CM1 to CM2 transition. CM2 continued authenticity to WW2

[DavidFields]

As an American, when I used to travel to Europe (usually Suisse), the first day my mind would be filled with "the cars are like American cars except....", "the supermarche is like a supermarket except....", and similar, until at some point my mind "switched over"--and realized the place was not "like" anything. Things in Europe were just the way they were supposed to be, European. It was not a case of better or worse. There was no reason for comparison.

It was at that point I felt I had stepped across from being a tourist to more being a local.

My guess is that a similar thing will happen with my CM2 transition. My mind will crave to make a connection to something familiar to CM1, as a way of guiding me as to what to do. But at some point I will finally let go--it's not CM1. It is CM2.

The great thing on these boards is that CM:BN seems to be considered playable, and excellent to play. That is markedly different from the launches of other games I have seen--my guess there are people at Battlefront who could be traumatized by re-reading the early postings after CMSF came out.

I will only mention something in passing, not as a criticism--but as an observation to be kept in mind when further developing CM2 WW games. The tutorial felt to me like CMSF, or modern tactics, dropped into a WW2 game--With its "overwatch", and "fire base" terminology. CM:BN is not CM1, but it is also not Iraq. What percent of WW2 small-arms units could pull off, and how many WW2 militaries understood, a overwatch-suppression-flanking-assault maneuver (as opposed to the more primitive "fire a bunch of innacurate artillery, and attack")? Effectively use A-B-C squad teams?

We are generally losing our WW2 veterans, and I don't know how many are employed at Battlefront, but I hope we can retain the feel of desperate, but poorly trained, drafted, infantry, unlinked from effective communication from their artillery, having to keep together or else some of the soldiers would sneak off to take a smoke or look into a farm house for food, sick, wet, not having heard from home for months, told to attack a machine gun nest.

They might be the "maneuver group", but I am not sure that was how the fighting was descibed to them at that time.

[ChrisND]

What percent of WW2 small-arms units could pull off, and how many WW2 militaries understood, a overwatch-suppression-flanking-assault maneuver (as opposed to the more primitive "fire a bunch of innacurate artillery, and attack")? Effectively use A-B-C squad teams?

Infantry Field Manuel, June 2 1941:

CONDUCT OF ATTACK.--

Fire and movement.--

The approach march formation is maintained by the leading platoons until they are compelled to fire in order to advance

...

At the first firing position each attacking platoon seeks to gain fire superiority over the enemy to its front by subjecting him to fire of such accuracy and intensity that the hostile fire becomes inaccurate or diminished in volume. Battalion supporting weapons and artillery assist by fires on the hostile forward positions (unless masked by the attacking platoons) and by neutralizing rearward hostile elements which could fire on the attacking echelon.

...

Further advances are made by infiltration, by successive rushes of fractions of the leading squads and platoons, or by maneuver of rear echelons. The movement of advancing elements is covered by the fire of those remaining in position and by the fire of company and battalion supporting weapons and of artillery. Every lull in hostile fire is utilized to push groups forward and occupy the natural strong points of terrain from which fire, particularly that of automatic weapons, can be delivered. This combination of fire and movement enables attacking rifle elements to reach positions from which they can overcome the enemy in hand-to-hand combat.

Because of unequal resistance by the enemy, differences in terrain, and variations in the assistance received from supporting fires, some units will be able to advance while others are held up. A platoon or company not stopped by fire pushes on to capture the final objective, even though adjacent units have been stopped. This advance outflanks resistances holding up adjacent units, frequently enables light machine guns to be placed in positions from which they can deliver flanking or oblique fire on the hostile resistance, and may permit company supports to be moved into the gap to envelop the enemy or gain his rear. Islands of resistance are thus overcome by combined frontal and flanking action.

[Andrew H.]

