c3k

I've seen some publications give up reporting altogether because 'Washington beltway punditry' is of zero utility to this story and that's all they've got.

Nice video...but the loft-launching of unguided rockets will not be too effective. (The nose pitched up during the launch, so the longitudinal spread will be even worse.)  
 

You've hit the nail on the head.
There are, to me, only a few possible answers as to why Ukraine is doing this:
1. They are not confident in their ability to generate an operational win in the Donbas region. This lack of confidence may be well grounded. I am sure that Ukraine is far better equipped to determine this than I am, if this is the case.
2. They are allowing Russia to continue its relatively fruitless attacks (some small tactical gains, minor operational impact thus far) but at high cost to Russia.  (Never stop your enemy when he is making a mistake.)
That's all I can come up with.

The length of front plays against us. We have to keep troops on the border with Belarus and with Russian in NE part of country. Russians can allow itself to concentrate and grow own forces in one place or move them to other place or rotate. We can't. Almost all brigades on Donbas and Kharkiv oblast are fighting without rotation since 24th Feb. Decision to move some TD battalions to east in order to allow mech.battalions to rest was necessary measure. 
Zelenskyi said yesterday we already have 700 000 servicemen "under rifle", but how much of them is Ground Forces and how much of them in mech.infantry? We have a lack of light armor not only to equip Reserve Corps mech. brigades, but already and in cadre units because of losses. If we still have +/- enough number of tanks (thanks Poland, Czech republic + Russian trophies) to equip our brigades, that number of light armor for mech., motorized infantry and air-assault troops is too low and will be decrease day by day.
The second problem - artillery. Our artillery is working beyond physical and human capabilities. Even if guns are not destroyed in warfare, its barrels will be gradually exhaust, decreasing the accuracy. We havn't much artillery in stock, even old D-20. 
 

After UKR troops came to the border in Ternova area, approached to the border in Starytsia area, after SOF crossed Siverskyi Donets river and took gound on the eastern bank between Zarichne and Khotimlia, Russian command at last felt the threat to Vovchansk - the border town and the gate of shortest logistic way Belgorod - Vovchansk - Kupiansk - Izium. So Russians moved there two more BTGs, artillery, MLRS and conducted counter strike with a goal to throw UKR forces back to the T2104 road Kharkiv - Staryi Saltiv. After about three days of fighting they managed to retake Starytsia and Rubizhne villages, Ternova now still contested. But Russians also havn't enough forces to push UKR troops further to south, so now we have position warfare with probes and artillery strikes. Russians also renewed shellings of Kharkiv (but in less number, than they deployed near circle road) and villages north from the city. 
Simultainously Russians started to shell border areas of Sumy oblast and even conducted attempt to attack theese areas with small forces. Obviously the goal of theese actions - to create appearance of the offensive threat and tie down our forces in this oblast in order they could be moved to Kharkiv oblast  

I have spent just over a week in Medyka  and in the Ukraine, with an Aid Agency, been back a few weeks now. Besides the crossing being busy, but well organised id say, where we went to deliver aid/pick up refugees, the one soldier i spoke to, was adamant that they would beat the Russians. Not casual bravado, but a real chest beater.  The area we were in had been liberated by the Ukraine Army. If i was a scrap dealer id be heading south   Saw a lot of damage, shot down Russian plane, came under Russian shell fire (2-300 metres away) still felt like the countryside was still in 1941 with a homage in places to 2022.

Shutting down sources of US oil production helped worsen the supply imbalance of oil products...and raised the prices. 
Massive printing of money has led to inflationary pressures resulting in raised prices.
I'll ignore the statement about climate change and budgets. (But, if you'd like, you can venmo me some money and I'll apply it to carbon offsets in your name.)
Fiat currencies, politicians fueling the financial crisis, kicking the can down the road to future generations, deficit spending, short-sighted government policies...that is what is causing the current inflationary spiral.
But I'm not sure what that has to do with Ukraine kicking Russia's ass?

Shutting down sources of US oil production helped worsen the supply imbalance of oil products...and raised the prices. 
Massive printing of money has led to inflationary pressures resulting in raised prices.
I'll ignore the statement about climate change and budgets. (But, if you'd like, you can venmo me some money and I'll apply it to carbon offsets in your name.)
Fiat currencies, politicians fueling the financial crisis, kicking the can down the road to future generations, deficit spending, short-sighted government policies...that is what is causing the current inflationary spiral.
But I'm not sure what that has to do with Ukraine kicking Russia's ass?

