Vanir Ausf B

Machine translation of a summary:
 
 

Machine translation of a summary:
 
 

Sorry to interrupt the lively discussion about US politics, but I'd want to add my two cents regarding the Avdiivka situation.
Most likely, it will attempt to halt or slow down the current RU attack on the O0542 route. It is the most dangerous RU attack, with the potential to collapse the entire Avdiivka pocket rapidly. If 3rd manages to stop or slow this RU attack down, we could argue that 3rd indeed saved Avdiivka from quick collaps.
 
Most likely, Avdiivka is going to fall because the Russian gliding bombs (UMPK) have not been neutralized yet. Essentially, RU are simply leveling with UMPK UKR strong points that their meat groups encounter. The system works as follows: an RU meat group meets a UKR strong position, dies while the RU command watches it through drones and then RU command orders a bombing of the strong point into oblivion. A fresh RU meat group is then dispatched forward. So, given enough time and bodies, RU will capture the place that once was called Avdiivka. 
 
The situation is advantageous to UKR in Avdiivka. Avdiivka is the most fortified area in UKR. Even with UMPKs, the Koksohim plant and south urban areas are incredibly tough to breach, and RU losses are horrific.
The problem is there is a certain critical vulnerability that RU have found and are trying to exploit now. If they succeed, Avdiivka will fall swiftly. Much faster than it would be otherwise.
Let's discuss the overall situation and then look at my quick map.
RU failed to encircle Avdiivka via Stepove > Orlivka (north axis) and Vodyane > Tonenke (south axis). The assault via Tsarska Ohota (48.11372615890259, 37.77596770282691) toward the major urban area (that pipe infiltration) was originally successful but is now slow and painful. Finally, since the Azov Steel battle, RU want to avoid any major assaults on large plants such as Koksohim.
So, using their standard tactic of persistent pressure by meat groups along the front lines, they discovered the weak spot.

The O0542 road is the primary communication route for the Avdiivka defense sector. Assaulting via Avtobaza and Brevno is the shortest way to reach it. There are not many urban-style buildings in this village-style area. As a result, it provides sufficient concealment for assaulting RU meat groups while providing substantially less cover for UKR defenders against UMPKs.
If UKR manage to neutralize this assault they could hold Avdiivka a lot longer. So, I believe this is the reason UKR commit 3rd assault "to save Avdiivka".

I would strongly recommend Paxton's "Anatomy of Fascism" or John Ganz's online writings about anti-Dreyfusard and/or Boulangiste France. The model of fascism represented by Mussolini or Hitler is not quite what's happening to the GOP, subject as it is to the cultural and political mores specific to the United States. On the one hand, that's a good thing because the essentially immigrant/moderate/revolutionary/democratic foundation of the state makes blood and soil dictatorship a much harder prospect. But on the other, the United States also contains within it strains of racism and violent action that, should they ignite fully, can be positively Balkan. 
Luckily, there's one simple and decisive thing Americans can do. Vote. Vote for the current administration even if it isn't your cup of tea. Because if nothing else, it will remain within the normal bounds of politics. And (to remain on topic)...because it is far more likely to see the war in Ukraine to a positive conclusion. 

Acoording to updated information UKR Su-25, lost on 7th of Feb was shot down on 17th minutes of flight by R-37 long-range AA missle, likely from Su-35. This missile has 200 km of range and speed 6M . Other carriers of this missile are Su-27 and MiG-31BM  
For the lost pilot Vladislav Rykov ("Magic"), this was 385th combat flight.

https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/02/10/syrskyi-in-zaluzhnyi-out-what-to-expect-from-ukraines-army-reshuffle/
 
 

Nah it will not. If Trump get elected he can delay decision makings and troop deployment enough to get Europe tangled in a war alone. I don't understand how an idiot like Trump can compete in the race to white house but i'm not American.
The whole russian strategy is to isolate the USA, and i cant understand how are they that successful with it. It almost feel like you guys wanna lose the next major conflict of the human history.
NATO is a sheet of paper only held together by trust. If you guys betray that trust than you global hegemony will be lost. As soon as peoples around the world get a whiff of cowardliness from the USA they gonna look for other partners. Everything that makes you live on the level of standards that you accustomed is based on your country's hegemony. Once things go down they go down quick.
 
