Syrian Tactics: The Mobile Defence

[Michael Dorosh]

Here is part of a good article I just found on another well-known game that does exactly what CM:SF seeks to do - simulate combat at the company level by giving control of individual squads and vehicles. I thought it might be of interest here:

What is the mobile defense? It is the defender's influencing, by fire, the attacker's lanes of advance from a series of defensive positions. As the locally superior attacker gains the ability to dominate a position, the defender retreats to the next covered rearward position that has good fire lanes. "Covered", in this case, means that the attacker doesn't already have the ability to lay significant fire on the position. The rearward move forces the attacker to advance through fire as he attempts to again displace the defender. The process is repeated until the attacker is rendered ineffective due to the losses sustained in repeated advances under fire.

When should the mobile defence be used? It is best used by a numerically inferior defender who has reasonable a) leadership, mobility, and c) time and space.

How is a mobile defense conducted? The defender picks a series of forward sites. Each site should have lateral fire lanes that protect other defended sites. Further, each site should not be open to fire from its immediate front. Lastly, each site should have a protected route out to another site, similar to the first, but closer to one's own rear areas.

When the attacker (not "if" he does) gains the ability to dominate the defender site, the defender retreats and starts the process all over.

The description is so cumbersome that it makes the concept difficult to grasp.

**Jon Mishcon, The General, Vol. 21 No. 6

I haven't read much about the conventional phase of either of the Gulf Wars but perhaps some of you have. Was the Iraqi Army schooled in this kind of defence? Is it even applicable against a heavily armed US opponent? Is it best employed in urban terrain as opposed to rural? Would it be something taught in a military academy/junior officer course, or something that would be developed within units as OJT?

I'm thinking from the perspective of an Arab army.

I gather it is one of many types of small unit actions the US Army would practice, if not in this precise form, then in some form, with training in defensive operations being a standard part of syllabus.

I thought maybe we could generate some general game-play discussion with real world examples as applicable.

I also think "mobile" may be a bit misleading since your infantry is generally doing all this on foot while in contact with the enemy, if I'm gathering this correctly.

But - I also gather the Syrians are heavily influenced by Soviet doctrine, and I'm not all that well read on Soviet defensive tactics. When I joined the Army, we were far more worried about their offensive tactics...

[DASman]

Sorry Michael, I was out of line with that big time.

E

[ June 24, 2007, 05:17 AM: Message edited by: DASman ]

[General_solomon]

das did you have a stroke??

[MikeyD]

In my (untutored) opinion Syrian army would be screwed the opening phase of hostilities no matter what he does. Static defense he'll be bypassed and reduced, Mobile defense American air assets would catch him in transit and chew him up. Especially in open country like Eastern Syria. But if he elects to give up the interior entirely and concentrates 100% on the heavily populated western edge of the country a 'mobile' defense might be very troublesome. U.S. would have to discriminate between deploying military and fleeing civilians - no easy task, something Israel pretty much abandoned trying to do during last year's war.

Using Iraq as an example is problematic. To my eyes it seemed most of his regular army was completely outclassed, but his highly mobile and fanatical irregulars gave us fits. It could be just the opposite in Syria - irregulars running around like keystone cops while the regular army is the tough nut to crack.

DASman, this is a serious tactical military sim. and as such serious military tactics are sometimes discussed. give it a chance, it could be more enlightening for you than reading criticism of how leaves move in the trees in-game.

[Capt. Toleran]

Yeah DAS, not cool, have some respect. A lot of us here appreciate military theory. If you don't care for it, maybe this isn't the game for you.

[Michael Dorosh]

Good points, MikeyD. Not to downplay the need for a good tree discussion.

I was thinking more at the tactical level, where we'll see CM:SF acted out, than at an operational level, though. I think the game is predicated - like any tactical game - on depicting the unusual situations where parity is achieved. That doesn't mean numbers either, as you know. The Syrian is likely to be outgunned in a lot of cases - dependent on the scenario designer of course - and the fallback defence will, I think, be a useful tool in his arsenal. I'm just wondering if it is something a real world commander would be adept at.

For that matter, training for the "good guys" seems to be based on 3-block war and COIN and all that good stuff that I honestly don't know if even the good can pull it out of the playbook when needed? Maybe some of the serving soldiers can speak to it?

I liked Sean Connery's description of the Arnhem evacuation in A Bridge Too Far; it's the only cinematic depiction that comes to mind, and that was only the briefing and I'm not sure it qualifies.

[MikeyD]

Your 'mobile defense' rather sounds like 'layered defense'. Instead of breaking an opponent's hard outer shell with the metaphorical combined arms hammer you swing and find you're hitting a deep sticky vat of jelly. I'm remined of an old North Vietnamese Army comment on fighting the U.S. Army. They said opposing the U.S. was like fighting a lumbering elephant. He can be heard coming from a long way off, he's easily outmaneuvered and harrassed, but if he ever manages to catch you you're screwed!

