I’m not sure how much congressional support will even exist once the primaries start since the rank and file Republicans may not want to offend the front runners and their enthusiastic supporters (I’m trying to be diplomatic),
Ronald Reagan and John McCain must be spinning in their graves -God rest their souls
I would have never imagined the Republican Party being the pro Russian dictatorship party.
Sorry for rant
Amusing.
Last year people in this thread were saying exactly the same thing "lol, silly Russians. The Ukrainians will blow past that in a day." And yet, 11 months later, here we are.
I assume that even the Russians are professional enough to recognise that ditches across open paddocks aren't the only element of a defence line they are going to need. The funny thing about ditches under tree cover is that they're not very photogenic.
The tricky aspect of photographic analysis is interpreting what you can't see from the things you can. The Luftwaffe radar installation at Bruneval, for instance, was first identified because of long grass of all things. The Germans had ringed the site with barbed wire because they were worried about a ground attack or raid, or randos wandered up and having a butchers. The problem with barbed wire is that it's really hard to mow the grass in and around it, so over the course of six months or so a distinctive ring of tall grass sprouted up in the middle of an otherwise nondescript paddock in front of the manor house. "Now why would that happen" the British photo interpreters asked themselves, and working from there - and combining their suspicions with other intelligence threads - realised that they'd found a Würzburg , which led to Op BITING.
IIRC, a similar process was used to delimit the boundaries a number of the minefields in Normandy before D-Day.
Interpreting what you can't see based on what you can is also one of the reasons so much effort is put into studying enemy doctrine.
So, putting all that together, and relating it to 2023: we can see ditches. Great, in themselves they're no great shakes. But based on doctrine and experience over the last 6-12 months, what else should the Ukrainians expect on and around these new positions.
Ditches which are in the middle of open paddocks and perpendicular to the expected axis of advance are probably pretty dumb. The only thing dumber than that would be to assume that ditches in the middle of open paddocks perpendicular to the expected axis of advance are the only things the Russians are building.
Russian counter-battery radar Zoopark-M1 was hit by HIMARS as claimed, but as for me it's more similar to Excaliburs. Target was tracked by UKR "Shark" drone, having very cool zoom. Location - Novopetrykivka village, Donetsk oblast. About 15 km SE from Urozhaine.
Ukrainian manpower has been at “a breaking point” for about 18 months now. Do we have any actual evidence of the state of Ukraine force generation, or are we seeing doom and gloom?
The obstacle dynamic is interesting. Minefields are supposed to be useless unless “covered”. What appears to have changed is what it takes to “cover” a given obstacle. It used to be dug in troop organizations, now it is UAS and ATGMs linked to artillery. So the bill for effective coverage has gone down significantly.
This is all starting to add up to the blindingly obvious - this is not a shift to Defence Primacy, it is a shift to Denial Primacy. We have been seeing denial in the air and on land (now projected onto the sea). Denial effectively raises the cost of action to a level that is unsustainable. One does not “hold ground” one simply makes the cost per foot too high. We appear to be entering into an age of denial. Closely linked to corrosive warfare concepts as Denial essentially is very expensive friction, the question remains whether or not the UA can overcome and project its own level of friction back onto the RA at a rate higher than the RA can sustain.
It has been a summer of slow grinding and not many signs of success but remember the metrics are not territory as much as they are systemic erosion. Which side is eroding faster? I do not know if the UA can reach a tipping point that leads to major advances. We have until about Nov and then the whole thing will peeter out, if last Fall is an indication. If the UA cannot achieve a major breakout by then, well there will have to be some difficult conversations I expect.
But Russia retains an almost unlimited capacity to lay mine belts and obstacles, all the way down to Azov and Perekop if it likes. It wouldn't surprise me if they're doing just that, in the absence of better options.
Manning these belts properly is another question of course, but to what extent does that make these fields less costly and time consuming to clear?
...And the Ivans are showing signs of moving up the tactical drone learning curve, which means fewer defenders can bombard and bleed out the sappers and assault troops while their movement is constrained. There's no way China isn't already supplying these lower tech systems to Russia in bulk.
Ukraine has a breaking point on manpower as well, which it's hiding well but it matters.
Keep in mind the US elections are over a year away,and any policies that would harm Ukraine would take another 3 months or so to have any serious effects on their conduct of the war. Having said that I believe Trump getting back in office is a dangerous thing, but Ukraine still has a decent amount of time before any significant change in US policy can do damage.
