17. SS-panzer Grenadier-Division

[Vark]

Aha, got it Blackcat, my mistake. Was it ever conceivable that Caen could have been taken on D Day? I need to read more on this campaign but are you saying the modern historians are overly critical or stripping aways years of official propaganda (I read it's one of the reasons why Patton and Monty disliked each other, they both asiduously cultivated a media image)

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Vark, In my experience there aren't many people around who accept that the plan mostly worked, as YankeeDog seems to do. Indeed most modern commentators seem to reject that tieing down the German armour in the East was actually part of the original plan and insist that Montgomery invented that idea during the battle to cover for 21st AG's failure to take its early objectives and to make much progress.

on the other hand, if you read for example Canadian military journals, they are quite clear on how the Canadians triumphed in stopping the Germans around Caen. :confused:

it's quite common to see on boards like these the "looolz" about how one or two Allied battalions (supported by TDs) singlehandedly destroyed foolish death-rides of panzer divisions (which then grow on to become panzer corps in these legends). of course when one looks at the events in detail, it turns out the panzer div/corps is actually basicly 3 infantry battalions supported by a panzer coy. and that they happen to stop and push back enemy force that is the equivalent of full-TOE oversized panzer corps on steroids.

thus the discussions are usually counterproductive when they deal with operational level affairs, so it might be more useful to stay as close to the tactical level (in wargame terms) as possible. i of course myself most guilty in posting absurd theoretical blah blah.

i really like the op post (and the replies in the same tune) of this thread, as it was strictly factual without stepping into the murky lands of general evaluation of the actions and operations.

[YankeeDog]

Aha, got it Blackcat, my mistake. Was it ever conceivable that Caen could have been taken on D Day? I need to read more on this campaign but are you saying the modern historians are overly critical or stripping aways years of official propaganda (I read it's one of the reasons why Patton and Monty disliked each other, they both asiduously cultivated a media image)

With the benefit of hindsight, I think it was definitely possible. Caen was not well defended on June 6, most German units in the area were caught flat-footed, and if the first British units off the beach and taken the risk and moved aggressively to take the city, I don't think the Germans could have stopped them.

But the British units on the ground on June 6 did not have the benefit of hindsight, and whether this objective was really prudent and realistic, what with all the uncertainty of Fog of War and the inevitable application of Murphy's Law, for them to make it all the way to Caen on June 6 or 7 is another debate entirely. Probably a subject for its own thread.

Heck, with a little better execution and less meddling by Der Fuhrer, it was also definitely possible for the Germans to take Moscow in the fall of 1941. But this doesn't necessarily mean it was prudent to set this as their strategic goal.

Had the British taken Caen and the heights immediately South of it early, the Germans probably would have thrown everything they had to try to dislodge them from the city; this is probably the fight the Allies anticipated happening in their pre-invasion planning.

[Nidan1]

I think Allied planners had a pretty good idea of the disposition of German forces before the invasion. Therefore they must have known of the existence of the Waffen SS units like the 12th SS and the Leibstandarte in the Commonwealth sectors.

The fact that the British and Canadians became embroiled in one pitched battle after another with high quality German units did accomplish what was either part of the initial plan or something that developed later after the invasion, keeping the German armored formations tied down, so that the American units could build up sufficiently to effect a breakout from the bocage country.

[Boche]

it the topic of the 17ss PGs, and the author of the thread seems to have a book on them.

do you by any chance know what recon assets the division had as of 10-11 june ?

[Blackcat]

Aha, got it Blackcat, my mistake. Was it ever conceivable that Caen could have been taken on D Day? I need to read more on this campaign but are you saying the modern historians are overly critical or stripping aways years of official propaganda (I read it's one of the reasons why Patton and Monty disliked each other, they both asiduously cultivated a media image)

Could Caen have been taken on D-Day? I don't think so. Leaving aside any German response, the practicalities of getting the units through the beach zone, formed up and moving in time to march to Caen were such that the task was impossible. Then there is the issue of the training and experience of the units assigned to the task.

I am not sure how much Montgomery really believed in the possibility of his deep armoured thrusts on day 1, but we will never know.

