Command Delay. Love it? Hate it? Should it ever return.

[Battlefront.com]

I'll ask people to not address Steiner14's post as we all know where that will head.

Steve

[Canada Guy]

Yes, I guess initiative is the word I was looking for. Leadership and experience would allow the training for initiative to be acted upon.

As I said though, it is not that I love the way the command delay system works in CMBB, but without giving green or conscript units an unfair advantage I am not sure how we model this without getting some very unrealistic results. Taking away certain commands though is a start. Maybe conscripts only have a move command and green a move and a quick command with veteran units having everything including assault. This would make the Soviet charge by multiple units a viable command again ( forget what it is called). Was this not a national characteristic used by the Soviets and Japanese? I do not recall every having heard the western allies or the Germans employing it.

[Vark]

When I visited the Royal Military College at Shrivenham the German tactical success, using auftragstaktik, or mission command, (too late to check if thats the right spelling) was explained like this. The British system for planning a tactical move was very rigid and would include specific objectives, in some instances it would even include ammo loadouts to be carried, especially regarding grenades and mortar bombs. The Germans were far more inclusive and allowed units to participate in the planning and direction of an assault when they were often told the final objective. The example that was given was an assault on a Hill

British approach: X forces assault at Y time to take Hill Z. Exact start times and deployments were given to the commanders participating but how they achieved that mission was up to the commanders use of his forces.

German approach: A panzer regiment is going to attack the bridge at B in two days time and you need to make sure that enemy forces have been cleared from the area. We suggest that Hill Z is assaulted first, as it guards the bridge, but if your local patrols have discovered another direction or objective to attack first then feel free to do so. German officers were also taught to be able to take command of any units they needed to achieve the mission, hence the adhoc nature of German TOE's and their ease in creating Kamfgroups from every unit under the sun (see the initial German forces in Arnhem for examples of extreme adhockery).

The Gemans are therefore aware of the big picture and told that there are no restrictions on what you do as long as it achieves the mission though, Late war, with paranoia running rampant and teens commanding I'm not so sure this idea survived.

Question is how do you show these different approaches (not sure about the US system but it would not surprise me if it was quite inflexible). I doubt small unit initiative varied that much in combat between different nations but often those units would find themselves in radically different situations caused by the idea of top down or devolved command structures.

[Erwin]

I really do appreciate the dilemma of time delays and it certainly affects many peoples' enjoyment of the game. It's the rationale behind getting rid of them that doesn't convince me.

The innovative introduction of Delays in CMBO was brilliant as it enormously helped depict how different nationalities and units with different levels of experience functioned. It helped make the CM1 games "feel" more realistic and provided a greater sense of immersion than any other comparable game I can recall.

It wasn't the concept of delays that was a problem, it was the enormous exponential increase in delays that became frustrating. Waiting 90 secs for a unit to move may actually have been quite realistic or even unrealistically fast(!) in some instances. But, it wasn't FUN.

I was hoping that all BF needed to do was REDUCE the delays - especially when one builds up 10+ waypoints. Just because it's a compromise and not a perfect solution doesn't mean that the "delay concept" isn't still a really innovative, useful and clever device to add an extra dimension of verisimilitude to the CM series.

What I am saying is that there is a real danger of the "baby being thrown out with the bathwater."

I imagine it's too late to change minds for CM:BN. But, please, please keep an open mind on the delay concept for future releases.

[Michael Emrys]

...not sure about the US system but it would not surprise me if it was quite inflexible.

It seems to have varied quite a lot from command to command. Some generals allowed and even encouraged a lot of initiative in their subordinates, but not all mid level and junior officers made a great success of that freedom. What I am saying is that it was not institutionalized in the US Army in the same way it was in the German. But neither was the opposite situation of top down command institutionalized to the same extent that it was in the British army.

So, while in Mark Clark's Fifth Army the command structure was very rigid, in Patton's Third Army it was less so. But even within those armies it could vary from division to division, sometimes dramatically so.

Michael

[Battlefront.com]

It wasn't the concept of delays that was a problem, it was the enormous exponential increase in delays that became frustrating. Waiting 90 secs for a unit to move may actually have been quite realistic or even unrealistically fast(!) in some instances. But, it wasn't FUN.

And we were being overly generous too In real life a unit might sit around for a day not doing anything because the orders to move out were intercepted.

I was hoping that all BF needed to do was REDUCE the delays

As I have repeatedly pointed out, if we reduced the delays then there is no point in the system because the difference between a Conscript and a Crack unit is so small as to be insignificant.

