Sgt Joch

As I recall, the plan was to support Peiper's KG, but the plan was thrown off schedule from day one by U.S. forces, rough terrain, poor roads, traffic congestion, bad maps, etc. Peiper was also to blame since he rushed headlong without worrying about his rear. As I recall, he was also cut off by accident, U.S. forces had been ordered to set up defensive positions which happened to be in Peiper's rear not knowing that Peiper was already to the west of them. That is all part of the fog of war, currently reading up on the Russian winter offensive of jan. 45. As the armies raced for the Oder, large gaps of hundreds of kilometers opened up between the Russian Army Groups which greatly worried Stalin and STAVKA. Fortunately, the Germans were not in a position to exploit the situation.

I don't know if anyone has mentioned "Tank Crew" from 1c. Still early access with limited gameplay, but may have potential. Problem with any simulation is you eventually see all the flaws and compromises from reality the Devs have made. Sometimes you have to take time away from a game to appreciate it. Overall, CM is still the best at what it does, i.e. WW2/modern company level armored/infantry tactical warfare.

or worse, being sure you remember something and when you do check the actual reference, you realise you remembered it completely wrong. A problem as you get older. For example when I did the "Battle of Chaumont" scenarios, I had found a source listing the exact types, i.e. 75mm, 76,mm, Jumbo fielded by the U.S. forces, but now I cannot find the source or even remember what it was...

not directly related, but good summary of the equipment used by U.S. armored divisions in late 44-early 45. https://worldoftanks.com/en/news/chieftain/us-guns-german-armor-part-2/

ok war movie, but very interesting because it features the Canadian Army in a semi-realistic scenario. I have actually seen it several times. One interesting bit is that the director/star Paul Gross actually went to Kandahar when the Canucks were still there and filmed a lot of footage, so the footage you see from 20 to 40 minutes in on Kandahar, helicopters, life on the base is all actual footage. The film itself was shot in Manitoba...amazing what you can do in a film. My fav scene is the funeral at the end..something about bagpipes...

bit late to this discussion, but here is another interesting article on the key role suppressive fire plays in successful infantry combat: http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/CoTTP/Suppression McBreen 2001.pdf

From what I have been able to find out, there was no clear pattern. Shermans were sent to depots and from there sent to combat units based on their needs. For example, when researching the battle of Chaumont scenario, I found out Patton's 4th armored division in December 44 was equipped with a mix of six month old tanks, tanks at the end of their service life and tanks in need of repairs, as well as new replacements. Of course, at this point, the 4th armored had been in pretty much continuous action since august. I have a list of the exact types present on dec. 23, 44, I will see if I can find it.

sorry to hear about Nidan1, I played a few PBEM games with him. He was a fine gentleman.

many factors go into a AFV's off road capability, i.e. ground pressure, suspension design, MMP rating, durability of components, etc. The game does not rely on any one factor. the Bar rating is only a rough indication of off-road capability. I had run some bogging tests of the T34-85 (3 bar) vs Tiger I (4 bar) some times back and in game performance of both was very similar:

this can be useful as well: http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/007/7-8-1/index.html

This has been discussed often, not only in RL, but in the forum. There were some good reasons why NATO switched from a 7.62 mm to a 5.56 mm round. Studies in WW2 showed that: 1-most firefights take place within 200 meters; 2-most infantry casualties are caused by mortars/artillery; 3-the principal role of small arms is to suppress enemy infantry to increase the effectiveness of point #2. The reason why 5.56 mm was adopted: 1. 5.56 mm weighs roughly 1/2 as much as 7.62 mm, so you can carry a lot more. That allows infantrymen to keep up a higher ROF to suppress enemy soldiers; 2. within 200 meters, 5.56 mm round can kill/incapacitate as well as 7.62 mm round; 3. with 5.56, you can use lighter, smaller weapons like the M4, which are easier to carry and more maneuverable in confined spaces, i.e. urban, room clearing. Certainly, you can find situations where the longer range/extra penetration of a heavier round might be more useful, but infantry is supposed to be working in cooperation with supporting arms, HMGs, AFVs, artillery, etc. to deal with those situations. Add to that the fact that everyone else, including the Russians (5.45 mm) and the Chinese (5.8 mm) have switched to a lighter round for the same reasons. So yes, these discussions come up very few years, but I don't see a switch away from 5.56 in NATO forces anytime soon.

yes, I have been playing a lot of CMBS lately, night scenarios. There are spotting issues that have to be tweaked. UKR tanks are blind while RUS T-72s/BMP3s have X-ray vision. OTOH U.S. Abrams + drone + 155mm Paladin w. precision ammo = shooting fish in a barrel...

