Sgt Joch

Try one of the free demos to test.

it is more noticeable in the modern titles, roughly 1/3rd of all pixeltruppen in the U.S. Army in SF, BS and now CW are "African-American" or other visible minorities which more or less tracks their real percentage since minorities have always been over represented in the armed forces for economic reasons. You will also find minority troopers in the British, Canadian and Dutch forces in SF.

yes, there have been "visible minority" pixeltruppen since SF1 days. Here is a CW screenshot I took some times back.

Here is the FAC procedure in more detail. This is from late 60s/early 70s in Vietnam: 01preface.qxd (defense.gov) (pp. 316-317)

The Mavericks in CW are the early model with optical guidance which uses a low resolution black and white monitor. Accurate enough to see and target, but not enough to say if it is friendly or enemy. Plus you are talking about a single seat plane where the pilot has to do everything at once (except for F4 of course). The ability to be able to ID targets really began with the Pave Tack pods deployed in the F-111 and F-4 beginning in 1982. Currently the Maverick is probably too accurate for the period with a PK close to 100%, but that is another discussion. I may not have explained it properly. The game assumes there is an abstract airborne FAC so gound troops can call in air strikes, but the call goes to an airborne FAC, hence the delay. As it is the 13 min delay is probably too short, it should probably be in the 20 minutes range, but this is a game after all. That is a compromise that has been around since SF days since you have to account for helos, as well as fast jets. It basically means there is an enemy target around that spot, see if you can find it and kill it. We can argue about how big it should be, but it would not be realistic IMHO to have planes roaming all over the battlefield picking off enemy units at low risk to friendly units.

CAS could use some tweaking, for example allowing all dumb bombs to be dropped at once, but don't agree on wholesale changes. IMHO, daylight CAS is already too easy for the player. In this time period, as in WW2, it was almost impossible for pilots with their MK1 eyeball to ID whether a target was friendly or enemy or even in most cases even to spot the target. Planes are too high, too fast and too far away to do that. Because of that, USAF had a very strict policy that only FACs could call in air strikes, either a FAC on the ground on an airborne FAC orbiting the area. Requests from ground troops were never sent to the ACs directly, they would go to the airborne FAC who would ID the target and direct the strike. FACs would also generally mark the target with smoke, either rockets from the airborne FAC or artillery for the ground FAC. The time delay to call in strikes is already very generous to the player. According to USAF, the average time for an air strike was around 20 minutes. ACs would never be allowed to strike random targets on their own close to friendly troops, the risk of friendly fire was too great. What USAF would do is desigante free fire zones where every target was fair game, but these would be miles away from friendly troops, so outside the scope of CM. For those reasons, I don't agree with making area fire larger than the current size. I also don't agree with a linear bomb target, that is not how fighter-bombers, like we have in game, work, they would drop all their bombs at once.

known issue, already on 1st patch list.

On the ammo loadout, your argument would have more weight IF it had a practical impact on the game. As it is the T64 has no problem killing any US tank from any aspect.

just some quick things I gleaned from a quick look on the internet. -jan. 1980 report to Congress by Sec Def: estimate that 75% of Soviet tanks in CFSG are T62s; -CIA estimate that by 1983 50% of Soviet tanks in Western military district would be “modern” T64/72/80 which would mean 50% were still older T55/62s; -OOB from 1989 showing 23% of all Soviet tanks were still T62s. it is not too hard to crunch numbers and see T62s were not phased out as quickly as the Soviets wanted.

Well Amedeo, you are of course free to believe what you wish to believe, if you actually had hard verifiable numbers, I am sure you would share them with us. The article you quoted has been around for some time, there is also an English translation floating about. As the author states at the beginning, there many different opinions and he says what he writes is just his opinion. He also gives no hard numbers on the breakdown of tanks so it is not the definitive answer on the subject. As to the CIA report, these were estimates based mostly on open sources and the CIA tended to err on exaggerating the threat. We also know that T-72s were not deployed in the GSFG. edit: here is the English translation of the same article I believe: https://boardgamegeek.com/thread/2426107/soviet-tanks-gsfg You will note he says that many units were still equipped with T-62s in 1980 and that the Soviets realized they would not be able to manufacture enough T-64s to equip all units as quickly as they had planned.

M60A3 TTS and M1 have a thermal gunner’s sight and the commander has a repeater window to see what the gunner sees, no need to unbutton those models.

Well actually no one really knows, most of the info on the Soviet OOB comes from U.S. CIA estimates which are mostly guesses and some bits and pieces from the Soviet side, like the article you cited. I had seen estimates that as late as 1985, half of the Soviet tanks in Germany were still t-62s. The only thing we know for sure is that most Soviet tanks in the late 70s wereT-62s and the Soviets planned to replace them by T-64/80s by the early 80s, however due to economic, financial, production issues, the replacement stretched out until the late 80s, so it not hard to figure out that in 1982, most tanks in the GSFG were T-62s.

