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Haiduk

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About Haiduk

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  1. There is a main problem, that UKR army should't have this ammunition. Alas, despite my several reports since previous patches, this hasn't been fixed to this time.
  2. Soviet rifle division in offensive: Winter 41/Winter 42 - 7...14 km (mostly in one echelone) Autumn 42 - 4..5 km Summer 43 - 2...2,5 km (two or even three echelones) 44-45 - 1,5 - 2 km Soviet rifle division in defense: 6...14 km But, of course all depended from current tasks and situation
  3. The author used mainly sources for 2015 -2016 years, which were writen by "hot pursiut" and many information in that time was on the level of rumors, distortet or inaccurate. Also as I see "spoiled radio" effect, alas. I will point errors later. There is official Report of General Staff about Debaltsevo in Ukrainian. Enough detailed, useful, but biased according to political position - as I told almost no one word about eastern flank fights, also all guilt for Debaltsevo loss they put on 40th battalion, not on stupid decisions of Sector C HQ like to take away garrison of Lohvynove etc. True picture is possible to see by several articles (the author pointed some of them) of artillery spotter officer of 25th battalion with codename ArtyGreen and very detailed articles about battles (on tactical level) by Dmytro Putiata, but all this in UKR/RUS only. This is huge part of work to translate it, alas.
  4. No, that was tank battalion "Avgust", which also mostly consisted of Russians. Tank breakthrow had to support cossack company of 6th regiment, but they had low motivation and after several close hits of UKR shells rejected to attack. Wagner's convoy was badly beaten three days after near neighbor VOP "Serhiy" in 4 km to the north from VOP "Valera" (in the article mistakingly pointed that Wagner was defeated also by "Valera" garrison, but this is mistake of the source). Also 21st of Jan first attack on VOP "Oleksiy" was repelled. These three failed attempts forced the enemy to reject from the plans to cut off UKR group in Myronivske-Svitlodarsk line and shift own main efforts on other flank to Vuhlehirsk (rus. Uglegorsk). By unknown reasons official UKR version of battle recognizes the start of Debaltsevo battle from the moment of assault of Vuhlehirsk, cutting off all successful defensive clashes 21-28 Jan. Maybe because this version is profitable to our political establishment, which was explaining the loss of the city by total superiority of the enemy. Of course, examples of battles on eastern flank, when platoon-sized strongpoints were successfully repelling much stronger enemy attacks don't fit in this conception. Good article, but I'm again wonder how some western researchers write about some facts and even give the links on the sources, but if we open that sources, we will not see anything about it. I'm about this Svitlodarks was never captured. The enemy only shelled it two times 24th and 27th Jan. The source 43 says nothing about this, source 44 says "In fierce fighting on 23-24 January the enemy managed to seize the villages of Troitskoye and Svetlodarsk, posing a threat to the M-103 highway. Obviously, the goal was to completely surround the Debaltsevo group and take the road. However, the Ukrainian command was prepared for such enemy actions. A timely counterattack by Ukrainian armour allowed the Ukrainians to drive the enemy from Troitskoye and establish a reliable foothold there. Simultaneously the enemy was ejected from Svetlodarsk". I suppose the author was confused by unappropriate translation "ejected from Svitlodarsk". It means the threat was driven off the town vicinity (why village?), but not "enemy was expelled from the town itself". This is about enemy attemts to trumple our defense on our eastrn flank since 21th Jan. Again incorrect. There weren't "violent tank clashes", though yes, the usage oh armored vehicles in this battle was large. Enemy lost most of own armor on AT-mines, and could hit some UKR armor with tank guns and further with ATGMs, during UKR assault attempt, but that all had the "surprise!" characther, not controlled action. The company of 13th mot.inf battalion with tank and AT support, defended the Vuhlehirsk had the bad commander with CM COMMAND/MORAL level maybe -2, they also had not so good training and low than average motivation, more - after the assault started, commander left the battlefield. MT-12 crews of support even didn't stand to the guns. 9P149 Shturm-S reacted too late, when enemy already was in the town, so one was shoot out directly in the center of the town, when it drove to the own position, other either was abandoned by crew and destroyed or captured by the enemy, I can't сall to remind now
  5. No. Neither tankers nor even by the pipes through the bridge. Russian Kuban' region beyond the Kerch Strait hasn't enough water resourses to supply additionaly Crimea. In first years Russian administration of Crimea drilled many artesian wells, but large consumption quickly degrades theses wells and the place of fresh-water occupies sea water - this leads to soil salinization. Relatively better situation with water only in south Crimea, were the springs and rivers in the mountains, but growing migration and military bases will demand more and more water. Crimea peninsula is returning to the same condition, which was before Northern-Dnieper channel building - this will be again saline-steppes or half-deserts in the northern and eastern parts. Russians tried to throw discussion about water for Crimea in Ukraininan society, including through several media-figures of "People's servant" party, as if "we must give a water to our Ukrainian people in Crimea" and "we must prevent ecological disaster of our Crimea", but