Other polls are consistent with that. Again, as some have pointed out, there may be the question of whether all poll respondents are lying because they are afraid the secret police will send them to Siberia. However, follow up questions in at least one Ukrainian poll suggest most Crimeans would rather be part of Russia than part of Ukraine:

No, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was an illegal war. The Bush administration tried to come up with legal rationales, i.e enforcement of existing U.N. resolutions or some made up doctrine of the "preemptive self defense", but those have been debunked by legal experts. but we are getting way off topic.....

That is the simple explanation, but it only provides a small part of the answer. What is left unanswered of course is if there were more competent technocrats involved in 1940-41, why was arms production so low and so poorly run. Speer took over in January 1942 and tank production only started to really take off in early 43 when he used his political muscle to make sure tank production received priority of resources, even Tooze admits that. The advantage Speer had was direct access to Hitler which was the source of all power in the Third Reich. A technocrat with brilliant ideas is useless if he does not have the authority to implement them.

Tooze brings up a lot of very interesting points when dealing with the war economy. For example, the standard view is that Hitler kept the economy at a peacetime setting to keep the support of the German people and only switched to a "Total War" economy in 1943. Tooze however argues quite convincingly that Germany had switched to a "Total War" economy as early as 1939-41, i.e.: -production for the domestic consumer market was cut to the bare minimum; -around 85% of German men in their 20's were serving in the Wehrmacht; -once you add in German women who were working on their family farms, while their husband/fathers were away, the percentage of German women active in the workforce is basically the same as in the U.K./USA. Again the standard view is that the massive increase in armament production in 1942-44 is due to switching from a peacetime to a war time economy. The implication being that if Hitler had switched earlier, he might have won the war. However, according to Tooze, Germany was already in a Total War economy and the increase in production is due to better manpower use and reallocation of resources. In 1940-42, many arms factory only worked one 8 hour shift, not because Germany was in a peacetime economy, but due to lack of basic resources. Germany was facing a labour shortage, since so many men were in the Wehrmacht, and a shortage of basic raw materials. Raw steel production stayed basically the same from 1939 to 1944. Where Tooze's analysis gets a bit fuzzy though is in trying to explain the 1944 "Armaments miracle". He does not want to give any credit to Speer who he views as basically just a politician trying to build a bureaucratic empire. I agree that Speer's reputation is overblown, but he did have managerial skills. According to Tooze, the 1944 production figures boil down to: - increased workforce: the remaining German workers were working 80 hour weeks and there was a massive use of "Slave Labour"; -better allocation of raw resources: by 1944, Speer could allocate resources/labour which allowed him to kick start many projects like the V1/V2; -creative fudging of the books. This however, does not explain why Tank/aircraft production went up 3-4 times from 1942 to 1944. What is skimmed over in Tooze is that rationalization in programs (what was being built) and how they were built were both improved which had an impact, and the rationalization push came from Speer's department However, no matter my quibbles, I consider Tooze's book to be one of the most important book on ww2 to come out in a long time.

Agreed. Hitler's policies made war pretty much unavoidable. Some however have argued that the Nazi economy was a house of cards and that Hitler was forced to start the war to prevent economic collapse. Nothing in Tooze supports that analysis. Hitler could have stepped back from the brink at any time with the only cost being a recession and increased unemployment.

Tooze is a great book, chock full of interesting details, but I don't agree with all the interpretations. Germany did enjoy an economic boom in 1933-39. There were 6,000,000 unemployed in jan. 33. By 1939, unemployment was below 3% while in the U.S.A/U.K., it was still in the 10-15% range. The standard of living of the German workers improved, real wages went up and they were able to get better jobs as employment shifted from farm/mining to manufacturing/office jobs. Of course, there was nothing magic about the Nazi economic policies, they just blundered into Keynesian economics, massive spending on the military and infrastructure stimulated demand creating jobs and part of the unemployed were absorbed into the expanding Wehrmacht. In 1938-39, the German economy was hitting a wall, but there was nothing catastrophic about it. It is no different that what we see regularly with our own economies. First, there was a cash crunch, spending was too high and it was difficult to obtain foreign loans because of the international situation. However, that would have been easily resolved by cutting military spending and/or raising taxes, both of which would have resolved the economic issue. Hitler chose not to do it for political reasons, but there was a simple economic solution. Second, there was a severe balance of payment problem/foreign exchange shortage which was caused by the fact that the Reichsmark was pegged too high at a fixed exchange rate. Again, devaluating the RM or even allowing it to float freely would have solved many of these issues since it would have stimulated exports/lowered imports. The Nazis decided not to do it for political reasons, i.e. fear of a repeat of the 1923 currency collapse, but there was a simple economic solution.