The matter of far-right or "pseudo far-right" (better to call them populists) support of Russia is not so ideology, but Russian money. Russia generously fertilized both left and right politics, activating them, when it needs.
But Le Pen doesn't support Russia after 24th Feb, though she afraids, that victory of Ukraine can lead to WWIII. Prime minister of Italy, for example, is representative of right spectre, but her level support of Ukraine is increadable. Polish ruling party and goverment also of right spectre, but they support Ukraine.
Why some (far-) right political organizations has pro-Russian or false "appeasemnet" (for the cost of Ukraine of course) positions? Isolationism became popular. "We have many problems inside, but current government is wasting our taxpeyers money and military resourses for senseless support of corrupted Ukraine!" Or "do not provoke WWIII!!!" And little of ideology - as I can see in tweets of western Russia-supporters, they respect Russia for "tradicionalistic values", "Christianity", "fighting with LGBT", "fighting with Jewish-Masons world conspiracy" and they see Ukraine like a dangerous puppet in hands of leftists and globalists (OMG!!!!). Though indeed level of conservatism in Ukraine is comparable to Poland or Hungary.
My personnal big dissapointment is US Republicans, which always were hawks in relation to USSR and Russia (McСain for exanle) and now MAGA-isolationism and QAnon ate brain of half of them and their followers
Economist
1843 magazine | Ukraine
How Ukraine’s virtually non-existent navy sank Russia’s flagship
The Moskva was the most advanced vessel in the Black Sea. But the Ukrainians had a secret weapon, reports Wendell Steavenson with Marta Rodionova
July 27th 2023
On the day that Russia invaded Ukraine, a flotilla of warships from the Russian Black Sea Fleet steamed out of its base in Sevastopol in occupied Crimea towards a small island 120km (75 miles) south of Odessa. This solitary speck of land, known as Snake Island, had strategic value beyond its size. If it were captured, the Russian navy would dominate the west of the Black Sea and threaten Ukraine’s coast. Snake Island housed a radar station and was garrisoned by a few dozen Ukrainian marines and border guards – no match for Russian ships.
Russian jets screamed overhead. A patrol boat began shelling the island, and smaller vessels full of Russian marines approached the jetty. The Ukrainian defenders knew they had little hope of resisting. They were armed only with rifles and a few rocket-propelled grenades. Over the horizon appeared the great shadowing hulk of the Moskva, the Russian flagship, 186 metres long and bristling with missiles. It demanded over the radio that the garrison surrender.
“Snake Island! I, a Russian warship, repeat our offer. Lay down your arms and surrender or you will be bombed. Have you understood? Do you copy?” On a recording of the exchange, one Ukrainian border guard can be heard remarking to another: “Well, that’s it then – or should we reply that they should **** off?” “Might as well,” said the second border guard. The first then uttered the riposte that would become a clarion call of Ukrainian resistance: “Russian warship, go **** yourself!” The Russians stormed the island and all communications with the defenders were lost.
The following day, a medical team set off to the island to retrieve the bodies of the Ukrainian soldiers, all of whom they presumed were dead. As they approached, their rescue vessel was hailed by a Russian ship and ordered to stop. Soon, a dozen members of the Russian special forces boarded their boat and detained those on board. A Russian officer pointed over his shoulder at the dark grey outline of the Moskva in the distance. “Do you see her?” he said. “You see how large she is, how powerful? She can destroy not only Snake Island but all of Ukraine!”
“Do you see her?” he said. “You see how large she is, how powerful? She can destroy not only Snake Island but all of Ukraine!”
Meanwhile the Russian army advanced from Crimea westwards along Ukraine’s southern coast. Everyone expected that the Russian navy would support it with an amphibious landing, either in Mykolaiv, a naval base and shipyard that was now on the front line, or – the great prize – Odessa, which housed the headquarters of the Ukrainian navy. The navy mined possible landing zones. In Odessa volunteers filled sandbags and strung bales of barbed wire to defend the beaches. Russian warships appeared so close that people could see them on the horizon.
In Berdiansk, farther to the east, the Russians had captured a dozen Ukrainian ships. The Ukrainians didn’t want to risk any more falling into the hands of the enemy. With a heavy heart, Oleksiy Neizhpapa, the head of the Ukrainian navy, ordered the scuttling in Mykolaiv harbour of his two largest ships, including his flagship. “This is a difficult decision for any commander,” he told me. The Ukrainian navy was now reduced to around three dozen vessels, mostly patrol and supply boats.