What I am saying is that there is a real danger of the "baby being thrown out with the bathwater."

As can be seen in this one thread alone, there's a lot of people that feel the baby was being drowned in the bathwater.

I imagine it's too late to change minds for CM:BN. But, please, please keep an open mind on the delay concept for future releases.

The reason we didn't improve Command Delays within CMx1 is we couldn't resolve the basic reasons for them not working effectively. The reasons we didn't add them in CMx2 is because we haven't come up with anything better. We're not interested investing time into something we know doesn't work well. Even supporters, like you, quickly tell us that you didn't like it either. This should tell you something

A minor tweak or two wouldn't do anything to make the CMx1 system any better than it was. It had fundamental problems that could not be overcome except by abandoning it and starting over. We haven't yet had a chance to start over. I don't know when we will, but I do intend to have some sort of simulation of command friction implemented at some point.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

The US was greatly influenced by German doctrine. Officially the wartime doctrine was very similar to German doctrine. And just like the Germans it was put into practice unevenly. Sometimes there were BRILLIANT actions that involved amazing initiative that could be argued was not found in any other army in the war. Other times there was ridged, lock step execution of rote orders with mixed results. This is where command leadership played the biggest role.

One common theme was about 1st/2nd LTs. (platoon leaders) coming in fresh from the various officer's schools. They had about a 300% casualty rate for the Western Front 1944-1945. Larger than all others, IIRC. This got the attention of the big brass even during the conflict, but also after. The basic findings were that these wet-behind-the-ears officers often tried to run things "by the books" and were killed as a result.

The LTs that survived were generally the ones who allowed their seasoned NCOs to guide them. In fact, that was the recommendation (I think officially) of these studies. A new officer needed to listen to his NCOs and then use his best judgement to arrive at the best plan.

Again, with a huge army you'll find a wide range of results. But overall, Americans showed a great deal of low level initiative during the second half of the war especially. The early disasters of North Africa taught a lot of hard lessons, including ridged planing got a lot of people killed and very few successes.

There's a lot of WW2 Field Manuals online that can be downloaded for free. I encourage people to read them because you'll see exactly what was expected of troops that were actually fighting. Tactical flexibility, you'll find, was stressed over and over again.

Steve

[Steiner14]

So, while in Mark Clark's Fifth Army the command structure was very rigid, in Patton's Third Army it was less so. But even within those armies it could vary from division to division, sometimes dramatically so.

But it was not the command structure that was lose in the German army, it was they way how and what kind of orders could be given to all subordinates and that they were perfectly fullfilled, while in any other army such kind of orders lead to inactivity or chaos.

[sfhand]

As a wego player I'm having a lot of fun imagining a rt player trying to manage a largish battle with varying command delays on 2 fronts with no ability to pause and obviously no replay... thanks for that!

[Battlefront.com]

But it was not the command structure that was lose in the German army, it was they way how and what kind of orders could be given to all subordinates and that they were perfectly fullfilled, while in any other army such kind of orders lead to inactivity or chaos.

As I've said, this is factually not correct. The US Army emphasized the same principles the German Army used. This included copying the German concept of Kampfgruppen and, in fact, making some small improvements. There are plenty of wartime AARs and post-war studies that prove that these concepts were implemented, often with great success. The seizing of the bridge at Remagen is one of the most dramatic examples of this. In fact, higher headquarters was angry that the bridge was seized because it upset much larger plans for crossing the Rhine. One thing senior staff officers don't like is to see weeks of hard work thrown out the window because a junior officer did

Again, the positive effects of this varied quite a bit within the US Army, but it also varied within the German Army as well. It is impossible to have a large armed force, under great stress and strain, performing optimally all the time, every time. Bad leadership can only be reduced in frequency, not eliminated.

In fact, I have seen some historians make the case that as the war went on the German tactical flexibility generally declined due to high casualties and "political" interference. At the end of the war this was taken to the extreme by execution of low level commanders who didn't achieve what they were tasked with. I've read first person accounts of this, on the German side, that said this sort of "you will do this or else" dramatically reduced individual willingness to take risks. But of course by this time the war was lost so in the big picture it didn't matter as much as the blunders made at the strategic and operational levels.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Here's an example that took me 2 minutes to find, copy, and paste here. It is from FM 7-10 Rifle Company, dated March 1944 (i.e. prior to Normandy):

9. DUTIES OF COMPANY COMMANDER.

a. General. The commander is responsible for the discipline, administration, supply, training, tactical employment, and control of his company. He is responsible that his company is trained to accomplish its combat tasks decisively; to function as an effective unit in the military team. He must anticipate and plan in order to prepare his company for prospective missions; his supervision must be continuous to insure that all subordinates properly execute their part in the company task. Decision as to a specific course of action is his responsibility in conformity with orders from higher headquarters. While he may accept advice and suggestions from any of his subordinates, he alone is responsible for what his unit does or fails to do.

b. Orders.

