chrisl

Almost like the world could use a really detailed simulation of what war will be like against a China-like adversary in about 10 years.  Something that lands somewhere between game and research tool…hmmm, I wonder where we could find something like that?
As to your original premise in this war against Russia, I totally agree, NATO would cut through that is left of the RA faster than it rolled thru Saddam in ‘91.  In fact if it weren’t for the nuclear equation I think we would have Gulf War’d this thing months ago.  I am at the point that the RA has devolved so far back (human wave attacks, seriously) that a good old fashion front door kicking at the right place and time might just do the job.  For example, what is the state of Russian C4ISR?  

You've had answers of the required depth from people who've been there and done it and here's one from another 'been there done that guy' - short of putting on a green suit and trying it yourself what has been posted here is as good as its going to get to convey the message.  From the information and analogies in your posts, it is clear you are focused on each individual tank and its operation by the crew in complete isolation.
You seem to be in rather a hurry and the reasons you articulate for that are sound but, the weather and ground conditions are iffy for large scale mechanised operations so the time is better spent training rather than rushing that kit to the front line.  History is replete with examples of how rushing stuff to the front line causes problems, British tanks at the Somme in 1916 and Tigers and or Panthers at Kursk being two vaguely comparisons relevant to the situation now.  Time spent in training and rehearsal is well-spent and lots of people here have rightly criticised the Russian military for launching this operation in a half-bottomed manner and equally criticised the quality of the troops that have turned up as a result of the mobilisation.  It would be unwiser than an unwise thing for Ukraine to adopt exactly the same courses of action as its never time for amateur hour in warfare.

This seems to me to be more a question of the resources available to the US Army than about the tactical merits of the tank.
If you have the luxury of being able to completely bomb the enemy into submission then you wouldn't even need tanks to break their lines.
Sure, if you have tanks, they will work well. If you have APCs they will also work. If you have just leg infantry, they will work, too. And if you really have the total air advantage, you might not even always need those. During Desert Storm, we saw the first cases of troops surrendering to drones.
I suddenly get the feeling that 500 years ago, people might have been arguing the same thing about the armoured mounted knight:
"Despite muskets, the knight is not dead yet, because a mounted charge still works - if you have enough infantry to completely surround the enemy force, and if you have an absolutely massive archer and crossbow support to hammer the enemy line and then send in huge numbers of knights to crush the disordered opposition".
 

And of course there is training people up to a level of proficiency that they do it on zero sleep while someone is trying to kill them part.  And then training them to not kill each other by accident. And kill the other guys well in a disciplined manner.  A lot of this is pure muscle memory which does not immediately translate from one platform to the next.  Last thing you want is a crewman to react as if they are in a T72 while in a western tank.

Russian defense analyst Ruslan Pukhov on western tanks.
Delivery of Abrams tanks could seriously aggravate the situation at the front for Russian forces because even export variants of the M1A2 SEP V2 is significantly better than existing Russian tanks in serial production. This doesn't include T-90M, which aren't in serial production. He says Russian tanks are using old Soviet-era ammunition, which is sufficient against T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks at short ranges, but NATO tanks could engage them at longer distances, putting them at a disadvantage. He also says that Russia lacks a 3rd generation ATGM like the Javelin, and that Russian forces don't have enough Kornets. Instead, older Konkurs and Fagot ATGMs are the bulk of Russia's ATGMs. He says that 30-50 tanks is unlikely to affect the situation, but 200-300 could be a significant operational factor. He says much will depend on Russian producers of anti-tank systems. https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1618380131214688261
 

So a bunch of already violent traumatized inmates are sent to front for further trauma, subjagation & oppression, and are then set free in russian society.  Seems like a good plan.  The only better idea would be to let them take home their AKs.

So even the Jawas are sending heavy equipment to Ukraine.  Why can't Scholz?

On UKR's lack of punching elsewhere, I am still thinking it's the dang mud?  Option B is that UKR is actually weaker than we think.  Option C is that UKR is waiting for RU to further degrade its artillery shell stockpiles?  I dunno.  I still think it's probably the mud.

Germany will send at least one company of Leopard 2A6.
 

