicting major breakthroughs. But they are guessing, like everyone else.
_______
Western partners have told him, he said, that they now need a “next example of a success because we need to show it to our people. … But I cannot tell you what the scale of this success would be. Ten kilometers, 30 kilometers, 100 kilometers, 200 kilometers?”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/06/ukraine-counteroffensive-expectations-hype-russia/

I presume from others sectors of the front not under attack. At least in theory. That's how these things work. Russia can't defend everywhere at once. But at the same time Ukraine can't attack everywhere at once.

Hey Skeptical,
I would ask him but I don't have a twitter account. I suspect most of these fortifications are unmanned or lightly manned. Many of the experts, or "experts" as the case may be, say it will come down to ISR and logistics, which is why some of them are predicting major breakthroughs. But they are guessing, like everyone else.
_______
Western partners have told him, he said, that they now need a “next example of a success because we need to show it to our people. … But I cannot tell you what the scale of this success would be. Ten kilometers, 30 kilometers, 100 kilometers, 200 kilometers?”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/06/ukraine-counteroffensive-expectations-hype-russia/

Hey Skeptical,
I would ask him but I don't have a twitter account. I suspect most of these fortifications are unmanned or lightly manned. Many of the experts, or "experts" as the case may be, say it will come down to ISR and logistics, which is why some of them are predicting major breakthroughs. But they are guessing, like everyone else.
_______
Western partners have told him, he said, that they now need a “next example of a success because we need to show it to our people. … But I cannot tell you what the scale of this success would be. Ten kilometers, 30 kilometers, 100 kilometers, 200 kilometers?”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/06/ukraine-counteroffensive-expectations-hype-russia/

Interesting thread on a report from independent Russian media on Russia's failing attempt to increase tank production
To paraphrase:
Can't get the workers as wages are not attracting people Falsely advertising wages so new workers leave after a month once they see the actual take home pay 'Voluntary-compulsory contributions' reduce worker's take home pay even more Lack of space is a constraint. Two new plants were promised but not built for example Difficult to get electronic components - normally 90% are imported Admittedly this evidence is from talking to workers at the various plants and not hard numbers but it does point to talk from Medvedev about 1500 annual tank production being complete and utter bollocks.  
The low wages is just weird. I would have thought with the war going as it is the Russian govt would be absolutely chucking money at anyone who can make any sort of tank. And the company would be absolutely chucking money at anyone who can even spell 'welding' to attract them. So either the govt. have big financial issues, don't think things are going that badly so why pay over the odds or the company's management are fleecing the workers. Whichever it is, long may it continue.
And the 'voluntary-compulsory contribution' - that's a theft in all but name. 
 
 

Hey Skeptical,
I would ask him but I don't have a twitter account. I suspect most of these fortifications are unmanned or lightly manned. Many of the experts, or "experts" as the case may be, say it will come down to ISR and logistics, which is why some of them are predicting major breakthroughs. But they are guessing, like everyone else.
_______
Western partners have told him, he said, that they now need a “next example of a success because we need to show it to our people. … But I cannot tell you what the scale of this success would be. Ten kilometers, 30 kilometers, 100 kilometers, 200 kilometers?”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/06/ukraine-counteroffensive-expectations-hype-russia/

UKR Striker M1296

Swedish Pvpj 1110 recioless gun in UKR service
New-established 38th marines brigade has T-72EA tanks, upgraded in Czechia
 

Even manned by just Mobiks,  a belt this deep is no joke. Supposedly runs full length of Front (not sure on that). 

Having seen the video, my takeaway is that hypersonic weapons aren't as useful to the US as they are to our adversaries. Hypersonic weapons are really only useful against a fairly narrow range of targets. In order to be worth targeting with hypersonic weapons a platform needs to be important enough to be worth expending extremely expensive ordinance, time sensitive enough to require ordinance that will reach it quickly, and well protected enough against conventional ordinance to require weapons that can penetrate those defenses. We have platforms that perfectly fit the description of a good target for hypersonic weapons (carriers), while our adversaries don't have many juicy targets. So hypersonic weapons neatly fit our adversaries' needs, but they don't fit our own needs as much. It's more urgent for us to develop defenses against hypersonic weapons than it is for us to develop the weapons themselves.