As to the historians. My view is that history has fashions and historians have axes to grind, papers to publish and books to sell. So the perceived wisdom goes in cycles for a least a generation or two after the main players have died (and sometimes for centuries). I fancy the Normandy campaign is undergoing one of those swings where the likes of D'Este, Hastings et al are regarded less highly as another generation of scholars go back to primary sources and re-evaluate what went on and why. A good example would be John Buckely's book "British Armour in the Normandy Campaign" (ISBN 0-415-40773-7), which lucidly and convincingly comes to very different conclusions then the previous generation of historians.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

But, in the initial stages of the campaign the Commonwealth units were pitched up against the most combat effective German units, at least on paper, why was this? Was it the Allied plan that they fought the armour (they had more effective AT capabilities with the 17lber, experience etc, were these factors, not realities but factors in the initial planning?), or did the German response just mean they were the poor sods who suffered the attentions of the majority of armour?

it's good to keep in mind that the Allies pushed 9000 tanks and SP TDs into Normandy.

it doesn't really matter what the Germans do, the Allies have all bases cowered (they lost 3000-4000 of the 9000 and it didn't even make a dent).

initially Germans concentrated armor on the sector because they wanted to split the Allies in two.

then they concentrate the armor on the sector where the Allies are putting up a fight.

they also expected Allies to breakthrough and exploit towards east-southeast and did not expect a breakout shouldering the sea at west.

--- offtopic warning ---

personally i think this Allied plan (hold Germans at east and breakout at west) is strange. if it's existence wasn't somewhat proven by wartime documents i would say it's absolutely ridiculous to claim someone would make a plan like that.

[Narses]

But, in the initial stages of the campaign the Commonwealth units were pitched up against the most combat effective German units, at least on paper, why was this? Was it the Allied plan that they fought the armour (they had more effective AT capabilities with the 17lber, experience etc, were these factors, not realities but factors in the initial planning?), or did the German response just mean they were the poor sods who suffered the attentions of the majority of armour?

I do feel some on this forum are overly sensitive to any suggestion that 'their side' did less at any particular time during an operation and seem to forget it was a joint effort. Robust debate should not needlessly antagonise, but surely it should not have to have every statement qualified. If offence is given and there was no malicious intent a swift apology or clarification should be all that's needed before resuming the main thrust of the debate.

To repeat my earlier post the positioning of the invasion forces were done based on the location in England of the forces. Ike's Chief of Staff (Bedell Smith) is referenced as saying it was because the US Forces were in cantonment ares in southwestern England and thus in position to take the Cotentin area. This could not be changed given the huge size of the forces and material.

[JasonC]

URD - I don't think the allies lost 4000 tanks in Normandy. I know for a fact the US lost less than 1000 mediums (Shermans and TDs combined), and would break even 1k only by counting Stuarts and such. Brit losses may have been higher, but not by any huge factor.

As for whether things went according to plan, no not really. The plan expected ground to be taken on the Brit front by mid June at the latest that was not actually taken until late July, or after the US breakout. Taking Cherbourg went according to plan. Several British front attacks in June and July were meant to break out into the operational rear as actually happened in Cobra, but failed to do so. Some of the early ones because the Germans threw in reserves, the last despite every advantage in supporting arms and in odds, largely due to tactically inept uses made of massed armor. The "explanation" (which is charitable) that this was just meant to tie down German reserves is revisionism and excuse making. Montgomery was quite clear to all his higher ups that he intended full fledged breakout on those occasions. When he didn't deliver, he fell back on the "at least using up their reserves" defense.

[Narses]

it the topic of the 17ss PGs, and the author of the thread seems to have a book on them.

do you by any chance know what recon assets the division had as of 10-11 june ?

The SS-Panzeraufklaerungs-Abteilung 17 was organized with 5 companies:

1 (PzSp), 2, 3, 4 (Aufkl), 5 (schw).

This unit started moving on 7 June and was past St Lo by 8 June.

Since this division did not seem to have SPW (250 or 251) haltracks and the Marders and Stugs were on flatcars as part of the PAK Abteilung I don't know what was in the 1st or 5th company of the Aufklaerungs Abteilung. But CMBN has a correct Aufklaerungs set of units.

It seems to me the 5th Co should have mortars or towed 7.5cm le.IG at least.

Hope this helps.

[Pete Wenman]

Originally Posted by boche

it the topic of the 17ss PGs, and the author of the thread seems to have a book on them.

do you by any chance know what recon assets the division had as of 10-11 june ?

Wood & Dugdale show SS-Panzeraufklaerungs-Abteilung 17 as at 01/06/44 having

1.Ko Armoured Car Co)

2x Sdkfz 222, 11x Sdkfz 223, (but interestingly 13x 2cm KwK, which the 223 did not have !) and 31 LMG

2.Ko (motorised Recce Co)

20 x LMG, 4x HMG, 2x 81mm mtr,

3.Ko (motorised Recce Co)

20 x LMG, 4x HMG, 2x 81mm mtr,

4.Ko (motorised Recce Co)

20 x LMG, 4x HMG, 2x 81mm mtr,

5.Ko (Heavy Motorised Co)

13 x LMG, 3x 7.5cm Pak (towed), 1x 2cm Flak Gun (towed), 6x flamethrowers.