Let's hope you are wrong  NL said they will consider sending F-16s if the request is made, and according to Reznikov the next Ramstein is to be about aircraft. Rumors of training going on appear here and there since summer, IIRC US even prepared a hefty sum for that some time ago. If NATO is serious about enabling UA victory, they planes have to happen in my opinion.
In other news, according to Sky News Arabia, US is prepared to send a token (for now) number of Abrams to put more pressure on Germany:
Oh, and here's a better source:
 

https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/manpower-materiel-and-the-coming-decisive-phase-in-ukraine/
In his latest discussion with Ryan on the war in Ukraine, Mike Kofman explains why the coming spring and summer will be strategically decisive. He also offers his analysis on the Russian command reshuffle, new Western kit, and the grinding battle for Bakhmut.
Bulletpoints:
Bakhmut, on the ground Russians have made progress. Difficult grinding fight. Odds about 50/50 that Russia takes Bakhmut in the coming weeks, BUT it doesn't matter which way it ends. What will matter are the casualties on both sides. We need to consider the risk UKR is losing higher quality troops while RUS is mostly using expendable troops. Fighting in Bakhmut might indeed be the smartest thing to do for the Ukrainians. Is there a spot that is more advantageous? There is criticism of UKR accepting this grinding fight,  but Ukraine might not be able choose a better fight at the moment. It is an important open question how much RUS is experiencing or going to experience shell hunger and its causes. We know the RUS shell usage has gone down but the reasons are unclear (smaller need now?, lack of supply lines?, lack of stockpiles? ...). We will know more when the fighting again widens and intensifies. RUS primary goals remain in taking the Dombas On the tank debate: The classifications of weapons (is it a tank or not or offensive weapon or not) depends on the needs of the policy. "It is what you make of it" It is a offensive weapon if the policies require it to be and it is not if the it needs to be policy constrained. About the Challenger 2s actually the AS90 is way more important. Western country giving significant percentage if its modern system. Heading to 2023 there is a quest to make Ukraine succeed in offensive operations under these new constraints. Constraints: RUS has the manpower advantage and next set of fights are going to be more difficult. Increase the qualitative advantage of Ukraine (better equipment and equipment for new formations) Equipment and manpower grind has to be avoided. RUS could sustain this for some time Develop and increase the UKR precision strike abilities. Shift Ukraine has mostly fought this as an artillery war. This is a costly and attrition approach as seen in Kherson. West is unlikely to be able to supply UKR with enough of overmatch of a fires advantage to win in this way. Even at this rate the ammunition and barrel consumption is hard to sustain. Combined arms training. The fix for the point above is to give UKR the skill and equipment to do mobile warfare. This is clearly now being pursued. Spring and summer look to become decisive. Next offensive UKR has a good opportunity to show that it can still advance under these new conditions. There will be lots of people eager to call stalemate Unlike in Kherson&Harkiv now in the next offensive UKR has a very real risk of RUS counter offensive if they fail or fall short. RUS offensive capacity is constrained but now there is a real risk. Lets be frank the Kherson offensive didn't start off well, this time around there will be risks if that happens. It is not clear what is happening with the forces. Have UKR managed to set aside enough units for offensive operations? What is going on with the RUS mobilization? Very little information on the Russian new forces, most like a lot of them are for rotational proposes.  This war going nuclear is matter of two points: Cascading failure and collapse of the Russian force and the campaign. Koffman sees this as low probability event.  what Putin decides to do in the above situation. This probability is pretty hard to judge. talk about internal struggle between the RUS war leadership RUS In Bakhmut interesting to see the changed tactics of no armor, only infantry and artillery. Also the artillery ammo is being rationed or having shortages. They are clearly preserving their mech forces.  RUS is likely not going to announce 500k man mobilization . It never ended, it is going to keep happening in the background. Also there is no way of sustaining such force increase. The war aims are going to stay inside Donbass. So forget about these fanciful plans being talked about in the press.