Shutting down sources of US oil production helped worsen the supply imbalance of oil products...and raised the prices. 
Massive printing of money has led to inflationary pressures resulting in raised prices.
I'll ignore the statement about climate change and budgets. (But, if you'd like, you can venmo me some money and I'll apply it to carbon offsets in your name.)
Fiat currencies, politicians fueling the financial crisis, kicking the can down the road to future generations, deficit spending, short-sighted government policies...that is what is causing the current inflationary spiral.
But I'm not sure what that has to do with Ukraine kicking Russia's ass?

Shutting down sources of US oil production helped worsen the supply imbalance of oil products...and raised the prices. 
Massive printing of money has led to inflationary pressures resulting in raised prices.
I'll ignore the statement about climate change and budgets. (But, if you'd like, you can venmo me some money and I'll apply it to carbon offsets in your name.)
Fiat currencies, politicians fueling the financial crisis, kicking the can down the road to future generations, deficit spending, short-sighted government policies...that is what is causing the current inflationary spiral.
But I'm not sure what that has to do with Ukraine kicking Russia's ass?

Global food crisis???
So, someone upstream posted something about how Ukraine's fight with Russia, if prolonged, will create/exacerbate/ or otherwise worsen some sort of global food crisis.
I was curious...so I looked at some numbers.
Ukraine's production of corn/maize was 35 million tons in 2019 (a significant improvement over the previous years).
That's a lot of corn. However, worldwide production in 2019 was...1.15 billion tons.
Ukraine produced about 3% of the total production.
Hmmm...let's look at wheat. 28 million tons vs. 765 millon tons, or ~3.5%.
Crap. Those aren't doomsday numbers. What about sunflower seeds? 15m t of 56m t, or a bit over 25%. Sweet! Now we're getting somewhere! Sunflower oil production: 5mt of 18mt, so about 1/3.
Rapeseed, sugars, potatoes, sesame, rice all are far below corn or wheat.
 
Oh...it's not a global issue, it's a regional issue because some parts of the world depend on Ukraine food production more than others? Sounds like a shipping issue. And, it'd be very specific to very isolated locales with very obvious solutions.
Yes, prices are responding to the minor shortfall. That's how the market works: prices are a form of communication (much like war is all communication). Higher prices mean less wastage of the end product by the user, and is a form of self-correction in distribution.
The US (self-caused) baby formula shortage is causing more hardship than any putative famine due to Ukraine's lack of food production.

Global food crisis???
So, someone upstream posted something about how Ukraine's fight with Russia, if prolonged, will create/exacerbate/ or otherwise worsen some sort of global food crisis.
I was curious...so I looked at some numbers.
Ukraine's production of corn/maize was 35 million tons in 2019 (a significant improvement over the previous years).
That's a lot of corn. However, worldwide production in 2019 was...1.15 billion tons.
Ukraine produced about 3% of the total production.
Hmmm...let's look at wheat. 28 million tons vs. 765 millon tons, or ~3.5%.
Crap. Those aren't doomsday numbers. What about sunflower seeds? 15m t of 56m t, or a bit over 25%. Sweet! Now we're getting somewhere! Sunflower oil production: 5mt of 18mt, so about 1/3.
Rapeseed, sugars, potatoes, sesame, rice all are far below corn or wheat.
 
Oh...it's not a global issue, it's a regional issue because some parts of the world depend on Ukraine food production more than others? Sounds like a shipping issue. And, it'd be very specific to very isolated locales with very obvious solutions.
Yes, prices are responding to the minor shortfall. That's how the market works: prices are a form of communication (much like war is all communication). Higher prices mean less wastage of the end product by the user, and is a form of self-correction in distribution.
The US (self-caused) baby formula shortage is causing more hardship than any putative famine due to Ukraine's lack of food production.

Or else a large proportion of Russians rapidly apply the 'What Good Thing Do I Expect Will Happen If I Give My True Feelings On This Matter' test, and say the 'patriotic' thing?

Droog, Where's My БМП?
 