Russian warships manoeuvred close to the coast, seeking to draw fire in order to make the Ukrainians reveal their artillery positions. Then they retreated out of range and targeted Ukrainian defences and command posts with missiles. The Moskva, the largest vessel of the Russian attack force, provided air cover which allowed the other ships to operate unmolested. Commercial shipping was throttled by the presence of Russia’s ships and mines. Ukraine, the fifth-largest exporter of wheat in the world, was unable to transport any grain.
Neizhpapa lost a number of officers and men in those perilous days. Crucially, though, radar installations, which allowed the Ukrainians to identify the position of Russian ships, escaped unharmed. Neizhpapa realised that he had one, untested weapon that might drive the Russian threat away from the coast. “We were counting on this being a factor of surprise for the enemy,” he said. “I was very worried that the enemy would know about it. After all, the enemy had a lot of agents on the territory of Ukraine. I was concerned about keeping it as secret as possible – and then, of course, using it.”
The Moskva, launched in 1983 under the name Slava, was one of three warships in her class to enter service. They were built in Mykolaiv in the last decade of the Soviet Union and designed to sink the ships of us navy carrier strike groups. Its American equivalent has a wider array of weapons but the Slava-class has missiles with a greater range, rendering her potentially more dangerous in a duel. The Soviet navy was proud of the Slava-class ships and sailors vied to serve on them. The cabins were comparatively large and there was a swimming pool in which the crew could decompress during the months at sea.
A messy process of disentangling naval assets began after Ukrainian independence. Russia and Ukraine divided the Soviet Black Sea Fleet between them. Russia got 80% of the ships, Ukraine 20%
The Soviet Black Sea Fleet, which welcomed the Moskva, also employed Neizhpapa’s father, who served as an officer on a rescue vessel. Neizhpapa himself was born in 1975 and grew up in Sevastopol. As a child, he drew pictures of warships and dreamed of becoming a sailor too. The Soviet Union was collapsing as Neizhpapa entered adulthood. He chose to stay in Sevastopol for naval school, rather than go to St Petersburg to study. Neizhpapa means “Don’t-eat-bread” in Cossack dialect. The name identified him as Ukrainian at a time when national identities were re-emerging. Ukraine became independent in 1991, and Neizhpapa was certain where his loyalties lay. “I realised that I did not want to serve Russia,” he said.
During Neizhpapa’s first year at naval school, Russians and Ukrainians studied together, but when the cadets were required to take an oath of allegiance, those who chose Russia left for training in St Petersburg. A messy process of disentangling naval assets also began after Ukrainian independence. Russia and Ukraine divided the Soviet Black Sea Fleet between them. Russia got 80% of the ships, Ukraine 20%. The two countries continued to share naval bases and there were even cases of brothers serving on different sides. Relations between the cohabiting fleets shifted according to the politics of the day, becoming more strained in the aftermath of Ukraine’s Orange revolution in 2004 and warmer when Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian president, came to power in 2010. There were tensions over money – salaries in the Russian navy were much higher – and sometimes with the local authorities. (The Ukrainian police would let off Ukrainians for traffic violations but fine the Russians.)
In 2012 Neizhpapa, by then a captain, was invited on board the Moskva, which had become the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. He remembers the imposing size of the vessel, its foredeck canted upwards to attack. It was armed with 16 huge missile-launchers, as large as aircraft fuselages. The command tower was flanked with the domes, curved dishes and antennae of several radar systems, and the deck swooped towards a helicopter pad overhanging the stern.
When he stepped aboard, Neizhpapa “felt pride and tradition and also a certain power in the cruiser. I would have never guessed that within a couple of years my naval forces would sink it.”
On April 13th 2022, Neizhpapa received information that the Moskva had been located 115km off the coast. The vice admiral is tall and imposing with steel close-cut hair and bright blue eyes that seem to reflect some distant, sunny sea. Mild-mannered but military-correct, he would not be drawn on how the Ukrainians found the Moskva. “I can’t answer your question in much detail, but I can tell you that it was identified specifically by the Ukrainian naval forces,” he said.
It’s difficult to find warships at sea, not least because they are designed to hide. A ship can go quiet – turning off communications equipment so broadcasts cannot be intercepted – or use camouflage to make it difficult to see from above. Satellites can spot a ship only when their orbit passes overhead and most of them cannot penetrate cloud cover. Even when skies are clear, large warships are mere mites of grey on a vast grey ocean.
Most radar is limited to a range of 20-30km. It can transmit and receive electromagnetic pulses from objects only in its direct line of sight. Anything below the horizon remains invisible, in the radar’s so-called shadow. The Moskva remained on the other side of Snake Island, over 100km away.