I can speak a little bit with respect to US export controls - the export license for arms (which are very broadly defined) is completely separate from the purchase contract.  The export restrictions are a set of rules derived from federal law and if you violate them you're subject to both civil penalties (typically for the organization) and individual criminal penalties for the particular people involved.  When you get a license or partial exemption for an export, that generally comes with an acknowledgement that the recipient person or organization has to sign that acknowledges that if they want to re-export the item (which could even be transfer to other citizens of their own country) they have to go through the whole export approval process.  For a foreign actor there isn't anything like fines that can be imposed, but it can put the company on a blacklist, put the country on a blacklist, and put the people on a wanted list so that if they try to enter US territory they'd be arrested on entry.  
I've had to sign similar acknowledgements when buying things from foreign countries, where there was no obvious penalty, but if I'd violated them I'd presumably end up on an arrest list if I tried to enter.  
I think the bet here on the Polish side is that nobody in the German government would take the political risk of trying to enforce the re-export restrictions because of the public backlash they'd face.  It likely comes down the the risk that the individual Poles doing the actual exporting perceive - it's one thing to put the leader of a foreign government on trial, but would arrest and trial of the guys in shipping and receiving get raised to the same level of visibility?  Given Poland's history with neighbors to both east and west, I suspect they DGAF and would be happy to drive the Leopards all the way to Moscow themselves.

Interesting concept. I would argue though that the "Hunter" vehicle seems overengineered and you'd get more bang for the buck by mostly substituting it with  lots and lots of Toyotas and quad bikes carrying portable missiles, small loitering munitions and micro UAVs.

How about:
Reparations
Return of kidnapped citizens of Ukraine
Reparations
Prosecution of war criminals
Reparations
Probably some things I can't think of right now
Reparations.
No guarantee provided by Russia is worth the steam off a bear's night soil, so UKR won't be negotiating for that.
For this, Zelensky is going to need the continued, probably long-term assistance of the rest of the world in keeping the economic, political and personal sanctions screwed tight, so that the "pips squeak". Since Moscow, St Pete and VGrad are completely off the table, For Ever, sanctions will have to be sufficient.
Someone needs to teach the Russians some Game Theory, or at least the concept of the non-zero-sum game. It's the basis of whatever prosperity we can claim for the "rules based international order" having provided, however patchily distributed, and Russia looks like it should have a splendid starting position, with all its resources, if it could just get over the requirement of needing to screw some other guy to get ahead.
 

Following the long discussions on tanks and modern warfare in the Ukraine thread, I have proposed a new vehicle concept as per these images. The idea borrows a lot from @The_Capt and others on that thread so thanks for the discussion. 
All of this can be done with todays technology. Some development would be required for some of the "harder" aspects such as shooting down ATGMs with a chain gun (it is similar to CWIS), but that is not central to the concept. 
The really radical part is the Hunter concept, but it is actually quite simple. Reduce the size/signature/expense of a vehicle by putting most of the crew in another vehicle, while optionally having one crew to pull it out of the mud/take over during heavy EW etc. This means the Hunter can be pushed aggressively towards the enemy to push back their ISR bubble and screen your own force. If you lose a few Hunters it is not a big deal since they are relatively cheap and you can use them uncrewed in more dangerous situations. 
The other emphasis is lots of drones (like 4 in the air per platoon, plus replacements) with operators in vehicles using big screens and reliable comms rather than squinting at a phone in a field. These drone operators can have a birds-eye view on one screen while commanding the Hunter on another for maximum situational awareness. I anticipate a lot of help from AI visual recognition to spot enemy signatures too. 
Given you now have borg-spotting and your enemy doesn't, the lack of heavy armour doesn't matter so much. I still see a use for modern MBTs as hyper-specialised breakthrough vehicles, but the Killer fills all the other roles of the tank on a much lower logistical/visual footprint. 
Let me know what you think!

100 km DMZ on the RU side of the border.

100 km DMZ on the RU side of the border.

100 km DMZ on the RU side of the border.

