Normandy Game

[Cambronne]

You really are praying for a miracle here.

C'mon do you really think that the British battleships could have faced the endless air raids of the Luftwaffe???! And survive enough of them and in a state good enough to deal with Bismark,Cavour and Cesare. Admiral Tom Phillips may have had the same thought when he left Singapore in December'41.A ww2 battleship is easy mark for an air attack for God's sake! If 10 Battleships are getting crowded into the Channel this is the heaven for dive bomber pilots.They would be at the bottom of the sea in the first day. No matter how passionate you may be of the Royal Navy,if the Axis had air supremacy,their chances to get the invasion fleet to the British coast were good enough to worth a try.

I have to repeat myself,with no air cover Akagy, Kaga and Soryu were out of action in 5 minutes,PoW and Repulse in 1 hour,the monsters Musashi and Yamato in a few hours.Why would I believe that the other big ships of the British Fleet would have more luck?

[JonS]

If Britain is not taken out of the war quickly, and an invasion of the major British Isles is not within Germany's grasp, what is left is a peripheral strategy.

I read somewhere - Tooze? - that the invasion of Russia was conducted as a preliminary to an invasion of the UK and war with the US. From memory, the thinking seems to have been something along the lines of:

* Germany tried but failed to invade the UK on the bounce after the fall of France

* this had left a weakened but still powerful belligerent on the western flank of the German empire. With time this belligerent - with it's global resources - will recover, grow stronger, and could sooner or later expect active American assistance.

* Germany will not be strong enough in the necessary capabilities to invade the UK in the short term, and has an insecure eastern and southern flank.

* Therefore, invade the Balkans to secure the southern flank.

* Invade and defeat Russia to secure the eastern flank, AND gain resources, (AND lebensraum, etc)

* Once that's done, the KM will have been rebuilt, Germany will be resource rich, and the pre-conditions fora successful invasion of the UK (the main enemy) will have been met.

[JonS]

Cambronne; you clearly aren't paying attention to what's going on. Either shush up and pay attention, or go fiddle with your Wii some more.

[Michael Emrys]

I read somewhere - Tooze? - that the invasion of Russia was conducted as a preliminary to an invasion of the UK and war with the US. From memory, the thinking seems to have been something along the lines of:

* Germany tried but failed to invade the UK on the bounce after the fall of France

* this had left a weakened but still powerful belligerent on the western flank of the German empire. With time this belligerent - with it's global resources - will recover, grow stronger, and could sooner or later expect active American assistance.

* Germany will not be strong enough in the necessary capabilities to invade the UK in the short term, and has an insecure eastern and southern flank.

* Therefore, invade the Balkans to secure the southern flank.

* Invade and defeat Russia to secure the eastern flank, AND gain resources, (AND lebensraum, etc)

* Once that's done, the KM will have been rebuilt, Germany will be resource rich, and the pre-conditions fora successful invasion of the UK (the main enemy) will have been met.

I mostly agree with that. Where I differ is that SFAIK, at this point in time there was no thought in the German High Command to invade the Balkans. In fact, they were rather hoping that that region would remain quiet until the USSR was finished off. They had engaged in a rather aggressive diplomatic offensive to get a foothold in the region in order to preclude the necessity of using military force.

It was Mussolini who upset the applecart there. He had ambitions in that region as well and when Hitler told him to leave Yugoslavia alone, went instead against Greece without giving the Germans a chance to object. This brought in the Brits, which Hitler found intolerable. Etc., etc.

Michael

[JonS]

... at this point in time there was no thought in the German High Command to invade the Balkans. In fact, they were rather hoping that that region would remain quiet until the USSR was finished off. ...

Quite probably, and I've no particular difficulty going along with that. In terms of the overall outline presented it's a fairly minor point

[Battlefront.com]

Michael Emrys

While there is a slim chance of this all working out to Germany's advantage, its position is very delicate. It would require great political and strategic shrewdness, and I don't see a lot of that evidenced in the Third Reich after the shooting started.