Neizhpapa and other naval sources were understandably reluctant to furnish details on when and how they found the Moskva. According to their version of the story, low cloud cover that day meant that radar pulses were reflected in such a way that extended their reach far beyond their normal range. “The warship was found by two radar stations on the coast,” an insider told us. “We were so lucky.”
But Chris Carlson, a retired captain in the us navy and one of the designers of the naval-war game, “Harpoon V”, which is used to train armed forces around the world, believes that other methods were employed. “I have a hard time attributing it to just plain old luck,” he told me. He suggested that, even if a coastal radar station managed to ping the Moskva, the information relayed by the echo over such a distance would have been insufficient to identify the ship or target it effectively. Carlson pointed out that in 2021 Ukraine had announced that its advanced over-the-horizon radar system, called the Mineral-U, had completed factory testing. It’s possible that the navy rushed it into active service, even though the Ukrainians – given the need for wartime secrecy – have never admitted that they possess this capability. Neizhpapa said that this was not the first time the Ukrainians had spotted the Moskva and other warships.
The Ukrainians had also deployed Bayraktars – Turkish-made drones that became cult icons in the early months of the war – against the Russian fleet for observation, distraction and attack. It’s possible that a drone may have spotted the Moskva. In private, Western military sources have hinted that the Ukrainians had more help in locating the Moskva than they like to admit. American military sources have confirmed that they were asked to verify Ukraine’s sighting of the Moskva, which they probably did through a maritime-surveillance aircraft. It was clear, however, from the predictable changes of position made by the Moskva, that her crew believed she was invisible.
The Ukrainian navy went into the war with a depleted force. After the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia seized much of the Ukrainian fleet, including 12 of the 17 ships moored in Sevastopol at the time. Training schools, artillery batteries and munition stores were claimed by the Russians. A cohort of Ukrainian naval officers, including three admirals, defected. Neizhpapa, who was at home in Sevastopol, was recalled to Odessa. He made it across the new de-facto border crammed into a car with his wife, two sons, the Ukrainian navy’s head of military communications and all the belongings they could fit. As they crossed to safety, Neizhpapa had a “feeling that I had been in captivity and was free at home”.
The Russians began to modernise their newly strengthened Black Sea Fleet; the Moskva was upgraded and ship-to-ship Vulkan missiles installed. These had a range of over 500km, which allowed them to target cities too. The Ukrainian fleet had been reduced to a handful of ships: one frigate and a few dozen smaller craft. The war in Donbas between the Ukrainian army and Russian-backed separatists stagnated into a stalemate and sucked up much of the armed forces’ attention and resources. When Neizhpapa was made commander of the navy in 2020 by President Volodymyr Zelensky, who had been elected the previous year, there was no money or time to build new ships. Neizhpapa decided that what he needed most of all were radar systems for surveillance, minefields for coastal defence and long-range missiles, which Ukraine had also lost in Crimea.
The Luch Design Bureau in Kyiv, a state-owned munitions developer since Soviet times, had begun work on the Neptune, a subsonic shore-to-ship missile system, shortly after the loss of Crimea. Based on an old Soviet design, the Neptune would have a range of over 200km. It was ready to be tested around the time Neizhpapa assumed command. A technical expert involved in the design, who didn’t want to be identified, showed me a video on his phone of one of the first live-fire tests. An old rusty tanker had been towed out to sea as a target and a small crowd of engineers and naval officers gathered in a field close to the launcher to await the results. When the news came that the tanker had been successfully hit, they clapped and hugged each other.
Yet the government dragged its feet on funding production and it took an intervention by Zelensky himself for manufacturing to begin. “I was in this meeting,” said the technical expert. “He was intelligent, he understood that we had only three or four [operationally effective] ships in the Ukrainian navy and that it was not enough to protect the coastline.”
Production began in early 2021. The first battery – comprising two command vehicles and four launch vehicles, each able to transport and fire four missiles – had been built in time to join the annual military parade in Kyiv on August 24th, Ukrainian Independence Day. That December, Neizhpapa announced that six batteries would be deployed to the southern coast the following spring.
On the morning of February 24th 2022, the technical expert woke to the sound of “shooting everywhere, helicopter attacks everywhere”. Russia had invaded and the Neptune batteries were still parked near Kyiv; they were in jeopardy from seizure by Russian soldiers. The technical expert’s superiors told him to transport the missile systems to the south of the country. It took three days for the launch vehicles to reach the coast. “We were worried because they were very visibly military vehicles,” said the expert. The missiles themselves were sent later, hidden in trucks.