I don't know what you guys doing on the other side of the sea but everything seems messier by the week.

it wasn't even the dumbest thing he said.
The best comment of all though was from Nikki's husband
 

As I wrote, the sample is from WW2 Italy and North-West Europe. The only  failed attempt by the Allies to take a city that I can find off the top of my head in that period is Arnhem. Although even that battle can be described in reverse way as a successful German attempt to storm it from UK/Polish defenders rather than failed Allied attack. So certainly the majority of actions from Allied side would be successful attacks, and those which failed, are probably temporary repulses (e.g. 1st and 2nd Monte Cassino). If German battles are included (will try to check that) you may have Bastogne from the Battle of the Bulge
You are right that an failed attack on a city would probably have significantly different outcome in terms of casualty ratios, because for the attacker, the desired return on his investment in the form of POW harvest at the end does not happen. 
Also, I agree that these big success rates/low casualty rates in urban attack must be to a large degree the result of commanders knowing it is a difficult fight, preparing for it particularly well and going slowly. in addition to those second-order effects, the other factors are abundance of cover for the attacker and the posture of the defender, who is often determined to defend a city even from encirclement, so at the end of succesful attack, there is a large crop of POWs and all unevacuated wounded men and damaged equipment become permanent losses.

We critically need F-16. Problem of KABs have been becoming more and more dangerous month by month
This serviceman writes from Novomykhailivka, where Russian intensivley attack and drop many gliding bombs:
For the hour 17 KABs impacted, and I more and more looking for F-16 on the horizon 
Autumn photo of Novomykhailivka with two gliding bomb craters
The same serviceman: "Then [in Autumn] about 30 KAB were arriving for a day. More than 200+ bombs were dropped. No one di...k can't sit there. Two years Russians have been grinding it, the cities have fall, but Novomykhailivla still stood"

This is article of UKR OSINT group "Information resistance" (alas in UKR only) about number of KAB usage by Russians: https://sprotyv.info/analitica/taktichna-aviacziya-rf-rekordno-zbilshila-vikoristannya-kabiv/
According their information November of 2023 became a record month of KAB strikes - 1200 and one day - Nov 25th had daily record - 120 KABs. 
For the 10 day of February 2024 Russians aviation already dropped 460 gliding bombs. And this month can beat the previous record. Despite Russian gliding bombs don't have the same precisiosn like JDAM, but their quantity already turning to quality and our troops feel this on their own. 
Russian industry produce up to 50 gliding kits per day for FAB equipping. France is going to give us 50 AASM per month. Feel a difference...
The quantity of US JDAMs likely was also in dozens of bombs. And all they already dropped.  
 

We had usual FPVs, then "Mamont" - the "fat FPV" has appeared, now we have "Darts" - the "long FPVs". This is winged type-FPV, but not the same as Lancet - completely other architecture and control. 
M2 SBU unit already operates with them. Each "Darts" complex has 10 drones and control/transmitting equipment. There are no information except these drones can carry about 3 kg of load. Their range is more than usual FPV, but some less than Lancet. But this drone complex is more cheaper.

In other "serious" class of kamikadze-drones, some recently unknown UKR long-range jet drone was found in Russia

More evidences, that UKR has some new EW system, which can supress Shaheds and force them to land. One more almost undamaged UAV was found in Dnipropetrovsk oblast  
 
This statistic shows since Russians (or Iranians) two months ago made some improves in Shahed design - new black composite shell, integrated SIM card of UKR cellphone operators, which probably gives opportunity of inflight change of route wapoints, resultativity of UKR AD on Shaheds reduced on 1/3. Though, this can other reason - Air Forces Command didn't count supressed by EW and landed Shaheds as shot down. They are "drones, which didn't reach aims"

I used to work with tanks through the seventies and eighties. We were trained to basically unbotton from M47 all the way through M60A3, for situational awareness. We only had residual light amplifiers in the latter, though. It changed with Leo 2 of course. Especially in the american tanks visibility from the buttoned-up cupola was very bad. So far the real live expierence.