No, I don't think that's the case at all. The British population was very much NOT looking forward to another continental war with the Germans. The leadership was becoming growingly concerned about its ability to maintain its Empire overseas. The German threat to lines of supply, commerce, and communications was very big and real in 1940 (the RN had some serious setbacks and it was not yet known that Hitler was going to screw up the naval war). It was also very, very uncertain that the US would come into the war at all, not to mention in time to save Britain. There was also a pretty significant faction within the British royalty and political elite that actually thought the Third Reich was a model to emulate, not oppose. And there were even more that simply doubted that Britain could win a protracted war.

Keeping that in mind, if Germany had done nothing differently in 1940 other than bagging the BEF (which it almost certainly could have done), there would have been a ready and willing audience within Britain that would be anxious to hear about options for peace with Germany. If Germany had outlined terms such as these, I think Britain would have had almost no choice but to accept:

1. A pledge of no interference with any of Britain's internal and external affairs, including all territory within its control.

2. A speedy return of all captured British service personnel currently within German hands.

3. Pledges that Germany's navy would not be expanded in any significant way.

4. Preferential trade agreements with Germany and all territory under its control.

5. Demilitarized English Channel.

6. Pledges of establishing new autonomous governments in the territories that it captured as a result of invasion.

7. Willingness to apply pressure on Italy to not interfere with British interests in the Med Theater and Africa. Remember, Greece was still "in play" and the threat against Egypt was huge.

8. Ask almost nothing of Britain other than a peace treaty.

And probably a bunch of other minor things to sweeten the pie. Some of these things I listed would be for domestic consumption, some would be to buy support from enough of the government to sign off on the deal. In all cases the tone would allow Britain to save face and to not give up anything while actually protecting what it already had.

Germany, in turn, would lose nothing by all of this since it actually never had any interests in messing around with Britain's non-continental interests. Places like Greece and Yugoslavia could very easily been left in the British sphere without causing problems for Germany's other intentions. Remember, in fact, that Germany unwillingly invaded Yugoslavia and Greece. Had those areas not been a threat to Nazi ideas for the East, Germany would have very much liked NOT to have invaded and occupied those two countries.

Anyway, my point here is that it wouldn't have taken very much skill to get Britain to sign a face saving peace deal immediately following the fall of France.

JonS,

I read somewhere - Tooze? - that the invasion of Russia was conducted as a preliminary to an invasion of the UK and war with the US. From memory, the thinking seems to have been something along the lines of:

I don't know about those specific claims made, but the general thinking is that Germany did not see its own aims as being in conflict with Britain. In fact, there is a pretty good amount of evidence to suggest that Hitler thought favorably of Britain's continued existence as an Empire. On the other hand, Hitler wanted the East and that's where he wanted to concentrate. So if war could be avoided with Britain, then that is what Hitler wanted. But boy, oh boy, did he not know how to get what he wanted out of the Brits!!

Militarily, the thinking was rather simple and pretty straight forward. Britain would take a major effort to invade and occupy (similar to my previous argument), which would necessarily detract from any moves to the East. Conversely, the British were years away from being a significant threat to Germany's position on the continent. Even assuming an immediate entry of the US into the war. Longer still if the US remained mostly neutral.

Therefore, considering a sort of enforced multi-year stalemate along the English channel, a quick campaign in the East against the Soviet Union would allow the Germans to take care of business and then pressure Britain into signing a peace deal. Because really... who here thinks the British would have even attempted to invade the continent if Germany won against the Soviet Union in 1941 or 1942? They would have been fools to, and if the British are one thing (besides bad cooks ) it is very pragmatic.

Cambronne; you clearly aren't paying attention to what's going on. Either shush up and pay attention, or go fiddle with your Wii some more.

Please remember to play nice, eh? You may not agree with Cambronne's opinion (I know I don't ), but he does have the right to express it.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Cambronne,

C'mon do you really think that the British battleships could have faced the endless air raids of the Luftwaffe???!