so I rewatched "Valkyrie" last night, great movie. The color of the uniforms does shift, but there are explanations for this. WW2 German Uniforms were not uniformly grey, but grey-green to grey-brown, with variations in hue especially as the war went on. You can see how many of the principals have uniforms which have slightly different hue. Secondly, the filmmakers used a slightly washed out palette to give the film more of a WW2 feel, it is not as noticeable as in SPR or BOB, but noticeable if you look closely. Because of that the color of the uniforms changes constantly from dark brown-grey to grey-green to dark or light green depending on the lighting. Stauffenberg/Cruise is different since in the second half he wears a light grey uniform which shows up uniformly as grey.

As I recall there was a wide variation in color shading of wool used in Heer uniforms, from green to Brown grey. The early war uniforms were more greenish but officers had more freedom in choices of uniforms. For example, notice that Stauffenberg in the movie, as in RL tended to wear lighter grey uniforms. As to the movie itself, I find it very good and on the whole well made and accurate, but then it's hard to fault a movie that uses actual working Ju-52s. The teletype room which you see a few times is a faithful reproduction, many of the machines are of ww2 vintage.

don't know if this has been mentioned, monograph on the logistic problems faced by the Germans in the Ardennes offensive: http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA384410 very instructive

German Panzer divisions also worked on the same principles. The Germans had specialized fuel trucks, but they seem to have been used mostly by the Luftwaffe. Fuel for the Panzer divisions were transported usually in regular trucks: "d. DISTRIBUTION OF FUELS AND LUBRICANTS. Fuel from home fuel depots or from Field Army mobile reserves is directed to the railheads. Sometimes the fuel is kept loaded in tanker trains (Eisenbahntankstellen) near the railhead and transferred from these directly to fuel columns, but preferably it is laid down in 20- and 200-liter containers in Army Fuel Dumps (Armeebetriebesstofflager) forward of the railhead. From these dumps the fuel is taken forward to Division Fuel Distributing Points (Divisionsbetriebsstoffausgabestellen) or, in the case of some motorized and armored divisions, to Division Fuel Dumps (Divisionsbetriebsstofflager). Fuel is forwarded from the division area to lower echelon supply points and to fuel points that are set aside for the use of single vehicles (Tankstellen für Einzelkraftfahrzeuge): The latter may also be supplied from the army fuel stores. " https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Germany/HB/HB-6.html The 20 liter container is the German equivalent of the 5 gallon can, i.e. the original "Gerry can". The 200 liter container is a 55 gallon barrel. This was also used by the the British and Americans, but since it weighed about 330 lbs fueled loaded, it was a lot less practical. This is quote from the 1st Panzer division supply officer on how the division was kept fueled during the drive to the Meuse in may 1940.: "Retired Graf von Kielmansegg, who was the supply officer in charge of logistics for the 1st Panzer Division, looking back described the fuel supply movements during the advance to the Meuse River as “one of the toughest tasks” that he ever had to accomplish during the war.The main problem was a conflict between tactical and logistical requirements. Zeitzler demanded that all vehicles must pass not only the border of Luxembourg but also the Belgian border fully loaded with fuel. But, at the same time, the requirement of the operations officer of the 1st Panzer Division, Major i.G. [Walther] Wenck, was strictly to adhere to the time frame on the march movement table. There was to be no stopping on the move. Kielmansegg used an improvised system of gasoline can delivery to resolve that conflict. The fuel quantities needed for all the marching groups were calculated precisely and were then stockpiled in gas cans at the planned tactical rest halts along the hundred-kilometer march to the border. In addition, numerous trucks carrying gas cans were inserted into the spearhead of the march movement group. At suitable points, gas cans were simply handed to the crews as their vehicles slowly drove past. Thus, the next stop could be used for refueling— the empty gas cans were simply thrown out on the roadside at designated points. There they were picked up and refilled in the next fuel dump. In that way, it was possible to meet both requirements at the same time: all vehicles drove through the Ardennes fully gassed up with fuel, and it was not necessary to interrupt the march movement to refuel. " http://grogheads.com/forums/index.php?topic=16080.0