Amateur historian chiming in, so take it for what it's worth: yes with a but.
I'd suggest that there are two kinds of war, the second of which is relatively uncommon. I'd distinguish them based on what the victor gets at the end of the war.
The first kind of war is a war-for-things. The aggressor wants to take some things (which can be abstract things) from the defender. The victor gets to keep the things. For example, when the United States fought Mexico in the 1840s, that was a war for things. The victor kept Texas and California. Or the Roman conquest of Gaul: Caesar plundered everything that was not nailed down, and functionally annexed modern France to Roman rule. These are pretty common, and World War II was, from one side, a war for things: Germany wanted Lebensraum, Japan wanted the rich resources of the indo-pacific region (particularly oil). Note that I'm defining wars-for-things in terms of the spoils, not the rhetoric that surrounds the spoils. I'd note that modern war is so mind bogglingly destructive that rational actors have concluded that protracted war-for-things is a suckers game. There are no things you can get that are worth the destruction on the things you want!
The second kind, which is relatively rare, is a war-for-rules. The aggressor wants to impose (or maintain) a particular rule set on a collection of polities. The ancient examples of this would be Roman expansion in Italy (which ended with the defeated state bound into a treaty structure rather than obliterated) and the inter-Polis wars in Greece (which were by and large prestige competitions). The victor incorporates the defeated party into a particular rule-set. The objective is not to take things away from the defeated party.
We've also seen asymmetric combinations of the two. For example, Gulf War I. Iraq was fighting a war-for-things against Kuwait, but the Coalition was fighting a war-for-rules against Iraq (we did not annex Iraq at the end of the war, we said, "no annexing neighbors, bad Iraq").
So the war in Ukraine is a combination of these two. Russia is fighting a war-for-things against Ukraine. They are attempting to take the whole of Ukraine's territory, and stealing grain and people. Simultaneously, Russia is fighting a war-for-rules against the Status-quo Coalition. The rule change they're attempting to effect is a return to the "annexing-neighbors-is-ok" rule set that preceded WW2. Ukraine is fighting an existential war-for-things against Russia, and wins if they exist as an independent state at the end of the fighting. The Status-quo Coalition is fighting an existential war against Russia as well: the absolute lynchpin of the status quo is that annexing neighbors is not OK. If that rule falters, it will blow up the international order and allow a renegotiation of lots of the status quo by actors not enamored of the status quo (the Baltics, Taiwan, Africa, the Middle East, &c.). Victory of the Status-quo Coalition is deterrent: showing everyone that attempting to violate the international rule set is *just not worth it*.

@OBJ
I am convinced that Putin has no intention of stopping.  At the most he would take a ceasefire to regroup and rebuild, but right now he probably thinks he is winning and will not look for a ceasefire.  Any attempt by Ukraine to look for a ceasefire will be rejected - Putin is looking for a surrender, not a ceasefire.  Why would Putin stop now when everybody is dancing to his music including the United Nations and the United States Congress?
Putin himself reminds me of Macbeth:
"I am in blood / Stepped in so far that should I wade no more, / Returning were as tedious as go o'er"
He has no way back.

Well, I can't claim to be an expert in military history, world or any one nation's, or anyone's generals, but I do have the sense wars 'won' through exhaustion, tend to start up again as soon as one side or the other decides it is no longer exhausted. In the era of mobilized nation states, a ceasefire negotiated peace tends to leave the issues that caused the war in the first place unresolved. On the other hand, wars in which one side is utterly devastated, occupied and dictated a new form of government, those wars tend to be 'over,' the issues causing them being permanently removed.
So, if current fighting in Ukraine stops with a cease fire, possibly a negotiated 'peace,' show of hands, who here thinks that's the end of it, IF, what's left of Ukraine isn't brought into NATO and protected by article 5 before Russia reconstitutes? 
Do diametrically opposed political ideologies typically peacefully coexist for centuries, especially if they share a border? Is it worth differentiating between great power wars, minor power wars, minor power participation in great power wars and wars followed by a century or more in which the entire world geopolitical and technological situation changed?
Did the Allies really win WWI if they had to fight Germany/Axis in a much more destructive war 20 years later?
If NATO service chiefs are saying they need to be ready to fight Russia in 3-6 years, did the west really win the Cold War? Can a Cold War really be in the same conversation with a shooting war? Is deterrence the same as war? Is economic collapse without war the same as in a war?
I don't know but would guess the experts on any major power's national military history and past Generals are people having spent their professional lives (30+ years) making a career of it, in or out of uniform.
Again, I am no expert. I am interested in other's thoughts on above in relation to Ukraine.

Clearly, Drop Team Remastered. 
But no remake until 2031.
 

The things is, Grant had no intention of fighting a battle at Shiloh. The Union generals thought the Confederate army was 20 miles away and were taken completely by surprise.

Have to quibble: Grant did fight at the start of the war and he did not fight at all like Lee. He also had a very clear sense of the strategic goals of his moves right from the beginning. I agree that Lee made the calculation you did above but he was very muddy on how to get there. 