I hope this isn't true, this would be a major shift and very shortsighted:
 

He can, and probably did. The more interesting issue is why Putin doesn't want to give him that for already, what..2-3 months? The only answer is that it is beneficial for him when Prig is pissing publically on MoD carpets. It's political theatre to cull military, and maybe put some steam off the public/prapare for blamegame phase.
Sound strange and even conspiratory to our politcal thinking, but for guy like Puitn such PsyOps on internal use are bread and butter of politics; he learned them before even found himself at Kremlin. He did after all survived and shaped very competing political environment for already 2 decade, without resorting to widespread violence. He did it among other with such careful powerplays.
 
Pretty interesting case study of Russian fortification efforts:
 

Muscovite video with YPR-765 hit by Russian fire. Fortunatelly, everyone seem to bail out.
 

Air Forces Command reportedly really angry about this leak from Defense Express. That's why wasn't official report about types of targets shot down over Kyiv in night on 4th May. Air Forces now officially claimed there wasn't "Kinzhal" tracked in our airspace in this night and Defense Express info is fake. But all Kyiv heard in 2:40 this triple explosion in the sky and this of course wasn't Shakhed. 
Today one serviceman of some radar or SAM brigade wrote a post in twitter (already is deleted obviously on demand), where told if Defense Express issued this info, then he also can confirm that their unit tracked "Kinzhal" on US radar, which have 600 km range. Also he told Rissians considers "Kinzhal" as hyper-sonic missile, but in real this not quite right. This missile launches when it carrier achievs hyper-sonic speed, further the missile is gradually losing own speed and on final section of trajectory has a speed higher, that usual ballistic missile, but already not hypersonic, so it can be intercepted with some probability.
Looks like, AF command didn't want make publicity this info, that now we can successfully shot down "Kinzhals". I think, US side also should be surprised.

Can’t say I’m surprised about this:
https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/05/politics/russia-jamming-himars-rockets-ukraine/index.html
Jamming GPS is a very effective tactic versus UAVs, interesting that the Russians are using it effectively versus HIMARS and Excalibur. Bet the Russians are losing a ton of jammers now. 

Despite sanctions Russia keeps opportunity to produce at least light armor in enough numbers. Russian army got third batch of BMP-3, produced in 2023 year. "Kurganashzavod", manufacturer of these vehicles works 6 days in week per 12 hours in a day and produced in first quarter of 2023 year the same number of BMP-3 as for whole 2019 year.
As told Ukrianian tank expert Andriy Tarasenko, in 2019 MoD signed contract with "Kurganmashzavod" for 163 BMP-3, so presumably in 2019 they could produce 50 vehicles. 
 

Apparently those numbers were supposed to be for the whole war since December.

In this sad new some interesting statistic of typical "Starstreak" tasks:
Andriy Liniychuk (callsign "Celt") has died at the war - most effective AA-shooter of AFU. On his count 16 Orlans, 1 Zala and Kа-52 helicopter. Andriy was first, who has performed combat usage of "Starstreak". For three years of service he was wounded twice and twice has returning back to own unit. He served in 95th air-assault brigade. He was killed in artillry shelling of out positions. 
 