On 15th June the Division as a whole had

13 out of an authorised 18 2cm KwK

93 out of 99 81mm mtr

102 out of 110 HMG

930 out of 1044 LMG

22 out of 27 Pak 40

By 7th July the Panzeraufklaerungs-Abteilung was down to 6 armoured cars only, so it would suggest it was in a pretty good state as at 10th June

HTH

P

[undead reindeer cavalry]

I don't think the allies lost 4000 tanks in Normandy. I know for a fact the US lost less than 1000 mediums (Shermans and TDs combined), and would break even 1k only by counting Stuarts and such. Brit losses may have been higher, but not by any huge factor.

some months ago i tried to get a figure (for nth time) by combining various reports and got something like 3300 (IIRC) by end of August. Zetterling gives 4000 (again IIRC) but i don't have his book with me now and i can't remember what dates he used and so forth.

it doesn't really matter if it's 2000, 3000 or 4000 what comes to the point that Allies had so many tanks in Normandy that there was very little the Germans could do about it. no matter where Germans would concentrate their own armor, they would be more than matched on the Allied side. their best chance would most likely have been the opposite of offence -- to do some sort of back-hand blow, forcing the enormous mass of forces to uneconomical maneuvers.

[sburke]

Unfortunately the back hand blow isn't going to work against an opponent more mobile than you with command of the air. The German advantage in the East in mobile warfare did not apply in the West. You also have to be able to trade space for maneuver room. If Germany allowed the Allies to breakout of the lodgement area there was no way of putting the genie back in the bottle.

[Boche]

wow thanks for the detailed explanation

[Vark]

Jason, have you read the Psychology of military incompetence? Especially interesting the chapter on Monty and the profile he constructs.

[JonS]

Could Caen have been taken on D-Day? I don't think so. Leaving aside any German response, the practicalities of getting the units through the beach zone, formed up and moving in time to march to Caen were such that the task was impossible. Then there is the issue of the training and experience of the units assigned to the task.

Those are all very good points. Yet, I still think that Caen might possibly have been taken on a different D-Day.

We all recall that the weather was very marginal for launching the invasion at all. The big meeting early on the morning on the 5th, GpCapt Stagg giving his forecast, some dissension as to whether OVERLORD could be mounted at all, the Ike grabbing his cast iron ones in his hands and saying "I don't like it, but I see no other choice. It's Go!"

So we all know that part of the story. But everyone then usually just sort of drops the weather from their consciousness. But the weather continued to have a huge effect throughout the day. The airborne landings on both flanks were scattered and in trouble because of it. The DDs and howitzers on OMAHA were lost because of it. And on SWORD - the beach going for Caen -

it turned a nice wide beach into carmageddon when the winds pushed the tide right up, virtually eliminating the beach itself, and preventing vehicles and units moving and getting off the beach. And that effect continued throughout the day - worst at high-tide, obviously, but noticeable all day. And, of course, high tide, when the worst effect was, was right about the time that the units designated to go for Caen were trying to sort themselves out.

Then on top of that, to paraphrase Grant, the Germans had their say.

So, on a different D-Day, with better weather and freer movement on and off the beaches, could they have got to Caen? Maybe.

Nevertheless, I still think that setting ambitious goals was absolutely the right thing to do. On all the beaches. SWORD was supposed to get Caen on D-Day- they failed. OMAHA was supposed to get St Lo within a couple of days - they failed. UTAH was supposed to get Cherbourg within about 10 days - they failed.

They all failed. But they only failed to get the objectives of the plan on the time-scale envisaged by the plan. They all succeeded in fulfilling the intent of the plan and achieving the most crucial element of the plan - establishing a sound beachhead - and they all succeeded in securing their objectives, albeit a bit late.

[Vark]

Blackcat, damn another book to purchase! Had this title recommended before by other posters, have little time for revisionist historians, axe to grind? More like an armies worth of bardiches! Alas, sensationalism sells, as does Brit bashing, sigh!

[JonS]

I think Allied planners had a pretty good idea of the disposition of German forces before the invasion.

They had a reasonable idea (although not complete) of where divisions were, but they didn't have a very good idea of how these divisions were constituted, except in the most general terms.

[JonS]

Blackcat, damn another book to purchase! Had this title recommended before by other posters, have little time for revisionist historians, axe to grind? More like an armies worth of bardiches! Alas, sensationalism sells, as does Brit bashing, sigh!

Buckley's 'British Army in Normandy' is very good. As is his 'The Normandy Campaign', an edited collection of presentations from two symposiums.