The problem with adding years is that it did not really work that way. This is not like WW2 where a model would come out, be obsolete in 6-12 months and replaced by a newer model. M60s were in service for a long time. By the time you get to 1980 ish, M48s and early M60s were obsolescent and were being withdrawn from front line service. The remaining early M60s in good shape were being upgraded to RISE Passive standard which could mostly be done in Army depots during regular maintenance. But the U.S. Army did not have a special designation for that, all seemed to have just been called M60 RISE Passive after conversion/upgrades, so technically there were very few original M60A1/RISE/RISE+ in front line service in Germany in that period. Mix seems to have been 75-80% M60A1 RISE Passive of total U.S. tank strength in Germany. So to be really accurate, BFC could have just modelled the RISE Passive and ignored all the early models. In game, the RISE Passive has the M735 and the newer A3s/M1 the M774. Both will kill Soviet Tanks, although the M735 has trouble killing T-64/80s from the front. Even on the Soviet side, most players don't seem to realize that the most common tank in the GSFG in the early 80s was the T-62 which apparently made up between 50-75% of the tank park.

On the U.S. side, this was extensively discussed (and argued) and the decision was made to model tanks/ammo as they originally were when the model came out. Keep in mind this is a what if game which allows you to pit various models one against the other. In real life, pretty much all U.S. M60A1s on the front line in Germany in the early 80s were the RISE Passive model, either factory originals or earlier A1 models that had been converted/upgraded to the RISE Passive standard.

The reason soldiers did not like self-loading rifles like the G41 is because they were more prone to jamming. With a bolt action rifle, the soldier manually loads each round so it is pretty much foolproof. In a auto rifle, generally gas from the firing of the previous round provides the energy to load the next round. On paper, sounds great, but if dirt or mud gets into the mechanism, not an uncommon occurrence in the field, it can jam. The last thing a soldier wants is to have to worry that his weapon will jam at the wrong time.

no, just uninstal what you have and do a fresh instal. No need to unlicense. If you have already activated, you should not have to activate again.

it does not always, we also sometimes get missing files. Redownloading usually solves the issue.

redownload the game Thomm.

Hi, that computer is just fine for CMx2. It is good value for the price. certainly, if you build your own, like many of us here, you will get more bang for the buck and more upgradeability, but it will be more expensive. A upper tier CPU will cost around $500, MB $400 and better graphic cards than the 2060 are impossible to get currently at decent prices because of crypto-miners. I have wanted to buy a RTX 3060/3070 for close to a year, but not a 2 or 3 times MSRP.

looks nice, I had read about this OP in Terry Copp's "Cinderella Army", looking forward to giving it a spin.

yes, AI artillery works the same as for the player, so any unit that has line of sight and can call in artillery may or will. For the Soviets, only FOs can call in the heavy stuff, but pretty much any HQ unit can call in mortars. The AI is very good and quick at calling in artillery, so act as if you were playing a human: don't bunch up your troops, don't linger in LOS too long and if you see a random spotting shot falling nearby, you can be sure a barrage is not far behind.

Well, trying to argue that Guderian was a liar to get Sturmtigers into a game is a bit...gamey. Pretty much all the top Nazis/Germans who wrote biographies after the war embellished their role in the war, but why would Guderian lie about such a minor point that only wargamers 70 years later would care about? Given Guderian’s position as inspector general of the Armored forces and then chief of staff at Hitler’s HQ, I would think he would have first hand knowledge about this. p.s. - I actually read his book a very long time ago, and unlike many other accounts by former Nazis.....I mean German generals, I thought he came off as very professional.

On the Sturmtiger , it is in CMFB since it fought on the Western Front although in very limited numbers, so it is not as if BFC did not want to build the model. As I recall, the original plan was to include in FR, but this was dropped because there is no reliable info it was ever used in action on the Eastern Front. Even if we accept all the evidence, you had maybe one or two that were present for a few days, not enough to justify their inclusion.