U.S. Army doctrine was similar. U.S. Armoured divisions had no organic fuel tankers, all gas was transported in 5 gal. cans. If a division was operating far from a supply point, it could have a Quartermaster company with fuel tankers attached, but the role of the QM company was to set up an intermediate supply point where it would decant its fuel into 5 gal. cans: "Class III, fuel and lubricant, supply points were established by the army on recommendation from the division G4. Since the armored division lacked organic fuel and lubricant vehicles, these supply points were within thirty-five miles of the most distant unit "B" trains. 25 Typically, fuel was supplied in five gallon cans which were filled and picked-up at the field army's supply point. For protracted operations, where a field army supply point would be too far away, the armored division required attachment of a quartermaster company, gasoline supply, to operate a division Class III supply point. 2' The quartermaster gasoline supply company consisted of fuel tank trucks that set up a divisional supply point and decanted fuel into 5 gallon cans." http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a241430.pdf (p. 21) 5 gallon cans were a wasteful and inefficient way to deliver fuel, but it was a very flexible system. The cans worked as both a temporary storage facility and fuel delivery system. You could setup a fuel depot anywhere, anytime in any quantity and fuel could be delivered to combat units by any available vehicles. U.S. First Army fuel dump near Spa, Belgium, Dec. 7, 1944. Specialized fuel tankers were always too few in numbers and were better used as transport from the permanent supply sources to the end fuel depots.

JonS, I have been taking a second hard look at this, but I do not think you are correct on the TOE. The organic 3 ton bulk petrol lorries in the Canadian armored regiments are I think just standard trucks used to carry 5 gallon cans. In the British Army and I presume the Canadian as well, specialized 800-1750 gallon fuel trucks were grouped in non-divisional "Bulk Petrol Transport" companies: "NON DIVISIONAL UNITS (SPECIALISED) Bulk Petrol Transport Company This provided transport for bulk petrol, usually on the Lines of Communication. Headquarters of a Mechanical Transport Company The headquarters will have the following additions Captain batman cook ACC In accordance with note 2 the Headquarters of a petrol tanker platoon has the following additions 10 ton 6 X 4 GS driver IC 3 X Transport Platoons. The vehicles could be 1,750 gallon 4 X 4 -2 (6ton semi trailers) tankers, 800 gallon 4 X 4 tankers or 800 gallon 4 X 2 tankers. Some companies operated a mixture of types. 2 X Relief Driver Increments Composite Platoon. This composite platoon only handles petrol and so the ammunition and butchery personnel are deleted serjeant butcher corporal butcher 2 X butcher corporal storeman (ammunition) RAOC 2 X storeman RAOC 1 X Workshop Platoon, Serial 2. If the Company operated 1,750 gallon tankers then at least one 3ton 6 X 4 Breakdown Lorry is replaced by a Heavy Recovery Tractor." If the British followed American doctrine, the role of the Bulk petrol company was to transport fuel to decanting points where it could be transferred to 5 gal. cans. Organic transports in the Armoured Divisions were regular trucks used to carry all sort of supplies, including gas in 5 gallon cans: "IN AN ARMOURED DIVISIONArmoured Brigade Company.Transport for the carriage of 2nd line scales of ammunition, petrol and anti gas reserves, and of supplies on single echelon on unit basis for units of an armoured brigade.Headquarters Mechanical Transport Company RASC4 X Transport Platoon with five sections of 3ton lorries (4 X 4)1 X Transport Platoon with five sections of 6ton lorries (4 X 4 – 2 semi trailers)1 X Composite Platoon with A, B, C and D increments3 X Relief Driver Increment 1 X Workshop Platoon, Serial 5On account of its size this company headquarters varies from the basic organisation in having the following additions2 X Captain2 X batman 2 X cookA serjeant ammunition adviser RAC attached." http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/23786-motor-transport-units-rasc/ see this also: "The transport of petrol. The system for the transport of petrol differed form that for supplies because all petrol was alike and was not perishable. There was no need for two echelons working a two day turn round. - Supplies of petrol were delivered to the divisional petrol refilling point by corps transport where it was held on wheels until collected by the divisional transport as required. The corps RASC held a reserve sufficient to move the entire division 25miles. - Forward of the divisional refilling point was a holding point where the second line transport held a reserve on wheels sufficient to move the entire division 50 miles. Second line vehicles also ran a shuttle service from the holding point to unit supply points so that petrol was always available when required. - On return journeys lorries should carry salvage in the form of empty jerricans. All petrol was in cans and a 3ton lorry could carry 160 jerricans. - There was less need of clerks, although deliveries were monitored so that fresh supplies could be ordered." http://ww2talk.com/forums/topic/23787-royal-army-service-corps-introduction/

As to why the Germans bumped up the max ROF, I do not know, but in actual battle conditions, the effective ROF was about the same, apparently 150-154 RPM when used as a LMG. http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/intelligence-report/use-of-mg42.html