Also (from the same field manual) -

Fire and movement.--

When the platoon comes under effective small-arms fire, further advance is usually by fire and movement. The enemy is pinned to the ground by frontal (and flanking) fire, under cover of which other elements of the platoon maneuver forward, using all available cover to protect themselves against hostile fire. In turn, the original maneuvering elements may occupy firing positions and cover the advance of the elements initially firing. The platoon leader hits weak spots in the enemy position by having his support attack against the point of least resistance, or by maneuvering his support around a flank to strike the enemy with surprise fire on his flank or rear.

And this does seem to correspond to what happened historically. As does the frequent use of artillery - the US issued radios down to the platoon level and were able to call artillery on very short notice.

But - to turn to the real point - I think it may only be the training scenario that is making you think of CMSF...in the regular scenarios the Germans are much less compliant.

[WillLight]

He he... if you remember Ubisoft's Brothers in Arms game, Fix and Flank was the one and only game mechanism in there

[LJFHutch]

He he... if you remember Ubisoft's Brothers in Arms game, Fix and Flank was the one and only game mechanism in there

You mean Find, Fix and Flank, the three F's soldier!

[DavidFields]

I am not really arguing here, but, Normal Dude: Doesn't the language in "Conduct of Attack" almost sound, as a bit of hyperbole, like Chaucer? I note that Battlefront did not use it for the manual.

Do you see the terms "overwatch", or "fire base" in that description of attack?

I am not saying the concepts were not there: the double envelopment is as old as the Romans.

But I think the "attack with overwhelming firepower and with minimal losses" evolved between Pickett's charge, WW1, WW2 and now. For the grogs: What is the single day largest casualty count for a European or American power since 1945?

The US in WW2 means 1944, unless you count Torch--and there is a lot of embarassment if one includes that campaign. (Ok, Sicily--better).

Let's be friendly. Can we agree that WW2 is not Iraq or Afghanistan--the troops, terrain...well...how soldiers ended up being the soldiers.....a lot of things are different?

[Speedy]

For the grogs: What is the single day largest casualty count for a European or American power since 1945?

This figure would really not be useful in an argument over the difference in tactics over the last 70 years.

There are just to many other variables such as differences in force sizes committed (how many million US troops fought in WW2 - How many fought in 2003 Iraq 100,000?) then you have the size and relative quality of the opposition.

Generally my understanding is that there has been some evolution of tactics since WW2 prompted by variety of things, new weapons, theory etc. But the basic concept of fire and maneuver is still the same and still utilized.

edit - Probably the best way to see what has changed and what is the same is to read a modern infantry field manual and one from immediately after ww2 which includes lessons that were learnt in that war and compare the differences.

[ChrisND]

I am not really arguing here, but, Normal Dude: Doesn't the language in "Conduct of Attack" almost sound, as a bit of hyperbole, like Chaucer? I note that Battlefront did not use it for the manual.

Do you see the terms "overwatch", or "fire base" in that description of attack?

I am not saying the concepts were not there: the double envelopment is as old as the Romans.

But I think the "attack with overwhelming firepower and with minimal losses" evolved between Pickett's charge, WW1, WW2 and now. For the grogs: What is the single day largest casualty count for a European or American power since 1945?

The US in WW2 means 1944, unless you count Torch--and there is a lot of embarassment if one includes that campaign. (Ok, Sicily--better).

Let's be friendly. Can we agree that WW2 is not Iraq or Afghanistan--the troops, terrain...well...how soldiers ended up being the soldiers.....a lot of things are different?

I'm not particularly interested in the specific terms used here. What I am interested in is the part of your post that I quoted which sounds like you think effective tactics shouldn't be taught to the player, and instead he should be taught how to play "authentically". If you want to play authentically, more power to you. I'm going to write so that the player can do well and enjoy themselves, because this is a game and not a rote history re-enactment. Given that these tactics, regardless of what they were called, existed at the time, I don't think it's much of a stretch at all to have them. The players concerned with total authenticity can play however they want. I don't think a large percentage of new players would appreciate being told that they should fight in a way that they will later find is sub-optimal, simply for history's sake. In fact, that sounds like a great way to piss people off.