Your layered/mobile defense would be good to try in-game head-to-head against a human opponent. None of the previous CM games have been particularly famous for the AI disengaging and pulling back to fallback positions.

[Wisbech_lad]

It is best used by a numerically inferior defender who has reasonable a) leadership, mobility, and c) time and space.

I would guess that CMSF the Syrians will mostly be numerically superior, less mobile than the US forces.

In CMI terms, you probably need troops of vet or better quality, to be able to break contact without getting pinned.

I think mobile defense will suit better the US forces in CMSF

[Londoner]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I was thinking more at the tactical level, where we'll see CM:SF acted out, than at an operational level

To me, that article looks like it's talking about the Operational side of things. In fact the whole idea of "mobile defense" is an operational idea no? The tactical phase of "mobile defense" would still be fairly static. Surely retreat, regrouping, reorganisation etc at anything more than the section/platoon level would take place outside the scope of a CM battle.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Londoner:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I was thinking more at the tactical level, where we'll see CM:SF acted out, than at an operational level

To me, that article looks like it's talking about the Operational side of things. In fact the whole idea of "mobile defense" is an operational idea no? The tactical phase of "mobile defense" would still be fairly static. Surely retreat, regrouping, reorganisation etc at anything more than the section/platoon level would take place outside the scope of a CM battle. </font>

[Sgt Joch]

"Arabs at War" is the only book on the subject.

Arab armies are not good at mobile warfare. The biggest reason is the centralized top down leadership. Junior officers show little initiative and wait for orders. They are at their best when they follow detailed, carefully rehearsed plans, like the crossing of the Suez canal in '73.

The only or most successful mobile operations were those waged by the Iraqi army against Iran in 1988. The Iraqi generals designed operations that minimize their weaknesses. They first formed elite units with the best officers and men. They then designed limited operations lasting no more than 48 hours so every part could be carefully choreographed and everyone would have detailed orders to follow. Against Iran, it work like a charm. 5 operations lead to 5 overwhelming victory, which lead Iran to accept peace.

The Iraqis did try mobile defence against the Iranians but it was a blunt approach. Iraqi units did not maneuver and only did frontal asaults. So generals would try to position units on the flank of any perceived Iranian attack so the inevitable Iraqi frontal assault would go in on the flank of the Iranian attack. Of course, that only worked if the units were prepositioned before the attack.

They were hoping to use a similar approach against the allied forces in 1991, but of course, they were overwhelmed by events.

The strength of arab armies is supply and engineering, so they will build up good static defences.

In the Syrian case, mobile defence would be next to impossible, their armored units would be wiped out from the air before they even got close and the survivors would be cleaned up by tanks and ATGM's. Their best strategy would be to use their special forces/commando units to setup ambushes in key positions and inflict maximum casualties on the attacker.

[Michael Dorosh]

Let's try this.

Your company (+) of Syrian infantry with attached anti-tank and engineer assets has been ordered to set up a blocking position. Your regiment is retreating west in the face of a US Stryker brigade. North is to the top.

The terrain you're told to defend is suited for the defence. To north and south are steep hills, unsuited for vehicles, but bare and rocky, devoid of cover and too hard for digging.

The main road is surfaced and the Americans will want to use it as a Main Service Route. A narrow defile through the hills is offset with an agricultural complex. Fields of crops are separated by low earthen embankments topped by rows of trees. Similar to the bocage in Normandy, the embankments are not an impediment to vehicle movement, but are high enough to block line of sight from one field to the next.

(See 34 29'58.05"N x 38 10'19.18"E) for a suggestion of something similar.

You have the advantage in that the enemy has shown a reluctance to cause collateral damage to civilian infrastructure. The buildings in this area and irrigation conduits are crucial to the local economy and the enemy will likely restrict his use of heavy ordnance, artillery or airpower. When he attacks, it will be with infantry and light armoured vehicles.

How do you defend? What plan will cause the maximum amount of delay and loss to the enemy?

The Goal Line Stand

Hit the enemy hard at short range as he comes up; everything goes on the line. Dig trenches along the front and shift positions laterally to confuse the enemy as to your true strength.

Head for the Hills

Head for the high ground; the enemy can't operate from the safety of his vehicles; make him come to you up in the hills; mine the road to stop his convoy and execute ambushes each time he attempts to move past. Long range anti-tank weapons go up high, machine guns down lower to sweep the road.

Fallback Defence

As described above. Long range anti-tank weapons are sited on the main road to stop any flanking movements into the fields. As he builds up men and firepower to deal with line of defences, fall back to the next field. Use trenches or natural cover to move from embankment to embankment. Trade space for time. Counter-attack if the enemy sticks a squad or platoon out too far.