While I completely disagree that the Germans had any chance, at all, of invading Britain for years... I do agree with you that if the Germans had decided to make life miserable for the Royal Navy they very well could have. The survival of the Royal Navy had as much to do with Hitler's incompetence as a senior military leader as it did the fighting qualities of the British forces. Or put another way, if one changed the competency equation on the German side of the balance sheet, and changed nothing else, the British would have been effectively neutralized as a short term military threat. The evidence? Even with the gross incompetency of Hitler the British almost lost the war in the Atlantic even WITH active aid from the US. It shouldn't take too much creative thinking that in 1940, without US aid in the picture yet, the Germans could have knocked Britain's navy out of effective control of the seas.

But the Germans still would have had ZERO chance of a successful invasion

Steve

[Elmar Bijlsma]

Cambronne,

in all your post the Axis are the actors and the Brits hapless victims.

Do you have even the faintest idea how strained the Germans would be to put up a fig leaf of naval and aerial protection?

They'd have to protect both their flanks with naval forces. This would stretch the Kriegsmarine rather thinly. A Kriegsmarine that, I remind you once again, could probably be overpowered by the Channel Flotillas alone. In the event of the Italians participating (never happen, it's a straight goodbye to their African adventures) they'd still be at a massive disadvantage.

The strain on the Lufwaffe would be even greater. Duties for their invasion day:

Provide aircover over the fleet and beaches, aircover over the Kriegsmarine, suppression of defenders and coastal airfields and finally also bombing raids on British naval forces.

Compare that to the duties for the RAF: Aircover for whatever fleet(s) they send out, provided they even do so during the day. And mass bombing raids on whatever target Bomber Command picks and escorts for that, again only if they decide to strike during the day.

And the Brits can pick and choose where to strike whereas the Germans are obliged to cover all the bases.

You keep mentioning various sinkings but fail to register some vital differences. No aircover for the vessels, no nearby port to run to for shelter and AA ammo. And in both cases they were attacked by some of the best anti shipping strike forces of the war. Again, don't let perceived German überness get in the way of acknowledging that the Luftwaffe wasn't that great at it, as witnessed by their dismal showing attacking freighters and DDs in British coastal waters.

And all the aforementioned unfavourable conditions for the Germans apply to the daytime. At night, the Brits would be complete masters of the channel. The RN would be more challenged by sinking a sack of puppies.

Is it impossible that the Germans could've pulled it off? No. But near enough to impossible as not to matter.

[Wrath of Dagon]

Had the Germans not mysteriously tarried at Dunkirk and destroyed the BEF instead, Churchill would've been finished and the rest of the British government would've made peace with Germany. One of those moments when history could've been changed forever.

[Michael Emrys]

Keeping that in mind, if Germany had done nothing differently in 1940 other than bagging the BEF (which it almost certainly could have done), there would have been a ready and willing audience within Britain that would be anxious to hear about options for peace with Germany.

Of course there was. The question is whether it could have carried the day. That's somewhat of an imponderable, but I think there is ample reason to entertain grave doubts. One clue is the massive and enthusiastic support Churchill received in Parliament with the situation as serious as it was. I can't believe that all of that sentiment would have evaporated with the loss of the BEF, as bad as that would have been.

If Germany had outlined terms such as these, I think Britain would have had almost no choice but to accept:

1. A pledge of no interference with any of Britain's internal and external affairs, including all territory within its control.

2. A speedy return of all captured British service personnel currently within German hands.

3. Pledges that Germany's navy would not be expanded in any significant way.

4. Preferential trade agreements with Germany and all territory under its control.

5. Demilitarized English Channel.

6. Pledges of establishing new autonomous governments in the territories that it captured as a result of invasion.

7. Willingness to apply pressure on Italy to not interfere with British interests in the Med Theater and Africa. Remember, Greece was still "in play" and the threat against Egypt was huge.

8. Ask almost nothing of Britain other than a peace treaty.

And probably a bunch of other minor things to sweeten the pie. Some of these things I listed would be for domestic consumption, some would be to buy support from enough of the government to sign off on the deal. In all cases the tone would allow Britain to save face and to not give up anything while actually protecting what it already had.