(1) Having decided upon a detailed plan of action to carry out an assigned mission, the company commander must assign specific missions to his subordinate units. Company orders are usually issued orally to the leaders concerned or as oral or written messages. Sketches are furnished when practicable. Prior to combat, subordinates frequently can be assembled to receive the order. This facilitates orientation prior to issuance of orders and enables the company commander to insure that his orders are understood. (See FM 7-40.)

(2) Whenever practicable, the order is issued at a point from which terrain features of importance to subordinates can be pointed out. In attack, this often will be imprac-

ticable because of hostile observation and fires. If time is limited and leaders are separated, the company commander will issue his orders in fragmentary form. Leaders of units which are engaged with the enemy are not called away from their units for the purpose of receiving orders.

c. During combat. During combat the primary duties of the company commander are to -

(1) Know where the enemy is, and what he is capable of doing.

(2) Keep informed of the situation on his front and flanks.

(3) Anticipate the needs of his platoons for supporting fires, employ the supporting weapons under his control to provide such of these fires as is practicable, and call on the battalion commander for additional supporting fires whenever the situation demands it. In calling for such fires, he specifies the target, and also indicates when and for how long such fire is desired.

(4) Insure mutual support and cooperation by the subordinate elements of his company.

(5) Assist adjacent companies whenever this can be done without detriment to the accomplishment of his own mission.

(6) Insure continuous all-around protection of his company.

(7) Control the company support prior to its commitment, and then employ it to accomplish the company mission, or to exploit a favorable situation developed by the success of his own or adjacent units.

(8) Insure proper execution of his orders by supervision, and prompt intervention when required.

(9) Control the employment of company transportation within the company area, and insure the timely replenishment of ammunition.

(10) Keep the battalion commander informed, by frequent reports, of the situation of his company and of all information obtained of the enemy.

Lots and lots of stuff in here to support what I've been saying. The most important is this:

Decision as to a specific course of action is his responsibility

It couldn't be said any clearer than this. The next bit also specifies that the Company Commander can take advice from subordinates, but to remember that it is his ass on the line if things don't work out. It's also his chest meddles are pinned onto if things go right.

Other interesting things such as helping out neighboring Companies is within the Company Commander's area of authority provided it doesn't negatively affect his own mission.

Etc.

It should also be reminded that a US Army SGT came up with the tool that most significantly helped the American forces finally break out of the Bocage. And this innovation was implemented within the space of days across several divisions. Training for using this device was done on the spot behind the front by ad-hoc groups from low level groups. These lessons learned were printed and handed out within days. There was no months of deliberations about this... the lowest echelons figured out how to greatly improve the strategic position and within a few days several divisions were advancing that were previous stuck. Although this story has been embellished somewhat post-war, the facts are basically not in dispute.

Steve

[Vinnart]

I found some of the delays were too long, and sometime made no sense at all. I could live without them especially where realtime play is comcerned. It might make realtime play feel a bit awkward. CMSF seems to flow well with not having delays. If you want a delay just use the pause command to set it to the time delay you want.

[Vark]

Thanks Steve, I know more about post war US forces doctrine than WWII, which is odd because the former influenced the later. More accurately, I only know about US combat doctrine in WWII when it is mentioned in post-war sources, though often those sources focus on its short comings. I did have other sources though and the Willie and Joe cartoons ,by Bill Mauldin, cast a pretty soured eye over new officers and their antics, Ellis' The Sharp End truly horrified me about the casualties suffered, post D-Day so I often wondered what, if anything went wrong, or were those rates to be expected given the situation confronted ("Green Hell" was an eye opener as well)

Final point, I'm interested why German combat veterans surveyed, rated the US infantry below that of the Russians for effectiveness, is that a refusal to admit to the nature of the society who kicked them severely in Western Europe or a grudging admission of the effectiveness of the US artillery and air support.