While transatlantic partners remain supportive of Ukraine, there are questions about the success of the much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive. Many Western leaders doubt how a protracted war could impact the future of transatlantic support of Ukraine. In this context, how will the Ukrainian counteroffensive shape the future trajectory both of the battlefield and transatlantic unity? Michael Kofman joins Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Jim Townsend to discuss this and more.
bullet points of the Mike's comments:
On this subject of the Winter Offensive:
In the fall, Russia barely managed to stabilize its frontlines but faced difficulties in improving its military force. The mobilization process primarily achieved increasing the number of troops rather than enhancing their capabilities. The loss of experienced leadership, high-quality equipment, and lack of ammunition further hindered the force's overall effectiveness. The Russian forces didn't have the ability to transition from static defense to more dynamic offensive operations. They appeared incapable of executing large-scale operations and were forced to divide efforts into four or five separate axes. In none of these sectors were they able to gain a significant advantage over the Ukrainians in terms of firepower, manpower, or equipment.  It's unclear why the Ukrainians hyped up the Russian winter offensive to the degree they did.  Interestingly, the media bought into the Ukrainian narrative, and it took them weeks to recognize the actual situation, even after the offensive had already begun. For weeks, the media reported on a non-existent other larger army that was expected to follow up on the initial offensive. This offensive operation showcased the limitations of Russia's offensive capabilities. On the other hand, it revealed little about their defensive capabilities, which may prove more crucial in the summer.  On the counter-offensive:
The stakes appear to be so high because there doesn't seem to be a Plan B for this operation or any contingencies for its aftermath(from the Western coalition). Most of the Western investment appears to have been made with this specific operation in mind, and there is no indication of a significant follow-up build-up. There may be further developments to address this in the summer, but the extent of these efforts remains to be seen. The appropriate way to view this operation is as a window of opportunity for Ukraine. There is significant support provided to Ukraine for this operation, but this does not provide a sustained advantage for the foreseeable future. It is highly likely that the war will return to a static state after this counteroffensive, regardless of its success. There is no visible strategy or momentum to maintain the advantage for Ukraine after this offensive operation. The potential for a decisive defeat that would drive Russia to the negotiation table is unlikely, and even in the best scenarios, the conflict is likely to continue as a cross-border war with the possibility of future escalations in the far future. Many people make the mistake of equating a long-protracted war to a stalemate. This could not be further from the truth. It is improbable that Russia can sustain this war without a second wave of mobilization, which they are currently planning and also doing everything to avoid, like last year. The losing side decides when the war stops. On the strategic picture:
On the three goals of the US: Strategic defeat for Russia, victory for Ukraine, and escalation management. Strategic defeat for Russia has been achieved and the US is balancing between the last two goals. Mike is confused, as even he doesn't understand his own country's plans for the next phase after the counter-offensive. The counter-offensive probably won't be decisive enough to end this war, which is a fair assumption.  If the West waits for the results of the spring offensive, it may take another six months to launch a new operation. Mike states he doesn't usually criticize the government and appreciates the difficulties of balancing various factors ext. However, now he's making an exception.  Fighting a war with one offensive at a time, separated by six months, is not a great plan, and that is exactly how this war has been going.  You cannot wait for the results of the offensives to decide what you will do next.  Mike hasn't heard any plans about sustaining Ukraine in a long war. No one has explained the big picture, which is important for setting expectations for the Russians. Currently, the Russians could be counting on winning this war in the year 5 or so. Generally speaking, Russia might be able to sustain it for a couple of years. Russia's ability to produce ammunition and pull equipment out of storage will increase over time. However, the extent of this is uncertain and is still not going to equal demand even close.  Then there are unknown factors like China that can change the whole equation. China is likely to adopt a “salami-slicing” the US deterrence policy, providing components and industrial enablers that will have significant effects over time. Regarding economic sustainment, Mike doesn't know much, but the outlook does not generally look good for Russia. However, sustaining the war for a couple of years seems feasible. In summary, Russia can sustain this war for years, but it cannot change its fortunes on the battlefield. In terms of aid, Mike is not focused on any single item, like the F-16, but rather on issues like equipping 9 brigades and providing enough ammunition for offensive operations. Western countries are also starting to accept the fact that this will be a years-long war, but they have not yet specified what this means or how to adapt their approach. For now, they are still operating on a three-month timeline. As for Moscow's perspective on this war: 
Highly depends on who you ask in Moscow, but generally... Mike thinks they understand the disaster it has been, but they also recognize that they have survived a lot so far.  They see a total economic collapse as less likely at this point. Putin's political troubles will likely only begin if the war ends.  Russia is transitioning to a war mobilization approach as a nation.  At this point, Russian leadership must be cognizant that their military will not be able to capture Ukraine They are considering the possibility of additional mobilizations. They have settled on the idea of a long war, believing they can eventually wear Ukraine down over the years. Belief in their nation's latent power and cherry-picking history has often given great power leaders false confidence. What indicators is Mike watching now (the counter-offensive):
A series of operations that will unfold over the coming months. He is not expecting significant territorial changes early on. Territorial changes are often a lagging indicator in war. People tend to focus on territorial changes because they are visible, but the driving forces behind them are more complex.  The initial operations are probably not the main effort(s). Mike will be looking closely at sustainment. In the past, the challenge for Ukraine has not been breaking through but sustaining defensive operations. Pushing through the second and third lines, and handing Russian counterattacks. The best time to gauge the effects of the offensive on the war will be late summer, as it will be challenging to determine the operation's impact on the war before that. We have not seen these two militaries face each other before, making it impossible to accurately predict the outcome. Untested, newly-formed Ukrainian units equipped with recently introduced equipment and new tactics will be engaging with Russian-mobilized, untested troops in defenses that have not yet been put to the test.

Payback?
 

Payback?
 

Payback?
 

Rarely. In the early Combat Mission days circa 2000 he would pop in a little more often but it's never been his thing.

Payback?