Thank you, I believe that you just made my case for me.

I can't imagine that Hitler or anyone in the High Command or the upper levels of the Nazi Party could have conceivably had the foresight to play such a shrewd and subtle hand. By this stage, the iron fist had come out of the velvet glove, and it was not to go back in. Even Chamberlain had realized by the spring of 1939 that Hitler's word was not to be trusted and Hitler knew it.

Michael

[Cambronne]

You keep mentioning various sinkings but fail to register some vital differences. No aircover for the vessels, no nearby port to run to for shelter and AA ammo

the case was of german air supremacy wasn't it?somebody posted here that even witn NO RAF in the air the landing would have been a sure failure.

As about no AA ammo,Yamato just got full at her leaving for Okinawa and there is no clue as far as I know thar her smaller companions were short of AA ammo.At Midway there are records about strong defensive AA so I doubt they were short of ammo too.I don't know about the ammo suply of the Force Z,but from my knowing Repulse was upgraded to an AA cruiser so it should have more AA ammo than a regular ship.

The nearby ports to shelter the ships,I assume you are talking about the asylum and repair ports to run to after the ship is severely damaged.In that case there would be no difference,since the attacker's goal would be either to sink the ship,the ideal variant(for them of course) or to take it out of action for the rest of the campaign.So a crippled ship somewere in a port under repair for months is as good as a sunk one from the attacker point of view.

[Knaust1]

Until now you all forgot that the key factor to Allied final victory was Italy.

If Hitler wasn't distracted form the Balkan campaign because of Italian disasters in Greece, Barbarossa would have started in May, as planned, so it would have been very possible a Nazi victory in Russia.

And with USSR out of war the Allied invasion in France would have been very dubious.

The invasion of England is secondary to the Nazi strategy.

[Mikko H.]

Until now you all forgot that the key factor to Allied final victory was Italy.

If Hitler wasn't distracted form the Balkan campaign because of Italian disasters in Greece, Barbarossa would have started in May, as planned, so it would have been very possible a Nazi victory in Russia.

In fact the Barbarossa would have started in June, Balkans or no Balkans. Both the supply situation and weather conspired to that effect.

BTW, reading Tooze's Wages of Destruction and Frieser's The Blitzkrieg Legend were real eye-openers for me. Apparently, the German economy was facing collapse in early 1940, and only the astonishingly successful invasion of France and the Low Countries saved it. And the success of the Westfeldzug in May 1940 was a close-run thing indeed. I'm tempted to say that if we could rerun history from a given point, the German invasion would fail nine times out of ten and result in the collapse of Germany in 6–12 months.

And in mere weeks Germany came from almost losing the war to almost winning it. It appears that in late May 1940 the British cabinet has a series of tense meetings about the possibility of continuing the war despite the disaster in the Continent (my source here is Roy Jenkins's biography of Churchill), and the news of the successful evacuation of the BEF from Dunkirk was what finally carried the day for Churchill. Had the Wehrmacht bagged the BEF in Dunkirk, it's conceivable that Churchill's cabinet had fallen and replaced by one willing to see what kind of terms Hitler would offer.

Yeah, lots of 'if', 'apparently' etc in this posting. But it's inevitable in a speculative excercise like this.

[Battlefront.com]

Michael Emrys,

Of course there was. The question is whether it could have carried the day. That's somewhat of an imponderable, but I think there is ample reason to entertain grave doubts. One clue is the massive and enthusiastic support Churchill received in Parliament with the situation as serious as it was. I can't believe that all of that sentiment would have evaporated with the loss of the BEF, as bad as that would have been.

I tend to agree with Wrath of Dragon that it would have been a "game changer" if the BEF got eliminated. The "Miracle of Dunkirk" gave the Brits a MASSIVE morale boost at a time when it needed a massive morale boost. If the Germans had instead bagged almost all of the BEF, I am certain that on top of everything else it would have been too much for too many Britons to accept of its current political leadership.