Talking of command delays, I remember a student, who was a senior cadet (is now an officer on tour in Afghanistan) playing CM on my lap top and loving it but he did comment about how things moved so quickly, especially units being given orders. I was wondering if a command sytem could be created that could be varied depending on how 'realistic' you needed it. Players who wanted to watch their troops hurry up and wait or, the other end of the scale where there are no command delays and no restrictions.

[Battlefront.com]

I've read many first hand German (and American) opinions about each other. They vary from glowing respect to complete disdain. I found some of it depended upon where and when the impression was formed. But one thing I did see quite often was the German's depression at how effective the Western Allies (and US in particular) were in using artillery and aircraft.

My feeling is that the average German soldier believed the years and years of propaganda about their supposedly invincibility very deeply. And why not? Even though the war in the East wasn't going well, up until late 1942 the Germans were generally on top despite the odds. In the East they found they could reconcile their serious losses by blaming Soviet superior numbers, the weather, and of course the "sub Human" disregard for life.

The problem with the Western Allies is this didn't work. At first the illusion of superiority could be maintained because, frankly, they were superior. The Allies blundered horribly in 1940-1942 time and time again, being truly bested by the Germans at all levels. But the Germans never though of the Western Allies as "sub Human" and therefore when things started to go against them they couldn't just turn around and say that they were the victims of Human waves of unthinking, barely Human creatures. So they had to come up with other was to maintain their ingrained belief of superiority with the facts on the ground which simply didn't support that notion.

The obvious targets of this were the Allied Air and Artillery advantages. So instead of Human waves being the acceptable reason for losses, it was instead ordinance waves that were responsible. And like most conspiracy theories, there certainly was a grain of truth to this. But of course, the Germans did the same things to get their superiority edge in 1940 and it didn't seem to make them think less of themselves

The Soviet artillery was considered a blunt force weapon that could basically be relied upon to only work well in specific set piece battle situations. The Germans hated this, even as early as Yelnia, but I don't think they felt it was "unfair" because it was tactically crude. Not so with Western Allied surgical strikes and their complete dominance of the air. Some of the strikes must have seemed like playing cards with someone who is peeking at your cards. The Germans weren't aware this was actually true (ULTRA), but they were aware of the effects. Like an HQ meeting accurately shelled, well planned moves being hit well behind the lines, badly needed equipment and ammo trains being destroyed, counter attacks that were effectively stopped before they started, etc.

Take all of this and look at the results that the Germans were seeing in the West. The Germans in the East were used to losing battles by 1944, but not until they left heaps of Soviet dead and destroyed equipment. Even when the Soviets won a battle they very often lost more than the Germans did. Not so in Western Europe. Often the Germans wound up losing more men and material *and* lost the ground they were defending. On the attack the Germans never mounted a significant counter offensive that achieved noticeable gains. In fact, the major operations were all disasters for the Germans, losing more men and material than the Allies and then being forced to not only give up the ground they took but to give back ground they already had. The best results the Germans experienced were in static defense with local counter attacks. That's not going to win a war, and they knew it more and more as time went on.

And I'm sure that only scratches the surface.

Steve

[MeatEtr]

As a wego player I'm having a lot of fun imagining a rt player trying to manage a largish battle with varying command delays on 2 fronts with no ability to pause and obviously no replay... thanks for that!

As a mostly RT player, except PBEM good times, I and probably most other RT players simply don't play largish battles. I'd say my limit is about two companies with supporting vehicles. But that works fine with me since going back to the CMx1 days I wasn't into the big battles anyway.

Now if the BF crew got in a rolling one-minute-replay feature for RT, this would certainly change. It would essentially make playing WEGO against the AI obsolete.

[Erwin]

For us die hard fans, here is a... uh... historical example of command delays. Note the time it takes to comprehend what they are looking at and come to a decision (compared to how we could do it) heh.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q32MrziPoTM

But, I realize that the RT fans just don't understand why we WEGO people much prefer it over RT.

**Some sort of time delays forever!**

[Gryphonne]

For us die hard fans, here is a... uh... historical example of command delays. Note the time it takes to comprehend what they are looking at and come to a decision (compared to how we could do it) heh.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q32MrziPoTM

But, I realize that the RT fans just don't understand why we WEGO people much prefer it over RT.

**Some sort of time delays forever!**

Hmm, when you look at this video, isn't the "command" delay then already sort of "simulated" in you as the commander of those forces studying the situation and forming an appropriate response?

I mean, you would look on your screen, see the enemy movement, and would weigh certain options against eachother; after a while you'd click your units to perform action x. This may or may not take as long as it takes these guys in the video to do the same thing. Hence, here is your "command delay"..? I'm not saying it's an all time solution to the "problem", but when you look at it from this point of view it's rather intruiging.