Point Defence

Defend the outbuildings to the last man; turn each concrete building into its own fortress and fight to the last. Make the enemy split up to deal with you one by one.

Other?

Each plan has obvious disadvantages. What are they?

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[Karelian]

In my opinion the only way the Syrians could even hope to use some kind of a mobile defense is by limiting it to tactical level and by making good preparations beforehand.

The forested hill regions of western Syria are the only part of the country where the terrain provides at least some consealment and is thus the area where such fighting methods could be most succesfully used.

Here the Syrians could extensively use mines to slow down the movement of enemy forces, preventing them from either quickly bypassing or encircling the difficult terrain where the defender has chosen to fight. By building a series of tunnels and underground strongpoints à la Hezbollah the defender could easily fight in a large area with a number of small, dispersed units that would also have extensive network of hidden ammo and supply depots avainable.

This way they could carry on their operations even when surrounded without immediately running out of water, ammo and food. Armed with shoulder-fired SAMs and especially with the best AT-weapons avainable they would be able to cause casualties to any US force by a quick ambush and then disengage from their fortified positions while the minefields and their limited AA-capability would make it more harder for the US forces to maintain contact and inflict casualties.

Now, these elusive detachments of more professional Syrian troops (commandos, paras) would fight on in this difficult terrain, away from the direct routes to strategically important areas but within their vicinity, so that they would still pose a threat to the US supply lines by conducting ambushes and mortar strikes. If the US would then choose to drive these harassing forces away from the hills, they would be forced to either send in small recon elements to spot targets for their air power and arty or enter to this region with brute force. In either way significant forces would have to be tied down to this operation so that the defenders would not have chances to slip away.

When the US forces would act against this kind of a defense, the first option (sending in spotters to mark targets for air and arty) is more likely, but with at least some form of night-vision equipment and longer-range sniper rifles the Syrian defenders could well inflict casualties to these US recon elements as well. Surely this kind of hitting and running within this limited battlefield could not go on forever, but it would still be much more effective than building such defenses next to the main roads so that the attacker could easily and quickly spot and destroy them with superiour firepower.

And naturally such tactics would only work in terrain that provides plenty of concealment and is less usable by heavier vehicles, in the open steppes of Eastern Syria the defenders would do well by abanoning all attempts to hold this region alltogether.

[ChrisND]

A mobile defense at the tactical level with a Syrian dismount team would require an urban setting, or if in the countryside very good covered and concealed routes of exit and the Amis couldn't be mobile. Otherwise, the attacker would flank and cut them down while enroute to the next defensive position. Even in urban this is a significant risk, ie streets.

Requires good knowledge of the terrain, mobility preferred (or your opponent lacks it), and very good small unit discipline and leadership.

The risk of disaster in a mobile defense is very high. All it takes is one attacking unit in the right spot to pin the defender down and then it's over.

[MikeyD]

"...the only way the Syrians could even hope to use some kind of a mobile defense is by limiting it to tactical level and by making good preparations beforehand."

I like that concept. Sorta like a static implimentation of a mobile battle. The 'mobility' part would be highly choreographed making best use of the Syrian army's penchant for following orders. If the U.S. stumbles on the defense unawares the've got trouble, if they're aware of the choreographed defense beforehand they can systematically dismantle it.

[Tony_Hill]

I think for a tactical game like CMSF, such a debate isn't too relevant to this operational and strategic talk being put forward - the CMSF designer will always seek to put you in a position of parity, or at least an "interesting" situation where one side does not automatically have the right to a win.

On the operational and, more importantly, strategic level you are hemmed by the fact that no matter which way you shake it, the Syrians lose. So it's a lot of "IF value X is true, and IF value Y is not in play, THEN..." If my auntie had a robotic aircraft carrier then she could do a lot of damage to somebody.

However it's an interesting debate... I think that Karelian has it on the head - Hezbollah style tactics, on the ground that could work, is what the Syrians could best do for this sort of mobile, sticky defence. Anything else and you've got a lot of variables to play with - for example, concealment to get to your next position. All well and good, until somebody throws up a few UAVs and starts, say, laying fire onto your expected exit routes.

The Syrians could cause trouble, but then it's more of a political matter as to whether they'd win - Hezbollah, and say the VC, are good examples of mobile defence, but then you could say that the real reason they didn't lose was political... obviously all stuff outside of the scope of CMSF.

My .02 cents on mobile defence, Syria and the arab armies... more 0.11 cents, really.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Tony_Hill:

I think for a tactical game like CMSF, such a debate isn't too relevant to this operational and strategic talk being put forward

Which is why I tried to steer the conversation back towards a very specific tactical situation which you ignored in favour of discussing operational concerns...