Mind you, I said that the British public would be open to suggestions of peace, not that it would capitulate. If the peace offer were ridiculously one sided, they would have likely stuck it out. But if the offer was fair and face saving, a rather large segment of the British population and government would have gone for "one in the hand instead of two in the bush". I'm absolutely convinced of that. And if the Germans had sunk a few more of Britain's big surface vessels, I'm sure it would push them over the edge and accept even less favorable terms.

Remember, at the time the British government was very concerned about losing an Empire which it took 200 years to build up. You should not underestimate how important this was to the British willingness to risk everything. Empire threatened... risk it all. Empire not threatened... try not to risk it all.

I can't imagine that Hitler or anyone in the High Command or the upper levels of the Nazi Party could have conceivably had the foresight to play such a shrewd and subtle hand. By this stage, the iron fist had come out of the velvet glove, and it was not to go back in. Even Chamberlain had realized by the spring of 1939 that Hitler's word was not to be trusted and Hitler knew it.

Ah, but you are forgetting we are talking about "what ifs". When talking about "what ifs" you absolutely have to talk about plausible alterations of fact. Inventing an invasion fleet that would give Germany the capacity for an amphibious assault in 1940 or 1941, based on the reality of 1940, goes way outside of the bounds of "what ifs" in my opinion. Having Hitler making a different decision, no matter how unlikely, is definitely within the bounds of a "what if".

I stand by my "what if" because it is within the bounds of reason that Hitler COULD have stipulated a shift in attitude towards Britain and Germany could DEFINITELY have made a proposal as I outlined and not run afoul of other national intentions (such as turning East). The only thing that would have been needed is Hitler turning on one tiny bit of logic:

-> can't turn east with Britain undefeated, but to defeat Britain means not going east

Hitler had shown the capacity for some pretty shrewd and/or practical (even brilliant) decisions up until this point. For example, the idea of a radical panzer thrust through the Ardennes. Therefore it is possible to think that if someone got Hitler's ear that Hitler trusted enough, and that someone said "we can go east without worries if we just let the Brits save face" it is definitely possible, even considering all of Hitler's other faults, that he would have pushed such a policy into practice.

The truth is that there were many, and I mean many, in higher circles that believed that Britain had to be out of the war completely before turning east. None of them took seriously the notion of invading the islands, so it was either knocking out its will to fight or making peace. Unfortunately for the Third Reich, they made the wrong decision. But all of the elements were in place for things to have gone the other way. The fact that they didn't is why we're talking about this at all

Again, compare this to the notion of an invasion of Britain in 1940 or 1941 THEN a move east. You'd have to wear out the keyboard's I and F keys typing "if" to get me to go along with that notion

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Mikko H.

And in mere weeks Germany came from almost losing the war to almost winning it. It appears that in late May 1940 the British cabinet has a series of tense meetings about the possibility of continuing the war despite the disaster in the Continent (my source here is Roy Jenkins's biography of Churchill), and the news of the successful evacuation of the BEF from Dunkirk was what finally carried the day for Churchill. Had the Wehrmacht bagged the BEF in Dunkirk, it's conceivable that Churchill's cabinet had fallen and replaced by one willing to see what kind of terms Hitler would offer.

Exactly. It's one of the "problems" of a democratic government... lose the confidence of the people and you lose your jobs. Confidence in Churchill, at that particular moment, was fragile to say the least. If the BEF did not return home I very sincerely believe that Chuchill's government would have fallen. The replacement for Churchill would likely have been someone very open to the possibility of peace. And if Chuchill's government survived, I think it would be so politically weak that Britain would have been better off if it had fallen. IMHO nothing is worse than a parliamentarian system where there is near parity of power.

Steve

[Ziploc]

Whilst I tend to consider the planning of Operation Sealion as an attempt primarily to enforce a political settlement of the conflict with Great Britiain would this have led to a sustained long term peace in the west? Even with the BEF "bagged" at Dunkirk would either party have been willing to perpetually honour it's agreement? Certainly Hitler had a ready willingness to abandon treaties when they conflicted with his intentions. As such would the British political landscape have been able to accept peace with such a regime? Rather would it not have provided a period for the British to re-build their position through an agreement they never truly intended to honour?