[sfhand]

...

It would essentially make playing ... against the AI obsolete.

Welcome to my world. I'm sure I'm shortselling myself by only playing pbem, but what the heck, I'm having a good time.

[Erwin]

Argh... Gryphonne... I presume you play in RT and pause or...?

I hate the idea of pausing whenever you want as it denigrates the realism/verisimilitude of the game.

As a die hard WEGO player, yes I have all the time I want every minute, but that doesn't count imo. It's the planning and discipline of creating orders that will work for 1 minute of continuous action without getting any of my guys massacred which is the challenge.

And in CM1 that meant taking the time delays into account. Yes, it wasn't perfect, but it was an innovative concept and feature that helped make the CM1 games classics. There really should be a way to show poor quality troops taking longer to do things than elites.

But, I sadly yield to the harsh reality of CM2...

[Steiner14]

But one thing I did see quite often was the German's depression at how effective the Western Allies (and US in particular) were in using artillery and aircraft.

Steve,

it definately was not depression about the EFFECTIVENESS, it was depression about the sheer AMOUNT of the material - and that certain normal things in France suddenly didn't function anymore properly (explained later).

I have NEVER read about, or talked to a german soldier, that was stating, that the german artillery had not been superior to any other regarding precision, flexibility and reaction time.

But i heard many complaints, that in France was no Luftwaffe at all which made unit movement during day almost suicidal. With 50% to 80% losses before the attacking positions are reached, there is not much left to show operational or tactical skills, if the same air superiority persists all the time.

You wonder, why they had their biggest sucess with static defenses in France and that no counterattacks couldn't be sucessfully developed?

Look into the air, there you will find the answer. Not on the ground.

If around a third of all tanks are lost due to air bombardement without highly precise weapons for that task, and only 17% of the german tanks were lost due to direct tank to tank combat, you must get a feeling for the dimensions.

Now imagine what such an incredible air superiority means for infantry, logistics and support.

What every german soldier was indeed wishing for, was only a third or the half of the amount of endless ammunition and material the US-americans and soviets had.

The amount of the ressources was it, that was depressing. That it was such an unequal fight like against a Hydra.

I don't want to provoke believers in US-superiority, but a few hard facts regarding the view of the US-soldier seem to be necessary, before the US-self-adulation here sees new heights. And who is capable to judge an soldier, if not the enemy?

On first place in the ranking of the enemies was - by far - the Russian soldier. Because of his braveness to hold even in obviously lost situations. Always. To the end. And also for his capability to bear all circumstances how bad they might have been.

These aspects of the russian soldier are also the reason, why all german soldiers i knew and have talked to, honored the russian soldier as fighter.

Compare that view of the german soldier with the antigerman propaganda that the german soldier felt as "Übermensch" torwards the russian. Ugly, very ugly propaganda. Congrats, that you have that as base for your understanding of the german soldier...

The russian soldier was seen in that core aspects as equal, sometimes even a bit stronger (especially in the judgement of W-SS veterans, because they sometimes had made not good experiences with wehrmacht units that didn't hold when it was absolutely necessary and possible).

Then follows the British soldier. He was received as brave in his broad mass and with a good morale, that could not be broken easily or by surprise.

Then come the french soldiers from '40.

Sorry, but the one with the least reputation is the US-soldier.

The experience was, without air and artillery support, his morale didn't last very long. Especially when he was in numerical inferiority, he tended to be brittle (for example the Ardennenoffensive was built on that experience)

I can understand if that sounds incredible and like blasphemy for many US-ears, because the western propaganda-machine makes you believe you have the best army and the best soldiers in the world. But that is the overall verdict of the german soldiers.

My feeling is that the average German soldier believed the years and years of propaganda about their supposedly invincibility very deeply.

Invincibility. You project a propaganda-tale of a ruling "Übermensch"-idea in Germany into the german soldier as a given fact and then you are making your conclusions from it.

But nothing could be farther from the truth. My grandfather was in the 3rd Geb.Div., PzJgRgt (tank hunter regiment) and the Ersatzregiment was thrown in February 1942 into the defensive operations after the collapse of the 6th Armee to stop the Soviet advance torwards Rostov, which was a deadly threat for the Heeresgruppe Süd with it's 1 million soldiers to be cut of.

Although he was in training since summer '42, he told me everyone of his comrades knew how extremely hard the fight in the east was, before they arrived in Russia.