 

In nearest 1-2 weeks we will see culmination of Russian offensive. Their pressure now is unprecedent. Lyman and Avdiivka today were shelled severly during several hours almost with all calibers and systems. Siverodonetsk and Bakhmut also under fire. Russian use own usual "burned earth" tactic. 
Russian penetrating around Popasna stabilized by elements of 80th air-assault brigade, but heavy clashes are ongoing. Villages Viktorivka, Oleksandropillia, western part of Komyshuvakha still a grey zone and arena of clashes. Russians are digging in Volodymyrivka and in 1,5..2 km south from Vasylivka - Lypove villages. Locals wrote in twitters - the endless stream of Russian armor and concentration of troops in Alchevsk, Kadiivka, Pervomaisk town. Reportedly at least 18 BTGs now on Popasna - Bakhmut axis
Russian commander of "Popasma group", mayor general Avdeev is relatively young general and he uses more flexible tactic, than direct assaults after artillery fire. He use HUGE amount of artillery and aviation support to supress resistsanse but instead direct assaults he uses outflanking and infiltrations of relativelly big number of small combat groups (1-2 reinforces platoons), consisting of mix of 76th VDV division  and PMC units. Our soldiers point that PMC have many experienced troopers, which passed many wars - they are dangerous enemy, which never surrender and never take prisoners. This actions and lack of troops on Popasna-Bakhmut axis (as well as retreating of some TD units) forced our command to pull our right flank. 
Today UKR troops on Svitlodarsk bulge destroyed the bridge through reservoir of Luhan' river and abandoned Myronivskyi settlement. Looks like we will retreat soon also from Svitlodarsk beyond the river and all efforts will be concentrate on defense of Bakhmut area. 
Destroyed bridge near Myronivskyi
Russian occupants (PMC?) in Myronivskyi

And hypothetical solution...

Global food crisis???
So, someone upstream posted something about how Ukraine's fight with Russia, if prolonged, will create/exacerbate/ or otherwise worsen some sort of global food crisis.
I was curious...so I looked at some numbers.
Ukraine's production of corn/maize was 35 million tons in 2019 (a significant improvement over the previous years).
That's a lot of corn. However, worldwide production in 2019 was...1.15 billion tons.
Ukraine produced about 3% of the total production.
Hmmm...let's look at wheat. 28 million tons vs. 765 millon tons, or ~3.5%.
Crap. Those aren't doomsday numbers. What about sunflower seeds? 15m t of 56m t, or a bit over 25%. Sweet! Now we're getting somewhere! Sunflower oil production: 5mt of 18mt, so about 1/3.
Rapeseed, sugars, potatoes, sesame, rice all are far below corn or wheat.
 
Oh...it's not a global issue, it's a regional issue because some parts of the world depend on Ukraine food production more than others? Sounds like a shipping issue. And, it'd be very specific to very isolated locales with very obvious solutions.
Yes, prices are responding to the minor shortfall. That's how the market works: prices are a form of communication (much like war is all communication). Higher prices mean less wastage of the end product by the user, and is a form of self-correction in distribution.
The US (self-caused) baby formula shortage is causing more hardship than any putative famine due to Ukraine's lack of food production.

Thanks for letting me know - my attempt at using links to dropbox image previews seems to have only shown up for me (a security feature I guess), direct links having unsuccessful.  I have uploaded them elsewhere and beg your collective indulgence (you'll bloody like it and say so) as I repost both parts below.  Mods feel free to delete my previous two posts (when has that ever happened).
 
"Looks like (before the thread hurtles past it) we are touching upon a fundamental of warfare: hills!  How should they be considered in modern war?  An amateur's thoughts:
They are hard to get up. You can see the surrounding land. You can be seen from the surrounding land. That's it.  That's all I can think of.  These broadly mean:
Being hard to get up makes them harder to take with infantry and vehicles, and easier to defend.  They are harder to supply and harder to place heavy weapons upon. Once under your control, you can use them (as in the past) to control the surrounding area, through spotting and direct fire. Every bastard in the area around you can see the hill.  And since the hill is always smaller than it's surroundings, all other things being equal, this means more people will be able to see and hit the hill than are able to see and hit from it. So we have some nuance.  You can say a drone with FLIR negates the benefits of a hill, but how many pairs of eyes are on the hill and how many are staring at the monitor?  Who or what are you going to put on the hill?  Who or what is in the surrounding area?  Anyway, having my mind on the subject led me to starting up Google Earth.  It's amazing what we can do at home with modern tools:"
 
"More Google Earth extravagance further to my previous post:"
"Alas the flight ends there.  I had in fact imported the whole BMU-E into Google Earth, about 180 images, and was positioning for a shot when the whole thing crashed, losing almost all the work I had done over the previous hours.  Bastard. 
I will do it again if I feel it serves enough purpose (I did wonder if it was worth it as I realised how long it was taking), and can perhaps provide for requests should the posts not prove instructional, time allowing."