There is no indication that Russia would ever invade the Baltic States. If they do, they will be protected by NATO and we will have WW3 on our hands and the end of civilization as we know it since any all out war between USA and Russia will probably go nuclear very quickly...... The reality, and everyone has known it since 2014, is that NATO will not go to war with Russia over Crimea/Donbass.

while we are waiting for the invasion .... or non-invasion..., I thought some might enjoy this. I saw this some time ago, but it seems appropriate to this topic: "The “Moscow Rules”: Ten Principles for Working with Russia Russia’s actions and statements are guided by an understanding of the world that is consistent, and consistently expressed. And yet, they repeatedly cause surprise, alarm and dismay in Western capitals. Western leaders often find it hard to understand that Russian assumptions persist unchanged: that Moscow believes in a hierarchical, rather than rules-based view of international relations, spheres of influence and the limited sovereignty of neighbours, the ‘right’ to a defence perimeter extending into or well beyond the territory of others, a right to oversight of countries where Russian ‘compatriots’ reside, and a default to Darwinian assumptions when these principles are not accepted. This lack of comprehension of the fundamentally different Russian approach to international relations leads to errors that recur time and again in Western assessments of what Russia might do next, and how the West can best manage the relationship with Moscow. The following ten “don’ts” are based on decades of personal observation of Russia, and the study of centuries of its previous history. Taken together, they provide a set of rules for avoiding further expensive mistakes and unpleasant surprises when dealing with Moscow. 1. Don’t say “they wouldn’t do that, it doesn’t make sense”. Abandon any assumptions about what Russia might do that are based on what a Western liberal democracy would consider rational. Russia’s decision-making framework is bounded by an entirely different understanding of history, geography, social policy and relations between countries from that of the West. To understand the choices open to Moscow, it is critically important to see the world through a Russian lens, rather than be guided by what “makes sense” in Washington or Brussels. 2. Don’t confuse understanding Russia with excusing Russia. Russia is guided by its own distinctive sense of historical imperatives, and consequently an enduring sense of privilege to disregard commonly accepted norms of behaviour. But the conviction with which these views are expressed does not necessarily make them right, or provide an excuse when they are acted on in ways the West finds repugnant. 3. Don’t ask binary questions. Don’t ask about Russia “is it either this or that”, “either yes or no”. The answer is likely to be both, at the same time, or neither, or more. Dealing with Russia necessitates being comfortable with paradoxes and contradictions, and many things spoken and written about Russia are both true and not true at the same time. Consequently, when you ask “why does Russia do X”, don’t look for just one answer. There will be several reasons, some of which will overlap and some of which will contradict each other. 4. Don’t be distracted by bluster, bravado and bluff. Just because Russia makes a lot of angry noise about your plans or proposals doesn’t mean Moscow will not be prepared to live with them when they are implemented. Russia defaults to threats and feigned outrage in order to improve its negotiating position, because the West’s responses show that this sometimes works. Listen instead for changes in tone that indicate real concerns. 5. Don’t forget that Russia does not consist of just one man. The current leader in the Kremlin at any one time is not the problem if he is driven by persistent Russian beliefs and imperatives. The country and its leaders respond to internal and external challenges in ways that remain consistent over centuries; course corrections that accompany a change of leadership tend to be temporary aberrations. 6. Don’t just hope for “change”. Change in Russia is rarely as deep as it appears, and certainly not always for the better; so it is dangerous to assume that political change in Russia is desirable because it will necessarily be an improvement. Russia’s current behaviour towards other countries and its own citizens is reprehensible. But by historical standards, Russia is still in a period of unprecedented liberalism. It would be hard for things to get better, but it would be very easy for things to get far, far worse. 7. Don’t expect Russia to respect values and standards that were invented elsewhere. You can’t embarrass Russia over its behaviour at times when it places no value on its reputation. “Naming and shaming” has limited effect: it is important to “name” by continuing to call attention to Russian actions and holding Moscow to account for them, but do not expect Russia to feel the “shame”. What western liberal democracies think, or believe, or would like to happen is not a deciding criterion when Russia considers which course of action to choose. 8. Do not hope to appeal to Russia’s better nature. It doesn’t have one. Russia sees compromise and cooperation, with no evident and immediate benefit to state or leadership interests, as unnatural and deeply suspicious. This places strict limits on the potential for working with Moscow even on what may appear to be shared challenges. 9. Don’t assume that there must be common ground. It’s natural to search for these shared challenges, assuming there must be some way we can work with Russia on mutual interests. But there is a reason this search does not bring results, despite being conducted intensively throughout the almost three decades since the end of the USSR. Whenever it appears that Russia and the West could work together on a problem, it quickly becomes clear that not only Moscow’s understanding of the issue, but also its preferred solution and the methods it would favour to deliver it are entirely incompatible with Western norms, values and even laws. 10. Don’t think that you can choose whether to be at war with Russia or not. Sometimes de-escalation, taken to its logical conclusion, equates to surrender. At the same time, Russia will never be “at peace” with you. Normal relations with Russia include fending off a wide range of hostile actions from Moscow; this is the default state throughout history, and Western nations should by now be realising this is the norm. Taken together, these ten principles could help the West avoid repeating past errors in dealing with Moscow. This in turn would provide the basis for a relationship with Russia that is less hostage to misunderstanding and surprise." https://icds.ee/en/the-moscow-rules-ten-principles-for-working-with-russia/