Around December '42 he also told me, that everyone knew that it was not looking good in the south, because the 6th army was stuck in Stalingrad and couldn't get out.

I can assure you, the german people were by far much better informed, than the antigerman propaganda claimes.

And you don't need to believe me, you can convince yourself: try to get uncensored and uncut German Wochenschauen. You will be surprised how well and objectively informed the Germans were.

Because it fits here: the antigerman propaganda always portrays the germans as so badly informed due to the official censorship and because it was forbidden to listen to enemy radio stations (Feindsender): the intention of enemy-radio is and always has been, to reduce the morale of the listener. So the western propaganda turns once again the lie into a truth, if it claims, that their intention were free information.

And it also is a propaganda-tale, that in '44 the german people wouldn't have known, that the war was not looking good and maybe could get lost. Everyone knew it. Therefore the development of groundbraking new weapon-technologies became more and more important as the last remaining realistical hope.

And the training of the german soldier also was very careful to avoid a contraproductive feeling of superiority. That is simply another tale, that was brewed in the propaganda-kitchens of the enemy and you take it as fact...

In fact the oposite is the truth: while in the US-army special forces have always been received as being arrogant, for the german soldier that was almost unknown (except individuals).

It would lead too far to explain it now, but is has to do with the german culture, how the german idea of elite is defined since Prussia took the lead in Germany and how the Nationalsocialists educated the youth based on the Prussian virtues.

Further with the tale about a believe in invincibility: When my grandfather came to his unit in February '43, he already knew, that the Soviets seemed to have endless amounts of material and his commander informed them, how difficult the situation was and that in the case of a Soviet breakthrough the war would be lost without the million soldiers that were standing down in the Caucasus.

That was early 1943. When was the allied Invasion that - following your theory - showed a surprised german soldier he was "not invincible"?

Or let's take the first winter '41/'42, when the Heeresgruppe Mitte was facing it's total destruction before Moscow: again EVERY German knew, how dangerous the situation was! The "Winterhilfswerk" collected clothes and everyone was worried about the outcome of the war.

1942.

Watch the original german newsreels, read german newspapers from that time. You will be surprised! Or shocked - about the Matrix...

And why not? Even though the war in the East wasn't going well, up until late 1942 the Germans were generally on top despite the odds. In the East they found they could reconcile their serious losses by blaming Soviet superior numbers, the weather, and of course the "sub Human" disregard for life.

"Sub Human". You show, that you may have read a lot of propaganda-books, but you have no clue about the thinking of the german soldier or the germans in general in these days.

My family also had a "sub human" polish "slave laborer" how they are called in the "free media" of the truthbringers. Guess what? This "slave" ate the same on the same table in the same house and after the war the "slave" visited with his family my family. Almost every family here had it's personal slave. I don't say, that all were treated like family members, but you are so misinformed and full of hate-propaganda, it hurts.

The problem with the Western Allies is this didn't work. At first the illusion of superiority could be maintained because, frankly, they were superior. The Allies blundered horribly in 1940-1942 time and time again, being truly bested by the Germans at all levels. But the Germans never though of the Western Allies as "sub Human" and therefore when things started to go against them they couldn't just turn around and say that they were the victims of Human waves of unthinking, barely Human creatures. So they had to come up with other was to maintain their ingrained belief of superiority with the facts on the ground which simply didn't support that notion.

I already have written, how the german soldier saw the russian soldier.

But interestingly it always have been the US-AMERICANS, that believe the world needs their mission and the whole globe is their country, while the "free" media manage it to make most of them believe, it are the others, that want to supress others.

On the attack the Germans never mounted a significant counter offensive that achieved noticeable gains. In fact, the major operations were all disasters for the Germans, losing more men and material than the Allies and then being forced to not only give up the ground they took but to give back ground they already had.

Let's take for example the fate of german 21. Pz. It was perfectly placed, because Hitler expected the Invasion exactly where it took place, and despite strong resistance of the generals, that time they couldn't convince him (he was suspicious about traitors in the highest ranks).

In the night of the June 6th, the commander of a regiment of that division received radio messages from german units, that convinced him, that this was the invasion they were waiting for. He called his HQ (Feuchtinger) but it didn't answer. More radio messages were received and for the regimental commander of the 21. it was clear, the invasion was beginning. So on his very own decision he gave alarm and moved as fast as possible torwards the coast. That was between two or three o clock in the morning.

While on the move he informed the HQ that he was now on the move torwards the coast.