The Neptunes were first fired in March 2022 at Russian landing craft. In April, they probably targeted a Russian frigate called the Admiral Essen – that month she was retired from service for a few weeks, suggesting that the damage sustained was slight – and at smaller ships threatening Mykolaiv. A number of sources suggested the Neptunes were not wholly successful. The system was untested in combat and there were teething problems: with the radar, with parts failing, with the software for identifying targets. The technical expert told us that the missiles had been launched from the west of Odessa at a high altitude, which would have made them more easily detectable by Russian radar. “We don’t know exactly what happened,” he said, “but it seems the missiles were intercepted.” Engineers were dispatched to fix the problems.
Once the location of the Moskva had been confirmed on April 13th, Neizhpapa ordered two Neptune missiles to be fired at it. The technical expert showed me a video on his phone of what he claimed was the launch of the missiles that day. The launcher truck was parked in a thin line of trees with bare branches. At ignition, the cap of the launching tube, which looks like the lid of a rubbish bin, was dispelled from the barrel and crashed into a field of green spring wheat. A fiery roar and a trail of black smoke followed. Then the second missile was launched.
A fiery roar and a trail of black smoke followed. Then the second missile was launched.
Silence reigned in Neizhpapa’s command centre. The Neptune, which is five metres long, flies at 900km per hour and is designed to skim ten metres above the surface of the sea in order to avoid detection. Neizhpapa watched the clock tick through the six minutes that it was supposed to take to reach the target. For a long time nothing seemed to happen. Then Russian radio channels erupted in chatter. It was apparent that smaller ships were hurrying towards the Moskva. The radio traffic was garbled and panicked. Neizhpapa inferred that the ship had been hit.
It didn’t take long for news to spread. “People started calling me from all over Ukraine,” Neizhpapa said. “There was only one question: ‘Did it sink or not?’ I said, ‘I can’t answer that!’ Hours passed. I was constantly asked the same thing. I joked I wanted to get on a boat myself and go and look. I said, ‘Do you realise that this is a very big ship? Even if it was hit by both missiles, it wouldn’t sink immediately.’”
Some hours later, satellites spotted a large red thermal image in the middle of the sea. Officials from nato phoned Neizhpapa, he recalled, “to say that they saw something burning beautifully”.
The only publicly available film taken of the Moskva after she was hit is three seconds long. The sea is calm, the sky pale grey. The full length of the ship is visible as she lists sharply to one side, thick black smoke billowing from the foredeck. Her life rafts are gone, suggesting that surviving crew members had been evacuated. The camera falls away sharply as a voice is heard saying, in Russian, “What the **** are you doing?”
It’s apparent from the film that the two Neptune missiles struck the Moskva near the foredeck on her port side, just above the waterline. The fire may have been caused by the missiles themselves, or fuel tanks or ammunition magazines in that part of the ship which ignited. We may never know exactly what happened but the attack clearly caused the Moskva to lose power and propulsion. Sometime in the early hours of April 14th she rolled over and sank.
Why had the Moskva, which had capable radar and surface-to-air missiles, failed to detect and intercept the incoming Neptunes? Carlson, the naval expert, has dug into the possible reasons. The ship was in dry dock for repairs several times over the past decade but upgrades to her weapons and operating systems seem to have been delayed or done piecemeal. A readiness report, briefly posted online in early 2022 before being removed from the internet, showed that many systems were broken or not fully functional. “All her major weapons systems had gripes,” said Carlson on a podcast last year. Moreover, the Moskva’s radar and targeting tools were not entirely automated and relied heavily on well-trained operators. But over half the ship’s crew, which numbered 500, were conscripts who served only a year. In consequence, the sailors “had extremely limited training which would be considered woefully insufficient by Western standards,” said Carlson. “The Moskva was not properly prepared to be doing combat operations.” This was yet another example of complacency by the Russian armed forces that has been evident throughout the war. Even so, Carlson was astonished that none of her radars appeared to have spotted the incoming missiles.
Officials from NATO phoned Neizhpapa, he recalled, “to say that they saw something burning beautifully
Once the Neptunes struck, the crew seems, in a panic, to have left watertight doors unsecured. Studying a screenshot of the Moskva on fire, Carlson observed that “you can see smoke coming out of the shutter doors for the torpedo tubes...That tells me that the smoke had a clear path, and if the smoke had a clear path so did water and so [did] flame.”