[Gromit]

Mikko H.

Exactly. It's one of the "problems" of a democratic government... lose the confidence of the people and you lose your jobs. Confidence in Churchill, at that particular moment, was fragile to say the least. If the BEF did not return home I very sincerely believe that Chuchill's government would have fallen. The replacement for Churchill would likely have been someone very open to the possibility of peace. And if Chuchill's government survived, I think it would be so politically weak that Britain would have been better off if it had fallen. IMHO nothing is worse than a parliamentarian system where there is near parity of power.

Steve

Nice discussion guys. I don't think it takes all that much conjecture or what-if'ing to realize what Steve is driving at here. Had decisions been made to pursue the British at Dunkirk the way the German generals had wanted, with the BEF in the bag, who is to say that invasion was even necessary at that point?

Defeating the RAF would have required a more strategic gameplan for sure; maybe something beyond Goering and his cronies. But flattening all the 11 Group radar sites and airfields as a prelude to hitting the southern factories that made fighters might have given the Germans enough time to make a serious effort to strangle England's supply lines through the air as well as on the sea via U-boats.

Given the dicey political situation, I could see where enough "bad news" piling up day after day in 1940 may have broken the Brits will to fight to the death.

1. Mass surrender of the BEF.

2. Defeat of the majority of Fighter Command and loss of pilots.

3. Increased sinkings of convoys in summer of 1940.

Obviously there are challenges to overcome for the Germans too. Loss of pilots being a major one as you don't intend on occupying southern England. Another would be modifying the Luftwaffe from essentially a Army support short-range tactical force to a more well-rounded one. I think the pieces were there to some extent. The Germans knew they had a winner with the JU-88 design. It worked well in many roles and could have been modified earlier to provide longer range alternatives. As far as fighters... that's a tougher nut. The Fw190 was a year away historically; if decisions had been made to concentrate on refining its radial engine a bit earlier, who knows? Building more Fw200 Condors and working on resolving its superstructure issues would provide yet another increase in long range air attacks on the supply convoys.

I don't believe it to be all that far fetched that things could have turned out VERY differently, given the political situation.

I guess that's why I like playing games like Hearts of Iron 3 so much!

[Dietrich]

Boy, there sure is a lot of discussion about the recently-released module for the game that this part of the forum is about. Which makes sense, what with how people were so insistently pining for it. If it weren't for the latest incarnation of the Peng challenge thread, this and the other thread about CM:N would be the only ones getting more than a minimum of attention. Now I can see why BFC has delayed in setting up a CMx2/WW2 subforum. And to top it all off, the discussion is this particular thread only indirectly pertains to Normandy!

Seriously, though, the Germans, as far as winning (in any sense of the world) the Second World War, were doomed from the get-go, insofar as Hitler's ambitions outstripped the German war-machine's capability and his willingness to view himself as the ultimate authority on war-waging led to decisions which hobbled the Wehrmacht more and more.

Just my two bits (two cents adjusted for inflation ).

[Battlefront.com]

Yes, just remember the series of things which could have gone the other way if Hitler had simply woke up on the other side of the bed that morning:

1. Not moving into the Rhineland.

2. Signing a non-aggression pact with Stalin.

3. Doing a frontal attack on France instead of going through the Ardennes.

None of these things were recommended by the High Command, yet all of them worked very much in favor of the Third Reich. Imagine how different things would have turned out if Hitler followed the High Command in these instances! Then imagine how things might have turned out if he had followed their advice in others:

1. Crushing the BEF when it was vulnerable.

2. Establishing a heavy bomber program.

3. Not invading the Soviet Union in 1941, or at all!

4. Withdrawing from North Africa instead of reinforcing it in 1943.

5. Any one of a hundred blunders on the Eastern Front, but especially towards the end (withdrawing Army Group North in 1944 after Bagration, for example).