This woman is an angel, who help to defend Avdiivka. She is a citizen of this town. She supplies FPV drones, anti-drone EW and many other stuff for guys who defend this town. Her crowdfunding campaignns already brought hundreds of drones to defenders. But with lack of shells and under endless enemy attacks the need in FPVs, thermal sights, EW, drone detectors are huge. 
If anybody wants to help Avdiivka defense - you can donate to her. Her goal for next batch of drones, EW and sights is 100 000 $
PayPal:  yana.statna21@gmail.com 
 

Typical dirt road in winter Ukraine... Yesterday we had +10, today +1 and snow with rain. Only tracked vehicles will survive! 
 

Usually I ignore most of articles in WP/ NT about Ukraine, because many of them had been written by authors, who worked in Russia or had any relations with Russia and this is not journalistic, but sort of influence on public opinion and to sow scepticism. 
But this is article, despite had been written by "anonimous sources among UKR battalion and company commanders" (if I see "anononimous source", this is 50/50 BS) in whole reflects probably more significant problem, than artillery sjells shortage - the crictical lack of pesonnel in "line units" - those who hold positions and should go forward. Problems with mobilisation and failed information policy of the state in this sector led to army receive too few replenishment. And many of infantry, who come from Ukrainian tarining centers have very weak training. (My addition - existing 151st training center, established by volunteers and saved in endless wars with old soviet dumbs top brass from GS anD MoD gives very food training, but can't reterain more that 2-3 batatlions for one cycle)
In conditions, when units have 30-40 % of personnel, which have no normal rest, we can't think about any offensives, And if this not be solved in short perspective, this with addition of probable US aid termination can lead to very bad consequences
   https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/08/ukraine-soldiers-shortage-infantry-russia/

This is very sad, but looks like Avdiivka battle comes to the end and, alas, not in our favor (not counting about two divisional vehicle sets, which Russians lost here). 
During last three days Russians captured quarry area on the NE of the town and gained foothold in dachas and first streets of northern part of Avdiivka. Yesterday they broke through overpass bridge in front of coke plant. Also reportedly for last two days Russians dropped on Avdiivka about week amout of gliding bombs. 
110th mech.brigade, defending the town itself is completely exhausted, drone operators almost don't sleep by days - FPV attacks and Mavicks maintaining resistance in conditions of artillery shells shortage. But bad weather in last days limited their flights and this immediately gave opportunity to the enemy, having overhelming advantage in manpower. Russians continuously replenish own troops with fresh meat, they go forward, die and next meat come behind of them, death conveyor is working, but Russians achive own goals in this way. 
Our artillery near Avdiivka keep almost full silence already four days - no shells. So 110th brigade command moved to positions as riflemen almost all rear services soldiers, because no more opportunity except FPVs and contact clashes to hold this horde. 
But not only ammunition shortage led to this situation. 
- OTUV "Tavria" command (gen.Tarnavskyi) again repeated all mistakes of Bakhmut defense. Expecting that Russians will assault stronpoints (like factories in Bakhmut and coke plant in Avdiivka) directly, when they use enough flexible tactic and after first fails attacked on flanks, made many bogus small assaults to confuse about real attack directions
- passivity of OTUV "Tavria" comamnd, as far as before October, when Russians recently captured Krasnohorivka and began to fill this northern "balcony" above Avdiivka with troops. 
- no reserve fortifications on flanks of Avdiivka. Only when Russians crossed railways, we started to establish some positions, but in conditions of unstable weather when frosts change themeselves with rains and mud it was belated idea
- manpower lack and fatigue. 110th brigade two years fights in this place and never was rotated for rest in full composition. Other units, who were moved here from Zaporizhzhia front also weren't rested and replenished after summer clashes, when Russians continously were replenishing own units. 
- weak air defense capabilities. For whole Avdiivka battle Russians lost only one aircraft. 
The map of northern part of Avdiivka for 5-6th of Feb. Avdiivka is on 90 % is private 1-2 storey cottages, only on the south east from coke plant there is small "Khimic" ("Chemestrian") micro-district with multistorey urban type buildings for coke plant employees. These are so-called "Old Avdiivka" and "New Avdiivka"
 

From Financial Times

BTW, to echo @Anthony P.s excellent points above, the guy in the video has a website (linked in the video description) containing a wealth of Soviet primary source material. But he is absolutely not an impartial investigator. He presents information that supports his narrative, ignores everything that doesn't, and is hostile to anyone who questions the data.

And if it gets shot down on the way, it will double as a coffin.
A big part of why drones are so successful is that they are so small that they are almost impossible to spot and hit at range. This one, not so much.