even the tips that we can give the water to ther Crimea summoned the storm in social networks, so this question luckily doesn't have the continue. For now. Yes. But it need to consider, many channel sections already out of service. Locals are looting large concrete plates of the chanel, the watercourse overgrown with bushes and trees for 6 years in many sections. Russians need to repair occupied section of the channel in order to the water could pass. So if they wil start any works - this will be first sign "the attack is coming". Though, they can attack first and then to start repair, as if "locals had several years of problems, so they can be patient one year more". Russian primary targets will be the сhannel gate near the Chervonyi Chaban village, which closes the water flow to Crimea, then the pump facility in Nova Kakhovka town, which serve the water in the channel and and Kakhovla hydroelectric power plant in the same town as well as the dam. Their secondary target can be some "security zone" that Ukrainian artillery couldn't hit electric plant, else the pumps will not be able to work. Also they should to secure or more probably just block the bridges through the Dnieper near Kherson. Though the area of Kherson oblast between Crimea and Kakhovka resorvoir is hard for fast advance of large number of armor, because there are many irrigation canals, limiting the maneuvers. Russians will be forced to break through along three roads, heading to Nova Kakhovka and Kakhovka towns. Crimea garrison hasn't enough forces to coplete this task, so air-assault units must be moved to Crimea first.
  6. This is a third warning during three months from different sources. Water crisis in Crimea will buid up very quickly. Most of Crimean water reservoirs already dried out by 50-70 %. From Russia to Crimea also already moved about 500 000 of settlers, that creates additional water resourse load. But for Russia is no matter to problems of local civilians - only one is important - stable and sufficient water supply on military units. Currently their supply is mostly normal, but who knows, what will be through the year, if the winter will be again without snow and too few rains in other seasons? Ukraine now is moving additional units to the South, also during the Caucasus-2020 will be conducted large Ukrainian maneuvers with participation of NATO units.
  7. By priority: 1. Blitzkrieg 39-40 with horses 11. European conventional conflict "sandbox", based on CMBS (+Ukraine with UNCONs, +Baltic states, +Poland, +СMSF2 NATO countries) maybe on CMx3 engine Turkey and France modules to CMSF2 7. Fulda Gap 5. Arab-Israeli 1973 12. Korea
  8. This is upgrade of SBR-3 "Fara", designed in 1969 and adopted in 1976. SBR-3 is portable version of PSNR-5 radar, which using in CMBS in BRM-1K and PRP-4 vehicles. There is one SBR-3 have to be in each Soviet rifle company (in HQ), but as I read, mostly this device didn't use, because for proper usage it demands a good trained operator. Merging SBR-3 to AGS-17 and different MGs took place in Afganistan and showed good results on group targets. New versions of SBR/PSNR has output to computer display, which simplify the work and indetnification of targets - in the original device operator listened attentively in radar squeaks and by chanhing of it tunes he can judge about the type of target and distance. In CMBS PSNR-5 works unrealistically precise. It shows real position of traget and it clear identification, but it should show approx position and general type (infanryman, group of infantry, armor, truck etc)
  9. Ahah it had recіpe like a pirates grog in Monkey Island
  10. The bottles with BGS of KS melanges were used actively in 1941 and early 1942, but with the increase of grenades and AT-rifles production, their use by the end of 1942 was reduced to almost zero. Large formations of partisans in 1944-45 already were well equiped and organized almost like regular troops, so they haven't need in Molotov for fight with the armor, except maybe some diversions.
  11. I read UPA fighters had many SVT rifles, gathered in 1941, but had short of appropriate ammo. They used old WWI bullets for Mosin rifle, stored since 20th years, but this quickly weared the barrel. So, I think passing 7,92 through the 7,62 barrel weared it much more. And this weapon modification possibly had a sense in first wave of Red partisan movement in 1941, when detachments, established by local Party and NKVD chiefs could suffer problems with ammunition. Most of these groups, especially in Western Ukraine, Baltic and partailly Belarus were eliminated by Axis forces. But when the second wave started, partisans got centralized command, established big units and actually turned out in "army behind the emeny lines" - they got enough weapon and ammunition, big detachments had good supply by air and this "hand-made" tricks with weapon were no longer needed. In most cases popular image "partisan with trophy MP-40" is cinema stereotype. Their main weapon was Soviet, foreign weapon used like secondary, except maybe some small detachments in deep rear. The tactic changed. It is a mistake to consider UPA only like partisan army. They initially planned a deployment in regular-type army from the partisan level, so in most cases stored captured vehicles, guns and even several airplanes - the weapon, useless for partisan actions. They tried to receive tactical field manuals about modern warfare. In 1944-46 UPA tried to fight like regular army - they operated like army structure and tried to use regular army tactic, adopted to own conditions. But since 1949 this was mostly classical guerilla, when main unit already was not a "sotnia" (company) but "boyivka" (big squad). They mostly used ambushes, night attacks, diversions, elimination of military, Party active and communist-followers. SMGs were most appropriate for such tasks.