The Russians have never admitted that Neptune missiles were responsible for sinking the Moskva; they claimed she suffered an accidental fire at sea. But only a few days later, they bombed a Luch Design Bureau facility in Kyiv in apparent retaliation. The Russian authorities have also never been open about the number of casualties, but up to 250 sailors may have died. On November 4th 2022, more than six months after the sinking, a court in Sevastopol declared 17 of the missing dead.
Despite the reports of their heroic deaths, the defenders of Snake Island were in fact alive. They were taken captive and held in prison in Crimea before being transferred to a prison in Belograd, a city near the border with Ukraine. Conditions were brutal. Temperatures fell to -20°C, yet the prisoners were housed in tents for the first few days. Frequently, they were interrogated, beaten and electrocuted. They had no news of the outside world, beyond the names of the cities captured by the Russians, with which the guards taunted them.
One day, the prisoners overheard a news report on the guards’ radio saying that the Moskva “was not floating properly”. The expression puzzled them for a while, before they realised that it was a euphemism for “sunk”. They began to cheer. “The Russians increased our torture,” said one of them, who was later returned in a prisoner exchange, “but this was a great moment of happiness.”
The sinking of the Moskva was a turning point in the war. Neizhpapa said that “our fleet, which was considered non-existent a year ago, is now winning against the larger force, thought to be unbeatable.” nato allies began to take the Ukrainian navy seriously. Ukraine has limited stocks of Neptunes but the Danes and Americans are supplying Harpoon missiles, which are similar to the Neptune but carry a bigger warhead. Previously, Neizhpapa admitted, this kind of weapon and support would have been a “dream”.
Sometime in the early hours of April 14th she rolled over and sank.
Having destroyed the air-defence umbrella that the Moskva provided, the Ukrainian navy was able to harass the Russian navy in the west of the Black Sea with drones and missiles, damaging and sinking supply ships, and destroying air defences and radar stations installed on gas platforms. In June 2022 Ukraine retook Snake Island and the Russian Black Sea Fleet withdrew towards Crimea, leaving the Ukrainian coast safe from amphibious assault. Turkey and the United Nations were able to broker a deal to allow ships into Ukrainian ports to export grain. “Now,” said Neizhpapa, “they keep their ships outside of the range of our cruise missiles” – even state-of-the-art frigates that are armed up to the gunwales.
The Ukrainian coast has been secured. Neizhpapa pointed out an area of 25,000 square kilometres where neither the Russians nor Ukrainians can now operate freely. “There’s a certain kind of status quo that we need to take over,” he said. Neizhpapa maintains that the only way to secure peace in the Black Sea is to throw the Russians out of Crimea. “In imperial times, all of the emperors always said that whoever controls Crimea controls the Black Sea. In Soviet times, they called Crimea the aircraft-carrier that cannot be sunk. Nothing has changed since then.”
I asked Neizhpapa what he missed about his home. He gazed upwards for a moment. “Honestly, I miss the sea near Crimea the most. It’s not the same as here. It’s brighter, more transparent.”
Wendell Steavenson has reported on post-Soviet Georgia, the Iraq war and the Egyptian revolution. You can read her previous dispatches from the war in Ukraine for 1843 magazine, and the rest of our coverage here. Marta Rodionova has worked as a television journalist and creative producer.
Of course!
That is why we can't give Ukraine Javelins, because Russia said it will nuke us. But wait, they didn't.
Oh but that is why we can't give Ukraine HIMARS, because Russia said it will nuke us. But wait, they didn't.
Anyway, this is definitely why we can't give Ukraine tanks and IFVs, because Russia said it will nuke us if we do. But wait, they didn't.
But it definitely is why we can't give Ukraine proper air defense systems, because Russia said it will nuke us. But wait, they didn't.
This time though, this is why we can't give Ukraine Western tanks and IFVs, because Russia said it will nuke us. But wait, they didn't.
It is however most definitely why we can't give Ukraine long range missiles, because Russia said it will nuke us if we do. But wait, they didn't.
And of course we can't give Ukraine the cluster ammo, because Russia said it will nuke us if we do. But wait, they didn't.
But this time. This time for sure! This time we can't help in any other way, whether it's the grain deal (also known as "Russia manufacturing famine in the third world", something Russia does for fun every once in a while) of jet fighters or more missiles, because Russia said it will nuke us if we do!
...
I took a tram in the city the other day, and saw a teenage girl with Ukraine pin on her backpack. She was wearing a glove over the stump where her right hand should be, and had some black cloth covering part of her thigh where something took out bunch of flesh. World doesn't need more of these.