Is it remotely possible that in the midst of all this very public international finger-pointing, give'em this don't give'em that, can/can't absorb multiple variants of weapons, can/can't train on multiple variants of weapons, NATO will/NATO won't, etc. etc. etc......
That Ukraine has and is being trained on some very dangerous and a wide range of weapons which will be delivered in a moderately short window that will absolutely rock the Russian's world?  That all of the bickering and stalemating is nothing more than a smokescreen from which the Ukrainians will step into Spring with the tools they need to, well for lack of a better term--kick the Russian's ***?
Or is this just wishful thinking on my part?
From my humble and poorly informed perspective, there seems to be a LOT of public discourse about what the Ukrainians will receive that would be better served to be held and discussed behind close doors.  Maybe all this BS is an intentional diversion.

It’s in NATO’s interest to look a little conflicted among members publicly while being unified in the back rooms.  It helps avoid looking like it’s RU against NATO and giving support to Putin’s propaganda.  It also helps to be arguing about tanks publicly while quietly shipping trainloads of long range rockets.

Reposting this here from "that other place" I frequent...
What I find interesting is that if you leave out all the theatrics and simply look at the packages that were announced at each Ramstein meeting, you get very distinct phases of weapons shipments that were highly coordinated across NATO and partner nations:
Handheld AT weapons/ATGMs/MANPADS Ex-Soviet MBTs & IFVs Artillery (tube and rocket, self propelled as well as field-artillery) APCs & MRAPs (M113, Dingo, etc.) Western medium-range SAMs (NASAMs, IRIS-T, SAMP/T) Western IFVs  <---We are here This poses the question if the entire thing is actually more coordinated than it might seem and how much of the public hysterics about the "next step" of weapons shipments is simply a useful theater play to make the West look weak and fragmented, possibly to manage escalation risks vs. Russia. Some article I read recently called it "boiling the frog". You gradually heat the water, just like you gradually escalate weapons shipments, instead of sending everything at once and risk Putin doing crazy things.

I think this is right, but the thing is that this really isn't physically sustainable for very long. Soldiers could keep up that for maybe 96 hours before they just, well, stopped. Stopped by falling asleep while driving, falling asleep eating, falling asleep looking through a weapon scope, falling asleep mid-radio message, falling asleep refuelling or re-loading, falling asleep mid-poo. And the guys that don't just falling asleep will be hallucinating, hard, which isn't going to generate good outcomes.
I think it's likely that forces will draw back from each other in order to give themselves enough time to OODA. So, no-mans land becomes something like 100km deep. Maybe some snake eaters are wandering around in there, but they'll be moving very slowly since there'll be so much EM radiation being dumped into that space that an overly dramatic eyeroll would be noticed. At 100km, practically all barrel artillery is out of range and all ATGMs are out of range. The only things with sufficient legs are stuff like hearty missile systems such as ATACMS, and air power, and the breadth of no-mans land provides enough time to sense and engage those before they get anywhere interesting. That way the human stuff can occur - eating, planning, sleeping, rehearsing, resupply, maintenance, and such like - with reasonable safety and security.
The obvious problem then becomes, well, ok, how do I as an attacker cross 100km of sensor-dense no-mans land and then break into and through the enemies defended zone? How do I achieve surprise? How do I concentrate? How do I feint?
Steve's 'bobbing and weaving' is part of the answer, but I believe you'll also need to break open some good, recent WWI histories and see how they overcame essentially the same problem 100 years ago. Then update and apply their answers in a modern context.
 
 

I'm sorry my German friends, I've lived in Germany, love the place and people, astounding art,  history,  culture,  Beer,  bread,  women, I even like the actual language (!) but holy **** has Scholz made political spinelessness into a martial art. 
Even if he publicly commits He'll find ways to foot drag, reduce, side step and avoid following through in full on his word. 
Let's see Friday, but honestly, I'm not holding my bloody breath.

The fumes in those tanks...thats just so ludicrous. Even if using brand new, unused ones,  the air supply need is where? How do they not  Far more useful to use them for fuel. RUS has no issue moving men etc around. Plus, once those half-dead, fume-brained mobiks stagger out/are lifted out of the tanks,  then what?  They still need to be housed, and unless you're breaking the force up into small groups and - 
Im sorry,  this is just a waste of time. 
 

Boom boom boom  I'd give that much more priority than tanks, that's for sure!