Karelian

Finland would be a nice addition as well, it's been a while since I've seen T-34s knocked out with pinecones...

Meh, I'd still prefer StuG IIIs, KV-1s and T-34s.

Oh well, as long as the would-be DLC has properly modelled AT pine cones...

Most of the Mannerheim Line could be easily modelled with trenches, barbed wire and few single-line anti-tank obstacles. During the Winter War concrete forts had a tactical impact in two really small areas - Summa sector which was the only one fortified to at least some extent, and in Taipale where two flanking-fire MG bunkers managed to operate undetected nearly to the end of the war. It ain't that surprising considering the fact that the whole line was built with less concrete than the Finlandia House in Helsinki...

Too bad that there won't be any light tanks around - they could spearhead the attack with infantry and recon AT positions for assault guns to knock out.

Considering how fun CMBB was with Finns back in the day, I really hope this game will eventually allow us to recreate all those scenarios and battles

On the actual topic: I prefer to dismount my infantry well before the actual target building if there´s enough cover to that. I then use all avainable firepower for support and overwatch duties and try to aproach the actual target area from a direction that offers maximum protection for dismounted infantry, while at the same time trying to spot targets for my vehicles and fire support to suppress and kill. Once I assume that the foe is adequately pinned down I pop up smoke to cover the infantry even further, and then seek to quickly assault inside the building to finish the foe off. And as for the supposedly too high casualty rates and the latest remark that made comparison to Lebanon: Hezbollah was reportedly an extremely elusive opponent as well, and their forces usually conducted only short ambushes and scirmishes with IDF units and then sought to broke off.

Finnish Army, 12 months of basic training at Pori Brigade, Säkylä in the 1st Jääkäri Company, (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finnish_Rapid_Deployment_Force) Designated wartime position either as a squad leader or as a commander of Sisu XA-185 APC. In the following spring our unit marched through Sweden and continued to northern Norway alongside with a Swedish mechanized company. There this two-company strong detachment participated to Battle Griffin 2005 as the largest non-Nato force precent. During the same year I enlisted to peacekeeping duties in Kosovo, and spent the following year at Suvi Do near Lipljan as regular guardjaeger of the 3rd squad of the 1st Platoon, Alfa-Coy, MNBC, KFOR.

Sergei, I live next to the place in the same municipality, but back in the day in II/03 I volunteered to the FRDF in Pori Brigade, Säkylä. Gonabiitsi kun nyt on mitä on, niin hyvässä kuin pahassakin.

A few ROP-A "Shmels" would always be nice. http://www.janes.com/defence/land_forces/news/jidr/jidr010104_3_n.shtml

The Stryker Brigade is close enough to my wartime training to keep me playing with the US forces, but then again the Syrians are a classic underdog and will definitively become my favourites as well. It´s same as with the previous CM-titles, each side was more than interesting enough to play with.

The second best air force is like the second best hand in poker table, and thus the Syrians should focus on improving their AA-systems instead of investing to their air forces. But then again these kind of major arms deals are always political moves as well, and with the increasingly unstable Iraq and Lebanon next door the Syrians actually have pretty good reasons to gear up (and warm up their relations with Russia), no matter of their actual motives.

And just when I doubted that APILAS would be actually too large and cumbersome to haul around in the battlefield... Those RPG-29 gunners must be swearing like demons when they have to quickly crawl somewhere in a full combat gear, hauling their weapons with them.

In my opinion the only way the Syrians could even hope to use some kind of a mobile defense is by limiting it to tactical level and by making good preparations beforehand. The forested hill regions of western Syria are the only part of the country where the terrain provides at least some consealment and is thus the area where such fighting methods could be most succesfully used. Here the Syrians could extensively use mines to slow down the movement of enemy forces, preventing them from either quickly bypassing or encircling the difficult terrain where the defender has chosen to fight. By building a series of tunnels and underground strongpoints à la Hezbollah the defender could easily fight in a large area with a number of small, dispersed units that would also have extensive network of hidden ammo and supply depots avainable. This way they could carry on their operations even when surrounded without immediately running out of water, ammo and food. Armed with shoulder-fired SAMs and especially with the best AT-weapons avainable they would be able to cause casualties to any US force by a quick ambush and then disengage from their fortified positions while the minefields and their limited AA-capability would make it more harder for the US forces to maintain contact and inflict casualties. Now, these elusive detachments of more professional Syrian troops (commandos, paras) would fight on in this difficult terrain, away from the direct routes to strategically important areas but within their vicinity, so that they would still pose a threat to the US supply lines by conducting ambushes and mortar strikes. If the US would then choose to drive these harassing forces away from the hills, they would be forced to either send in small recon elements to spot targets for their air power and arty or enter to this region with brute force. In either way significant forces would have to be tied down to this operation so that the defenders would not have chances to slip away. When the US forces would act against this kind of a defense, the first option (sending in spotters to mark targets for air and arty) is more likely, but with at least some form of night-vision equipment and longer-range sniper rifles the Syrian defenders could well inflict casualties to these US recon elements as well. Surely this kind of hitting and running within this limited battlefield could not go on forever, but it would still be much more effective than building such defenses next to the main roads so that the attacker could easily and quickly spot and destroy them with superiour firepower. And naturally such tactics would only work in terrain that provides plenty of concealment and is less usable by heavier vehicles, in the open steppes of Eastern Syria the defenders would do well by abanoning all attempts to hold this region alltogether.

Excellent videos, now the only thing that I´d like to see more is infantry movement and fighting within buildings.