Gotta admire the skill! I mean, correcting for windage for a long drop is pretty hard, and they were spot on. Twice. Whereas I've never dropped anti-armor munitions from a drone, I have spit off the top of some pretty tall buildings. It never lands where you think it would...
 

On the one hand, he repudiates EVERYTHING he's ever been told by his government or their propaganda organs. And then, he discusses his hatred of Ukraine because of what he's been told.
The morale issues his unit had (has?) are, hopefully, symptomatic of the entire Russian army. And based on their performance, it's not far off...

Gotta admire the skill! I mean, correcting for windage for a long drop is pretty hard, and they were spot on. Twice. Whereas I've never dropped anti-armor munitions from a drone, I have spit off the top of some pretty tall buildings. It never lands where you think it would...
 

The President of Poland visited the Ukrainian parliament in person.
Relations between Poland and Ukraine seem better than ever.

Popasna and high ground
 
Popasna
The Russian victory at Popasna potentially unhinges Ukraine defenses east of that point. It is a serious incursion and needs to be countered. Attacking the shoulders of the penetration is the tried and true solution, but involves having more forces and capability than the Ukraine can field in that area at this time. Short of cutting off the penetration, resistance to the forward elements needs to coalesce such that it is either deflected or stopped.
The larger danger is that this penetration, aside from endangering Ukraine forces to the east (either by pocketing them or just choking off supplies), it gets past the field fortifications and defenses built up since 2014.
In short, it sets the stage for a left hook, getting behind the Ukrainian defenses to the southwest of Popasna.
That's the danger.
Ukraine can definitely stabilize the area...by pushing in (reliable) troops and more support.
 
And that brings us to high ground.
This conflict in the Luhansk/Donetsk area seems to be WWI-esque with less troop density. There are trenchlines, artillery support, raids, observation flights, and movement measured in much smaller distances than in conflicts after that period.
All the ravines that cut through the area (drainage basins) definitely cause a funneling effect. Look at how the German offense (Kursk) developed in this area at the tactical level: each village is important because they are on the high ground and on roads. The road network and the terrain are such that these pieces of high ground are worth defending.
That brings us back around to the trenches and observation. Sure, drones are available, but a trench in a low ground is just a pre-dug grave. (See German defense lines in WWI vs. what the British did.) If you're going to get pummeled by directed artillery, high ground or low ground is about the same...but if the enemy is going to use infantry to pry you out...high ground wins.
 
Finally, that brings up the "burn rate". The big pushes are what are getting attention, but what is the daily level of attrition in the "quiet" sectors? How many artillery shells are being used per day and to what effect? What about raids, recce, etc? Ukraine may have mobilized more and sooner, but we don't know how many are dying across the front.
This is what may have led to that Territorial Defense unit collapsing. Just the daily grind, followed up by a determined enemy advance.
Yes, Russia has lost more, and in a more spectacular manner, but what is going on in the rest of the engagement zone? 

Popasna and high ground
 
Popasna
The Russian victory at Popasna potentially unhinges Ukraine defenses east of that point. It is a serious incursion and needs to be countered. Attacking the shoulders of the penetration is the tried and true solution, but involves having more forces and capability than the Ukraine can field in that area at this time. Short of cutting off the penetration, resistance to the forward elements needs to coalesce such that it is either deflected or stopped.
The larger danger is that this penetration, aside from endangering Ukraine forces to the east (either by pocketing them or just choking off supplies), it gets past the field fortifications and defenses built up since 2014.
In short, it sets the stage for a left hook, getting behind the Ukrainian defenses to the southwest of Popasna.
That's the danger.
Ukraine can definitely stabilize the area...by pushing in (reliable) troops and more support.
 
And that brings us to high ground.
This conflict in the Luhansk/Donetsk area seems to be WWI-esque with less troop density. There are trenchlines, artillery support, raids, observation flights, and movement measured in much smaller distances than in conflicts after that period.
All the ravines that cut through the area (drainage basins) definitely cause a funneling effect. Look at how the German offense (Kursk) developed in this area at the tactical level: each village is important because they are on the high ground and on roads. The road network and the terrain are such that these pieces of high ground are worth defending.
That brings us back around to the trenches and observation. Sure, drones are available, but a trench in a low ground is just a pre-dug grave. (See German defense lines in WWI vs. what the British did.) If you're going to get pummeled by directed artillery, high ground or low ground is about the same...but if the enemy is going to use infantry to pry you out...high ground wins.
 