[Nidan1]

Unfortunately the back hand blow isn't going to work against an opponent more mobile than you with command of the air. The German advantage in the East in mobile warfare did not apply in the West. You also have to be able to trade space for maneuver room. If Germany allowed the Allies to breakout of the lodgement area there was no way of putting the genie back in the bottle.

There is an interesting quote from a 17th SS Staff Officer in the book, "The Germans in Normandy" by Richard Hargreaves, that describes air attacks by US fighter bombers on a 17th SS column moving into the Normandy area.

Apparently they were not that used to being harassed like that from the air, and they finally halted their move and pulled all serviceable vehicles off the road. All the men stayed under cover. This was their first expossure to their new opponents.

Allied command of the air certainly prevented adequate movement and manuever by German forces throughout the Normandy campaign.

[Nidan1]

They had a reasonable idea (although not complete) of where divisions were, but they didn't have a very good idea of how these divisions were constituted, except in the most general terms.

They certainly knew which were armored formations, no?

I remember a scene from "Band of Brothers" when they saw some German bodies and realized they were Fallschirmjaegers. At the grunt level they were probably never informed as to who would be on the ground that they were dropping onto, other than that they spoke German.

Sometimes we, with all the knowledge and documentation we have now, assume that those people involved in those events knew as much as we think we do.

[JonS]

They certainly knew which were armored formations, no?

Yes mostly, but they grossly over- and under-estimated their capabilities. The Germans had ... twelve? panzer divisions in and around France. They were all different in terms of OoB and ToE. [edit: less than 12. I was counting 9 and 10 SS which didn't arrive till later, although they too had different OoB and ToE]

Sometimes we, with all the knowledge and documentation we have now, assume that those people involved in those events knew as much as we think we do.

Yep. Allied intelligence in 1944 was astonishingly good, but compared to what we know know they were fumbling around like a blind man in a locked room listening to white noise at 120dB.

[Narses]

Yes, but they grossly over- and under-estimated their capabilities. The Germans had ... twelve? panzer divisions in and around France. They were all different in terms of OoB and ToE.

Yep. Allied intelligence in 1944 was astonishingly good, but compared to what we know know they were fumbling around like a blind man in a locked room listening to white noise at 120dB.

Another issue is those "elite" divisions were in bad shape. France was used as the R&R location for East Front units. Only 21 Pz and 2 Pz were just about fully up to speed on personnel, training and equipment. For example 2SS Pz on 15 May was short 2000 trucks, all its authorized SPW (326) and 90 PzIV and 72 V's. By 1 June for this divison some things improved like receiving 235 SPW and having a few more panzers but still only 617 trucks.

1SS Pz was only transferred from the East Front in April 44 and like 2 SS was short of everythhing . On 1 June it had only 38 Panthers and 42 Iv's but did have 44 Stugs and over 1000 veterans were in Germany for training.

Even Fallschirmjaeger-Rgt 6 with a mostly veteran cadre had only 70 French truck of 50 different types !! But it did have 4000 men - a big rgt - but a bit weak in artillery.

[Nidan1]

Yes mostly, but they grossly over- and under-estimated their capabilities. The Germans had ... twelve? panzer divisions in and around France. They were all different in terms of OoB and ToE. [edit: less than 12. I was counting 9 and 10 SS which didn't arrive till later, although they too had different OoB and ToE]

.

I read that SS Armored formations in the East, namely Viking and Totenkopf were filling out their tank battalions with StuGs because of a shortage of actual tanks in 1943-44. Also SS formations were being transfered from East to West in anticipation of the invasion, and taking most of their tanks with them.

If you look at German tank production throughout the war, for the most part German industry maintained a reasonable production rate, even under air bombardment. So Waffen SS formations in the West did not initially suffer from lack of armor, they were really short of qualified infantry.

[Narses]

it's good to keep in mind that the Allies pushed 9000 tanks and SP TDs into Normandy.

it doesn't really matter what the Germans do, the Allies have all bases cowered (they lost 3000-4000 of the 9000 and it didn't even make a dent).

initially Germans concentrated armor on the sector because they wanted to split the Allies in two.

then they concentrate the armor on the sector where the Allies are putting up a fight.

they also expected Allies to breakthrough and exploit towards east-southeast and did not expect a breakout shouldering the sea at west.

--- offtopic warning ---

personally i think this Allied plan (hold Germans at east and breakout at west) is strange. if it's existence wasn't somewhat proven by wartime documents i would say it's absolutely ridiculous to claim someone would make a plan like that.

I have a report showing during June, July, August the US lost 895 tanks (all types) and the British/Canadians 1535. Cannot verify this but it would seem legit that the Brit/Can lost more faced as they were around Caen by the main German armor. I'm assumig these are total write-offs - maybe but report doesn't say.