But keep coming up with reasons why Russians should be left alone murdering and crippling more and more Ukrainians. Keep calling looking for solutions "bloodlust". I'm sure it's easy and fun thing to do. I wouldn't be able to look myself in the eyes, if I did, but you do you.
- In response to the current back and forth on the forum here -
With regards to certain enemy capabilities which we spend oh so much time discussing, I do not worry about it, though I respect it. It can be managed. Personally, I (and many of my colleagues) are readier than ever to finally get into the fight and help win this. Everyday I wake up waiting for them to do something stupid and finally give NATO a clear, unambiguous, reason to intervene directly in this war. That’s the solider in me - - it hard to see all of our (combined) power not being used when everyday Ukrainians have to bear the burden alone (at least physically). That doesn’t sit right with me, never did.
All of this to say I get it, it’s hard to watch this from the sidelines, whatever the reasons for that up to now. Still I read, learn about, and appreciate the challenges of leading the combined West through this crisis, with all of the diverse perspectives that it comes with.
I trust the Alliance, and I trust the Ukrainian General Staff. I have my own opinions on what I would risk, which is more than current, but that isn't up to me. In the end, we are all on the same side here, let’s remember how important that is, even when it gets testy.
The question facing military professionals everywhere out of this war are:
- "What is unique to this war?"
- "What is universal to all future wars?"
We had a whole thread going on the General Forum on development of warfare over the 19th century and I believe modern militaries are facing a similar conundrum.
"How would NATO do in this war?" Well it depends which side we are going to be. As Ukraine against Russia we would likely have seen a shorter sharper war but the costs would have been a serious shock to the western world. [note: let's not get dragged into another nuclear equation discussion, we can just put that one to the side] We are talking likely tens of thousands of casualties and a lot of expensive kit lost. Why?
- Air superiority. I do not know what this means in a modern context. A2AD capability is rapidly becoming distributed and highly portable. We may have been able to gain air superiority over 20,000 feet but below that we would have been taking serious losses as there is not such thing as SEAD for MANPADs basically everywhere. Modern MANPADs and IADs can operate independently all over the battlefield. Further they can deny airspaces at much higher altitudes and higher ranges. Why? Because while we were stonking Iraq, Libya, Serbia and a bunch of dirt farmers in Afghanistan competing states were taking notes and investing heavily in the tech. Take away our air supremacy and the western way of warfare is immediately in trouble. And, shocker, places like Iran really don't like us and do not want to be invaded.
Below 20,000 feet it is the freakin wild west right now. I do not care how many lasers we strap on every tank, IFV or truck. I do not care how much EM is pumped into space - birds f#ucked up for the next 20 years. Unmanned systems are 1) cheap, 2) highly effective and 3) everywhere. Whether they are doing ISR or strike they have changed the fabric of warfare between about 3 to 20,000 feet...and they are just getting started. Air superiority below 20,000 feet does not exist as a concept right now. Hell we lost it below 2000 feet in Iraq to freakin ISIL, who were basically the lowest bar one can get with respect to conventional warfare. If we were fighting the RA the UAS problem would be extremely costly...as in freakin nations pulling out after losing too many people, costly. Can anyone imagine if the Taliban got their hands on this tech and started dropping old cluster munitions right on our heads back in the COPs and FOBs? I slept for weeks about 200m from a 50,000 gallon fuel bladder that was resting under an open sky ...let that sink in.
So what? Well "wither goest Air Superiority" is one of the biggest questions of this war, and as you can see it is a multi-dimensional one.
- C4ISR. Russia does not have a world class C4ISR architecture. But even with what they do have the principle of "making them go dark" to establish C4ISR superiority - far more important in this day and age then any domain superiority - is also in question. With everything being a sensor hooked into crazy comms and networks - hell with hotspotting everything can be a node in a comms network. So I am not even sure how to make an opponent go dark anymore (see unmanned). I am sure we got people working on it but the fact that an even poorly armed opponent can see me tens of kms out makes me nervous. Worse, they can see my logistics train as well. The fact they can record all this and stream it all over the planet in real time turns really concerns me. A half decent opponent would be broadcasting every screw up and horror show, which makes sustainment of national will a big problem.