SUDDENLY the HQ was there and answered: stop immediately and turn around. Paratroopers were landed somewhere deeper in the country in your back.

He followed and turned around.

Around four o clock he arrived but - suprise! - no enemy, no paratroopers. Nothing.

Only when the morning had begun, the commander of the 21., Feuchtinger, moved torwards the coast.

The 21. was shot into pieces from the naval artillery and from the air and the attack was cancelled

It is fact, that without the traitors the 21. would have taken it's positions on the landing zones in full strenght already during the night, while during the day the close distance to the landing zone would have made massive alliied air-support or naval support impossible.

Heinrich Severloh with his MG showed, how fragile an amphibious landing operation really is. Now multiply that single MG with the firepower of a regiment of a Pz-Div and you know, Operation Overlord would have been a total failure without the help of the german traitors.

What indeed was new for the german soldier in France, was the amount of the sabotage in the own high ranks. From the east the soldiers were already familiar with the fact, that the Red Army was prepared for every operation and that it knew all data and operational targets ("Werther"). Nevertheless the german machine was intact enough, since no total air-superiority made any success impossible and so the soldiers nevertheless could follow their orders. But in France the betrayal reached complete new dimensions, unseen in military history before.

Not really surprising, if the own HQ is infitrated with traitors, who work for the other side, who direct the own divisions into wrong places, open the MLR, who delay the most important commands, who support the illusion with faked inteligence infos, of a still to come main landing. It says a lot, if the Oberbefehlshaber, Rommel, knows about traitors and sabotage in his staff, or leaves his position in one of the few nights, that were identified as optimum for landing, to celebrate a birthday in Germany.

That's an example of what was NEW for the german soldier in France.

After the war, when the german traitors like Speidel were rewarded for their biggest betrayal in war-history, with high ranks in the NATO, they even supported a doctrine to destroy Germany with nuclear bombs, if that deemed their angloamerican masters necessary. That's what REALLY went wrong in France.

Betrayal is something, that is indeed a dark part of the german national character. We germans do not know something like "Good or bad, my country."

Napoleon said, that for a slogan the germans prosecute their own german people more radical than their enemy.

And Bismarck said: "If the germans stick together, they beat the devil out of hell."

If the word if wouldn't be...

[MeatEtr]

For us die hard fans, here is a... uh... historical example of command delays. Note the time it takes to comprehend what they are looking at and come to a decision (compared to how we could do it) heh.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q32MrziPoTM

But, I realize that the RT fans just don't understand why we WEGO people much prefer it over RT.

**Some sort of time delays forever!**

I hate the idea of pausing whenever you want as it denigrates the realism/verisimilitude of the game.

Not a very good example of command delay, the delay is mostly in setting up the mortar.

But ok, let's use the video as an example. If this was in a CMx2 WEGO game and they saw the tank early in a turn, then they would have to just sit there staring at it until the one minute turn was up. Then the god commander(that's us the players) would then give the order to attack. Is that more realistic?

I'll use another example with the video, let's say that zooka team was given a hide order. Well that zooka shot would of had to wait for the end of the turn to get the order to un-hide for the TacAI to fire. Is that more realistic?

In WEGO the player is forced mostly to rely on the TacAI. Whereas in RT the player takes more control away from the TacAI. But which mode gives more realistic results?

I'll give my answer in an example. A squad is ordered to run Fast into a enemy occupied building, a blunder no less in any game mode. In WEGO they will keep running towards the building despite taking fire and casualties and eventually getting pinned until the end of the turn. In RT you can hit the deck immediately upon taking fire by canceling the Fast order and give area fire order. I think it's obvious which one more accurately reflects what a squad would do in the real world.

I'm just saying the argument of playing in WEGO automatically makes the game more realistic or historical is simply not true. In fact, in most cases the opposite is true.

[panzermartin]

Well it is true though, that american prisoners were treated far better than the russians. Most of soviet pows had sadly the fate of a "subhuman". Maybe it was an ostfront limited resources thing but still this shows no respect to the human side of the russian soldier.

[Sloth]

Hi all,

A few thoughts

1. The starting point for considering command delays is to consider what you are trying to simulate (or even if you are aiming for a sim or a game). The problem with command delays here arises because:

a) command delays are absolutely crucially important if you are a HQ. For CM this probably applies to company HQ and definitely battalion HQ. If you are trying to simulate a battalion commander's experience of an attack then delays in changing initial orders are crucial. As an officer I found delays were also important in planning as co-ordinating an attack so that things arrived together was key. For more senior HQ it becomes essential. The ability to go through the sequence of observing, orienting, deciding and acting quickly was a key to German success at the operational level in early parts of WWII. Degrading the enemies ability to do this is the goal of command and control warfare these days.