6. Any one of a hundred blunders with the Kreigsmarine.

So again, I'm limiting my "what ifs" to circumstances which could have gone either way solely based on the whims of Hitler. In this case, if Hitler wanted to force Britain into a peace treaty, I think he could have. But he was arrogant, short sighted, over confident, and above all obsessed with the East. Which is why he made so many of the wrong decisions. I just want to point out that earlier on he often made some really, really good decisions. Getting Britain out of the war could have been one of those IMHO.

Steve

[MikeyD]

There's an entire subgenre of historical studies out there called "counterfactual history". It works very much like wargaming, but with entire societies. But you can only play 'what if' so many layers down before your alternate history becomes very fuzzy. - 'What if' Hitler's mom had had a headache on the night Hitler was to have been conceived? That headache may have spared forty million people gruesome deaths. But would that fortuitous headache have then caused Europe's population to explode to a crowded billion+ instead of the current 700 million (including Russia)? That's the idea behind the over-used metaphor of the 'butterfly effect', that the action of a butterfly flapping its wings can lead to a cascade of events that eventually results in an Atlantic hurricane.

[Michael Emrys]

...the action of a butterfly flapping its wings can lead to a cascade of events that eventually results in an Atlantic hurricane.

Conceptually possible. However, in the real world there are a lot of butterflies flapping their wings, and who's to say that they don't cancel each other out, at least as far as the generation of hurricanes is concerned?

Michael

[JonS]

There's an entire subgenre of historical studies out there called "counterfactual history".

Hari Seldon FTW!

[MikeyD]

...a lot of butterflies flapping their wings, and who's to say...

I think that's the whole point, who's to say?

William Randolph Hearst, to sell more newspapers, was the primary instigator behind the Spanish American war - which may have then fueled Japanese extra-territorial ambitions. So there's a direct chain of events starting at Hearst to the Bataan death march 45 years later, and on to Hiroshima, followed by the Cold War.You change one small thing and maybe that changes everything for a long time to come.

[GSX]

C'mon do you really think that the British battleships could have faced the endless air raids of the Luftwaffe???! And survive enough of them and in a state good enough to deal with Bismark,Cavour and Cesare. Admiral Tom Phillips may have had the same thought when he left Singapore in December'41.A ww2 battleship is easy mark for an air attack for God's sake! If 10 Battleships are getting crowded into the Channel this is the heaven for dive bomber pilots.They would be at the bottom of the sea in the first day. No matter how passionate you may be of the Royal Navy,if the Axis had air supremacy,their chances to get the invasion fleet to the British coast were good enough to worth a try.

I have to repeat myself,with no air cover Akagy, Kaga and Soryu were out of action in 5 minutes,PoW and Repulse in 1 hour,the monsters Musashi and Yamato in a few hours.Why would I believe that the other big ships of the British Fleet would have more luck?

Sadly, you seem to be one of those posters who just dont read what is written and continue to bang on with your own theory rather than listening to or reading competing reasons.

Firstly then, the Germans in 1940 just didnt have the ability of the Japanese or US in 1941/42, heck they didnt even have the capability of the RN in 1940.

So all those Nazi Stukas etc werent equipped with an armour piercing bomb, which would have been quite essential against a Battleship. (Prince of Wales etc were suink by torpedo, which again in 1940, the Germans didnt have, or didnt have in numbers).

Then onto the Bismark, what makes you think it would have made a difference? It didnt against RN ships later on as it was sunk, one battleship against maybe 12 wont last long.

Then you seem convinced that all the Germans have to do is land and the war is over. They need re-supplied with everything and they need to be in enough numbers to fight. This means no Panzers and so its German infantry short on supplies Vs UK infantry and armour, supplied and fighting on the defensive in their own country.

I find you re-stated argument totally invalid and backed by absolutely no proof of the capability that you are attributing to a non maritime powers ability to project their forces over a body of water succesfully against determined and more experienced opposition (thats Naval experience Im talking about).

Convince me of your case and I will buy you a lolly.

[patboy]

Another tiger pic!!!

enjoy!!!