- PGM. Artillery, ATGM...insert whatever nightmare comes next. No one is ready to face this. I cannot begin to imagine trying to do an obstacle crossing when my opponent can hit me at 3-4kms with an 80% success rate with ATGM. "Oh that is ok, we have APS"...fantastic, right up until someone comes up with workarounds like sub-munitions or EFP. And even if we do magically put bubble wrap around ourselves, nothing on earth can stop artillery round that can land directly on my head. Oh and this is while I am still trying to deal with old stuff like mines, and new stuff like UAS.
All of that adds up to some very disconcerting calculus. As in "is combined arms dead as we know it?" type of calculus (someone is going to try and answer this, someone always does...just don't bother. I do not post my mil quals for some very good reasons but trust me when I say no one has this figured out yet).
Now here is the punchline: this is all if we were fighting Russia. I, frankly, am far less concerned about fighting Russia - now more than ever. I am very worried about fighting Ukraine. If we get stuck on the wrong side of a proxy war and our opponent is armed with C4ISR, PGM and A2AD like Ukraine is right now, we are in very serious trouble.
"Well we just won't fight those wars." Ya, that is not how it works. We don't get to choose the wars we decide to fight, gawd that is a post-Cold War perception that needs to die, and fast. This is the nightmare scenario and I do not know if you guys have been paying attention but we kinda been doing a lot of expeditionary operations in all sort of places to push the brand. What happens when Chinese space based ISR start lighting us up? We wind up in a hybrid fight with the other side armed with HJ-12s?
I do not know. This is a big reason when [insert talking head] says "Ukraine needs to do this" "We need to give them that"...and the war will be over in a week. My advice is to stop listening. No one in the west has been in a war like this since Korea and the freakin needle has moved miles since Korea. I say this without hyperbole, we are going to be spending the rest of this century trying to figure this all out as things like UGVs start coming online. Tell your (grand) kids to get into the sciences of killing because it is a major growth industry. For now, the best we can do is watch and learn. Both the UA and RA are feeling their way through a war unlike any we have seen before.
An interesting and educational video recently released by Veritasium on fireworks illustrates the impact of confining an explosive quite nicely (see around 6-8 minutes and the 12:34)
An interesting and educational video recently released by Veritasium on fireworks illustrates the impact of confining an explosive quite nicely (see around 6-8 minutes and the 12:34)
An interesting and educational video recently released by Veritasium on fireworks illustrates the impact of confining an explosive quite nicely (see around 6-8 minutes and the 12:34)
An interesting and educational video recently released by Veritasium on fireworks illustrates the impact of confining an explosive quite nicely (see around 6-8 minutes and the 12:34)
An interesting and educational video recently released by Veritasium on fireworks illustrates the impact of confining an explosive quite nicely (see around 6-8 minutes and the 12:34)
An interesting and educational video recently released by Veritasium on fireworks illustrates the impact of confining an explosive quite nicely (see around 6-8 minutes and the 12:34)
Also confirmed on pro-Russian Telegram milinfolive:
https://t.me/milinfolive/103396
As a result of the strike by the British Storm Shadow cruise missiles on the ZKP of the 58th Army in the Berdyansk region, the deputy commander of the Southern Military District, Lieutenant General Oleg Tsokov, was killed.
Do not get me wrong - the discussion on this forum has been positively scholarly and gentile compared to other corners of the internet right now. I think we have some leanings among the group, some stronger than others. I do tend to want to ensure that any discussion around stuff like this be given the broadest treatment possible. So for example if we are going to start doing maths, let's do all the maths. If we are going to argue for human security issues, lets call spades, 'spades' and underline the inconsistencies. You will remember that I was just as hard on the whole warcrimes discussions that hijacked us last year.
The "firmly against DPICM" has not occurred here, it occurred places like my own government. I am just not a fan of it taking root here without being challenged anymore than the even more distasteful topics we have had to cover. I am firmly in JonS's camp on "why dumb DPICM, when we have HE PGM?" Further, I am also in the "PGM DPICM with a 100% (or at least comparable to dumb HE) dud rates" camp. The issue is that context appears to have changed and we should change with it. When I start to hear "DPICM bad no matter what because it makes baby Jesus (or certain Canadian political parties) cry", that would be when I start to push back and call out hypocrisy when I see it. There are weapons that should (and are) universally outlawed - chemical, biological and nuclear/radiation are at the top of that list.
Finally my own biases are showing when I hear from preachy political parties that basically did nothing to deter Russia from this war, even after 2014, beyond harsh language and finger waving. "But now that Ukraine is using cluster munitions well we had better speak up!" How about we worry less about which munitions are being employed in a war and work harder on stopping the wars before they start in the first place? Perhaps that is my preachy windmill on a hill of sand to tilt at.
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