They are also a nice way to model the benefits of better troop training (e.g. in CMX1 they were a key difference between conscript, regular, elite troops etc.

c) but the command delay makes much less sense at the section/squad & platoon levels. At these levels responses are drive much more by IA's (Immediate Actions), SOP or whatever you wish to call them. This particularly applies to first-contact and run away type drills.

So, is combat mission more a game about battalion command or tactical firefights, pretty toys etc? Ideally you could have two seperate games (or even one multiplayer game with different levels of command), but in the absence of this you have to settle for one. I think it is the latter. If it were a battalion command game you would absolutely have delays as well as fuller planning orders set for your subordinate units, boundarys between units, primary & secondary objectives etc. etc. I would love to play this game. However I also love the tactical firefight stuff where you can manage the individual vehicles. Humans get a lot of satisfaction out of controlling things and a game that reduces that control is usually less enjoyable. Being able to manouevre realistic vehicles and troops over realistic terrain is, on balance, probably more fun than acting as battalion commander in BHQ. This means that any delay system would need to be optional as it wouldn't provide the game some folks are looking for.

With all that said, on balance I quite liked the delay system in CMX1. Yes it meant some road moves were slow, but it really brought out the flavour of better trained/experienced troops being more effective on the battlefield, while forcing you to use conscipts for simpler, less active work. Wego doesn't really replicate this. I would have thought the realism advantage of Wego over realtime is that wego allows more realistic consideration of what 20-30 units would have time to think about rather than having one human reacting to everything in realtime. Finally one question - will there be delays in calling in indirect fire in CM:N? I gather there is no command delay for on map units?

[LongLeftFlank]

"Sub Human". You show, that you may have read a lot of propaganda-books, but you have no clue about the thinking of the german soldier or the germans in general in these days.

My family also had a "sub human" polish "slave laborer" how they are called in the "free media" of the truthbringers. Guess what? This "slave" ate the same on the same table in the same house and after the war the "slave" visited with his family my family. Almost every family here had it's personal slave. I don't say, that all were treated like family members, but you are so misinformed and full of hate-propaganda, it hurts.

Betrayal is something, that is indeed a dark part of the german national character. We germans do not know something like "Good or bad, my country."

Napoleon said, that for a slogan the germans prosecute their own german people more radical than their enemy.

And Bismarck said: "If the germans stick together, they beat the devil out of hell."

If the word if wouldn't be...

Umm, your forefathers and correspondents haven't necessarily told you everything they saw or did. And what they decided to tell you later, in hindsight and having lost the war they began catastrophically, isn't necessarily what they felt at the time.

The grim reality is that somebody in the service of the Third Reich purposefully murdered about 12 million European civilians in cold blood over a period of 5 years. Hitler and a few depraved criminals and "traitors" didn't go out there and do it alone.

The grim reality is that most slaves of the Third Reich who survived the experience endured daily physical abuse, overwork, malnutrition, poor sanitation, and nonstop terror. Not to mention the emotional distress of being stolen from their homes and incarcerated in a foreign country. And the slaves endured these things at the hands of ordinary Germans who called them "stucke" (cattle). Not some small subset of convenient scapegoats.

If you intend to deny those cold facts of history, I have nothing more to say to you here and would ask the moderators to ban you from this board as quickly as possible together with your odious Nazi apologist views, since this board has no Ignore function.

[Steiner14]

Most of soviet pows had sadly the fate of a "subhuman". Maybe it was an ostfront limited resources thing but still this shows no respect to the human side of the russian soldier.

Yes, sadly many died but have you ever heard about the severity of the german logistical problems in Russia and why that was?

It was not even possible to supply the own german troops as needed.

Now imagine a crowd of 3.5 million POWs.

Now imagine on his retreat, the enemy destroys EVERYTHING the own people would need to survive. Even the wells were poisoned by throwing dead animals into! The rural people were stripped of their animals they need to survive. You find nothing but a poor country that additionally has been completely devastated. (what a great ally for Mr. Roosevelt...)

All you have for the supply are a few railways and - in case they were not destroyed - they have another size. So you can't use your own trains as long as you have not changed the size.

But you also find no adequate roads.

And your units need every supply they can get.

I think now you can answer your question yourself.