Like I said, I'm not losing any sleep over what names were used, since the topics covered would have been exactly the same.

[JasonC]

LJFHutch - that's find, fix, flank and finish 'em, actually. Don't forget the last...

[Fetchez la Vache]

I think the OP makes an exellent point. In retrospect I realise I am routinely spltting my squads into sub-teams in order to increase the effectiveness, and decrease the risk, of typical infantry actions (recon, assault, etc). But how historical is this? Surely a squad 2/3 full of replacements is simply not going to be able to work like this and it would in fact have to stick together as a big unit?

Should I perhaps be self-imposing some limits on myself? For example:

1) Veteran squads can be split into 3 teams

2) Regular squads can be split into 2 teams

3) Green squads cannot be split at all

[Destraex1]

field manuals are vastly different to tactics employed and capabilities of troops. That much is well known during the napoleonic wars where it was well known that complex drills in the manual would not be meet the calibre of men that actually reached the front lines with "emergency" training and I am sure the same is true during ww2 also.

However as I understand it the Americans had a lot of time to train... how many years they must have known they would eventually join the war....

I am sure somebody will correct me who has the actual figures....

[DavidFields]

Ideas like those of Fetchez la Vache, if thought to be realistic, can be programmed. I seem to remember in CM1 some squads, (if conscripts?) could not split.

And only the Russians, as I recall, had the wave attack.

The point is not to teach bad tactics, it is trying to simulate the various conditions the local commanders had to deal with, which were non-optimal.

Poor "overwatch" assets for the British in North Africa (dearth of HE throwing tanks).

Poor artillery coordination for the Russians, early war.

All making things less generic. For CM:BN, the question is just this: did the combatants generally have the practical capability to split their squads in 3 pieces? If not, which units could do it?

And, no, I don't want to get hung up on terminology, but often these simulations have manuals and other "atmospherics" of the relevant time frame.

[YankeeDog]

The 3-team Able (Scout) - Baker (Rifle) - Charlie (BAR) split was the basis of U.S. Army Infantry 12-man squad-level training and doctrine in WWII, so I don't imagine why would wouldn't allow any infantry unit with a modicum of training to use this kind of split.

Now, the ability of a lower-experience squad to effectively work in split teams is an interesting discussion. For example, you could make the argument that Green scout teams should get very nervous (easily suppressed) when they get more than 2-3 action spots from the squad leader. You could also make the argument that Green split teams should have difficulty communicating between each other if they get more than 2-3 action spots apart.

These effects may already be in the game... I haven't analyzed what goes on with Green or Conscript units much yet.

[George MC]

Now, the ability of a lower-experience squad to effectively work in split teams is an interesting discussion. For example, you could make the argument that Green scout teams should get very nervous (easily suppressed) when they get more than 2-3 action spots from the squad leader. You could also make the argument that Green split teams should have difficulty communicating between each other if they get more than 2-3 action spots apart.

These effects may already be in the game... I haven't analyzed what goes on with Green or Conscript units much yet.

From my experience this is already in-game. Split units are more brittle - the poorer quality and out of C2 are very prone to being easily supressed.

[Sgt Joch]

Ideas like those of Fetchez la Vache, if thought to be realistic, can be programmed.

But they're not.

The way it works now in CMBN is exactly the way it worked in RL.

The TO&E of a 1944 US rifle squad had three elements: a scout team, a BAR team and a rifle team. In combat, the scout team finds the enemy position, the scout and BAR team then setup a fire base to establish fire superiority and the rifle team maneuvers to assault the position.

That is how the US Army trained before D-Day and that is how it fought in combat in Normandy. "Fire superiority", "Fire and maneuver" were the mantra of US infantry tactics in 1944. This is how I fight all my CM battles. There is

nothing to change because the game is already correct.

For those who actually want to know how the US Army fought in Normandy, an excellent book is Joseph Balkoski's " Beyond the Beachhead: the 29th infantry division in Normandy". I am re reading it now to get some tips.