Finally, that brings up the "burn rate". The big pushes are what are getting attention, but what is the daily level of attrition in the "quiet" sectors? How many artillery shells are being used per day and to what effect? What about raids, recce, etc? Ukraine may have mobilized more and sooner, but we don't know how many are dying across the front.
This is what may have led to that Territorial Defense unit collapsing. Just the daily grind, followed up by a determined enemy advance.
Yes, Russia has lost more, and in a more spectacular manner, but what is going on in the rest of the engagement zone? 

Popasna and high ground
 
Popasna
The Russian victory at Popasna potentially unhinges Ukraine defenses east of that point. It is a serious incursion and needs to be countered. Attacking the shoulders of the penetration is the tried and true solution, but involves having more forces and capability than the Ukraine can field in that area at this time. Short of cutting off the penetration, resistance to the forward elements needs to coalesce such that it is either deflected or stopped.
The larger danger is that this penetration, aside from endangering Ukraine forces to the east (either by pocketing them or just choking off supplies), it gets past the field fortifications and defenses built up since 2014.
In short, it sets the stage for a left hook, getting behind the Ukrainian defenses to the southwest of Popasna.
That's the danger.
Ukraine can definitely stabilize the area...by pushing in (reliable) troops and more support.
 
And that brings us to high ground.
This conflict in the Luhansk/Donetsk area seems to be WWI-esque with less troop density. There are trenchlines, artillery support, raids, observation flights, and movement measured in much smaller distances than in conflicts after that period.
All the ravines that cut through the area (drainage basins) definitely cause a funneling effect. Look at how the German offense (Kursk) developed in this area at the tactical level: each village is important because they are on the high ground and on roads. The road network and the terrain are such that these pieces of high ground are worth defending.
That brings us back around to the trenches and observation. Sure, drones are available, but a trench in a low ground is just a pre-dug grave. (See German defense lines in WWI vs. what the British did.) If you're going to get pummeled by directed artillery, high ground or low ground is about the same...but if the enemy is going to use infantry to pry you out...high ground wins.
 
Finally, that brings up the "burn rate". The big pushes are what are getting attention, but what is the daily level of attrition in the "quiet" sectors? How many artillery shells are being used per day and to what effect? What about raids, recce, etc? Ukraine may have mobilized more and sooner, but we don't know how many are dying across the front.
This is what may have led to that Territorial Defense unit collapsing. Just the daily grind, followed up by a determined enemy advance.
Yes, Russia has lost more, and in a more spectacular manner, but what is going on in the rest of the engagement zone? 

Popasna and high ground
 
Popasna
The Russian victory at Popasna potentially unhinges Ukraine defenses east of that point. It is a serious incursion and needs to be countered. Attacking the shoulders of the penetration is the tried and true solution, but involves having more forces and capability than the Ukraine can field in that area at this time. Short of cutting off the penetration, resistance to the forward elements needs to coalesce such that it is either deflected or stopped.
The larger danger is that this penetration, aside from endangering Ukraine forces to the east (either by pocketing them or just choking off supplies), it gets past the field fortifications and defenses built up since 2014.
In short, it sets the stage for a left hook, getting behind the Ukrainian defenses to the southwest of Popasna.
That's the danger.
Ukraine can definitely stabilize the area...by pushing in (reliable) troops and more support.
 
And that brings us to high ground.
This conflict in the Luhansk/Donetsk area seems to be WWI-esque with less troop density. There are trenchlines, artillery support, raids, observation flights, and movement measured in much smaller distances than in conflicts after that period.
All the ravines that cut through the area (drainage basins) definitely cause a funneling effect. Look at how the German offense (Kursk) developed in this area at the tactical level: each village is important because they are on the high ground and on roads. The road network and the terrain are such that these pieces of high ground are worth defending.
That brings us back around to the trenches and observation. Sure, drones are available, but a trench in a low ground is just a pre-dug grave. (See German defense lines in WWI vs. what the British did.) If you're going to get pummeled by directed artillery, high ground or low ground is about the same...but if the enemy is going to use infantry to pry you out...high ground wins.
 
Finally, that brings up the "burn rate". The big pushes are what are getting attention, but what is the daily level of attrition in the "quiet" sectors? How many artillery shells are being used per day and to what effect? What about raids, recce, etc? Ukraine may have mobilized more and sooner, but we don't know how many are dying across the front.
This is what may have led to that Territorial Defense unit collapsing. Just the daily grind, followed up by a determined enemy advance.
Yes, Russia has lost more, and in a more spectacular manner, but what is going on in the rest of the engagement zone?