  12. But they used by them. Large Red partisan groups received its by the air like more heavy artillery guns. Maxims transported on carts or packed on horses. As I read UPA memories, they appreciated Maxims for precision and continuous long range firing, but because of their weight, these MGs mostly used for defense and for machine-gunners training. Usual MGs for riy (squad) and chota (platoon) were DP-27 also in some less number used Hungarian 31M Solothurn, also happened Polish wz.28 (Browning M1916) and Chech ZB vz.26. MG34 and since 1944 MG42 considered more like platoon/company level weapon, though they could be and in squads. Interesting that in UPA exactly DP27 was favorite LMG. German MGs, especially MG42 had a problem, because of high rate of fire their barrels need of periodic substitution, but in conditions of parts supply impossibility, Soviet LMG was more firm in use. If we will back to Maxim type MMG, UPA also used Polish wz.30 (Browning M1917) and even WWI rarity probably Hungarian or Chech Schwartzlose M.07 In whole UPA used weapons of all countries, which units operated in Western Ukraine, so their equipment was very motley even inside one platoon or even squad. There is almost wasn't a problem to get and store a weapon in 1939 when Polish army collapsed or in 1941 when Red Army withdrew and left many weapons. Much more problem was ammunition to it. UPA High Command even was forced to limit a number of SMGs in squads, because ammunition for it shot out faster, than rebels could replenish stocks. Only when UPA was disbanded in 1949 and Ukrainian resistanсe crossed to small groups guerilla, almost all fighters in units got SMGs.
  13. This was short-time episode in mid of 1944, when Germans were leaving territory of Western Ukraine and UPA High Command at last allowed to commanders to negotiate with Axis units and make agreements "weapon in exchange on neutrality and safe pass without confrontations and on recon information about Red Army". Before this decision the same High Command restricted any contacts with Germans and several local commanders were executed for betrayal, when they tried to make contact with German units by they own. Most good relations was between UPA and Slovakian units, they often supplied Ukrainians with weapon and ammunition and as a rule sabotaged any orders of Germans, directed against UPA. Most bad relations were with Hungarians and Russian Cossacs in German service, so weapon from them Ukrainians got only in battles. UPA was established in the end of 1942, so most of weapon until this unofficial pact in 1944 were got from old stores, partially from OUN members in Ukrainian Shutzmanschaft, which by the order deserted from German service and went off to the forests. Further the weapon mostly captured in different actions against Red Partisan, Axis occupation forces and Armia Krayowa. After 1945 most of weapon already was captured Soviet. Лента за лентою - this also could be Maxim %) Though, most of weapon in 1943-45 was German/Hungarian with some number of Soviet, taken in in 1941. Unlike Red Partisans, UPA as well as their enemy Polish Armia Krayowa, operated in Ukraine territory, hadn't centralized supply and solved a problem with weapon and ammunition and as they could.
  14. Engineer units, reflected in the CMRT and assault engineers, which had Panzerfausts are differnt units. I don't know either assault engineers will be present in the module or not. You can read about them here: http://community.battlefront.com/topic/136836-soviet-assault-engineers-elite-infantry-in-bodyarmor/ Main difference between assault engineers and usual engineers (engineer-sapper) - the first were armed with SMG and had bodyarmor. They were much close to special assault units, than to sappers. But during urban combat Soviet troops formed assault groups, combined from different units. Their constitution can be different due to the task. Usually this was rifle platoon (company), reinforced with assault-engineer squad (platoon) and 2 (4-6) flamethrowers/Panzerfausts + 1-2 (several) guns/SP-guns and tanks. Panzerfausts were on aramament of flamethrower battalion of assault engineer brigade, so they can choose a weapon, appropriate for own task. Also some sort of "pocket MLRS" usually made - the device, which allows simultanous launch of dozen Panzerfausts in the target (in the fortified house, for example)
  15. Historically all captured German Panzerfausts and Panzerschraks were in service of engineer-assault brigades approx since the winter 1945. Rifle units never used it.
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